

Jordan Under The Hashemite's

BY
Dr. Naser Tahboub

المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية

رقم الإيداع لدى دائرة المكتبة الوطنية

(٢٠١٦/١١/٥٣٤٨)

٣٢٠.٩٥٦٥

Tahboub, Naser

Jordan Under The Hashemite's, Naser Tahboub.

Amman: The Author, 2016

(٤٠٢)P

Deposit No: 2016/11/5348

Descriptors:/Jordan// Policy

يتحمل المؤلف كامل المسؤولية القانونية عن محتوى مصنفه ولا يعتبر هذا المصنف عن رأي دائرة المكتبة الوطنية أو أي جهة حكومية أخرى.

This book, *Jordan Under The Hashemite's*, encompasses a breadth of knowledge, research, and study of international relations, political science, comparative politics, and the regional study of the Middle East.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In appreciation of the individuals who have provided encouragement, and academic support, as well as time, effort, and technical assistance, I would like to directly thank these individuals.

I would also like to thank all those who have granted interviews in Jordan and abroad, providing information and clarity regarding processes of Jordanian Foreign Policy. In particular, I would like to thank His Late Majesty King Hussien Ben Talal; His Royal Highness Prince Hassan; H.E. Zeid Rifai, former Prime Minister; H.E. Mr. Adnan Abu Odeh, Former Political Advisor to His Majesty King Hussein; H.E. Mr. Taher Al Masri, Former Prime Minister; H.E. Mr. Taher Kana'an, former Minister of Planning and Minister of Occupied Territories; H.E. The Late Dr. Abdul Aziz Al Khayat, Former Minister of Awkaf and Islamic Affairs; H.E. Hazem Nussiebeh, former Minister of State, Foreign Minister, and Jordan's Ambassador to the United Nations; Lieutenant-General Abdul Hadi Al Majali, Former Chief of the Public Security Department, and former Ambassador to the United States; H.E. The Late Dr. Nasser Eddin Al Assad, Former Minister of Higher Education; H.E. Mr. Shawkat Mahmoud, former Minister of Occupied Territories; H.E. Dr. Adnan Badran, Former Minister of Agriculture, and former President of Yarmouk University; H.E. Dr. Sami Joudeh, former Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs; H.E. Mrs. Ina'm Al Mufti, Former Director of Noor Al-Hussein foundation and former Minister of Culture and Social Development; H.E. Mrs. Laila Sharaf, former Minister of Information; Dr. Abed Al Salam Al Majali, former Prime Minister, President of the University of Jordan; Dr. Ahmad Sharkas, Former Director of Libraries and National Archives; H.E. the late Anwar Nussiebeh, former Governor of Jerusalem; Dr. Hanna Nasser, Former President of Bier Ziet University and former member of the Palestine National Council; Mr. Anwar Al Katib, former Governor of Jerusalem; Judge Tayseer Kana'an, former Judge of Jerusalem; Mr. Mohammad Milhelm, Former member of the P.L.O. Executive Council, and Former Mayor of Halhoul; the late Mr. Rashad Al Shawa, former Mayor of Gaza; the late Mr. Fahed Al Qawasmeh, former Mayor of Hebron; Brigadier Abed Al Razzaq Al Yahya, Member Of The P.L.O. Executive Council; Professor Albert Agazirizian, Bier Ziet University; Dr. Sa'eb Iriakat, Head Of The Palestinian Negotiating Team.

Also I would like to thank the numerous institutions and information services which gave support to this effort: Duke University Perkins Library; Jordan's Information Office in Washington, D.C.; the Georgetown University Library; Hoover Institute at Stanford University; the American Embassy in Jordan; the British Council Library in Amman; the University of Jordan; and the Jordanian Ministry of Information.

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	2
INTRODUCTION.....	1
Historical Context.....	2
Role of the Key Individual Decision-Maker.....	3
Domestic Environment	4
Structural Characteristics of Negotiations	4
External Environment.....	5
PART I.....	7
CHAPTER 1: Historical Overview	7
Creation of Jordan.....	7
Domestic Factors within the Ottoman Empire.....	13
Declaration of War and the Arab Revolt.....	16
Events at the End of WWI	20
Arab Armed Struggle and Kingship by Negotiation	22
Inter-Arab Politics.....	25
Ideology.....	33
Unity, East and West Banks Of The Jordan River	39
CHAPTER 2: Role of Key Decision-Makers	47
King Abdullah: Jordan’s First King.....	47

Jordan under Talal 1951-1952.....	60
Hussein bin Talal: King of Jordan 1953-1999	64
<i>King Hussein on the Domestic Front</i>	68
<i>King Hussein and Regional Politics</i>	77
King Hussein and International Relations	87
<i>King Hussein, Palestine and the Palestinians</i>	90
<i>King Hussein's Leadership</i>	99
CHAPTER 3: Jordan' Interests: Domestic, Regional and International.....	101
Post-1970 Domestic Factors in Jordan.....	107
<i>Geography</i>	107
<i>Population and Structural Stratification</i>	111
<i>Domestic Concerns & the Palestine Issue</i>	122
CHAPTER 4: Jordan/PLO Relations 1970-1985	129
CHAPTER 5: The February 11th Agreement - A Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Accord.....	159
Significance Of Accord: Jordan/Palestinian Relationship - Continuity And Change, 1921-1985.....	159
Domestic Factors	174
The PLO Factor	179
CHAPTER 6: Implementation of the February 11 th Agreement - Gains and losses	183
PART II.....	199
CHAPTER 7: Jordanian Diplomacy between February 11 Agreement and Madrid Peace Conference.....	199
Jordanian Diplomatic Efforts Supporting Moderation in the Region.....	199
The Arab Summit of 1987	201

<i>Efforts of Jordan To Bring The PLO Closer to the Moderate Camp</i>	203
The Palestinian Intifada and Jordan.....	205
Shultz Initiative.....	207
Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank	211
The Palestinian Peace Initiative and the Role of Jordan.....	213
The Shamir Plan.....	217
Mubarak’s Initiative	220
The Baker Plan.....	221
CHAPTER 8: Regional and International Shifts in the 1990s and their Impact on the Peace Process	225
The Gulf War	225
The Stance of Jordan on the Gulf War	227
The impact of Gulf War on Jordan	230
The Impact of Gulf War on Arab-Israeli Conflict.....	232
The Impact of the Fall of the Soviet Union on the Arab-Israeli Conflict	235
Immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel	237
The US Unilateral Management of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.....	239
Change in Israeli Stance Towards Peace.....	240
CHAPTER 9: Madrid Peace Conference.....	245

The Oslo Accords.....	255
<i>Principles of the Accord</i>	259
<i>Oslo I and Oslo II</i>	260
<i>Analyzing Oslo provisions</i>	264
<i>Impact of the Oslo Accords on the peace process</i>	277
The Jordanian- Israeli Peace Treaty.....	279
<i>Economic pressure</i>	289
<i>Political pressure</i>	291
The Peace Treaty	292
Boundaries, Sovereignty and Land	294
<i>Security</i>	296
Water	297
The Economy	299
<i>Refugees and Internally Displaced Palestinians</i>	302
<i>Places of Historical and Religious Significance and</i> <i>Interfaith Relations</i>	305
<i>The gains of Jordan and Israel from the Peace Treaty</i>	307
Developments In The Peace Process Until King Hussein’s Death.....	309
<i>Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference (29-</i> <i>31 October, 1995)</i>	309
<i>Jordanian support to the PNA</i>	310
<i>Developments in the Palestinian settlement</i>	312
CHAPTER 10: Reforms of King Abdullah II.....	317
Political Reforms	317
<i>Freedoms and Political Parties</i>	318
<i>The Political Role of Women</i>	319
Economic Reform	321

