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About the book and the Author

Theories of Political Participation and Change

Naser M. Tahboub

This book provides a critical examination of both orthodox and radical theories of political participation and change, and seeks to introduce the student to contrasting points of view. Dr. Naser Tahboub clarifies the major theoretical directions found in the literature of political participation and political change. The main focus of the book is on system theories, culture, and reflects upon voting behavior in advanced industrialized societies.

The book serves as a guide to major theories in comparative politics, discussions, and provides an extensive bibliography.

Naser M. Tahboub is a member of the faculty and Prince Hussein School of International Studies at the University of Jordan. He is the author of *Jordan Under the Hashemites*, *Jordanian Foreign Policy*, and *Alsiyasah Alkharijeyeh AlUrduneyeh*.

Table of contents

	page
Selective overview of comparative political studies	1
Citizen participation in decision-making	8
Educative role of government institutions	8
Performance of political institutions	9
Bourgeois Thesis	17
Social mobility thesis	17
Mass society thesis	17
Community integration thesis	18
Cognitive mobilization thesis	18
Aging party system thesis	19
value change thesis	19
Competing models of comparative political analysis	21
Canada	33
Japan	34
Great Britain	37
Attitudes toward political parties and vote choice	38
Beliefs attitudes and vote choice-- multidimensional study of the U.S.	41
Overview	47
Rational voter model	49
Wasted vote thesis	51
Short-term factors and voting behavior	53
Political alienation mistrust-efficacious hypotheses	57
Alignment theory	62
Generation replacement and value change	70
Concluding notes	92
Bibliography	107

Theories of political participation & change

By

Dr. Naser Tahboub

University of Jordan

Selective Overview of Comparative Political Studies

In the nineteenth century two opposing theories of political processes---pluralist and class analysis –dominated the literary attention of political philosophers.

Where class structure⁽¹⁾ and class conflict were the central guiding principles of Marxist theory, group classification⁽²⁾, and group compromise were the opposing perspective of men such as Weyer, Bentley, Truman and others. Although Truman recognized the class character of some groups, both he and Dahl⁽³⁾ maintained that class is only one among many variables les which explain politics. Thus a major contention has been the emphasis on class: was it central, nonexistent, or only one variable among many in explaining politics?

Western scholars de-emphasized the importance of class analysis and directed their attention toward a pluralist theory of group interaction. The non-Marxist, pluralist perspective conceived of the state as a political marketplace in which competing demands and interests of individuals and groups were

⁽¹⁾The division of society into those who own and control the means of production and those who work for wages.

⁽²⁾A fragmentation of groups such as religion, race, ethnicity and language

⁽³⁾Found in Dahl's earlier works in the 1960s. Dahl in later works, 1976 and 1982, has revised his view on pluralism offering strong criticism of the system performance of plural-ism for its failure in progressing toward greater economic and social equality.

resolved. Several perspectives on the working of pluralism were put forth. One view held that party and group conflict was mediated by neutral state agencies.

A second view held that such agencies were not neutral but were the source of political power and that agency competition for funds determined their relationship to interest groups and parties⁽⁴⁾.

Progressively, the research emphasis of the political science community in the west became formalized, and investigative studies were limited to the structure of the state, and description of state units such as the legislative and executive branches. This practice was successfully challenged by David Easton, who in the 1950's and 1960s, developed a systems theory of politics⁽⁵⁾. Easton believed that focusing on the political system and its processes yielded richer in-sight into the politics and behavior of a national unit than attention to the legal and formal institutions of a state.

Easton's political system incorporated the dynamics of environmental and psychological influences as dimensions of political system variable interactions. Several factors can be identified which contributed to the building of the "politics of

⁽⁴⁾An in-depth look at class issues will be addressed later in this study.

⁽⁵⁾Three important works of David Easton are: *The Political System* (1953); *A Framework for Political Analysis* (1965), and *A System's Analysis of Political Life* (1965).

consensus"⁽⁶⁾ in the west. An era of economic expansion and affluence signaled an end to ideology.

After World War II the United States emerged as the number one superpower in the world. In a deterministic way, it was assumed⁽⁷⁾ that economic development and institution building in other polities, reflecting the American experience, would develop an American style democracy, leading eventually to a universalistic demo-critic system.

The primary focus of political scientists centered on maintaining order and stability. Easton's theory of the political system was the ultimate model at that time⁽⁸⁾, capturing the value preferences and normative priorities of the political elite. General System's theory assumes that societies are mutually interconnected wholes, each part contributing something to the whole. Easton was particularly interested in the persistence and dynamics of the system. He believed that political systems were capable of

⁽⁶⁾See "Political Dissatisfaction and Mass Support for Social Change in Advanced Industrial Society," Ronald Inglehart, Vol. 14, No. 4 Jan. 1982. listed in bibliography.


⁽⁷⁾assumed by American Political Scientists of the Positivist School of thought. Positivists believed that democracy provided the best normative goal for a political system. This is not to say that all political scientists were of the positivist school.

⁽⁸⁾Easton was one among many scholars contributing to general systems theory. It is my opinion that his work is worthy of being singled out for further attention. Almond and Powell in Comparative Politics, contributed to political systems theory with their work on political culture. 1980.

enduring during times of change and surviving conditions of great stress and pressure. A most distinguishing feature of Easton's work is his recognition of equilibrium and disequilibrium in political life. Systems analysis makes it possible to separate political life from the environment for purposes of empirical research.

It will be particularly useful at this point to briefly describe Easton's Political System. In Easton's diagram of a political system:

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The political system is a separate unit of analysis, a black box in which any form of political system can be inserted. Concepts of power, authority, decision-making and policy are central to Easton's vision of political life as the authoritative allocation of values for society. The environment comprises two


data sources: the situation-al and the psychological. Psychological data encompasses the social environment: the personalities, motivations, attitudes, actions and reactions of individuals.

Situation-al data encompasses all the physical, geographical influences of the environment (such as natural resources, topography, and location of a political system). The total environment, divided into infra- and extra- societal environments by Easton in 1965 (including: infra-a-ecological system, biological system, personality systems, social systems; extra--international political systems, international ecological systems, international social systems) serve as inputs into the political system in the form of demands and support. "Demands arise either in the environment or within the system itself. Whether externally or internally stimulated, demands become issues...Supports are actions or orientations prompting and resisting a political system. Outputs emanate from the political system in the form of decisions and policy actions." ⁽⁹⁾ Theoretically, Easton's input/output model provide an all-inclusive framework for political analysis. It must be remembered that a primary purpose for political analysis is to understand political behavior. But, beyond a general systems framework, Easton greatly contributed to an understanding of system support. Easton's model of political support identifies three

⁽⁹⁾Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm*; pgs. 147-148.

categories of support: sources of support, type of support, and object of support.

His work is particularly important because he makes a distinction between diffuse and specific support⁽¹⁰⁾:



Risto Sankiaho offers a useful analysis of Easton's support model, he states that "diffuse support is derived more from socialization experiences, while specific support depends more on policy output evaluations. Furthermore, diffuse support is directed more toward the political community and the regime, while specific support is directed more toward political authorities and policy outputs. Diffuse support is an implicit, unquestioning support, while specific support is tentative and conditional."⁽¹¹⁾ There is an obvious connection between system type and system support.

⁽¹⁰⁾"Political Remobilization in Welfare States," Risto Sankiaho; in *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Societies*.

⁽¹¹⁾*Ibid.*, p. 73

It is assumed that the degree or percentage of diffuse and specific support would vary with the type of political system. There remains in the western world debate over the issues of democracy and the nature of public participation. For example, Michels reported that citizens in lower socio-economic groups had no interest in politics nor in being politically active. Schumpeter, Dahl and others questioned the existence of a democratic character among the general public. According to Sartori "Once a democratic system has been established the democratic ideal must be minimized retaining vertically i.e. the structure of authority and leadership, because populace participation will lead to mediocrity, danger of destroying its own leaders, replacing them by undemocratic counter-elites. The people...must "React" ...to the initiatives and policies of competing elites. They must not act.

Taking the above factors into consideration many scholars called for a revision of classical democratic theory⁽¹²⁾. Schumpeter's interpretation of democracy as method has been accepted by many scholars: "That institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals esquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote⁽¹³⁾.

⁽¹²⁾A reaction against populist theories

⁽¹³⁾Schumpeter

According to Carole Bateman, "Competition for leadership is the distinctive feature of democracy. Consumers choose between the policies and the parties regulate the competition⁽¹⁴⁾." In contrast to democratic theory, as postulated above, is participatory democracy represented by scholars such as Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and G.D.H. Cole. The ideal model type of participatory democracy reflects direct participation rather than a representational system.

The emphasis of participatory democracy appears to be on:

- 1) Citizen participation in decision-making: Whereas Rousseau was against the existence of organized groups prefers individual direct participation, John Stuart Mill advocated a pluralist system of voting based on educational achievements each individual would have a voice but an unequal voice. (As Cole, Mill believed that representative government was necessary in a large or industrial society).
- 2) Educative role of government institutions: Government institutions are assigned an educative role in Promoting the desired character of a participatory citizen.

Cole believed this could be achieved through the socialization process, training, participation and by familiarizing individuals with democratic processes.

⁽¹⁴⁾Carole Peterman, Participation and Democratic Theory; p. 4.

- 3) Performance of political institutions: John Stuart Mill argued that political institutions should be judged according to the degree that they "promote the general mental advancement of the community-advancement in intellect, virtue and practical activity and efficiency "⁽¹⁵⁾.

Whereas Cole and Mill were interested in promoting the enhancement of individual character Roseau had particular interest in the human personality (qualities and attitudes of individuals) and the psychological impact of the interrelationship between personalities and social and political institutions. Not only is socialization a process conducive to building national character, but the interrelationship between government structure and individuals, outside the social community, can have a primary impact.

John Stuart Mill advocated participatory democracy while acknowledging the necessity of representative democracy in a large scale society. His solution subscribed to the rule of the educated minority; voting privilege would be dependent upon educational achievement. G.D.H. Cole found it necessary to balance representative and participatory democracy for the simple reason that organizations which ascribe to goals which are complex may be forced into dividing tasks into manageable

⁽¹⁵⁾Ibid., p. 28.

assignments with appropriate authority, in order to realize final goals.

Democracy is obtained by affording individuals the opportunity to participate in associations which directly concern them. Such associations are primarily those in the workplace. Coles philosophy of groups maintains that individuals be given equalization of status and opportunity. In the setting of the functional association of one's workplace, the worker should be given equal position in the decision-making process, especially since it is an area in which they have information and knowledge, and can make educated and rational judgments. But democracy, on the level of associations, must be distinguished from representative institutional arrangements at the national level. Complexity at the national level, and the necessity for experienced individuals necessitates the selection of representatives who are given specific tasks and authority to pursue organizational objectives, as noted above.

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion of various positions on democracy and public participation that there are a number of preferences as to the mix of participatory and representational democracy. Some models are ideal types with little prospect of institutionalization; others are normative with prescriptive force. All are models which may serve the political

science community but may not accurately describe any political system. What is certain is that discussion on democracy and political participation continues and will be an increasingly important factor in analyzing political behavior.

The "consensus", as mentioned earlier, had several underlying premises. A long-standing principle had been the interrelatedness between economics and the political system. Political protest in industrial societies was associated with economic decline while affluence and economic prosperity was thought to be associated with regime support. Further, it was believed that adoption of democratic institutions and economic expansion in third world countries would result in the institutionalization of democratic politics. Subsequent developments, particularly in the 1960's and 1970's, brought these assumptions under question and resulted in the dissolution of the consensus.

Several developments and incidences in the western world contributed to the dissolution of the consensus. First there was the emergence of totalitarianism in democratic politics (Germany, Japan, Italy and France). Second, consensus politics failed to explain developments in third world countries such as underdevelopment and lack of stability. Third, the emergence of political disorder during the 1960's and 1970's in western industrial

societies were motivated by non-economic issues which strongly suggested that the political process may be independent of economic and social development.

Deane Neubauer constructed an index of democratic performance and found no relationship between the level of democratic performance and measures of socio-economic development. Consequently, political scientists redirected their focus from study of the total system toward study of parts of a political system.

Researchers became concerned with concepts such as change, instability and stability⁽¹⁶⁾. Mark Kesselman is one scholar who arrived at a very interesting thesis addressing disorder in industrial polities.

In recent years the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, France, and Italy have all experienced some significant degree of disorder. It is Kessleman's postulation that "over institutionalization" and political constraint" are in part, sources of political disorder in post-industrial societies. "Over institutionalization" refers to a "clutter" of institutions ...that •••.

⁽¹⁶⁾This group of political scientists has often been refer-red to as Neo-positivists. Their work usually concentrates on aspects of representative democracy, often writing on such aspects as party competition, voting behavior, resource al-location. Micro economic analysis and emphasis on the construction of rational models of behavior characterize this approach toward the field of comparative politics.

are so strong and integrate participation so successfully that change is stifled."⁽¹⁷⁾ " In modern polities disorder does not derive from the inability of political institutions to contain participation.

Rather, it frequently comes from their past success in accommodating challenges, demands, and rising participation--for this very past success may hinder current adaptation"⁽¹⁸⁾ Huntington's analysis of order and political change contributed to Kesslelian's theory of over institutionalization.

Huntington asserted that organizations must develop autonomy "in order for institutionalization to occur. "In order to survive organizations must inculcate loyalty to the organization as a separate value"⁽¹⁹⁾. An organization must develop a life of its own, a self-supporting existence.

But, when this occurs the organization may become deletions save, guarding achievements, and in its rigidity it fails to become adaptable and flexible to future demands for change. As stated by Kesselman "When institutions are better at holding the line than responding to change, political constraint and over institutionalization occur"⁽²⁰⁾ Thus the dangers of under

⁽¹⁷⁾Mark Kesselman, "Over institutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1, July 1971; p. 25.

⁽¹⁸⁾Ibid., p. 25.

⁽¹⁹⁾Ibid., P. 25.