<i>The impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on Jordan</i>	328
Public Sector Reform.....	330
The Social Reform	333
We Are All Jordan.....	334
CHAPTER 11 – The Peace Process under King Abdullah II	337
The Roadmap for Peace.....	337
Palestinian Elections 2006	342
Post 9/11 Jordan.....	344
9/11 Attacks and their Impact on the Palestinian Cause	346
Us Invasion Of Iraq 2003.....	347
<i>The US invasion of Iraq and its impact on the Palestinian Cause</i>	348
<i>The US invasion and its impact on Jordan</i>	349
<i>The Amman Message</i>	351
Amman Bombings 2005	353
<i>Post- bombing Jordan</i>	354
Prelude to Israel-Lebanon War 2006	356
<i>The Arab and international stands during the Israel-Lebanon war</i>	358
<i>The Main International Efforts to End the Aggression on Lebanon</i>	361
The impact of the war on Israel	363

The War on Gaza.....	364
Iran Nuclear Program.....	368
CHAPTER 12: THE PATH OF REFORM IN LIGHT OF THE ARAB SPRING	375
JORDAN'S INTERNAL AND REGIONAL SITUATION	375
INDICATORS AND STAGES OF REFORM IN JORDAN.....	379
LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT.....	379
DISCUSSION PAPERS OF KING ABDULLAH II.....	381
POPULAR MOVEMENT:	384
THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM:.....	386
MODERN ELECTORAL AND PARTY LAWS	387
DECENTRALIZATION.....	389
STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS	389
A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO COMBAT EXTREMISM IN ALL ITS FORMS	391
COMPONENTS OF A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT EXTREMISM:.....	392
CONCLUSION.....	397
APPENDIX.....	401
TEXTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS	401
PEACE PROPOSALS:.....	403
BIBLIOGRAPHY/PERIODICALS.....	409

INTRODUCTION

When the French and the British drew the boundaries and borders of what would become the Middle East with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, they sealed the fate of the region. The effects of having its borders imposed by outsiders, creating a small nation state with limited resources surrounded by larger, wealthier and more powerful regimes, has had a tremendous influence on the history of modern Jordan. Yet, despite being a small country with no oil and limited water reserves in a turbulent region, historically Jordan has continued to play an important role in the Arab world and has exerted influence and practiced diplomacy beyond the size of the state.

Jordan's foreign policy has always been a balancing act of pursuing national interests and providing for the welfare of its citizens, while at the same time fulfilling its stated commitment to the overall prosperity, peace and identity of the Middle East. Due to its geography, and cultural and historical ties Jordan has never had the option to isolate itself and has always identified as part of the greater Arab world and felt a responsibility to be an active advocate and participant within it.

As a small economy with a growing population that has often been pressured to submit to the will of dominant forces in the Middle East and internationally, Jordan has continually found itself in a balancing act of relations, of being a "good neighbour", remaining friendly with international powers, and taking care of its own citizens.

The issue that has continued to engage Jordan and influence its relationships and policies is that of the Arab Israeli war and the Palestinian question.

This book will focus on Jordanian foreign policy by dividing its history into two parts. Part I will focus on the history of the formation of Jordan in 1921 until the signing of

the February 11th Agreement, and Part II will continue from the effects of the February 11th Agreement to 2009.

In 1985 a document known as the February 11th Agreement was signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in which the political relationship between the two entities was defined. Many commentators and analysts view this agreement as one of the most significant developments in Jordanian politics. For the first time in the history of the Middle East conflict, Jordan and the PLO had structured a proposal for peaceful negotiations with the State of Israel.

The February 11th Agreement was significant not only for the specific feature of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian peace initiative, but also with respect to its non-specified features: namely a definition of Jordanian-Palestinian relations reflecting changed attitudes and conditions in the 1980's, and the long-term commitment of the Jordanian-Palestinian understanding irrespective of the success of the peace initiative.

Historical Context

In seeking to understand Jordanian foreign policy, it is vital to recognize the historical context of Jordan's history as a manifestation of the structural transformation of the Middle East at the end of WWI, and the formation of Transjordan in 1921 under the leadership of Emir Abdullah ibn Hussein, subject to British mandatory control. The effects of the international system and external influence on regional and Transjordanian politics are important elements that have shaped Jordanian foreign policy.¹ The personal characteristics and values of King

¹ The case concepts of Historical Context and External Environment--specifically systemic structure and the international system--are employed with reference to Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing company, 1979, within the parameters of this study, and the relevant issues

Abdullah, in conjunction with the degree of continuity and change implicit in the transference of the Hashemite legacy to his grandson, King Hussein ibn Talal, are additional factors which must be assessed if we are to understand the external influences involved, and the role of key personalities and individuals with regard to decision-making processes in Jordan.

Role of the Key Individual Decision-Maker

As Fred Ikle points out, officials who play a role in negotiations are influenced by their own sympathies and/or hostilities; they may also respond to anger, impatience or feelings of gratitude.¹

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a monarchy and, as such, one area of analysis must focus on the perceptions and attributes of King Hussein. As a leader, participant in the negotiations, and as an institution in himself, King Hussein's role must be carefully studied, particularly the constraints placed upon the King by identifying his goals and objectives for Jordan and the Palestinian peoples, and by assessing the impact of his perceptions on the construction of Jordanian foreign policy and negotiating positions.

Concerning the appropriateness of studying the role of the individual I would refer to the following extract from a tribute to Abd al-Hamid Sharaf in the book The Shaping of an Arab Statesman:

The Middle East is a part of the world where, in the absence of strong institutions, men put their personal imprint on events. The style of government is shaped, the tone of society

of power configurations, balance of power politics, distribution of power, and structures of power and their inter-relationships.

¹ Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, Harvard University, 1967. p. 143. Another excellent book on bargaining behavior is: I. William Zartman, The 50% Solution, Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976.

set, even to a large extent the quality of life determined by the man at the top...¹

Domestic Environment

The domestic environment of decision-making and negotiation has also played a key role in defining Jordanian foreign policy. The domestic environment includes, among other variables, geography, population and social structures.² An analysis of the domestic environment will reveal something of the capabilities and constraints affecting the national government in formulating and implementing foreign policy decisions, initiatives and negotiating positions; and it is this environment which forms the context within which concrete action can be taken with a reasonable chance of success or failure. Five dimensions of the domestic environment will be emphasized:

- 1) the interaction of domestic affairs with regional and international politics.
- 2) domestic concerns and the Palestine Issue.
- 3) Jordan's geographic location and composition.
- 4) population and social structures.
- 5) economic growth and development.