⁽²⁰⁾Ibid, p. 25.

institutionalization and over institutionalization converge when institutions are bypassed and possibly overthrown because they no longer respond to demands or serve the functions for which they were designed. Kessleman held that political constraint would eventually pass on to political decay, the same kind of political decay faced in developing nations whose demands are no longer successfully managed by government institutions.

Directing research toward explaining political change, stability and instability were not the only changes in the political science community when the consensus eroded.²² The scope of inquiry became much narrower, focusing on aspects of representative democracy such as party competition, voting behavior, and resource allocation.⁽²¹⁾ With respect to this study, its primary concern will be to report on the current status of the comparative study of voting behavior in western democracies and Japan.

The structure of the study will be flexible in order to account for the rich variety of conceptual, theoretical approaches and diversity of subject interest.

⁽²¹⁾There was an emphasis on micro—economic analysis and deductive reasoning from the construction of rational models of behavior. The authors Stanley Feldman and Alan Zucherman in "Partisan Attitudes and the Vote: Moving Beyond Party Identification," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, July 1982, offer an alternative approach.

Voting, according to Richard Rose, "is the chief form of mass political behavior in societies with competitive free elections"⁽²²⁾, "The study of voting has been dominated by several major research traditions:

- 1) social class and social structure,
- 2) party identification,
- 3) rational choice, "⁽²³⁾

However, the rise in incidences of political disorder and significant degree of political change in western societies has resulted in a proliferation of partial theories and conceptualizations in explaining these changes. For instance, the emphasis of earlier empirical studies was on the group basis of voting. More recent studies have followed the 'Michigan Model' of voting giving greater attention to social—psychological influences upon voters.

Accordingly, Richard Rose refers to an election as a "multivariate phenomena."⁽²⁴⁾ Rose believes that social characteristics become important when they have an impact on political behavior. Two counterpoising theories are social

⁽²²⁾Richard Rose, "Comparability in Electoral Studies," in *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook* (see bibliography), N.Y., 1974. P. 3

⁽²³⁾See footnote number 23, Feldman and Zucherman article. Vol. 15, No. 2, July 1982

⁽²⁴⁾Richard Rose, "Comparability in Electoral Studies," N.Y., 1974. p. 8.

determinism which holds that social differences structure party loyalties; and voluntarism theories which stress individual perception and motivation in explaining party identification. Some of the multiple factors Rose identifies as having an influence on individual voters are:

- 1) eligibility to vote rules
- 2) turnout considerations
- 3) party actions and political events
- 4) social characteristics (effect of political behavior)
- 5) standing party identification and
- 6) issue predispositions.

In simplistic terms Rose has identified a multiplicity of factors which have an impact upon voters and these variables are subject to further constraints on action if one places greater influence on socio-psychological motivations. These observations are meaningful but need to be conceptualized in theoretical terms and related to the existing variety of theories of political change. Towards this direction Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck in "Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies" address prior research efforts in this area.

Dalton, et. al, describe seven theories which could serve as a "linkage mechanism" accounting for general trends in advanced industrial societies and causal processes of partisan change. Each theory will be briefly described below⁽²⁵⁾.

1) Bourgeois Thesis: represents a "consensual" or middle class model of politics. Political change is based on economic factors. Prosperity produces an overlap in the income and lifestyles of the middle class and the working class. The working class would assume the values of their middle-class lifestyles. Narrowing of class differences would result in a moderation of political conflict⁽²⁶⁾.

2) Social mobility thesis: explains the decline in class voting as a function of social and occupational mobility rather than the homogenizing effects of affluence (decline of agrarian sector, rise in non-manual sector). Urbanization and occupational mobility are blurring traditional class and economic alignments.

3) Mass society thesis: stresses the atomization of society which accompanies advanced industrialism. A traditional political style based on primary networks (family, village, unions) becomes less

⁽²⁵⁾ Authors depiction of theories paraphrased.

⁽²⁶⁾ See Oglesby et. al. 1968, Ladd with Hadley, 1975; Upset, 1981a, Kemp, 1978.

relevant, group ties have eroded; independent voters may be mobilized for a variety of causes⁽²⁷⁾.

4) Community integration thesis: argues that political cues are derived from face to face contacts with family, friends, neighbors and work colleagues. Contextual effects literature assumes that these social networks are structured largely by class, ethnic, religious and other social cleavages Industrial societies produce a decline in community homogeneity and solidarity. The capacity to mobilize votes decreases---in Japan and Sweden networks assume neutral positions. The theory predicts increases in political volatility.

5) Cognitive mobilization thesis: expansion of secondary and higher education, access to greater information provided by the electronic media has raised political resources available and cognitive skills of national pupil legations. Informed voters may dispense with social cues or party identification and make voting decisions based on issues and candidate positions. Political activity is not limited to "elite mobilized"⁽²⁸⁾ participation. Citizens can initiate and focus activism through elite challenging participation. The result is a weakening of traditional political participation. Two

⁽²⁷⁾Geographic, social and structural mobility has been associated with the decline of institutional affiliations and loyalties. See Barnes, Irwin & Dietrich in volume.

⁽²⁸⁾Such as campaign or party activity. Also see Shivley, 1979, Borre & Katz, 1973; Dalton, 1984.

types of voters are de-aligned, and cognitive mobilization (marginal participants which may become aligned with a party). Either process may produce electoral change.

6) Aging party system thesis: suggests a "life-. cycle" view of contemporary political change. There is often a cyclical pattern to the life of party systems, based on socialization experiences (Beck, 1974). Political change represents the strains of aging. A revitalization or realignment of party systems would represent an adjustment to contemporary political realities. What is being witnessed is not a revolutionary change in democratic politics, only a recurring "biological" process.

7) value change thesis: argues that there is a link between advanced industrialism and the values of the mass public. Value priorities reflect the childhood environment and socialization experiences which tend to persist through the lifecycle. Postwar changes in social and personal conditions may be altering value priorities of the mass public.

Ronald Inglehart argues that citizen value preferences are shifting from materialist to post materialist values. Scott Flanagan conceptualized the process of value change as a decline in respect for authority, religiosity and the work ethic. There is a growing emphasis on values that secure the goal of self-actualizations-self-assertiveness, non-conformity, openness to new ideas, equality,

pursuit of leisure activities, a better quality of life and a tolerance for a variety of life styles. Evidence of generational changes in value priorities is available for almost twenty industrial democracies.

Dalton et.al., offer various criticisms of the above theories. Each has its weaknesses and all are incapable of serving, single-handedly, as explanatory thesis of political change. These authors advance their belief that a combination of several theses can "accurately model the process leading to advanced industrial politics." ⁽²⁹⁾.

But, it must be stated that description of a process, as advocated by these authors, fails to conceptualize a theoretical basis for political change and political behavior. Nor can description of a process illuminate a theory of voting behavior which can account for all the various variables which have been described as having an impact on individual voting decisions. None of these, variables and concepts have been integrated into a general theory.

Having reviewed recent research studies Rose has this assessment, "A content analysis of the literature about voting and elections would produce a long list of frequently discussed phenomena but it does not indicate how one might relate

⁽²⁹⁾Ibid., p* 20.

information about social structure, electoral laws and voting behavior."⁽³⁰⁾

Competing Models of Comparative Political Analysis

Understanding electoral behavior and vote choice within the domain of political science requires an interdisciplinary approach to the subject matter. Psychological, sociological, and anthropological studies have contributed to a better understanding of the complex process of political human development and behavior.

Traditional conceptions of public political attitudes as represented by Michel's, suggested that citizens in lower socioeconomic groups had no interest in politics nor in being politically active. Studies such as The people's choice, (1944), The Voter Decides, (1954), Voting, (1954), and the American Voter, (1960) substantiate this perspective.

Schumpeter, and others believed that the public's participation in government should be limited and representational. Participation, when it did occur, usually in presidential elections, was primarily influenced by long-term partisan attachment to a political party. Influenced by sociological research, Converse developed a parsimonious model of party identification based on

⁽³⁰⁾Richard Rose, "Comparability in Electoral Studies," N.Y., 1974 p. 8.

learning and transmission rates passed from one generation to another.

The model utilized age and life-cycle processes claiming that "partisan identification increases with age both for individuals and the system as a whole...(and) as a new party system ages the proportion of electorate identifying with the same political party rises." ⁽³¹⁾ Knowing the rate of party identification at a specific point in time, it is possible to predict a future (increased) rate of party identification taking into consideration the interval number of years and continuance of free electoral competition⁽³²⁾.

Party identification as a concept has an important functional application in western democratic societies⁽³³⁾.

First, identification with established political parties within a political regime confirms acceptance by the general public of the "rules of the game," the legitimacy of the political system.

Second, identification with a political party assumes the adoption or assimilation of one's personal identity with that of a party. The

⁽³¹⁾Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States," Ronald Inglehart, Avram Hochstein, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, Oct. 1972; p. 343.

⁽³²⁾Converse's model using data collected in 1959 and 1960, tested positively in the cases of the United States and France

⁽³³⁾Primarily an American phenomenon; some scholars maintain that the concept is not relevant outside the American Experience. Others disagree, and cite evidence of such relationships in Great Britain, and Germany.

party provides the individual with a specific perspective of the world and orientation toward domestic, social and political issues. The inactive and uninvolved citizen may identify with a party and vote in presidential elections, but decisions on public policy are generally left up to government leaders.

It is the psychological attachment to a political party that ensures system stability. Electoral participation is encouraged, in representational political systems, because the greater the strength of partisan identification the greater the viability of the political system. As already suggested political stability is maintained across successive generations through socialization and intergenerational transmission processes (Converse Model). In order to get a better understanding of these processes it is helpful to review the contribution that sociology has made to the field of political science. Socialization research is an important area of concern for political scientists. Two directional approaches to socialization research are the socio psychological--which focuses its "attention on why and how individuals acquire belief about politics," ⁽³⁴⁾ and the political approach-- which "assesses the consequences of socialization for the whole political system." ⁽³⁵⁾

⁽³⁴⁾Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Oct 1972. p. 230.

⁽³⁵⁾*Ibid.*, P• 230.

Traditional political concerns such as stability, ideology and civic training have led to three specific focal areas in socialization research:

- 1) Formal aspects of civic training.
- 2) Studies of personality, politics and national character.
- 3) Behavioral studies of the political socialization of children and adolescents⁽³⁶⁾.

There is no general consensus as to the definition of socialization. Some definitions focus on socialization agents such as the family, schools, mass media etc., while others deal with underlying patterns of political orientation and behavior. One definition describes political socialization as a "learning process through which an individual acquires political values, attitudes, behavioral dispositions and political knowledge." ⁽³⁷⁾ Although childhood and adolescent learning processes seem to be a major focus of study due to the proliferation of such research projects,

⁽³⁶⁾1 through 3 represent Greenstein's depiction of the major areas of thought dating from the 1920's to the late 1950's. Cited in Chilcote, p. 230.

⁽³⁷⁾"Patterns of Political Socialization: Stimulating the Development of Party Identification in Two Political Elites," William Mishler, Alan Kornberg, David Lundquist, Joel Smith; *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Jan. 1974; p. 402.

"individual roles, content, and agents"⁽³⁸⁾ are also central to the learning process of socialization.

An early assumption of learning processes child and adolescent socialization--presumed that socialization experiences of youth would have a profound effect and predominantly determine adult behavior. By identifying several variables representing these sociological experiences one could determine or predict adult behavior. Allan Beck and Kent Jennings, consistent with traditional concerns, tried to identify some of these variables. In an article premised on the belief that "adult Participation in politics is affected by strong pre adult forces," ⁽³⁹⁾ Beck and Jennings found that "civic orientations" play a crucial role in "converting pre adult experiences into later participation." ⁽⁴⁰⁾ Beck and Jennings evaluated four causal models identifying ways in which young adults participate in political acts.

Civic orientations are the intervening variable in each model. "Three of the models assess the direct and indirect effects of parental characteristics-socioeconomic status, political activity

⁽³⁸⁾Content includes knowledge, learned attitudes, and orientations toward authority. See Chilcote, pages 231 & 232.

⁽³⁹⁾in addition to contemporaneous factors; see Beck & Jennings article, Vol. 76, No. 1, p. 94. March 1982.

⁽⁴⁰⁾Ibid., p.94.

and civic orientations. The fourth model assesses the impact of adolescent involvement in high school activities"⁽⁴¹⁾

Each of these factors were found to have a significant impact on adult participation, although two of the variables--parent socioeconomic status and high school activism--had a greater impact. The results of this study suggests that there is a multiplicity of factors which contribute to the learning processes of socialization in the United States. The authors feel that the premise for conducting the study was upheld—that pre adult socialization processes do have an effect on adult behavior. But this perspective has been challenged by scholars who have tried to account for political disorder in the 1960s and 1970s ⁽⁴²⁾ and the emergence of political alienation.

The political violence and alienation erupting in the 1960's and 1970's caused some scholars to reject the traditional premise that early socialization experiences could maintain party identification and social conformity throughout the lifecycle. An alternative perspective was formulated, suggesting that adult political experiences, peer group pressure, rational considerations of issues and policies counteracted earlier socialization processes

⁽⁴¹⁾ Ibid., P. 94.

⁽⁴²⁾ The emergence of authoritarian regimes in democratic politics has been attributed to nonparty identifiers in the general population--a segment of the population which can be easily mobilized by new parties regardless of their nature. This phenomenon shall be addressed at a later time.

such as the. workplace replacing the role of the family, values and attitude change due to political events or new socialization experiences.

A whole new generation of research set out to reevaluate traditional assumptions concerning electoral behavior, socialization processes, party identification and the concept of stability in democratic states. Instability, change and development were key sources of inquiry.

The result of this period of reexamination was a proliferation of models, approaches, theories and partial theories designed to help explain electoral behavior. Some of these models may be referred to as rational actor models, the "wasted vote" thesis, models emphasizing the influences of individual attitudes on voting choices or emphasis on issues, candidates, party identification, and evaluation of government and _government leaders. Socialization processes have been reexamined as well as the concept of party identification.