Structural Characteristics of Negotiations

The structural characteristics of negotiations historically in the region have also informed and influenced Jordan's choices over the years. As Neale and Bazeman, for example, point out, such characteristics constitute one of the main lines of research

¹ Patrick Seale, Editor, The Shaping of an Arab Statesman: Abd al-Hamid Sharaf and the Modern Arab World, New York: Quartet Books, 1983, p. 1.

² Bahgat Kordany and Ali E. Dessouki, et al., in The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1984; identifies and describes four dimensions of what is termed domestic environment; they are: "a nation's geography, economic capability, population and social structure and military capability." Within the context of the dissertation all of these elements will be addressed.

in connection with explanations of negotiation behavior.¹ Structural characteristics are defined as "those characteristics of the negotiating situation which explain why negotiators failed or succeeded in reaching a negotiated resolution to a dispute,"² and two structural characteristics are prominent in the literature, third-party effects and the effects of constituencies. Specifically, an examination of the pressures generated by various third parties, and by Jordanian and Palestinian constituencies.

External Environment

The external environment affecting Jordanian foreign policy decisions and outcomes include:

- 1) the structure of the international system, as that system is affected by the balance of power configuration; more specifically, the effects of the distribution of power enabling the major imperial powers of Great Britain and France to transform and dominate the structure of Middle East affairs until the end of WWII, after which a change in power structure to an East/West dichotomy--the U.S./Soviet Union bi-polarity and spheres of influence--replaced Britain's once dominant position as an imperial power in the region.
- 2) the international system--the precise interconnection between inter-state relations, international organizations and regional groupings on the international level--in connection with the specific issue of the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The very nature of the conflict was internationalized, at its inception, when the League of Nations took it upon itself, through the instrument of the Middle East mandate system, to award Great Britain and France complete administrative and military control over Middle East territories in the early 1920s.

¹ Margaret A. Neale and Max H. Baperman, "Perspectives for Understanding Negotiation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 29, No. 1, March, 1985, p. 36.

² Ibid. p. 36.

The non-resolution of the Palestine question, in conjunction with the historical origins of the conflict and the role of the United Nations, has kept the conflict an international issue.¹

The systemic structure and international system dimension of the external environment will be addressed within the parameters of this study, as such dimensions help to explain Jordan's foreign policy posture.

3)Regional politics will be the predominant environmental factor examined in this book. The network of relationships implied by the concept "regional politics" includes inter-Arab state relationships, both on a bi-lateral and multi-lateral basis; inter-Arab relations within the regional organization, i.e., the Arab League; and Arab-state relations with Israel. The contextual content of regional politics must be presented within the framework of its impact on Jordan's foreign policy after 1921, and on the central issue of the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We must attempt to establish the degree to which environmental factors had a serious impact on Jordanian foreign policy.

¹ As represented by successive United Nations Resolutions on the subject, international proposals for a solution to the conflict and attempts to convene an international conference in Geneva.

PART I

CHAPTER 1: Historical Overview

Creation of Jordan

During the early twentieth century, the balance of power in the international system was dominated by the imperial powers of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. International relations were structured by power preponderance of actors, strategies for furthering national interests and the willingness of actors to use force to attain national goals. The international system of the early 20th century could be characterized as one of extra-territorial acquisition through imperial policies of colonial control, or the annexation of foreign territories into aggrandized empires. Within the international system of independent, interacting nation states, the Middle East became subservient to the grander political intrigue of global power politics and interests.

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire into de facto protectorates of Great Britain and France, an internationally sanctioned system of mandates awarded by the League of Nations, was made possible by an interplay of systemic international factors and domestic developments in the Ottoman Empire at the outset of World War I, and by the role of the Hashemites, an Arab dynasty in the Hejaz region of Arabia, in waging the Great Arab Revolt.

At the international level the primary areas of national concern for the five major power brokers were:

- 1) extension of the territorial and economic base of the motherland by means of territorial acquisition,

colonization and the winning of spheres of influence

- 2) maintenance of lines of communication
- 3) maintenance of open markets for natural resources
- 4) maintenance of sources of labor and manpower
- 5) protection and maintenance of markets for manufactured goods and trade.

Whereas India became the jewel in the crown of Britain's extended empire, alongside territories such as Egypt and Iraq that assured continued access to it, and France had extended extraterritorial relations with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in the North African Maghreb, Germany's foreign posture was directed toward Europe.

Germany's foreign policy decision to engage in the optimal use of military force to enhance its territorial and economic base in Europe was, in part, a response to the underlying power struggle taking place at the international level, among the main power blocs, to consolidate bases for imperial expansion and to seek enhanced national security against the uncertain fluidity of changing alliances.

Germany's expansive drive in Europe, and the perceived threat of the consequences of its success, resulted in an alliance of convenience between Great Britain, France, and Russia, united in their desire to prevent a continental Germanic power that could threaten the existing balance of power within the international system.

Within the context of power politics the Ottoman Empire was a non-actor. The empire, burdened with overwhelming internal domestic problems, posed no serious threat to the overall structure of the systemic balance of power, and the power struggle on the European front was not of any direct concern to the Eastern Empire. However, by declaring war on

Britain and Russia, the Turks involved the Ottoman Empire in a war that extended the European battleground. Britain and France were compelled to defend the outer reaches of their empires, and Russia was forced to protect and enhance its contiguous border along the Ottoman frontier.

The Ottoman Empire became a pawn manipulated by the big powers for their own interests. For Germany the empire was a critical element in its war strategy to free German troops on the European front, while simultaneously forcing Russia to deploy troops not only in Europe but on its southern flank along the Ottoman frontier, and to disperse British and French war efforts among several theaters.

In strategic geopolitical terms, the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the European conflict underscored for the potential threat of a militarily powerful and unified Near East continental empire, and of the Ottoman Empire to European imperial interests in the Near East, North Africa and South-west Asia. During the course of the war, therefore, the British and French arrived at a secret agreement, known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement of February 1916, which essentially provided for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and de facto protectorate status for the territories of the Fertile Crescent and Levant (Greater Syria), and Mesopotamia (Iraq), which were to be placed under the control of Great Britain and France. The agreement held that, if the war ended in victory Syria would be ceded to France, and Palestine and Iraq to Great Britain.¹

The strategic value of a dismembered Ottoman Empire to Britain and France was not the only consideration behind such

¹ Palestine, traditionally part of Greater Syria, was placed under British control to fulfill its wartime commitment to the Jews to establish a homeland: the Balfour Declaration.

action, imperial interests were also at stake. For France, its empire proved critical to its wartime efforts and survival. During WWI "the empire had supplied France with 1,918,000 troops, 680,000 of whom had actually fought on Europe's battlefields."¹ "The empire had also supplied nearly a billion francs in money and two and a half million tons of products including grains, oils, and other vital food stuffs."² France had a long history of investment and religious ties in Syria. "Through the years, French industrialists had cultivated Syria's vineyards, its wheat, barley, cotton, hemp, and silk."³ Economic interests alone were sufficient cause for the French to seek control, and for eventual annexation of Syria to the French Empire. As Lloyd George noted, "The French had managed to impress upon the Arabs and the British that they had no intention of quitting Syria once they were in control, and that their real purpose was to annex the country and constitute it an integral part of the Empire."⁴ But beyond the economic interests, there were also political motives for France in controlling Syria.