Other approaches⁽⁴³⁾ are value change, party alignment and de-alignment, generational replacement and political dissatisfaction. All these concepts, among others, have been offered as partial explanations of current political change. Aspects of these approaches will be addressed with reference to their

⁽⁴³⁾These will be examined later on this study.

application in western industrial states. A recent research project which will undoubtedly have an important impact on political socialization studies is "Patterns of Political Socialization: Stimulating the Development of Party Identification in Two Political Elites," by William Mishle Alan Kornberg, David Lindquist, and Joel Smith."

The article tests the assumptions and prior research findings of Dennis (1968), Hess and Torney (1968), and Jean Piaget (1954), concerning the political socialization experiences of elites, in contrast to the general public.

The first assumption of the article refers to the work of Dennis. Dennis believed that three different behavioral orientation categories exist⁽⁴⁴⁾:

- 1) affective,
- 2) cognitive,
- 3) evaluative.

Affective refers to the processes of being influenced by, of imitating, and appropriating a symbol for oneself. It connotes an

⁽⁴⁴⁾"Patterns of Political Socialization Stimulating the Development of Party Identification in Two Political Elites," William Mishler, Alan Kornberg, David Lindquist, Joel Smith; Comparative Political Studies, Vol.6, No.4, Jan.1974.

emotional association. Cognition is a state of knowing based on personal experience. Political knowledge is understood to be primarily a cognitive process.

Evaluation is a process of assessment which is usually associated with logical, rational thought processes. Dennis points out that all three orientations are part of the learning process and that a different learning process may be operative in each.

The second assumption operative in this article refers to the childhood and adolescent studies of Jean Piaget. Piaget identifies three distinct time periods (age groupings) and within each time frames there exists an equivalent distinction in the learning processes.

According to Piaget, children up to the age of seven are essentially "egocentric beings; between the age of seven and thirteen a transformation takes place and children develop into a "social being". The cognitive processes expand to include not only processes of affective imitation but the learning processes that require the capability for both logical and abstract thought." ⁽⁴⁵⁾ Whereas associations made prior to the age of thirteen are likely to be imitative and affective, "a simple appropriation of a political symbol or object," ⁽⁴⁶⁾ associations made after the age of thirteen

⁽⁴⁵⁾Ibid., p. 403.

⁽⁴⁶⁾Ibid., p. 402.

are likely to be made on more evaluative, rational, and logical criteria.

The logic of the model sustains the position that association with a party made prior to age thirteen will be bound in emotional, affective ties while identification with a party made in later years will be grounded in rational choice.

The data also indicate that the "family has its strongest effect during the initial time period (1-13), and peer group, public figures and public events have strongest effects during the third period (ages 18- 21)⁽⁴⁷⁾. As the assumptions were generally found to be true the consequences of these life-cycle processes can be determined.

The data allow for reasonable postulations of the socialization process and party identification. One can assume that party identifications made before age nineteen will persist through the third time period ages (18- 21) and party ties will probably continue to be held throughout the aging process⁽⁴⁸⁾. On the other hand identification with a party established in later years are likely to dissolve, be sporadic, and non-continuous in nature. Party loyalty will be contingent on evaluative processes, judgments on

⁽⁴⁷⁾Ibid., p. 419.

⁽⁴⁸⁾I would suspect this to be the case unless severe crises or event such as war force reevaluation of beliefs and values.

performance, issues and candidates. The relationship between age, the life-cycle, and political participation is of recurring interest to political scientists. The above study underlines this fact by permitting an understanding of the impact of political information and associations during specific time periods during formative childhood and adolescent years.

Lester Milbrath undertook the task of finding uniformities in age patterns across the entire life-cycle as it relates to voter participation. He found that "Participation rises gradually with age, reaches its peak and levels off in the forties and fifties, and gradually declines above sixty."⁽⁴⁹⁾ In accounting for low participation rates among the young and old Verba, Nie and Kim offered, as an explanation, the startup/slowdown syndrome.

The startup syndrome suggests that political participation, such as voting, increases with political experience and involvement in the workplace, family, marriage etc....; residence is also a factor. The young who change residences often may not develop attributes which encourage political Participation or they become disadvantaged by electoral regulations. The slowdown syndrome suggests that political participation among the elderly decline after retirement from the work force, but that is also due to

⁽⁴⁹⁾Quoted in "Political Participation and the Life Cycle," by Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and Jae-on Kim; *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 3, April 1974; p. 319.

the processes of aging such as fatigue, weakness, lack of mobility etc... •

The authors note, interestingly enough, that the fall off in voting in later years is less "steep reflecting the fact that voting is an "easier" political act, and one that may become a habit Voting can ben-and often is engaged in by groups who are otherwise uninvolved and inactive in politics." ⁽⁵⁰⁾

Studies under the general category of electoral behavior in the United States, presented so far, suggest that civic orientations and affective variables during adolescent years, such as parental socio-economic status and high school activism, directly affects adult political orientations. That family-parent variables serve as primary transmitters of party identification has long been a traditional assumption. It has been determined that age, -political information and experience are interrelated throughout the life-cycle and that these variables directly affect political orientations and behavior. The question must be raised: Can the research findings of case studies in the United States be comparative in cross-national research? Does party identification in the United states have similar meaning in the political experience of Western European nations and Japan?

⁽⁵⁰⁾Ibid., p. 327. Other scholars have also pointed out that voting is only one form of political participation and perhaps not the most salient for comparative analysis.

Canada

The nature of partisanship' in the Canadian electorate indicates that party identification is not a meaningful concept. A Canadian study, "Partisanship, Voting Behavior, and Election Outcomes in Canada,"⁽⁵¹⁾ by Lawrence Leduc, Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson and Jon H. Pammett demonstrates that

"Canadians have partisan attachments that are flexible in nature. These voters are either unstable in their partisanship over time, inconsistent in their partisan attachments between the national and Provincial levels of the federal system, or weak in the intensity of partisanship."⁽⁵²⁾ It was also reported in the article that there is a "low incidence of intergenerational transmission of party identification"⁽⁵³⁾ in Canada.

The authors of the Canadian case study report weak partisan identification (62% of the population), great flexibility in party attachment and a low rate of intergenerational party identification transmission. The causes of low transmission rates are not addressed. An important follow-up would be to discover if age

⁽⁵¹⁾"Partisanship, Voting Behavior, and Election Outcomes in Canada," Lawrence Leduc, Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson and Jon H. Pammett, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 4, July 1980.

⁽⁵²⁾*Ibid.* p. 402•

⁽⁵³⁾*Ibid.* p. 402

(Piaget's child-adolescent age study) can account for the large percentage of flexible party-identifiers in Canada.

As the Canadian electorate seems to be influenced by primarily short-term forces such as issues, candidates and performance in making electoral decisions, the flexibility syndrome would seem to fit nicely with Piaget's third age group, suggesting that party identification later in life would be subject to more evaluative processes. It would also appear that individuals politicized later in life, with weak party identification, could be affected more easily by short-term factors. On the other hand, the article shows that among durable partisans (strong party identifiers) both those with high and low political interest, "none of the short-term forces play more than a marginal role in the determination of the vote."⁽⁵⁴⁾ This finding also offers an interesting reflection on Piaget's study suggesting a possible example of enduring and long-term party identification which could very well be related to a child's interest in and association with adult political orientations.

Japan

Japan offers a further example of a country in which party identification is not a particularly salient phenomenon. As in Canada, the data findings in the article "Family Influence and

⁽⁵⁴⁾Ibid. p. 411.

Political Socialization in Japan," by A kiva Kubota and Robert E. Ward, suggests that "in many Japanese households there is virtually no transmission of party identification from one generation to another."⁽⁵⁵⁾ "Many" is used here because the authors believe that intergenerational transmission is dependent upon individual family relations and parental partisan homogeneity⁽⁵⁶⁾.

The authors also distinguish between rural and urban environs meets. Whereas continuity in political orientations tend to persist in Japan's rural areas, there is a tendency toward change, flexibility of partisan identification in urban centers. Two levels of analysis, micro and macro, are utilized by Kubota and Ward to explain socialization processes and party identification in Japan.

The macro level of analysis concentrates on macro forces which "consist of the entire spectrum of social, economic and political changes"⁽⁵⁷⁾ such as establishment of a democratic government, educational system revisions, agricultural reform, unionization, expansion of the nation's al economy, changes in mass communication systems, mass media, to name a few.

⁽⁵⁵⁾"Family Influence and Political Socialization in Japan," A kiva Kubota, Robert E. Ward; Comparative Political Studies Vol. 3, No. 22 July 1970; p. 165.

⁽⁵⁶⁾Ibid., see p. 165.

⁽⁵⁷⁾Ibid., p. 144.

The micro level of analysis focuses on the individual, in particular the progressive tendency of Japanese youth and the "socializing influence of peer-groups, the educational system and the mass media." ⁽⁵⁸⁾ The socializing variables mentioned above clearly indicate that "Japanese youth are moving away from the political views of their parents." ⁽⁵⁹⁾

What is agreed upon in Kubota and wards article is that due to macro and micro level forces there have been significant attitude changes among Japanese youth. Undoubtedly historical factors, major change--economic, societal, political, and family--have altered traditional socialization patterns in Japan.

Although the authors have attempted to substantiate their position that the family as a micro-force "has played a significant role in the longer-term process of political socialization* in Japan," with respect to stable party identification, this statement has not been proven in their article. To the contrary they also make the argument that urban Japanese youth do not identify with the political views of their parents but are influenced by peers, school, and voluntary organizations and associations. Where continuity and traditional networks and community organizations are maintained, youth may have a greater chance of being in-flouced

⁽⁵⁸⁾Ibid., p. 144.

⁽⁵⁹⁾Ibid., p. 144.

by their parents. But, this influence may be subject to other variables (such as age, interest, education, economic status) and to future change.

Great Britain

Party identification through family or parental intergenerational transmission is not a meaningful concept in Canada nor in Japan. The concept has also been criticized by Butler and Stokes in "Political Change in Britain," stating that, at least in the case of Great Britain, British voters cannot distinguish between party identification and their current vote intention⁽⁶⁰⁾. It appears that partisan attachment is no deeper than one's current voting position. Although this position may be challenged by other scholars the fact remains that alternative routes to much of this researching the mechanics processes receive have moved beyond explain electoral many -political scientists have sought explaining electoral behavior. And is directed more toward ascertain-of vote choice. Adult socialization increasing attention. Many scholars party identification in seeking to behavior. Stanley Hoffman and Alan Zuckerman have done just this in their article "Moving

⁽⁶⁰⁾Bruce E. Cain and John Ferejohn in "Party Identification in the United States and Great Britain," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1, April 1981, refute this position as stated by Butler and Stokes 1969. They believe that party identification is just as meaningful and useful in Great Britain as in the United States. The question is one of measurement and restricting analysis to the two major parties.

Beyond Party Identification." Here the concept party identification is replaced by attitudes--individual attitudes toward parties.

Attitudes toward Political Parties and Vote Choice

Vote choice is viewed by Stanley Zuckerman as a decisional process, in which individuals examine for the preferred party. Individuals when a high degree of indifference is attitudes relate directly to the vote Feldman and Alan most liberal demo-all parties and vote abstain from voting reached. Partisan decision,"⁽⁶¹⁾ "Vote change...occurs when the voters overall balance of attitudes comes to favor a new party."⁽⁶²⁾

The key to vote choice, according to Feldman et al., is the relationship between partisan attitudes and the vote⁽⁶³⁾. The model process can be simply stated that: "attitudes are tied to a person's beliefs and values. Attitudes respond to beliefs about the parties and the political world. Attitude analysis takes into account adult learning and socialization processes⁽⁶⁴⁾.

⁽⁶¹⁾Partisan Attitudes and the Vote: Moving Beyond Party Identification," Stanley Feldman, Alan S. Zuckerman; Comparative Political Studies, Vol., 15, No. 2, July 1982.

⁽⁶²⁾Ibid., p. 198.

⁽⁶³⁾Ibid., p. 199

⁽⁶⁴⁾The United States is an exception to other liberal democracies. The strong independent effect of the national candidate variable, in the U.S., weakens the tie between partisan attitudes and the vote. Recent studies of American voting patterns have shown that attitudes toward candidates alone are the best

Attitudes once formed toward parties, excluding indifference, can be analyzed and accurately predict voter electoral choices for presidential candidates. Cues (attitudes and beliefs) are likely to come from prior evaluations and feelings about the party. Vote decisions are more reflective of partisan attitudes than party identification. A voter may identify with a party but vote according to evaluations of performance, and perceptions of national candidates. Only bounded voters who have strong psychological ties and engage in actions of party support can be said to have party identification. All individuals have attitudes but not all citizens have party identification." ⁽⁶⁵⁾

Although attitudes toward parties are a greater indicator of vote choice this is not to say that this offers greater instability and vote change into the system. To the contrary, Feldman et al., believe that parties constrain partisan attitudes and that to the extent that partisan attitudes are reinforced by other partisan beliefs and attitudes the greater the possibility for stable partisan attitudes. Further stabilizing forces are the "structural characteristics of the voters social and political environment." ⁽⁶⁶⁾ The greater the degree to which the family, work-place, friends,

immediate Predictor of presidential voting (Page & Jones, 1970; Markus & Converse, 1979; Feldman et al., Ibid., p. 219 & 199.

⁽⁶⁵⁾The description of the model process is taken from different areas in the article. Some sentences are paraphrased, others are not.

⁽⁶⁶⁾Ibid., p. 219.

associates and organizations to which the individual belong share the same partisan attitudes the greater the unlikelihood of change in voter attitudes.

Such structural characteristics and party constraint serves to perpetuate long-term partisan stability and minimize effects of short-term influences. Although processes exist which tend to perpetuate greater partisan stability, Feldman et al. maintain that their model accounts for attitude change throughout an individual's lifetime. The circular process holds that individuals have attitudes towards parties and will vote for a party, taking into consideration evaluative processes. When indifference sets in an individual will abstain from voting until positive attitudes towards a new party emerges. In support of their hypothesis concerning party attitudes and vote choice Feldman et al., examined the dynamics of British elections between 1970 and 1974

"Of the panel who voted Labor or Tory in 1970, 87% remained consistent in the overall direction of their party attitudes. Of these 81% remained stable in their votes while only 2% switched to the other major party. Nine percent of the panel changed the direction of their attitudes from one party to another. Of these 47% changed their vote from one party to another. These

statistics indicate that there is a relationship between vote choice and attitudes toward parties⁽⁶⁷⁾.