Syria was the heart and mind of political and intellectual activity for Arabs during the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The intellectual nucleus of the Arab revolt was in Damascus, and it was to Damascus that Arab people looked for the formation a united Arab kingdom. This nationalistic Arab drive for independence posed a serious threat to France's continued control over the North African Empire, which was its life-blood. Thus France's political interests in Syria lay in eradicating any form of nationalistic fervor or movement for an independent

¹ Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East 1914-1924, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. pg.259.

² Ibid. p. 260.

³ Ibid. p. 260.

⁴ Ibid. p. 277.

state. Annexation and integration of Syria into the expansive French Empire would serve not only to protect its strategic and economic interests, but also to prevent an indigenous Arab nationalist awakening from inflaming France's North African colonies to call for self-determination. For France, the only answer was to implement policies geared toward the integration of Syria into Greater France.

Great Britain, like France, had strategic, economic and political interests in controlling Mesopotamia and Palestine. In strategic terms, Britain's primary foreign policy interest was to maintain maritime superiority and lines of communication with its imperial interests in Egypt, Persia, India, and the Cape of the Horn of Africa. For this purpose Britain required a territorial base from which to protect its interests in the region, Transjordan; peace and harmony in the territorial region of Iraq; and also "...Britain required control of Palestine for reasons largely associated with the defense of Egypt, including the use of Haifa as a Mediterranean naval base and the construction of a railroad and pipeline from Mesopotamia to the sea..."¹

For Great Britain the primary economic interest in Mesopotamia was oil. The Mosul oil fields were a leading source of contention between Britain and France in their final negotiations for the division of the spoils of the Arab territories. "On April 25, 1920, the final version of the oil pact was signed by Sir John Cadman and Berthelot, (re: allocation of 25 percent of shares of the Mosul oil fields to France, port and pipeline rights in the French Blue and A zones of Syria to Britain, and an additional British request for a railroad easement across Syrian territory). On the following day the Supreme Council

¹ Ibid. p. 282.

unanimously awarded the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia to Britain and for Syria to France."¹

On the strength of political considerations and de facto military occupation of Arab territories at the end of the war, Great Britain was able to argue decisively that it should be awarded the Palestine mandate in order to fulfill its wartime commitments. Britain's foreign policy during WWI had victory in war as its primary goal, and survival for itself and its empire. Britain, therefore, made conflicting promises to the Jews and to the Arabs to secure their help in its war effort. On the one hand the Balfour Declaration promised a homeland to the Jews, and on the other hand the Hussein-McMahon correspondence promised the Arabs independence and control over all Arab lands liberated by the end of the war. The impossibility of fulfilling both of these naturally contradictory promises was not initially a problem for Britain. As evidenced by Britain's actions at the end of the war, they intended to facilitate neither Arab independence nor a Zionist homeland, but to redefine these promises within the context of extending British imperial control to the newly acquired territories. Mesopotamia would become another India,² and Palestine would be managed to allow for controlled Jewish immigration, with limited Palestinian

¹ Ibid. p. 279.

² On March 29, 1918 a guideline was issued by London for moves toward Arab self-government, this guideline "...was rejected by Sir Percy Cox, the Commissioner (under the Indian army) for occupied Mesopotamia. ...Cox intended to run the country his way, the only "practical" way, under tight military rule and with the Indian forces who had conquered the land," Ibid. p. 367. "During the ensuing year (1919), therefore, a tight, centralized, Indian style government was officially reinforced and heavily staffed with Indian civil servants under the direction of British Senior officials. The very titles carried by the bureaucracy in New Dehli--civil commissioner, political officer, revenue officer, judicial officer--were precisely reproduced in this miniature Indian administration. So was the Indian legal Code and even the Indian currency, based on the rupee," Ibid. pgs. 368-369.

autonomy under British military and administrative control. Palestine and Mesopotamia were to be managed to serve the strategic, economic and political interests of the British Empire.

Domestic Factors within the Ottoman Empire

Domestic factors within the Ottoman Empire created easy opportunities for external manipulation of, and interference in, the internal affairs of the Empire.

The Ottoman Empire had long been subject to foreign influences, as represented by the capitulations and independent status of foreign nationals within the Empire and by targeted national minorities, the emphasis laid on the diversity of traditions, culture and religion among ethnic groups. This eventually gave rise to Turkish nationalism and the 1908 Turkish revolution, in which the ruling elite instituted major structural and policy changes aimed at imposing a nationally cohesive, unitary Turkish identity on the majority Arab population. The Turkish move to implement its revolutionary ideology evoked reactionary responses among the Arab population, with the Arab majority refusing to be assimilated into Turkish language and culture. In their drive toward self-identity, as influenced by Western intellectualism and preferences, the Turks became responsible for creating the conditions leading up to the Great Arab Revolt.

Extensive changes were instituted within the Ottoman Empire. The Turks set up a new administrative system, Arab participation in parliament and the government was restricted, the structure of the military was changed, Turkish became the official language in both government and schools, and school curriculums emphasized Turkish culture and traditions. Rebellions against Turkish rule under its new policies erupted throughout the Empire, most notably in 'Asir, Yemen, "Albania,

the Druze mountains and Kerak...".¹ "Syria demanded decentralization; Ibn Saud² occupied al-Ihsa."³ Within the context of a single nation remaining unified, Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the Emir of Mecca, favoured Ottoman unity and put down a series of rebellions. The uprisings were met with uncompromising military force and harsh, repressive tactics by the Ottoman army. "Delegations came from Syria to the Hejaz and submitted petitions to the Sharif of Mecca,"⁴ describing conditions facing the Arabs. The Sharif began to contemplate his options.

In actual reality the Ottoman army lacked the capacity to exert complete military control over the entire territorial base of the Empire without foreign interference or Arab support. The Turks were dependent on military supplies from Germany, while Great Britain exerted a sphere of influence over Egypt, and the strategically located Kuwait.⁵ The Italians were in Eritrea, and by 1911 Italy had drawn up a plan for the conquest of Libya.⁶ Britain recognized Turkey's suzerainty over Kuwait, but thwarted its attempt to establish actual sovereignty, preferring local independence for fear that "sovereignty would lead sooner

¹ King Abdullah, *Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan*, Edited by Philip P. Graves, London: Alden press, 1951. pg. 245.

² Ibn Saud, of the Saud family, returned from exile to the Hejaz in 1902, and waged a campaign to reconquer the Arabian Peninsula, which had been under Saud rule in the 1700's.

Saudi Arabia became an independent state in 1927, after a brief period of British protector ship.

³ Ibid. p. 246.

⁴ Ibid. p. 246.

⁵ "A deep-water port at the head of the Persian Gulf and an ideal terminus for the planned Baghdad railway, Kuwait had become the centre of rival international ambitions at the end of the nineteenth century," (from: Ibid. p. 73, footnote #4).