The authors conclude that models of rational vote choice and party identification do not account for attitude change nor its underlying prospects for instability resulting from indifference or vote change. Only an analysis of partisan attitudes can detect voter instability and vote change.

Beliefs Attitudes and Vote Choice-- Multidimensional Study of the U.S.

The partisan attitude and vote choice model developed by Feldman and Zuckerman was uni-dimensional and set at the institutional level. The study maintained that in most liberal democracies individuals vote for the Preferred party. The United States was considered an exception because of the unusually strong independent effect of the candidate variable in national elections which, the authors feel, weakens the tie between partisan attitudes and the vote. The next objective is to examine micro-level dynamics of partisan attitudes in the United States. Recent research published by Gregory B. Markus addresses this goal, on a multidimensional level by utilizing an "equation model of

⁽⁶⁷⁾Paraphrased

cognitive and affective processes"⁽⁶⁸⁾ which examines electoral choice in the United States. In order to explain electoral choice one must tap the cognitive processes through which individuals arrive at decision choices. One way to do this is to tap into an individual's beliefs and attitudes toward something. Whereas attitudes towards parties was the central factor in Feldman et. Al' s model, Markus examines several factors which might explain electoral choice--attitudes toward presidential candidates, issues, and party identification.

His model allows for "perceptions of candidate traits, assessments of presidential performance, and summary evaluations of the candidate...to be simultaneously interrelated." ⁽⁶⁹⁾

Markus's work can be divided into three major areas. The first, probed factors concerning presidential contenders during the 1980 elections in the United States. Markus was interested in discovering the extent of knowledge citizens had of presidential contenders and how these individuals viewed the capabilities and personal characteristics of the candidates. The data⁽⁷⁰⁾, resulting from an analysis of public perceptions of personal attributes of

⁽⁶⁸⁾"Political Attitudes During an Election Year: A Report on the 1980 NES Panel Study," Gregory B. Markus, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 76, No. 3, Sept 1982.

⁽⁶⁹⁾*Ibid.*, p. 551.

⁽⁷⁰⁾The data--7 descriptions pooled together were: moral, dishonest, weak, knowledgeable, power hungry, inspiring and provide strong leadership. The 4 candidates were Carter, Reagan, Anderson and Kennedy.

four presidential contenders, fell along lines of competence, and integrity similar to findings in other studies of candidate characteristics. During the campaign it was discovered that the public gained little further knowledge of already well known candidates and were shown to have gained further knowledge of serious candidates, through media coverage, who were relatively unknown nationwide before the campaign.

The second area is under the rubric of issue attitudes. Markus wanted to assess if public attitudes toward major policy controversies would affect presidential vote choice. As a test of issue attitudes Markus chose four issue areas--inflation; federal expenditures for health, education and welfare; defense spending; and Americans Soviet detente; and asked respondents to state their position on the issues and their perception of the candidate's positions on these issues. Markus also gauged citizen policy preferences against their understanding of candidate policy positions.

Two different hypothesis were offered to explain citizen reaction to issue positions: The projection hypothesis and the persuasion hypothesis⁽⁷¹⁾.

⁽⁷¹⁾ The Projection hypothesis holds that: citizens project their own policy preferences onto candidates they like on other grounds or perceive issue stands of other candidates they dislike in such a way as to distinguish further those candidates from themselves. The persuasion hypothesis holds that:

Markus learned that citizens found it "easier to alter one's view of the candidates issue positions than it is to change one's own position." ⁽⁷²⁾ The data results also show that by the end of the presidential campaign a significant percentage of the public had not developed clear opinions or positions with regard to the four major issue areas and roughly 10-30% had no policy preferences. An even larger segment of the population was not able to identify candidate positions on the issues.

The third area examined by Markus was partisan identification and ideological outlooks of partisan attitudes. "These attitudes are fundamental orientations that individuals use to structure and give meaning to information about more transient elements of politics including candidates and issues of the Day"⁽⁷³⁾ Partisanship was found to be relevant only in relation with summary evaluations of presidential candidates. Markus found that initial perceptions of candidates may be colored by party identification but that Partisan identification played no further role during the campaign. This variable was seen as arising again only in the case of a tie between candidate preferences. In order to prove that partisan identification and ideology played no

individuals may be persuaded over the course of the campaign to alter their own positions to coincide more closely with those of favorably evaluated candidates or change stands to contrast from candidates they dislike. See p. 543.

⁽⁷²⁾ibid; p.548

⁽⁷³⁾ibid; p.549

major role in the 1980 presidential elections, Markus measured public response to two surveys:

- 1) ideological self-placement on a left-right, liberal-conservative continuum
- 2) comparison of party identification prior to and after the 1980 election using a seven category identification system.

The findings show that there was no significant change in party orientations after the 1980 election, significantly demonstrating that the party identification variable could not explain the 1980 Republican presidential landslide victory. Markus reported that the ideological orientation continuum survey showed that 40% of the respondents could not place themselves on the continuum, that there was public ideological ignorance.

It has been illustrated, so far, at least, which factors have not accounted for significant influences on individual attitudes toward electoral choice in the United States. Party identification has a minor role, ideology, issues a less significant role. The variables which were significant were candidate summary evaluations and incumbent Performance.

Markus's logodds equation holds that a vote for an incumbent president is a function of party identification and the difference between summary evaluations of the major contenders.

The significance of summary evaluations lies in public beliefs of personal competence and integrity of the candidates. The Vote-choice model which includes all attitudinal measures failed to increase significance beyond the above equation.

The candidate summary evaluation hypothesis which emerged from Markus's research data corresponds closely to the model of retrospective voting. "The theoretical argument is that in an American Presidential Election the choice is ultimately among candidates, and hence judgments of incumbent performance,, (etc.) affect the vote only to the extent that they influence summary evaluations. "⁽⁷⁴⁾ By using survey data and taping measures of micro-level dynamics of political attitudes Markus was able to show that contrary to the belief of some scholars the 1980 election did not represent a shift in public orientations and party alignments for change but the election outcome represented an overall evaluative judgment of the performance, and capability of an incumbent president.

It is evident from the above analysis of public attitudes that party identification does not have the same meaning nor the same partisan attachment in the United States as contrasted to other western countries in Europe. This is one major reason why

⁽⁷⁴⁾Ibid., p. Mirer, 1974; 556. See also Markus & Converse, 1979; Kelley Brody & Page, 1973.

scholars such as Feldman, Zuckerman and Markus have seen the importance of studying public attitudes on macro and micro levels of analysis.

Contrary to Feldman et al.'s position, Markus demonstrates that Party identification is a factor in attitude formation, in the United States, albeit, not an overly significant one. It is also interesting to note that the findings in Marcuse's survey Point out a lack of understanding, preference and position stands of the general public on important issue positions. In fact, candidate positions on issues were not a major factor in voter choice. These findings will be significant in the later overview of post-industrial theories which focus on politically active segments of the population in advanced industrial nations, for whom specific issues surrounding post-industrial values are significant in mobilizing younger generations. Such issues can have a great impact on elections and the functioning structure of government institutions.

Overview

Models of vote choice which concentrate on individual or partisan attitudes provide us with insight into the cognitive processes which influence vote choice. But most of these models represent only partial insight into the complex pattern of individual political development. For example, a model focusing on partisan attitudes and vote choice usually limit their analysis to specific

time frames just prior, during and after an election. Due to costs and time constraints there are only a few longitudinal studies which try to explain vote choice over time.

Most of these studies focus more on life-cycle and generational explanations that causal changes in individual partisan attitudes including specific events and individual experiences. A further complication is that there are numerous attitudinal studies, each with a particular focus. There is a need to try to interrelate these works into a comprehensive theory both in respect to a grand theory of electoral behavior and a range of comprehensive partial theories such as partisan (individual) attitudes and vote choice. Although Stanley Feldman and Alan Zuckerman stated that "Recent studies of American voting have shown that attitudes toward the candidates alone are the best immediate predictor of presidential voting,"⁽⁷⁵⁾ several variations of the model have been conceptualized and utilized for Feldman and Zuckerman, the attitudinal model was preferred because it could be applied in cross-national comparative studies on voting behavior (Western European nations and Japan). Yet there are still other models of vote choice which have not been addressed yet: rational voter models and the wasted vote thesis.

⁽⁷⁵⁾Feldman & Zuckerman article, "Partisan Attitudes and the Vote: Moving Beyond Party Identification," Vol. 15, No. 2, July 1982 p. 198.

Rational Voter Model

The attitude model largely tries to explain voter choice but it does not necessarily account for actual voter participation. Feldman et al., attributed partisan none voting to indifference, and voting to party identification. The rational voter model tries to explain voter behavior in terms of answering the question as to why some citizens vote and others do not. This theory is not dependent on party identification but a rational cost-benefit calculation. Downs argues that "citizens will rationally weigh the costs and benefits of voting versus not voting and will cast a ballot only if the benefits exceed the cost." ⁽⁷⁶⁾ According to authors Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard. Rosenthal, theory which deals exclusively with "ideological or spatial competition (are)...missing a key ingredient of electoral competition. In order to win a vote, a candidate must not only convince the voter that he or she is the preferred candidate but must also get those preferred voters to the poll." ⁽⁷⁷⁾ Subsequently, not only is it necessary to understand Processes of vote choice but also the phenomena of why citizens don't vote, even if they have preferences. Feldman's indifference variable certainly cannot account for voter abstention

⁽⁷⁶⁾Anthony, Downs, "An Economic Theory of Democracy," referenced in "The Performance of Rational Voter Models in Recent Presidential Elections,". Carrol B. Foster; American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, Sept. 1984, p. 678.

⁽⁷⁷⁾"Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty," Thomas R. Palfrey, Howard Rosenthal, APSR, Vol. 74 No. 3 Sept 1984

from those citizens who have identified electoral preferences but failed to vote.

There are several theories as to why citizens do and do not vote. As stated above, Downs theorized that voters will vote if benefits outweigh costs. Costs to Downs was the "opportunity cost of time and resources spent in voting and acquiring and assimilating information needed to cast an informed vote." The rational voter paradox holds that the cost of gaining in will far outweigh the benefits of making an informed electoral. decision because one vote becomes lost in a "sea of votes." ⁽⁷⁸⁾ Therefore since costs are greater than the benefits of voting it would be irrational to vote. The paradox is that in the face of irrationality citizens still vote. The answer to why could be an overpowering sense of civic duty as suggested by Downs or" deference to social norms. The reason why so many people vote is because democratic societies systematically feed their citizens false information about the utility each individual personally gains from the franchise.

An alternative perspective offered by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1979) states that citizens vote in order to prevent a worst outcome scenario. They refer to this as the "mini-mum regret" model. On

⁽⁷⁸⁾"The Performance of Rational Voter Models in Recent. 67% Presidential Election," Carroll B. Foster; American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, Sept 1984; p. 678.

the other hand, Palfrey and Rosenthal developed a model of strategic uncertainty using a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium⁽⁷⁹⁾.

Wasted Vote Thesis

Most of the explanations offered above to explain voter decisions to abstain from voting or not can be applied to a two party or multi-party system. The wasted vote thesis propounded by Maurice Duverger applies more directly to political systems with three or more parties operating under a simple-majority, single-ballot system. The logic of this theory is that a small minor third party (candidate) has a relatively low possibility of winning, and voters feeling that their vote would be wasted will override their primary preference and vote their second choice in order to prevent an electoral win of the least preferred party (candidate), or to prevent victory of the greatest evil. Maurice Duverger calls this the "psychological factor."⁽⁸⁰⁾

Overview

The rational voter models, and wasted vote thesis are interesting variables which may contribute to an understanding of voter behavior but such variables cannot have a powerful impact unless they are integrated into a comprehensive theory of voter

⁽⁷⁹⁾Ibid., p. 678.

⁽⁸⁰⁾Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, 1963, p. 226.

behavior. In and of itself, research of specific variables which demonstrate significance in voter behavior is important and necessary.

But these works are not sufficient by themselves and cannot possibly offer any direction in how to conceptualize the process of individual political development, political behavior, change and its consequences on the general political system. Vote choice is a vibrant area of inquiry as demonstrated by the numerous research articles focusing on singular variables predicting vote choice through models of individual (partisan) attitudes and rational voter models. But such research represents only a fragment, a partial understanding of the process of voter electoral decision choices. The models can only provide limited information about cognitive processes operative in vote choice and these process theories are in no way conclusive nor absolute. It is doubtful that scholars will ever be able to accurately measure and make accurate predictions from mental processes. It is invariably impossible to be able to account for all the influences and experiences uniquely affecting each individual. On the aggregate level, vote choice seems to represent a more stable, consistent pattern. Micro-level analysis appears to reveal real voter indecision, volatility and apathy. Foster reported that voter turnout in presidential elections in the United States has fallen from 62.8% in 1960, to 53.2% in 1980. Voter turnout rates in Congressional, state and local elections is even

bleaker. Scholars repeatedly refer to falling voter turnout rates as a crisis in democracy.

New theories have tried to account for participation and voter decline. Some scholars point to the structural design of electoral politics--the Electoral College; other innovative scholars have come up with the theory of generation replacement. Another area of scholastic research focuses on party de-alignment value change and the new era of post-industrialization. The following sections will address other and more recent theories encapsulating electoral behavior in the 1980's.

Short-term Factors and Voting Behavior

The evolution of theoretical research on electoral behavior in the United States and other liberal democratic regimes have expanded from an emphasis on party identification and intergenerational transmission to focusing on adult political socialization, attitudes towards parties, a variety of rational voter models, the wasted vote thesis and the emergence of short-term factors which impinge upon

long-term party identification stability, or long-term stable attitudes towards a party. But just what are these short-term forces and why is there a concomitant decline in partisanship?

According to authors Leduc, Clarke, Jenson and Pammett⁽⁸¹⁾ short-term factors such as issues, party leader and local candidate images are associated with the conduct of election campaigns⁽⁸²⁾. And, "susceptibility to short-term forces is

a function of the strength and stability of partisanship."⁽⁸³⁾ If partisanship is weak or laden with a high percentage of non-party identifiers than short-term factors will have an impact on vote choice. Evidence of the influence of party leaders and/or issues for example has been supplied in studies of British, French and German voting*"⁽⁸⁴⁾ already reviewed was the study on election year political attitudes in the United States by Gregory Markus. He found that candidate evaluations and party identification were the primary factors influencing vote choice. His study based on data collected in 1980 did not find issues a significant factor.

On the other hand, Martin P. Wattenberg in an article entitled "The Decline of Political Partisanship in the United States: Negativity or Neutrality,"⁽⁸⁵⁾ demonstrated that in 1952 voters

⁽⁸¹⁾"Partisanship, Voting Behavior and Election Outcomes in Canada," Lawrence Leduc, Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, and Jon H. Pammett; *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1980.

⁽⁸²⁾*Ibid.*, paraphrased, p. 402.

⁽⁸³⁾*Ibid.*, p. 403.

⁽⁸⁴⁾See *ibid.*, p. 402; also Butler & Stokes, "Political Change in Britain," 1976.

⁽⁸⁵⁾Martin P. Wattenberg, "The Decline of Political Partisan-ship in the United States: Negativity or Neutrality?" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 75, No. 4, Dec. 1981

acknowledged the relationship between domestic issues and party policy stands, by 1964 respondents had shifted their position associating domestic issues with candidates rather than only Parties; by 1980 the ratio had increased over 2-1 favoring candidate only responses⁽⁸⁶⁾. These findings suggest that party salience has declined while candidates have become more salient in the eyes of the public, standing for important issues of the day, serving as informers, capable of drawing supporters and organizing an independent platform⁽⁸⁷⁾.

As stated by Wattenberg, "The stands which candidates take on issues may no longer be linked to voters Perceptions of the parties... when it comes to specific policies, candidates now stand above parties rather than with them." ⁽⁸⁸⁾ Although there is disagreement among scholars as to the validity of short-term variables at specific points in time, and which variables are more salient there may be agreement on a single point that weak partisan identification during a highly mobilized event such as campaign and election periods, will offer the opportunity for short-term factors such as issues, candidates and leadership to influence potential voter decisions.

⁽⁸⁶⁾Data findings paraphrases, see p. 947.

⁽⁸⁷⁾Ibid., p. 947.

⁽⁸⁸⁾Ibid., p. 950.

Within the discussion of short-term factors affecting vote decisions, several reasons for party decline were offered. First, party salience has declined because a large percentage of the American public has arrived at the conclusion (their perception) that parties are no longer meeting the functions for which they were designed. Second, parties are seen as not supporting their candidates who are running for office. Third, the alienation hypothesis maintains that two factors can account for party decline:

- 1) that voters increasingly see fewer important differences between the democrats and the republicans
- 2) as distrust of the government--political cynicism--has increased"⁽⁸⁹⁾ there is a concurrent "rise in voter independence."⁽⁹⁰⁾

Political alienation suggests non-conventional forms of Political behavior such as demonstrations, and disobedience, and it suggests government distrust dissatisfaction with government outputs or policy civil and implementation. The alienation

⁽⁸⁹⁾Ibid., P. 942.

⁽⁹⁰⁾Ibid., p. 942; Wattenberg refutes the alienation hypothesis. He believes that citizen feelings toward parties are not negative but neutral, and because these feelings are neutral and not hostile, party-identification can one day reemerge un-der appropriate conditions. Vol. 75, No. 4, Dec. 1981.

hypothesis as an explanation for party decline is a distinct area of scholastic research. It deserves further attention.

Political Alienation Mistrust-efficacious Hypotheses

In reference to the introductory chapter which reviews recurring discussions on pluralistic politics and participatory democracy in particular, some scholars contend that "one of the key aspects of participatory democracy is the general belief of an individual that he is capable of influencing the course of public policy and therefore can participate effectively in government."⁽⁹¹⁾ This general feeling has been attributed to the psychological variable "efficacy" which some scholars⁽⁹²⁾ say can account for conventional and non,

(conventions) forms of political behavior. It is largely assumed that levels of high trust and high efficacy among the populace will lead to conventional forms of political participation or no political action due to a sense of trust in government outputs. But trust, efficacy and conventional political participation has not been able to account for political alienation, demonstrations and rioting arising in the 1960s and continuing through the 1970s and

⁽⁹¹⁾"Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems," Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, Donald Mc Crone, and Rodney Stiefbold; *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1968, p. 75.

⁽⁹²⁾Gamson, Lee Sigelman, Stanley Feldman, James W. White. Vol. 16, No. 1, April 1983.

1980' s. In part this could be attributed to generational value changes, salience of particular issues etc.; but, some scholars attribute nonconventional political behavior to political alienation.

Kendall Baker asserts that political alienation occurs when there is a "discrepancy between what the individual perceived as his role in the system and what he thinks should rightly be his role."⁽⁹³⁾ Alienation translates into government mistrust. Combine mistrust with a high degree of political efficacy and the potential for unconventional forms of political action are high, such as riots, demonstrations, petitions, etc. The result is the mistrustful-*efficacious* hypothesis subscribed to by scholars such as Gamson (revised work), Sigelman and Gamson's *mistrustful-*efficacious** hypothesis holds that "a combination of high sense of political efficacy and low political trust is the optimum combination for mobilizations a belief that influence is both possible and necessary."⁽⁹⁴⁾ Only in tandem, mistrust and efficacy, in interrelation with each other, can the potential for unconventional political activities arise.

On the other hand, the combination *inefficacious* and *mistrustful* will only lead to hopelessness because individual

⁽⁹³⁾Kendall C. Baker, "Political Alienation and the German Youth," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, April 1970, P. 119.

⁽⁹⁴⁾"*Efficacy, Mistrust and Political Mobilization: A Cross-National Analysis*," Lee Sigelman, Stanley Feldman; *CPS Vol. 16 No. 1, April 1983; p. 120.* Quote is Gamson's, Gamson 1968:48.

action is believed fruitless in having an impact on government policy while, as mentioned above, high trust and high efficacy will lead to conventional activity or no action at all.

Gamson's main contribution to the efficacy theory was his distinction between two dimensions of political alienation: "political inefficacy--a perceived inability to wield political influence, "(and) political mistrusts-the belief that government is not being run in one's interest." ⁽⁹⁵⁾ The significant consequence of this combination was the potential for unconventional forms of political activity. According to research conducted by Evans and Hildebrandt, less than 10% of the adult population in many Western European countries participate in unconventional forms of political participation⁽⁹⁶⁾.

In order to test Gamson's theory Stanley Feldman and Lee Sigelman found it more appropriate to conduct research on protest potential than actual protest activity which accounted for less than 10% of the general population. Contrary to Gamson's assertion Feldman et al., found that the variables efficacy and mistrust did not explain a significant variance of protest potential. Rather, the authors thought 'policy dissatisfaction' was a superior measurement of political mistrust. Gamson's work was criticized

⁽⁹⁵⁾Ibid., p. 119.

⁽⁹⁶⁾Evans and Hildebrandt, 1979: 542, 548-549.

for not clearly defining political trust. Trust as both diffuse system support and output satisfaction have been used by Gamson.

Feldman et al. believe that the proper focus in explaining unconventional Political behavior should be placed on the interrelationship between efficacy and policy dissatisfaction. James W. White in a study "Civic Attitudes, Political Participation and Systems Stability in Japan," came to a similar conclusion stating that "trust is of minor importance and parallels other findings that trust and protest activity are perhaps unrelated." ⁽⁹⁷⁾ But the basis of Whites position should be addressed.

Political cynicism or political distrust is greater in Japan than the United States and it may be that cynicism will increase to even higher levels in Japan. The mistrusts efficacious model assumes that outbursts of violence, disorder, and demonstrations will undoubtedly occur in such circumstances⁽⁹⁸⁾. In his article, James White maintains that there is great potential for political conflict in Japan but that several factors mitigate against it. Social factors, societal structure, and distribution of potential protestors can be factors serving as constraints on unconventional political

⁽⁹⁷⁾James W. White, "Civic Attitudes, Political Participation and system stability in Japan 'comparative political studies, vol.14, no 3, OCT. 1981; p.376

⁽⁹⁸⁾See Flanagan and Richardson, 1980: 19, 27.

action. But White also suggests that perception of one's efficacy accounts more for civil disobedience than cynicism.

Further, White claims that "the role of cynicism may have been over estimated... Because, political cynicism (has) little impact on one's actual political behavior"⁽⁹⁹⁾. Accordingly, White points that "positive relationships were found between measures of conventional behavior and protest potential."⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ His conclusion postulates that "Protest may be simply one item in the behavioral "repertoire" of the democratic citizen and not the exclusive preserve of those who otherwise reject the system"⁽¹⁰¹⁾

Taking his position one step further stating that "distrust of leaders is a positive virtue", White used a direct quote from Thomas Jefferson: "every government degenerates when entrusted to the rulers of the people alone"⁽¹⁰²⁾.

Political alienation, or political neutrality? Conventional or unconventional political behavior? Are political activists and political protest part of the democratic process or a disruptive force threatening the stability of traditional government practices?

⁽⁹⁹⁾Ibid., p. 391.

⁽¹⁰⁰⁾Ibid., p. 376.

⁽¹⁰¹⁾Ibid., P. 376.

⁽¹⁰²⁾ibid., p. 376

The political alienation hypothesis, mistrustful-efficacious hypothesis and efficacious-policy dissatisfaction hypothesis are all partial theories which try to describe phenomena which try to capture the essence of current youthful political behavior; however, our understanding of party decline, of political change has not been enhanced. Now are these hypotheses to be viewed, integrated into existing literature? Once again single-dimensional variable explanations of political and electoral behavior do not contribute greatly to an understanding of general-overall voting behavior. Divergent perceptions of such behavior among scholars prevents a consensus from being reached. One can only return to the adage, more research is required, theory needs to be generated.

Alignment Theory

In trying to account for changing party identification, a relatively new area of scholastic attention is being Focused on what I call "alignment theory." Alignment theory encompasses three modes of voter-party relationships:

- 1) stable alignment,
- 2) de-alignment,
- 3) realignment.

Stable alignments refer to traditional bases of party support which within bounds of voter-party flexibility (vote change), does not alter the overall balance of major party support. De-alignment occurs when "individuals in the electorate

abandon their traditional party loyalties to vote for other parties or to abstain." ⁽¹⁰³⁾ Realignment refers to the development of new long-term party loyalties which can

signal "a significant shift in the group basis of party coalitions, and usually in the distribution of popular support among the parties as a result," ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ Since the creation of mass party coalitions (around 1800 in the United States) ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ there have been many instances of party realignment in the United States and Western Europe. It is interesting to note that for the United States in the 1930's "the shift in the overall balance of partisan loyalties...was based primarily on the mobilization of new voters rather than the conversion of voters with established party commitments" ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾. However, mobilization of new voters is not the

⁽¹⁰³⁾Brude E. Cain, "Challenges and Responses in British Party Politics, Comparative Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3, April 1980; p. 342.

⁽¹⁰⁴⁾"Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies," Russell J. Dalton, Paul Allen Beck, Scott C. Flanagan, in Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Real-ligament or dealignment, edited by same authors. Vol. 14, No. 4, Jan. 1982.

⁽¹⁰⁵⁾Ibid., p. 13, cited Clubb et al. 1980, Sundquist 1973.

⁽¹⁰⁶⁾Ibid., p. 13; See Campbell 1960: 153-156; Erikson & Tedin 1981.

only process that can result in party realignment. Long-term party identifiers may, at some point in time, transfer their loyalty to a new party or they can abstain from voting.

According to Dalton et al., party realignment in recent years can be attributed to party stands on emotionally charged issues and that the "pace of secular/critical realignment apparently depends on the nature of the realigning issue conflicts and the response of political elites."⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

Two questions naturally arise from this line of thought:

- 1) Why and what can account for the decline of support for political parties (phenomena of de-alignment)?
- 2) do voters become permanently dealigned or will realignment occur?

According to Bruce Cain "partisan de-alignment can be explained by understanding the nature of the demands placed upon the parties by the electorate and the way in which the parties responded to those demands."¹¹¹ It is clear from

Cain's case study on Britain that the Conservative and Labor parties have not been able to respond to environmental changes

⁽¹⁰⁷⁾Bruce Cain, "Challenges and Responses in British Party Politics," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 3, April 1980; p. 335.

in Britain. First of all, the two major parties have not been able to solve major economic problems since World War II.

The parties have also failed to adequately address controversial issues concerning the Common Market and immigration. Consequently, the established parties are receiving negative performance ratings bordering on incompetence from the general public. Exacerbating the negative perception of party performance, is the failure of British parties to adapt to changing electorate attitudes. Cain tells us that Britons have come to abhor class politics. But, Conservative and Labor party support has traditionally come from class based cleavages in Britain.

Unwilling to change the class basis of party support the Conservative party continues to maintain close ties with big business and the Labor party continues to keep its close ties with unions. The general public, on the other hand, Cain says, is dissatisfied and has two alternatives:

- 1) to abstain from voting,
- 2) or to change party loyalty to one of the minor parties.

It is apparent that the Liberal party in Britain has indeed benefited from this dissatisfaction. The conclusion, according to Cain, is bleak: "If the British party system does not adapt more

successfully in the future to changing circumstances, the long-term prognosis for Britain cannot be good⁽¹⁰⁸⁾.

Under this analysis two primary reasons for party dissatisfaction appear to be that parties in Britain are:

- 1) not meeting electorate demands nor are parties making necessary adjustments for electorate attitude changes and parties are not
- 2) seen as being able to solve domestic and foreign related issues.

Their performance being negatively rated by voters. The literature suggests, so far, that issues, performance, party-class ties and demand response are important variables which account for party de-alignments in Britain⁽¹⁰⁹⁾.

A somewhat different approach toward explaining electoral alignment is taken by Upset and Rokkan (1967), Ronald Inglehart and Avram Hochstein (1972).