⁶ Ibid. p. 74, footnote #1.

or later to the establishment of the Germans on the Gulf."¹ Britain used the threat of military force to make its position clear. Italy was just as eager as Britain to improve its status in the area, and it seized the opportunity of Arab rebellions in 'Asir and Yemen to further its own position. The "Italians were ready to assist the Idrisis and the Iman with supplies of rifles and ammunition in order to create diversions out of which they might ultimately obtain political advantages."²

Sharif Hussein was aware of the political machinations of foreign powers. His first conviction was against Arab separation, for fear of the consequences of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the weakness and initial chaos of separatist states, and the prospect of foreign intrigue. Only two options were available to remedy the existing state of affairs, to seek political accommodation with the Ottoman Turks, or to consolidate and initiate a unified, independent Arab Kingdom. At the time of the outbreak of WWI dual negotiations were initiated "between the Sharif and the Unionists ... "³ on the one hand, and with Great Britain on the other.

¹ Ibid. p. 73, footnote #4. More fully, the note states as follows: "Its able ruler, Mubarak ibn Sabah, though his predecessors had recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey was determined to maintain complete local independence. The British Government did not deny Turkish suzerainty, but they challenged the Turkish right to convert this into sovereignty, being convinced that sovereignty would lead sooner or later to the establishment of the Germans on the Gulf. Turkish attempts to bring Kuwait into their power by using the Ibn Rashid Amir against Mubarak were checked by British diplomatic action at the Porte and, in 1901, by the dispatch of a cruiser to support Mubarak against a threatened attack."

² Ibid. p. 74, footnote #1.

³ Ibid. p. 246. The full passage is as follows: "Meanwhile negotiations were being conducted between the Sherif and the Unionists sometimes by correspondence and sometimes through Amir Faisal (correspondence was also exchanged with Great Britain in an attempt to foster Arab independence)."

Declaration of War and the Arab Revolt

Domestic and international considerations became a factor in the final decision to wage an Arab revolution against the Ottoman Empire, as the Ottoman Turks persistently tried to implement policies contrary to the interests of the Sharif of Mecca, and of the Arabs generally. Two major factors were the Turks' decision to build a railway from Medina to Mecca, from Jeddah to Mecca and from Yanbo to Medina, which would have a severe impact on the trade routes and commerce of the Sharif's patrons; and Turkish insistence on extending the Provisional Law reforms to the Hejaz, effectively making the area a provincial state of the Ottoman Empire. The Sharif, as custodian of the Holy Land and religious sites, had enjoyed considerable independence and his political concern to defend his power base in the Hejaz, protect the interests of his patronage, and fulfill the duties of his office were contrary to Turkish interests. The last major factor providing the impetus for the Arab revolution was the entry of the Ottoman Empire into WWI in support of the Germans. As his letter to His Majesty Sultan Muhammad Rashad makes clear, the Sharif was opposed to this course of action:¹

Your Majesty appreciates that the end of the Balkan War left us weak and ill prepared for hostilities. It would be extremely dangerous to enter this war on the side of Germany. We depend upon Germany for the greater part of our arms and ammunition. The Ottoman arms factories are not sufficient to provide our armies with essential supplies, nor are they in a position to replace losses of

¹ Ibid. pgs. 128-129.

guns or equipment. Besides, the southern portions of the Empire, Basra, Yemen and the Hejaz, are exposed to attack from hostile navies. The Government cannot rely on the inhabitants of these outlying provinces to defend themselves as they are neither organized nor armed. I therefore entreat your Majesty in the name of God not to enter the war on the side of Germany, as this would be either ignorance or high treason.

The Sharif's advice was not heeded, and in October 1914 the Ottoman Empire entered the war in alliance with Germany.

In entering this war the Turks embarked on a venture that was unjustified by any consideration of national advantage and accentuated vital risks to the security and viability of the Ottoman Empire. Strategic and military factors alone cast doubt on the credibility of such action and the possibility of success. With the intervention of foreign powers in providing weapons and supplies for rebellious factions in the outlying districts of the Empire, and the threat of hostile navies in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and Red Sea, the Turks' action was viewed by many as foolish. The Arab assessment of these conditions led them to favour Arab separatism and independence rather than being subjected either to Turkish rule and the consequences of its actions, or to foreign subjugation through occupation or terms of surrender in war. The Hussein-McMahon correspondence, an exchange of letters between the Sharif of Mecca and the British High Commissioner of Egypt between 1915 and 1916, was to provide the terms and the circumstances under which the Arabs would wage the Great Arab Revolt, which was the irrefutable cause of the Ottoman Empire's demise and its ultimate surrender to the Allied Army.

After the Ottoman entry into the war as an ally of Germany, Great Britain denounced the action and immediately initiated contact with Sharif Hussein, offering to finance and supply an Arab revolt. After two years of negotiations the Arabs, on June 10, 1916, began the Arab Revolt at "Mecca, Taif, Jedda and the other Hejaz towns, with the issue of a proclamation by His Highness the Sharif Husain ibn Ali."¹ The Hussein-McMahon correspondence provided the terms of the agreement between the Arabs and the British, on the basis of which the Arab Revolt was to be waged. King Abdullah provided, in his memoirs, a basic summary of the conditions established in the correspondence:²

The gist of it was that Great Britain would help the Arabs in their fight for liberation until the evacuation by the Turks and Germans of the Arab countries had been completed. The boundaries of those countries were defined by my father in accordance with the statement drawn up by the Central Committee of the Young Arab Party in Syria.³ From Alexandretta southwards to the Egyptian border at Rafah; thence to

¹ Ibid. p. 142.

² Ibid. p. 134.

³ For the Arabs Damascus was the political and intellectual center of the Empire, and from there arose the nucleus of secret societies and associations which conspired to organize Arab independence from the Ottoman Turks. It was in Damascus that the protocol for Arab cooperation with Great Britain was formulated. "There Faisal (in Damascus) met leaders of the 'Fatat' secret society and later with officers belonging to the secret military association known to its initiates as 'al-Ahd'. ...on his return in May (he) found that his friends in the secret associations had drawn up 'a protocol defining the conditions on which the Arab leaders would be prepared to co-operate with Great Britain against Turkey'. They wished him to lay this protocol before his father. This he did and six of the leaders took an oath binding themselves to recognize Sharif Husain of Mecca as the spokesman of the Arabs and, should he secure an agreement with Great Britain on the basis of the Protocol, to raise the Arab troops in Syria against the Turks," (Editor's Note, (b); Ibid. p. 140).

*Sinai on the Red Sea, westwards through Muscat and Oman, turning north to Bahrain and Kuwait, eastwards skirting the province of Basra and the frontier of Iran, northwards to the frontier points of the Arab countries in Kurdistan; and then westwards including Jazirah and Mosul with the province of Aleppo and back again to Alexandretta.*¹

The Arab Revolt was conceived and implemented with the single objective of instituting an independent United Arab Kingdom. "At that time the Arab nation had the fundamental requirements for standing on its own. Arabs were in a vast majority in the provinces of Palestine, Beirut, Aleppo, Syria, Baghdad, Mosul, Basra and the Hejaz. Arab men held the highest posts in administrative, judicial and military circles in the Ottoman Empire. The Arab Corps of the Ottoman Army had centres at Damascus, Baghdad and the Hejaz, and bore heavy responsibilities."² The success of the Arab Revolt culminated in Allied victory in WWI and the liberation of Arab territories from Turkish control, but not in Arab independence. Arab political, military and economic determination and capacity for self rule was indisputable, but this was denied by the principal Arab ally, Great Britain. The betrayal was, first, Great Britain's promise to France--the Sykes-Picot Agreement of February 1916, dividing the Arab territories between France and Britain; second, the Hussein-McMahon correspondence setting the terms of

¹ "...the Lebanon and Palestine were recognized as falling within the Arab borders. Britain excluded those Arab Emirates which had contractual connections with the Government of India, namely Nejd, Bahrain, and the Sultanates of Muscat and Oman, and of Hadramaut and Lahej, together with Aden and the six neighbouring protectorates. Great Britain undertook not to conclude peace with Turkey or Germany before the complete liberation of the following countries: Yemen, 'Asir, Hail and the whole of Iraq and Syria," Ibid. p. 247.

² Ibid. p. 247.

agreement for the Arab revolt, namely independence for all liberated Arab territories, initiated in June 1916; and third, the Balfour Declaration of 1917, promising the Jews a homeland in Palestine.

Events at the End of WWI

At the end of WWI, Great Britain was in military control of all liberated Arab territories-- classified as Occupied Enemy Territory (OET) --with 200,000 troops on the ground.¹ Lord Milner, Lloyd George's foreign affairs adviser "...fully endorsed the original provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by which France would control the Syrian littoral, and Feisal and his Arab colleagues would govern the interior with the help of French money and guidance."² Towards this end the decision was made, on September 13, 1919, that the British army would evacuate Syria in fulfillment of its agreement with France. It was well known that once the French military occupied Syria the territory would be treated as a province of the French Empire. Feisal, the son of the Sharif of Mecca, entered into negotiations with the British, trying to dissuade them from this course of action, and then with the French in order to extract some concessions. Both ventures failed. The British were resolved to maintain good relations with France at any cost, while the Feisal-Clemenceau agreement was so detrimental to the interests of Arab independence that it was rejected by a reconvened General Syrian Congress.

On March 7, 1920, the General Syrian Congress "repudiated the Feisal-Clemenceau agreement and proclaimed the full and undivided independence of Syria, including

¹ The French army had a token 6,000 troops representing its interests in the region.

² Howard m. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East 1914-1924, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. pg. 261.

Palestine. The delegates simultaneously announced the election of Feisal as their constitutional king, and "the termination of the present occupying military governments in the three Zones," under British military control. "The Lebanon was promised autonomy..(and on) March 8, the declaration was read... (which) announced the birth of the new kingdom. ...another proclamation declared the "complete independence of Iraq" under the kingship of Feisal's older brother, Abdullah. Feisal proceeded to establish a cabinet and promise a reign of law, order, equality, and the protection of all foreign interests. A committee was appointed to draft a Syrian constitution, and after ten weeks produced a text loosely modeled on European lines, but discreetly silent on the question of the new kingdom's boundaries. Feisal meanwhile sent telegrams of friendship to the major Allied capitals, not excluding France. Paris ignored the communication. From London, an angered Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, warned Feisal that Britain would not recognize the self-appointed regime, and assuredly would not countenance the right of any group of people in Damascus to speak on behalf of Palestine and Mesopotamia."¹

The problem the Arabs faced was British military occupation of Greater Syria and Mesopotamia. The formidable military force maintained by Great Britain in the region precluded Arab chances of successfully waging military action to liberate Arab territories in Iraq and Palestine from British control. In Syria, Feisal had been given limited independence and enjoyed a political and military base, but it was insufficient to defeat the French army bolstered with soldiers recruited from the Greater French Empire. The actions of the Syrian Congress in declaring independent kingships in Greater Syria (including

¹ Ibid. p. 275.

Palestine) and Iraq, and symbolically nullifying Britain's military governments in the area, elicited a hastily convened meeting between the British and French, in non-compromising urgency, to settle the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement amongst themselves. The results of this were the provisions to sever the Arab territories from the Ottoman Empire, and the arrangement of mandates to be awarded to Great Britain and France.¹ The British would maintain military control over Iraq and Palestine, and France would be awarded Syria. Once the British vacated Syria, Feisal's regime in Damascus would be subjected to French military conquest and occupation.

Arab Armed Struggle and Kingship by Negotiation

The British military disengagement from Syria, in order to honour the wartime commitment of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, proved disastrous for British foreign policy strategy in the region. French occupation of Damascus on July 26, 1920, and the expulsion of Feisal, touched off a series of events culminating in a reversal of British policy and the submission of a proposal with terms for the creation of two Arab Kingdoms, one of Iraq and the other of Transjordan.

With Feisal's expulsion from Syria, four simultaneous events threatened Britain's position in Mesopotamia and Palestine. First, nationalist sentiment, as represented by the Syrian Congress declaration of Arab independence and annulment of foreign occupying military governments, spread throughout the Arab region as a result of the French overthrow of the Damascus regime. Arab nationalism and determination to establish Arab independence became manifest in simultaneous

¹ The British-French agreement on settlement terms in accordance with the Sykes-Picot accord were decided on April 19, 1920, in San Remo; The agreement served as the basis of Article 94 of the Turkish Treaty.

revolts in Mesopotamia¹ and Palestine,² creating the second and third events against continued British military occupation. The fourth event was the decision of Abdullah to raise a military expeditionary force against the French to help reinstate Feisal as king of Syria.³ The impact of these simultaneously occurring events, the media coverage in Britain, the human and material costs, and the timing following the conclusion of World War I, brought intense pressure on the British government to find a solution.

In March 1921 Churchill convened a Middle East Conference in Cairo to discuss developments in the region. Great Britain's primary concern had been to protect its political, economic and strategic interests in the area, these interests involving the maintenance of good relations with France, and a controlled, peaceful environment in Mesopotamia and Palestine.

¹ In August 1920, after the French military forces occupied Damascus and expelled Feisal, Jamal al-Midafi, who had served as an officer under Feisal in the 1916 Arab Revolt, organized a military liberation force of 300 men against the British in Mesopotamia. Spontaneous armed struggle arose throughout various sectors of the region against the British and Indian garrisons and military positions. A provisional Arab government was formed. The liberation movement and provisional government collapsed in 1921 when the British Empire reinforced its military position with a force of 30,000 men, 25,000 Indian and 5,000 British.

² After the dissolution of the Damascus regime under Feisal, the focus of Arab nationalism shifted to outlying areas in Mesopotamia and Palestine, under the leadership of officers of the 1916 revolt or traditional familial power bases. In Palestine the torch of nationalist sentiment was carried by two leading families: the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. Armed violence, demonstrations and civil disturbances were conducted against the British occupation of Palestine and against the implementation of the Balfour Declaration.

³ In August 1920 Abdullah entered 'Transjordan' on his way to Syria via the Hejaz Railroad, to reinstall his brother Feisal as King of Syria. Abdullah intended to prolong his journey in order to give the British time to consider their options. It was not until 1921 that Abdullah entered Kerak, where he met Alec Kirkbridge. Churchill was convening a Middle East Conference at the time to discuss developments in the region. Abdullah's next stop was Amman.

At stake was the protection of Britain's lines of communication and naval predominance within its extended empire, and various economic interests, including oil, trade, sources of labour and natural resources. These interests were being threatened and the cost of maintaining them was becoming too great. The solution, to re-establish a semblance of stability and pacify the Arab national uprising for independence, was to propose the establishment of an Arab kingdom in Iraq under the kingship of Feisal,¹ and an Arab kingdom in what was to be called Transjordan under the kingship of Abdullah, but under specific conditions. On March 24, 1921, the proposals were communicated to the parties involved.