⁽¹⁰⁸⁾Ibid., p. 348

⁽¹⁰⁹⁾Since stable party alignments represents continuity and satisfaction in the status quo, and does not account for party decline it will not be addressed here.

Crises, is the major instigative force which can "reverse or accelerate the growth of partisan identification." ⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Crises can lead to rapid shifts in party alignment, de-alignment or realignment. Lippset and Rokkan developed a model of party identification; party identification was the "result of some decisive crises in the past." ⁽¹¹¹⁾ An event or highly emotional issue raised to the heights of crises, according to Lippset and Rokkan, will have the explosive effect of 'freezing political alternatives.' The freezing of party loyalties over a highly emotional and salient issue would most likely persist until that issue was either no longer salient or new crises emerges. With respect to this model the authors suggest that once party identification has been established it tends to follow the model laid out by Converse and Dupeax in 1962. Party identification will increase through socialization processes, and intergenerational transmission.

The distinction being that the Converse model explains "equilibrium" between crises while the crises model described by Inglehart and Hochstein accounts for the creation of party-identification through crises.

⁽¹¹⁰⁾"Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States," Ronald Inglehart, Avram Hochstein; *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Oct 1972; p. 345.

⁽¹¹¹⁾*Ibid.*, p. 344.

The crises model, then, serves as an explanation for rapid party de-alignment and realignment.

Taking the example of France and the United States, Inglehart and Hochstein prove their hypothesis by examining the 1962 'crises' events in both countries and resulting political manifestations. In the case of the United States there was the Vietnam war and the civil rights movement. In France the crises was a "clear polarization of French politics along a single dimension: Gaullism versus anti-Gaullism." ⁽¹¹²⁾For the United States the process of partisan de-alignment continued, and is viewed to be continuing by the authors; For France the 1968 crises escalated rapid party alignment.

Two explanations are given to account for greater partisan identification in France than in the United States. First, rapid alignment (most probably) occurs under "conditions of strong (ideally, uni-dimensional) societal conflict--with the most important political parties at opposite poles of the dominant issue dimension. „⁽¹¹³⁾On the other hand, if conditions reflect major conflicts which have cross-cutting cleavages' "they are likely to

⁽¹¹²⁾Ibid., p. 361.

⁽¹¹³⁾ibid. pgs. 359-360.

result in cross-pressured voters--who tend to abstain or remain nonaligned."⁽¹¹⁴⁾

The first explanation accounts for increased partisanship in France in a crises environment, while the second feature explains why crises did not have the same impact in the United States. In the United States the process of de-alignment has continue⁽¹¹⁵⁾ with non-identifiers remaining unaligned or abstaining from voting. Variance of the two variables --civil rights, the Vietnam war (and lesser issues) --were "spread relatively even over several relatively equal and autonomous sources of conflict competing"⁽¹¹⁶⁾ for public attention. They were spread over a long period of time. In France there was clear polarization on a single issue. This singular dimension "simplified the French Party System and motivated previously unaligned voters to take on a sense of political commitment."⁽¹¹⁷⁾ It should be noted that ideology has greater saliency in France than in the United States. Ideology puts issues into sharp focus. This has not been a factor in recent U.S.

⁽¹¹⁴⁾Ibid., p. 360.

⁽¹¹⁵⁾The authors report that although there has been a major trend of dealignment in the U.S. during the period 1958-1968, and that this trend will continue; a further distinction needs to be made between black and white voters. Among prior non-aligned, non-mobilized blacks there has been an increase in party identification favoring the Democratic party. Among whites, previously aligned with a party, there has been an even larger incidence of party dealignment.

⁽¹¹⁶⁾Ibid., p. 365*

⁽¹¹⁷⁾Ibid., p. 360

domestic politics. Inglehart and Hochstein have demonstrated that under certain conditions 'crises' is the catalyst responsible in crystalizing party identification, in the rapid alignment and just as easily the reverse, de-alignment in party-identification. They also referred to the effects of the ongoing processes of the life-cycle and generational replacement.

It is my belief that generational replacement offers the greatest indicator of the salience of party-identification and the central element in which to study change. It is new generations, new environments, new political, economic and social climates which can stimulate and create new values and belief systems about the world, one's society and decisions about oneself, one's roles and political action. It is along the line of generation replacement as well as crises, I believe, that revitalization can occur. It is to this factor that some scholars have claimed that a new era has begun--post-materialism, post-industrialization. Justification for this perspective can be found in the writings of Ronald Inglehart, 1977 and 1982, Scott Flanagan, 1982, and Donald Calista, 1984.

Generation Replacement and Value Change

Motivation for this line of research was provided by the perceived need of political scientists to account for the "intense

and unexpected wave of political protest of the late 1960's and 1970's."⁽¹¹⁸⁾

A longtime accepted tenant of political theory was the interconnection between economic prosperity and political satisfaction and its reverse linkage--economic decline and political chaos. The examples of the Great Depression of the 1930's and the New Deal seemed to confirm this relationship.

However, Inglehart points out that two opposing developments invalidated this theory. The first development was political disorder during the 1960's and 1970's. The irony was that "never before had Western (or Japanese) Publics enjoyed such a high level of prosperity--yet protest was more widespread than at any time since the 1930' s."⁽¹¹⁹⁾

What confounded political scientists even more was the second development, "the relative quiescence of the mid 1970's: in the face of the most severe economic crises since the Great Depression, protest not only failed to increase, but it showed a noticeable decline in most countries."⁽¹²⁰⁾ This behavior, according to Flanagan, Inglehart and Calista represents a process of change

⁽¹¹⁸⁾Ronald Inglehart, "Political Dissatisfaction and Mass Support for Social Change in Advanced Industrial Society," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Oct. 1977; P. 456.

⁽¹¹⁹⁾*Ibid.*, p* 456.

⁽¹²⁰⁾*Ibid.*, p. 456*

that has been developing over several decades. There appears to be general agreement in the direction of change but not the causes.

General agreement exists on these points: ⁽¹²¹⁾

- 1) that value change has been taking place among publics of advanced industrial societies.
- 2) one aspect of this value change has been a shift from materialist towards post- materialist values.
- 3) this shift can be traced to an increasing level of prosperity especially among the highly educated sectors of the middle class.
- 4) these changes reflect a deep rooted process of intergenerational change.

However, the consensus ends at this juncture. Although Flanagan and Inglehart agree on several changes that have developed over the years, they do not agree on the causes. The question that needs to be answered is Why and How do values change? In a critical review of both Flanagan and Inglehart's work Donald Calista said that in order to determine "whether post

⁽¹²¹⁾Ibid., p. 445, paraphrased. It is interesting to note that Flanagan and Inglehart utilized different approaches, and data bases, yet they arrived at the same general conclusions--the change processes. They continue to differ on the causes of value change.

material value systems are emerging among youth in advanced industrial societies "⁽¹²²⁾the answer must lie in the determination of "the relationship between cultural continuity and value change."⁽¹²³⁾This relationship touches upon the two very different explanations offered by Flanagan and Inglehart.

The Needs Theory Approach may very well describe Inglehart's explanation of value change. Needs theory assumes the arrangement of an individual's value priorities in a hierarchical fashion. Physical, security needs, self-esteem and belonging needs, for example, will be ordered according to individual preference needs. As conditions of the individual change it is assumed that the numerical ranking of needs will also change--a reprioritization of values.

In recent years' general improvement in the living standards of mass publics and increased affluence, according to the argument of Inglehart, "has brought with it an intergenerational change from an emphasis on acquisitive, material concerns to post bourgeois, non-material concerns."⁽¹²⁴⁾Because children and adolescents are raised in an environment of affluence they will no longer identify

⁽¹²²⁾Donald J. Calista "Postmaterialism and Value Convergence: Value Priorities of Japanese Compared with Their Perceptions of American Values," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Jan. 1984; p. 531.

⁽¹²³⁾*Ibid.*, p. 531.

⁽¹²⁴⁾Scott C. Flanagan, "Changed Values in Advanced Industrial Societies: Inglehart's Silent Revolution from the Perspective of Japanese Findings," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1982; p. 406

with physical and security needs as priority needs. Non-materialist values such as self-actualization may become a need priority and be given a higher ranking. As a new need list is prioritized during youthful years' new values becomes part of the socialization process. Inglehart believes that "reorientations" take Place during childhood and adolescent socialization processes and that early learning processes are "resistant to changes in the socioeconomic environment, or individuals life circumstances thereafter. "⁽¹²⁵⁾

Whereas Inglehart provides an explanation of inters generational value change based on the individual level Flannagan maintains that generational value change is a macro societal causation: "...basic changes in the conditions of life stimulate fundamental reorientations in the value references of new generations." ⁽¹²⁶⁾Environmental conditions change in such a way as to make an altered set of social norms viable. "⁽¹²⁷⁾.

Flanagan's approach toward explaining value change is what he calls a "Functional Theory". Values are not chosen and ranked by individuals. Values are inherent to a particular kind of society and its needs. Flannagan best describes the determination of "societal norms" (needs) by asking the question "What attitudes will best ensure the survival and well-being of the individual and

⁽¹²⁵⁾.Ibid., P. 406.

⁽¹²⁶⁾ibid., P. 408.

⁽¹²⁷⁾Ibid., P. 407

the community in this socioeconomic context?" ⁽¹²⁸⁾Taking this argument one step further, if societal conditions of physical, security needs etc. have been met, suggesting an attainment level of greater affluence, then constraints on the behavior of individuals will be lifted according to the changing conditions within society. It is at this juncture that Calista's argument appears plausible: The key to discovering if post-materialism exists necessitates an examination of cultural continuities and value change. Calista argues that neither Flanagan's nor Inglehart's view of 'values' is correct. "The distinction between public and personal values is not as exclusive as Flanagan proposes nor as conclusive as Inglehart asserts, "⁽¹²⁹⁾Calista sees the two as being 'interactive'.

A series of value change processes in progress today in which Flanagan, Inglehart and Calista are in agreement has been presented. Two opposing approaches put forth to explain the causal factors behind these trends has been presented.

Our last author, Calista, cannot be depended on either, to shed greater insight as to the causes of value change. Although the two hypotheses presented in his research Study could not be

⁽¹²⁸⁾Ibid., P. 406.

⁽¹²⁹⁾Donald J. Calista, "Postmaterialism and Value Convergence," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Jan. 1984; p. 551.

substantiated by the research data ⁽¹³⁰⁾Calista could conclude with definite findings that there, indeed, is a trend among post-war youth towards "shifting consensus away from both material and national defense value orientations while expressing a growing inclination toward personal fulfillment and self-realization orientation" ⁽¹³¹⁾. His own conclusion suggests that "value changes are being shaped by a past that makes post-materialism a more (not less) adaptive process than previously recognized." ⁽¹³²⁾.

Class

Traditionalist Marxist literature, in simplified form, construes "class" to be the division of society into those who own and control production and those who are wage earners. But alternative definitions and applications of "class" have been utilized by political scientists and comparatives for example, Kenneth Wald' suggests that "Class based voting is a specific instance of a more general process of group formation. This term describes a process by which a set of individuals with something in common a "quasi-group" recognizes its collective interest and undertakes concerted action to advance it.

⁽¹³⁰⁾Calista focuses on 1) whether the movement (postmaterialism) also represents the crossover effect found •by Ike and 2) whether the value changes are leading toward political outlooks that are equated with what Flanagan calls libertarian; see p. 531. Vol 16, No. 4, Jan. 1984.

⁽¹³¹⁾Ibid., p. 530.

⁽¹³²⁾Ibid., p. 532.

In the context of social classes this process involves the transition from inequality to stratification, the organization of society into bounded sub communities based on economic criteria." ⁽¹³³⁾ More specifically Would outlines general Prerequisites toward group formation. A minimum of conditions which must be met include: first, recognition by a group of individuals that they share special or unique characteristics Which-Mind them together into a group, in a society in which it is recognized that social differentiation exists, a second requirement is group interactions-interaction within a bounded group creates a subculture and reinforce group solidarity and group persistence especially in a society made up of a variety of bounded groups; third, indigenous group organizational capacity would also be regarded as a necessary factor in reinforcing group solidarity's for the purpose of reiterating group character, and group continuance; lastly, the group aware that individual action outside be fruitful and will not improve the must be continuously of the group will not condition of the in dividable. It must be believed that only the power and ins

flounce of group action can make goal attainment possible. ⁽¹³⁴⁾

⁽¹³³⁾Kenneth Wald, "Stratification and Voting Behavior: Electoral Cleavage in Britain Under the Third Reform Act," *Political Studies*, Vol 15, No. 1., April 1982; P. 60.

⁽¹³⁴⁾Four "conditions of group formation" have been presented in paraphrased expanded form. See pages (ibid.) 61-62.

Alternatively, T. E. Marshall defined class "as simply the process of social interaction, the manner in which a person is treated by others and not the attributes or possessions which create that treatment."⁽¹³⁵⁾ Arthur Cyr maintains that "the best definition of class...should include the things which...go into determine class position—e.g. Occupation, income, power, personality, family background⁽¹³⁶⁾. Although there are different uses, applications and definitions of "class" the most important, current question is: can "class" still be said to condition politics and voting behavior in Western Industrial Nations? A structural- class view of society, it is argued⁽¹³⁷⁾, no longer describes social interaction in most western industrial societies. This section will focus on this charge and alternative perspectives.

Many scholars have come to the conclusion that class conflict has declined during the postwar era in western industrial societies. There is less agreement on the causes of decline. Some of the causes reported already in the literature include economic

⁽¹³⁵⁾T. H. Marshall's position presented by Arthur Cyr in "Class in Britain Through Liberal Eyes," *Comparative Politics*, Vol, 5, No. 1, Oct. 1972; P. 64.

⁽¹³⁶⁾*Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁽¹³⁷⁾Paul R. , Risto Sankiahho, Ronald Inglehart, John D. Stephens are some of the scholars who suggest that "class" is no longer the most important variable in accounting for social interaction, and political and voting behavior; also group formation. However, some of these authors caution that class analyses will and can be useful should environmental changes occur which cause strong group association and differentiation in society.

prosperity and affluence, changes in class structure and the policies and strategies adopted by political parties.