The terms for Abdullah's kingship of Transjordan were he "would abjure any further action against the French. He would additionally renounce his claims to Iraq, maintain order in Transjordan, and recognize Transjordan as an integral part of the Palestine mandate. Finally, the Emir would establish an Arab government in Amman and administer the territory in the name of the British mandate. In return, Britain would undertake to provide Abdullah with a monthly subsidy, with trained advisers, and with the assurance of Transjordanian independence at some future date. On March 27, 1921, Abdullah accepted the offer."²

In the 1920s the configuration of the Arab territories severed from the Ottoman Empire was not that to which the

¹ Feisal accepted the British offer of the kingship of Iraq on March 1, 1921, but the terms of agreement were subjected to prolonged negotiations and delay by Iraqi political leaders. In the case of Iraq, Britain initiated a formal relationship governed by treaty, but, in fact, the terms of the mandate constituted the operating document directing British-Iraqi relations. The treaty was submitted to the Iraqi Council of Ministers on February 19, 1922, signed October 10, 1922, and ratified under British "persuasion" by the Iraqi Assembly June 10, 1924. The treaty was then submitted to the Council of the League of Nations and adopted September 27, 1924.

² Ibid. pgs. 403-404.

Arabs had aspired, a unified Arab kingdom, but rather a land divided on the basis of British and French interests in the region. Whether by mandate or treaty, the reality of Arab relations with Great Britain was one of foreign control with limited autonomy.

Inter-Arab Politics

Arab politics from WWI up until the 1950's was primarily concerned with three issues: 1) liberation from foreign control; 2) governmental organization, institutionalization and consolidation of power; 3) relations between mandated power and subject mandee. The common theme in Arab efforts was action directed towards independence and Arab unity. The fact that the mandated territories had been artificially segmented into territorial units according to French and British national interests, and that the areas continued to be subjected to strict military control, forced the concentration of liberation movements into segmented movements, directed against the centralized military occupation forces.

The superficiality of these geographic units on the popular level was clearly manifest in the continual, recurring incidence of Arab insurrections, revolts and uprisings, which seemingly appeared spontaneously in one locality, only to spread throughout the Arab world. Reflecting this pattern were the Great Arab Revolt in 1915, continuing through WWI, the Second Arab Revolt of 1921 (for independence and abrogation of the mandate system), and the third substantive revolt of 1936-37, which forced Great Britain and France to accommodate Arab aspirations by exchanging the mandate system for a series of treaties with Syria, Iraq and Egypt.¹

¹ The three substantive series of Arab Revolts just listed--1915, continuing through WWI, 1921, 1936-37--are notable for the magnitude of resistance against occupation. However, it must be noted that resistance and uprisings erupted continually throughout

In reality the replacement of the mandate system by a treaty relationship did not change the power relationship between Great Britain, France and their respective spheres of influence, for the treaty terms continued to protect the interests of the major powers as specified under the mandate. The single event that unconditionally altered power politics in the Middle East and ensured Arab independence from British and French control was the outbreak of WWII and the consequences of the war for the political, economic and military position of these two great powers with respect to their imperial empires.

In 1936, the Arab revolt marked a sustained, violent military challenge to French and British suzerainty, and, on the European front, it marked the first stage of Hitler's strategic plan to make Europe Germany's empire. In 1939 Britain and France declared war on Germany, and France, forced to sue for an armistice, subsequently surrendered to Germany, which cast doubt on the status of France's imperial territories and external armed forces. Syria received instructions of neutrality, but was in fact to become subject to infiltration by the Germans, as the Middle East theatre became a strategic tool for Germany's war effort in Europe. As in WWI, the Middle East became a pawn in the international strategies and machinations of greater powers.

During the war years, the 1937 treaty series between France, Britain and their subject mandated territories became null and void. France cancelled both the constitutional system and cabinets in the Lebanon and Syria in 1939, and Britain enforced complete military occupation of Egypt, Iraq, Palestine and Syria during the course of the war. Whereas France lost its preeminent position in Syria after its defeat by Germany early in

this time span, until independence; examples are the Syrian insurrections in 1925-26 and endless conflict in Palestine.

the war, Great Britain reasserted its influence in the entire region and began to formulate a new Middle Eastern foreign policy strategy as a way of countering German and Italian influence in the region.

Assessing Britain's vital interests in the conduct of WWII, it is clear that Egypt was the key to Britain's base in the Middle East. Egypt served as a strategic military base, as a pre-position center for arms supplies and equipment, as a communication and naval base, and as Britain's link to India and the Cape. If Britain lost Egypt to the Axis powers, maintenance of its interests in Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan would be threatened, along with access to its other imperial territories. At all costs Egypt had to remain under British control.

The challenge for Britain was to formulate a foreign policy posture that would further its interests in the region and address local realities. The conquest of France provided Germany with an opportunity to establish a base in Syria from which pressure could be exerted against British control of Transjordan, Palestine and Iraq; and, meanwhile, the Italians in Libya posed a threat to the northwestern frontiers of Egypt, which was within the British sphere of influence. The Arabs were continuing to press for independence and Arab unification, and the possible alliance between the Axis powers and liberation movements in the Arab world would be disastrous for Britain if it had to face a concerted Arab Revolt in addition to countering Axis powers in Europe. The solution for Britain was to reverse previous policy by encouraging the Arab quest for unity, in the hope of solidifying joint Arab action against the Axis powers and of focusing Arab action against the remaining French occupation forces in Syria and any Syria-German alliance.

The first articulation of such a policy change was made in a speech delivered by the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, on May 29, 1941, in which he stated that "the British government thought it both natural and right that inter-Arab ties be strengthened and 'will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.'"¹ The scheme which the British eventually devised to foster Arab unity was the creation of the Arab League. Although the concept of the Arab League was in fact a British device, created to manipulate Arab political action and counter German infiltration in the region, the Arabs initially viewed it as a useful tool for furthering Arab interests.

The Arab League as it was originally envisaged, from both British and Arab viewpoints, failed to meet either's expectations or achieve the desired outcome.

Encouraged by British support for Arab unity, Emir Abdullah of Transjordan and Nuri al-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq, each advanced a unity initiative. Abdullah's 1938 plan for unification called for the unification of Syria under Hashemite rule. Essentially it provided for the implementation of the 1920 General Syrian Congress declaration, which proclaimed Syrian and Iraqi independence and termination of the military occupation governments.

The second plan, fostered by Nuri al-Said in 1942, "envisioned the merger of the Greater Syrian components with special provisions safeguarding the Jewish community of Palestine and the Christians of Lebanon as the initial step in a broader federation. Then the united Syrian entity would merge with Iraq to form an Arab League, which other Arab states could

¹ See text in Alan R. Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982. pg. 21.

join as they saw fit."¹ The two initiatives, sponsored independently by Emir Abdullah and Nuri al-Said, expressed a limited Hashemite Arab unification scheme non-inclusive of bordering territories under the control of rival Arab leaders, namely Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

During the interim period between WWI and WWII, two developments transpired which complicated Arab aspirations towards unity on the domestic level. 1) The change in the balance of power between rival Arab leaders. 2) The emergence of protectionism among mandated sponsored regimes and other regional actors, to sustain local power prerogatives and interests.