Paul R. Abramson, in "Social Class and Political Change in Western Europe"⁽¹³⁸⁾ is one scholar who suggests that affluence and economic prosperity explains the decline in class conflict.

Theoretically, the process of change that has led to a reduction in class conflict, Abramson's "scenario", goes something like this. Economic prosperity tends to raise living standards among the general public. As living standards are raised, the discrepancy between status groups is reduced bringing a relative convergence of life styles, and experiences. Along with higher education attainment across the board, there is an increase in intergenerational mobility which tends to reduce class-based conflict. "Class conflict continues to exist but it becomes institutionalized.

Working class demands are channeled through increasingly legitimate trade union structure, working class political parties begin to share power and become both legitimized and conservatized.

⁽¹³⁸⁾Paul P. Abramson, "Social Class and Political Change in Western Europe: A Cross-National Longitudinal Analysis," comparative Political Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, July 1971.

Political parties abandon their anachronistic ideologies and their class directed appeals. ⁽¹³⁹⁾ Abramson claimed that his "scenario" could explain not only the decline in class conflict but general political, economic and social changes in postwar Europe.

However, Abramson's research indicated that across the board social change did not occur as expected. Abramson had to refine his thesis further to account for the fact that the segment of the population which represented the greatest divergence from class-based alignments and associations were the youth in Germany, France and Italy.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ Intergenerational replacements rather than life-cycle processes were cited as the genesis of change in the orientation of new generations in the political process. According to Abramson, Great Britain was an exception to this trend.

Contrary to Abramson's thesis, John D. Stephens, in a case study of Sweden found that "affluence does not lead to changes in party preference," and that "the effect of education on party preference is declining."⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Rather, Stephens asserts that decline in class saliency can be attributed to structural changes in society

⁽¹³⁹⁾Ibid., p.131

⁽¹⁴⁰⁾Abramson made it clear that he believed that although class-based partisanship declined, it still remains an important basis of partisan cleavages, even among the young, see p. 145.

⁽¹⁴¹⁾John D. Stephens, "The Changing Swedish Electorate: Class Voting, Contextual Effects, and Voter Volatility," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 1981; p. 169.

and that such changes are most accurately accounted for through content analysis. Data from the case study on Sweden indicated "the existence of a contextual effect of class residential segregation on voting Behavior." ⁽¹⁴²⁾ Considering the results of his research project Stephens concluded that a "decline in class segregation has contributed to the decline in class voting." ⁽¹⁴³⁾

Structural changes that have taken place in Sweden are representative of similar changes which have transpired in other European countries which faced reconstruction after World War II, including Japan. Rapid economic growth, rural displacement, coupled with urbanization, increase in living standards, expansion of higher education, increased opportunities and social mobility are all examples of shared structural changes. Stephen's argument suggests that these changes have resulted in the desegregation of class-based localities as the mobile young (upward and down-ward on the economic scale) move into communities of mixed social class groups. Individual interaction, mass media, and new cross-cutting issues contribute to reduce class based associations and class voting. Such developments have contributed to changes in youth attitudes, values and actions.

⁽¹⁴²⁾Ibid., p. 164•

⁽¹⁴³⁾Ibid., p. 164*

Among the youth there is an increased interest in politics, there is a trend towards delaying party identification and such identification may be volatile--dependent on rational vote choices based on the performance, leadership qualities and policies of a particular party. Habitual party voting no longer applies among most youth. And for these reasons Stephens also believes that this trend could become dangerous should_ "American-style campaigning" ⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ be adopted in Sweden.

Certainly, structural changes in societies, as demons started throughout this study, has a direct impact on social, economic, and political developments in a society. Ronald Inglehart suggests that societal level changes can effect traditional societal based cleavage lines. Inglehart's explanation for the decline in class cleavages is the development of post-materialist politics. His thesis suggests that "new non-economic issues dimension reflects a materialist versus post materialist cleavage, rather than the social class and religious cleavages that gave rise to conventional L-R dimension." ⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ But what is post materialism and what segment of society does it represent?

⁽¹⁴⁴⁾Ibid., p. 200, American style campaigning is where the parties "substitute an increasing exploitation of personality politics, media campaigns and fashionable opinion...for programmatic discussion."

⁽¹⁴⁵⁾Ronald Inglehart, electoral change in advanced industrial society, see bibliography or citation.

"Post materialism" is a concept which reflects the emergence of a new era of value change in which individuals have come to place greater importance on self-fulfillment, quality of life and ephemeral issues than on salary and economic prosperity (materialism). It reflects the transition from industrial to postindustrial society, from an era of material to post material values. Structural changes in society, as enumerated in the Swedish case study, is tied to cultural changes. And cultural change suggests that new values and attitudes have been adopted. But does this manifestation hold true for an entire society or a segment of the population? Ronald Inglehart maintains that "post materialists" "tend to be recruited from the more affluent strata that traditionally supported the right."⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

Abramson would argue that post materialists are generally recruited from the youth who are more open to recruitment depending on their experiences and historical circumstances. Both arguments would appear to be sound as more affluent strata especially a youthful generation experiencing no incidences of economic hardship or deprivation, would seem to be more open to disassociating themselves with economic concerns and would actively pursue policies offering greater personal satisfaction and political rewards.

⁽¹⁴⁶⁾Ibid., p. 57; postmaterialists, themselves, support the left, according to Inglehart.

What attributes do these individuals tend to have? Generally, post materialists have attained high levels of education, greater sources of information are available to them, and are utilized, and they have generally achieved a high degree of political sophistication.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ The obvious consequences of these, attributes are that post materialists are more likely to have a greater sense of efficacy, sells confidence and greater potential for political action. Such individuals are more likely to subject vote choice to a critical evaluation of government policy outputs than traditional forms of diffuse (uncritical) government support. Meaning that voting behavior is more likely to be conditioned by government performance.

Risto Sankiaho has a most interesting perception of the post materialists. He maintains that post materialist views are the best predictor of pro-anti-establishment views*⁽¹⁴⁸⁾. He believes that the "anti-establishment type is likely to have post materialist values, low trust (in government), high efficacy, leftist ideology and a general dissatisfaction with politics."⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ In effect, the logic of Sankiaho's argument suggests that post materialists must be anti-establishment because their values, and position on what issues are

⁽¹⁴⁷⁾Risto Sankiaho, "Political Remobilization in Welfare States," in electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, p. 73; for complete citing see bibliography.

⁽¹⁴⁸⁾Ibid., p. 89.

⁽¹⁴⁹⁾Ibid., p. 89.

important conflict with established traditional values and government policy. Therefore, post-materialists do not trust the government, they are dissatisfied with government outputs, and they are more likely to progressively take actions in order to affect desired change. According to Sankiaho, the "New" Politics of post materialists necessitates the development of a "new" society.

In sum, post-materialists are likely to be found among the segment of society which has least suffered economic deprivation; especially among the youth and affluent societal members. They are likely to be well informed, highly educated, and politically sophisticated. Voting behavior will be conditioned by specific support--the critical evaluation of specific governmental policies, outputs and performance.

Such performance criteria and potential for affective political action anticipates Political violence in a post-materialist era. Political violence refers to the disturbances of value change on established political Processes. ⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Political cleavages are no longer based on social class and religious associations (the traditional left-right continuum). rather, the continuum of political cleavage rests along material versus post-material values.

⁽¹⁵⁰⁾Such as the emergence of new cross-cutting issues and the ability of parties to adapt to a change in public values, and new issue positions; role of parties, candidate roles etc. in elections etc.

The concept of post-materialism, as presented, and as described_ by Ronald Inglehart, suggests phenomena applicable in explaining the generalized outcome of John D. Stephens's contextual analysis of Sweden. The structural changes in Sweden and other Western countries since World War II, can generally account for decline in class voting but it can also indicate whether post materialism is emerging in these countries. Whether structural change, generational replacement, policies of political parties, post materialism etc... can individually or collectively explain a decline in class based voting, the question still remains: Is or Is not the concept of class politics useful in accounting for voting behavior in advanced industrial or post-industrial societies? The literature clearly indicates that in answer to this question no consensus exists.

A strong argument exists against the case of class analysis suggesting that if the concept "post-industrialization or post-materialism" accurately describes social and political relations in a society then, class analysis will not be useful in accounting for voting behavior.

The argument against class analysis follows that under conditions of post materialism party and traditional group loyalties erode with the emergence of new cross-cutting issues. issues, such as the environment, civil rights, quality of life, nuclear

disarmament etc... and candidates' positions toward these issues become the basis for individual electoral choice,⁽¹⁵¹⁾ Such issues cut across traditional ideological divisions. In fact, ideological divisions may be reduced or eliminated in a post-materialist-post-industrial era in which new values and concerns have arisen. It is plausible that ever changing issue concerns may introduce uncertainty into the political system as traditional political organizations try to respond to continuing change, increased demands, and conditional Public support. Under such conditions of constant changes new issues, and fluid domestic support--it may not be possible to identify meaningful typologies of group support that would make class analysis useful. Furthermore, the prerequisites of class as outlined by Kenneth Wald, may not be met rendering class analysis fruitless. It all depends on how one defines and operationalizes class.

The conditional requirement of this argument is that a society must be post-materialist in nature. However, it must be remembered that although scholars have addressed the phenomena of post-materialism, the fact remains that only a minority, albeit an articulate and effective minority of post materialists, exists in contemporary western societies. The dangers alluded to by most scholars is that the trend over the past 25 years indicates the possible transition towards a complete post-industrial value laden

⁽¹⁵¹⁾Other criteria may be government Performance,

society. Concerning this perspective both Abramson and Inglehart caution against simple conclusions; they raise additional factors which must be addressed in trying to account for the complexities inherent in change.

While acknowledging the existence of post-materialist values among a minority segment of western societies both Abramson and Inglehart point out constraints affecting post-materialist value development. It is suggested that social networks such as family, community ties, peer groups etc... can result in the continuance and maintenance of traditional values and political associations even under conditions of extensive societal structural and economic change⁽¹⁵²⁾. However, it is also asserted that as political, social economic change occurs, as under incidences of post-materialism, new cleavages will emerge.

According to Inglehart, although post-materialism reduces class based cleavages, political conflict will continue: but the nature of, and groupings of discordance in advanced industrial societies will be 'between ordinary citizens and a ruling elite based on control of bureaucracy and police.'⁽¹⁵³⁾ Abramson, on the other hand suggests that new forms of cleavage may develop along these

⁽¹⁵²⁾See Abramson, Inglehart articles (listed_ in bibliography, footnotes); Lipset, 1964; and Lipset and Rokkan, 1967.

⁽¹⁵³⁾Ronald Inglehart, *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Society*, p. 58; see bibliography, for full citations.

lines: "differences in educational style may become an increasing source of conflict, cleavages between age groups, between persons employed in contracting and sectors of industrial economy."⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ While it is clear that political conflict and societal cleavages will continue even if an era of post-materialism emerges it is not evident if these cleavages will result in clear, polarized group formations which would make class or group_ analysis possible. Another perspective remains to be addressed; those studies maintaining that class analysis is still important in understanding voting behavior.

Specific case studies continue to maintain that class or group analysis remains invaluable in understanding voting behavior. Two particular studies underline this perspective: "Electoral Traditions and Opposition Building in France," by Vincent E. McHale,⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ and "A Note on Class Voting in Great Britain and the United States," by John W. Books and Jo Ann B. Reynolds.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾

In the case of France, McHale strongly suggests that although new cleavages exist in France, the powerful force and importance of history in France will re-emerge with traditional

⁽¹⁵⁴⁾Paul R. Abramson, "Social Class and Political Change in Western Europe," p. 147; See bibliography for full citation. Vol. 4, No. 2, July 1971.

⁽¹⁵⁵⁾Vincent E. McHale, "Electoral Traditions and Opposition Building in France," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 4, July 1971.

⁽¹⁵⁶⁾"A Note on Class Voting in Great Britain and the United States," John W. Books and Jo Ann B. Reynolds, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1975.

Patterns of social cleavages reasserting itself upon the political system. McHale believed that the Gaulist front was uncharacteristic in French politics and would eventually disintegrate with the reemergence of traditional patterns. He maintains that the role that history plays in France is an enduring, powerful force, and will conflict with new-modern cleavages in France. McHale offers no satisfactory conclusion. We are left with no alternative except to assume that class or group analysis will continue, in the near future, to be important in understanding French electoral behavior. Similarly, Books and Reynolds recognize changes which have occurred in England and the weakening of class alignment in that country. However, they also acknowledge that class politics re-emerged and was an important factor in the 1970 elections. It is interesting that the overall trend among the working class and the "young" middle class, according to the authors, was Persistently towards increasing cross-class voting.⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ Yet, the 1970 election indicated strong partisan class voting behavior⁽¹⁵⁸⁾.

A general conclusion concerning the usefulness and viability of class or group analysis is demonstrably difficult. Strong dichotomies or absolutes in advising research directions, especially

⁽¹⁵⁷⁾Ibid., p. 368. (See)

⁽¹⁵⁸⁾Ibid., p. 369. (See)

in the field of politics and human behavior is fraught with uncertainties, ambiguities, and exceptions.

The most logical position to ascribe to would be one of flexibility. Model choices for case studies must be related to specific historical, social, economic and political experiences of the intended subject. It may also be pointed out that there is a general consensus in the political science, comparative political fields that western industrial societies are facing transitional changes. This change has been identified as the change from industrial to post-industrial society; from a change in material to post-material values. Research on the effects of structural, economic, political and social changes in western societies since World War II have successfully identified just that-- the changes -- but not the total ramifications of such change. It has not been determined how much change will eventually occur, if societies are in transition or in the process of returning to some form of continuity and persistence of traditional values and traditional political processes. It is just as unclear if a "new social system" and "new politics" will converge to necessitate the creation of a "new" political system. Understandably, many questions are left unanswered. The nature of empirical research is to understand current realities, but often the pieces of information available cannot always tell us what is in store for the future. Perhaps our quest to understand, has led comparativest and political scientists

to broaden their scope of inquiry to capture the entire political system. We have utilized sociological, anthropological, geographical and psychological approaches to enhance our understanding of human behavior and political development. From the study of wholes to a concentration on system parts the search to capture and direct the world we live in continues. Concerning contemporary directions of comparative research interests, as presented in this study, I will offer the following observations.

Concluding Notes

The field of comparative politics has evolved and expanded its breadth of coverage since the days of 'orthodoxies' and the "consensus". Research has expanded from an emphasis on party-identification and intergenerational transmission of values and associations toward focusing on alternative factors influencing individual political and electoral behavior such as: adolescent and adult political socialization, attitudes toward political parties, a variety of rational voter models, wasted vote thesis, concentration on short-term factors-issues, party leader, candidates---as an area of political inquiry, political alienation, alignment theory, generational replacement and value change, class, and post materialism (as explanations of change and political behavior). These are not all inclusive categories which account for all new developments in the field, but these are some of the more dynamic

areas of interest scholars have addressed over the last ten years. ⁽¹⁵⁹⁾But what is common about all these research topics is that each tries to account for at least a partial explanation of electoral behavior in general, and in particular, the recent phenomena of decline in the salience of party-identification and group or class analysis.

At risk are traditional political assumptions of western democratic societies, and its relationship to, political reality.

A brief and general review of important developments in the field of political science and review of some of the more important issues unresolved in political philosophy were raised in the first section of this study. Perhaps the most controversial and persistent issue of today is democracy and political participation. Within democratic theory there are scholars who adhere to a representational versus a participant interpretation on how democracy should be practiced. It is evident that this issue reemerges today and has direct impact on political behavior in western democratic societies in several ways.

First, a strong relationship exists between democratic practice and political theory. Under a theory of representational democracy, political participation translates into a competitive party system

⁽¹⁵⁹⁾Such areas of concern can be placed under a variety of typological categories or subject names.

which mediates societal demands and offers the public a chance to choose policy preferences through support of a political party. Sustenance of the democratic political system depends on individual party support, and continued identification with a political party.

Should party -identification decline so would the fabric of democracy in that society. Government supports under representational democracy, assumes diffuse support for the general public. Party--identification rather than public evaluations of government positions or performance on specific issues generally determine election outcomes.

Events occurring in the 1960's and 1970's in conjunction with documented research projects, as described in this study indicate that decline in party support and an erosion of party identification among the electorate is taking place.

This erosion of support for political parties has direct implications for political philosophy and theory. However, the issue of democracy is not readily being addressed, rather, most scholastic attention is being focused on the causes of party decline and the solution--how to increase public support of political parties; how to get the public to participate once again in the electoral process.

In sum, the point to be made is that political practice and theory are interrelated and must be congruent if theory is to be useful to political practitioners. Therefore, the tenants--working principles-of representational democracy must correspond to political practice. ⁽¹⁶⁰⁾as in the case of the United States, it was reported that the principles of democracy worked well with theory and practice of the political system. Democracy was achieved through political parties and the political system was sustained, and regenerated through the strength and persistence of party-identification through intergenerational transmission. It has been theorized that should this process break down then so will the political system. Tangible examples exist which demonstrate the emergence of change and how change relates to accepted political theory, the political system and democracy.

Political alienation, alignment theory, generational replacement and value change are three examples of areas in which scholars have conducted research in order to try to explain recent political and electoral behavior among the electorate. In particular, a constant concern has been the decline in party-identification and political participation. In general, the undisclosed incentive has been concern over change and its consequences for the established political system in modern, western democracies. it is the consequences of change that hold special meaning for us.

⁽¹⁶⁰⁾The same logic and argument follows for participant democracy as well.

According to Kendall Baker, political alienation occurs when there is a "discrepancy between what the individual perceives as his role in the system and what he thinks should rightly be his role "⁽¹⁶¹⁾Capability for unconventional forms of political participation occurs when two conditions are met: that an individual feels himself or herself to be efficacious, and that he or she be dissatisfied with government policies or outputs. Political alienation theory can identify segments of the population who are dissatisfied with the government and it can also tell us the percentage of the population which are capable of taking actions to bring about changes in that which they disagree. Such change is likely to be brought about through unconventional forms of political participation.

Political alienation theory and the efficacious (trust-efficacy; mistrust-efficacy) hypotheses have been two important areas of study in helping us to understand that not every individual is likely to engage in political activity. Invaluable was the discovery that differences in individual feelings of efficacy, in conjunction with one's beliefs and attitudes toward the government or government

⁽¹⁶¹⁾Kendall Baker, "Political Alienation and the German Youth," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, April 1970; p. 119.

policies would more than likely be key factors in determining not.
⁽¹⁶²⁾ only voting behavior' but potential for political action.

For example an individual who has high government trust but is inefficacious may not vote because of general satisfaction of the government and a feeling that the vote may not make a difference in an election outcome (obviously such an individual would not engage in unconventional forms of political activity), also, a person who does not trust the government or is dissatisfied with government policy and is inefficacious may not vote or engage in political activity because of a sense of helplessness. One of the many contributions and lessons of Each research is that analysis on the individual-micro-level can uncover particular behavioral nuances which may remain improvable to macro analysis⁽¹⁶³⁾.

The alienation and efficacious hypotheses were important in directing research towards answering the question of who is likely to engage in unconventional forms of political activity and those who don't. ⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ however, in society where established patterns of

⁽¹⁶²⁾Again, these are Partial explanations of voting behavior. As has and will be seen, many variables can affect voting behavior.

⁽¹⁶³⁾It should be understood that these are two different theories. Although both utilize the variable efficacy, alienation theory substitutes mistrust for policy or government dissatisfaction. It has already been pointed out that some scholars doubt the utility or viability of trust

⁽¹⁶⁴⁾Again, this is only one factor among many that may influence electoral and political behavior

behavior are generally followed this analysis will more than likely reflect a very small portion of an electorate. On the other hand, under conditions of dramatic environmental and social change such a model of analysis holds greater importance. For example, if we look at the research done on post materialism and relate the alienation-efficacious model to these phenomena the results may be most interesting. A stimulating exercise would be to try to ascertain if individuals holding post materialist values would seek to bring about change through established: Political Processes or through unconventional forms of political activity. It has already been established that post materialists tend to have greater feelings of efficacy, and greater potential for political activity. But, can post materialists be tagged as being alienated? We know that the tendency toward government specific support is based on performance evaluation of government outputs rather than diffuse support. Does this change in role perception of post materialists mean that in the long run changes in roles preclude the need for change in policy and theory? More questions are raised than can be answered; but certainly, it can be said that there is utility in partial theories, as a link in a chain through which we hope to learn more through continued research.

Certainly it can be said that a new generation of theory is being designed to try to account for societal change and that such theory will have to be eventually linked to the political process.

Alienation theory raises questions of role perception and traditional political processes. Post materialists are in more active pursuit of participant democracy. The phenomena of post-materialism may have the potential of raising the issue of democratic practice once again.

A new generation of theory may be referred to as alignment theory. Alignment theory refers to the relationship between individual voters and political parties. These relationships can be said to be governed by three sets of interactions—one of stable alignment, de-alignment and realignment.

A relationship of stable alignment indicates that a particular voter consistently supports the same political party over time or maintains persistent identification with a political party. De-alignment signifies the withdrawal of support of a political party by a voter, or it can represent habitual nonparticipation in the political process; it can indicate voter neutrality or indifference but de-alignment means that potential voters do not identify with or support any political party. Lastly, realignment simply means that a political party has once again captured the support of a voter whether it has been achieved through attraction by adopting new positions on issues, a new platform or if it is a new party which has emerged on the political scene.

This approach to alignment theory is really a descriptive device in trying to account for the options available in voter-party relationships. Alignment theory becomes useful only when it can capture the under-lying dynamics of the voter-party relationship. Right now the major focus of attention has been placed on explaining processes of de-alignment. Scholars as well as party officials and government leaders are interested in understanding the causes of decline in party support and what can be done about it. Alignment theory has been able to offer some causes leading towards voter de-alignment. As noted in this study, voters in Great Britain have stated that party support has declined because parties are perceived as 1) no longer serving the functions for which they were designed 2) that parties have not been able to solve important domestic and foreign policy problems and that 3) parties have not adapted_ to changes in voter attitudes. This kind of analysis which captures some of the reasons for lack of party support also logically indicates simple solutions to the problem. It is easy to take the position that if parties adjust their behavior and become more sensitive to voter demands and changes in voter attitudes, and if parties become more effective in finding ways to solve important issues of the day, then, the parties will be able to win back public support. The problem is more complicated than this.

As in all theory, scholars vary in the sophistication and theoretical basis of political analysis. A much more creative and

more interesting approach of alignment theory was achieved by authors Trip set and Rokkan; Stanley Feldman and Alan S. Zuckerman (Moving Beyond Party Identification). Moving beyond voter--party relations on the micro level of personal perception and opinion, these authors tried to find system level processes which could account for alignment and de-alignment processes.

Crises, under specific environmental conditions,⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ it was determined, was the Primary force which led either to conditions of rapid party alignment or rapid party de-alignment. Highly emotional, salient issues rising to a level of crises with voters dichotomized into opposing positions on the issue leads to a "freezing of political loyalties" to the parties representing the dichotomous perspectives.

Alienation theory can identify changes in voter perceptions of what their role in society should be, and their dissatisfaction with the performance of the government or political process. It also gives us information about unconventional forms of political participation. Alignment theory, on the other hand, gives us information concerning voter dissatisfaction with political parties, voter-party relationships, and the process on how identification or voter association with a political party is initially formed. Just as alienation theory, alignment theory --whether it be stable, de-

⁽¹⁶⁵⁾See pages 59-62, in this study for discussion of this topic.

alignment or realignments-has significant implications for the political system and functioning democracy.

The increasing trend towards a sense of voter neutrality towards political parties, Indifference, as well as persistence in voter de-alignment raises questions about the political system. Some scholars hold the position that de-alignment is a natural process of transition before realignment takes place. Other scholars maintain that what is occurring is fundamental change in the structure and values of society which may lead to severe consequences for the political system. Whichever is the case it is too early to ascertain which direction current developments will lead. However, it can again be stated that further research needs to be conducted in alignment theory. Further studies need to document patterns in voter-party relationships, and the dynamics of initial identification with a political party.

Perhaps the most fundamentally informative theory which suggests the conditional factors involved' in general change is the theory of generational replacement and value change. Just as time cannot be stopped neither can environmental conditions remain the same from one generation to another; rapid technological advancement in the industrial age serves as a poignant illustration. While it is generally acknowledged that there is a change in the values, living conditions and experiences of affluent, middle class

youth--from their parents and Perhaps the rest of society--there is no consensus on the causes of value change. Inglehart believes that individuals consciously prioritize their values according to a "needs" test (needs theory).

As individual living conditions change individuals will re-order their need values. Flanagan refutes this perspective.

He associates value change to changes in one's environment. Flanagan's functional theory maintains that change in one's environment makes "an altered set of social norms viable, Values are not chosen and ranked by individuals. Values are inherent to a particular kind of society and it's needs." ⁽¹⁶⁶⁾

The utility of generational replacement theory is that it can account for number of anomalies in society. It can account for value change within and between generations as sources for conflict and new demands on society. It can account for differences between age groups, non-identification with established political parties, changes in electoral behavior and degrees of continuity and change between generations in either following or calling for changes in the political system. Alienation theory could establish the propensities of a new generation towards conformity or change. Alignment theory could indicate whether

⁽¹⁶⁶⁾Scott C. Flanagan, "Changed Values in Advanced Industrial Societies, Vol. 14, No. 4, Jan. 1982. " see bibliography for full citation.

the new generation is in support of the established political party system. or not. Generation replacement theory can account for a whole generation and try to predict what consequence the generation would hold for the political system when the youth would eventually replace their elders in the political process. Historical experiences, environs mental conditions, value change, strength of socialization processes would all contribute to the emerging character of a new generation.

Generation replacement, and in particular the general character of the new generation will have an eventual, tremendous impact on the political system and the functioning of democracy.

These three theories: political alienation and efficacious theories, alignment theory and generation replacement and value change theory, demonstrate the emergence of a new generation of theory which is trying to explain current societal development. Decline in party support, and Political participation, emergence of disorder in the 1960's and 1970fs have directed scholastic research in a variety of directions.

Other directions already mentioned, have been: increased interest in socialization studies—childhood, adolescent and adults-beliefs, attitude studies, vote choice, class, short-term factors, and the phenomena known as posts materialism. All of these areas have been discussed in this study and do not need further

elaboration here. All of these approaches serve as practical inquiries into the general problem of change and political behavior. It is clear that a general emphasis on electoral behavior really encompasses multitude of potential research directions--all of the above being examples. Each of these topic areas of research has of information, one aspect of an offered a valuable piece larger puzzle that remains, somehow, to be put together. We don't yet know what picture the final solution to the puzzle will hold. All the parts have yet to be found, examined, polished and placed in its proper role in the puzzle.

At the same time, we need scholars who can come up with new generalized theories which can either help us locate the pieces of the puzzle or give us a creative view of the whole. Questions remain. How are we to relate all of these pieces? How do we integrate such diverse theory into a whole? How can we generalize the theory so that it will be relative in cross-national analysis?

if democracy is to be preserved institutions must be able to adjust to change. It is necessary to understand contemporary developments and how they will affect

the political, economic and social system in which we live. The broadened scope of inquiry demonstrates quite well that comparatives are meeting the challenge by demonstrating that they can come up with new theories which address new phenomena. It

is encouraging that intellectual inquiry is succeeding in furthering our understanding of previously intangible processes of the mind—cognition, attitudes, values, beliefs, socialization processes and political behavior. An overview of the direction of inquiry in the field of comparative studies has been presented. The study is not all inclusive, nor does it pretend to be. But, it does raise new issues of concern for comparatives and the research directions some scholars have taken in order to address the problems facing industrial democratic regimes. There is no end to inquiry, nor the richness of variety of subject interests. As changes in the structure, environment, and social conditions of societies occur, so the process of evolution of comparative study continues.

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