The Hashemite power base had led the Arab world, excluding Egypt, since the 1915 Arab Revolt. The Hejaz was under the patronage control of Sharif Hussein, and until July 26, 1920, the Arab liberated territories of the Fertile Crescent and the Levant were under the nominal political control of Sharif Hussein's son, Feisal, as proclaimed by the General Syrian Congress in March 1920.² The French occupation of Syria and dissolution of the Arab regime in Damascus altered the territorial base of Hashemite control, but did not extinguish it, for under the British mandate and treaty system the Hashemites enjoyed limited sovereignty over Transjordan and Iraq.

Whereas the Hashemites (Abdullah and Feisal) were to maintain control in Transjordan and Iraq for over 30 years,³

¹ Ibid. pg. 22.

² Feisal's kingship in Syria did have time, before its overthrow, to establish a constitution, government and administrative system. This did not happen in Iraq, which was under British military occupation, with a military government. The Syrian Congress symbolically declared Abdullah king of Iraq without any means of implementing it.

³ Hashemite rule in Jordan continues under the leadership of His Majesty King Hussein; Hashemite rule under King Abdullah, King Hussein's grandfather, was in force between

Sharif Hussein lost the Hejaz, and the peninsula came under the rule of the Saud family. The Hashemite loss of the Hejaz changed the configuration of the balance of power alignment amongst Arab actors, as the infusion of a rival Arab power in the Hejaz, Saudi Arabia, challenged Arab unification schemes championed under Hashemite leadership. Meanwhile, the status and future of Syria was dependent upon the preferences of Britain, after their reoccupation of the country during WWII. Thus the comprehensiveness of Arab unity, as a concept capable of implementation, held great potential but was dependent on domestic and external factors involving both British preferences and regional politics.

The actors involved in the negotiations over the conceptual definition of Arab unity and the structural design of the Arab League were Great Britain, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.¹ Although Great Britain was interested in a modicum display of Arab Unity it wanted to focus the discussion on Syria and isolate Egypt from Arab affairs. The two Hashemite unification plans represented the interests of uniting the Levant and Fertile Crescent, and consolidating these lands under the leadership of the Hashemite family. Syrian

1920 and 1951, witnessing the creation of Transjordan, the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with independence from Great Britain, and the union between Jordan and liberated Palestinian territory. Although King Abdullah was assassinated in 1951, Hashemite rule has continued. His Majesty King Talal reigned from 1951 to 1952 and made an important contribution through the development of the constitution and improvements in Jordan's inter-Arab relations. His Majesty King Hussein Ibn Talal succeeded his father, King Talal.

Hashemite rule in Iraq was in force under King Feisal from 1921 to 1933, when Feisal died; it was interrupted after Feisal's death by a military coup in 1936, but Feisal's four-year-old grandson was installed on the throne in 1939, and Hashemite rule then continued until 1958. 1958 marks the end of Hashemite rule in Iraq, and the beginning of a series of coups and political instability which rocked the country for years to come.

¹ The other Arab League members, Lebanon and Yemen, did not play an active role in these pre-negotiations.

domestic opinion did not favour the substitution of French occupation for British hegemonic influence, and the two regimes in Transjordan and Iraq were viewed as proxies for British interests in the region. Saudi Arabia opposed the unification plans not only because of unprecedented British influence in both countries, but in accordance with a long history of family disputes and rivalries. Egypt, on the other hand, wanted to play a major role in Arab affairs and perceived a united Greater Syria, including Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine, and Iraq as a potentially powerful rival in the region and a threat to the strategic, economic and political interests of Egypt. All of these competing interests had to be resolved in order to find a workable framework to guide inter-Arab relations, which all parties agreed to be in their best interests.

The configuration of power relations during the negotiations on the Arab League set an Egyptian/Saudi Arabian alliance against the interests of the two Hashemite regimes, Transjordan and Iraq. The predominant influential power affecting each of these parties was Great Britain, which needed an Arab consensus for unity. Thus in 1943-44 Great Britain arrived at a general framework for the Arab League and persuaded the Arab regimes to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution. Several preparatory conferences on the Arab League were hosted in Cairo, and on October 7, 1944, the Alexandria Protocol was signed, stating the general principles of the Arab League. "The basic proposal was that an Arab League be formed by the independent Arab states to consolidate inter-Arab ties, coordinate political plans, protect the sovereignty of member states against aggression, and supervise the affairs of the Arab countries."¹ On May 10, 1945, the Arab League was

¹ Ibid. pg. 23.

officially established. The compromise necessary to institute a cooperative Arab system of relations was the agreement to preserve the existing state system and to recognize the integrity and the right to non-interference in its affairs of each independent state.

Between 1920 and 1941, irrevocable changes occurred that made the hope of Arab unity an unachievable goal. Whereas in 1920 the fundamental conditions for a united Arab kingdom, such as popular endorsement, administrative network and organization, economic viability and geographical continuity, and united leadership under a single Hashemite familial regime, were evidently fulfilled, the environment was much different in 1941, when Britain decided it was in its interest to organize a system of 'Arab unity.' By 1941, the non-viable, non-contiguous ethnic and territorial boundaries of superficially instituted states of Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq¹ had each developed an administrative and governmental systems, and power bases, which, over time, fostered particularistic and national interests, and the desire to preserve personal positions of power and wealth.

By 1941 national interests, together with the personal interests of power and wealth, were determining factors in negotiating the framework for the Arab League. The desire for Arab unity was real, but was not to be sought at the expense of giving up one's own political and economic power base. Inter-Arab state integration meant change in the balance of power configuration in the creation of a new unified entity. Each Arab

¹ Viability of a state encompasses geography, economics and ethnic exclusivity, in which each state varies in its makeup. Imbalance in religious representation and ethnic and tribal divisions encompassing more than one state must be included as a factor in the viability and stability of an unnaturally created state.

leader could envisage a united kingdom but not if it meant forsaking his own political power. The only alternative was agreed to in 1944, namely mutual recognition of the desire of each Arab state to preserve the status quo and acknowledgement of the condition of protectionism for each state's national interests. The Arab League could never, in the context of such a structure, fulfill the original purpose of Arab unity. On the contrary, the organization perpetuated the idealism of Arab unity, while at the same time innately signifying the contradiction of Arab unity, independent nation state status with its adherent national and particularistic interests.

The general condition of inter-Arab relations became manifest in the conduct of affairs in the Arab League, which came to reflect the contradictions, rivalries, and also the cooperative ventures and power blocs within the Arab world. Contrary to British expectations, formation of the League did not isolate Egypt from the Arab fold, nor did it bring Arab unity, or concentrate Arab political action against the French in Syria. Egypt came, in fact, to champion Arab issues and dominate the Arab League, and was instrumental in fighting for Egyptian and Arab independence from British hegemony in the area. Ideology became the theoretical tool for the politicization of the Arab masses and the orchestration of Egyptian and Arab domestic and foreign policies.

Ideology

For the Arab world the 1940's marked its second involvement in a global conflict emanating from the interests and concerns of Western imperial powers. However, the devastating effects of the war on the political, economic and strategic resources of Britain and France presaged their imminent departure from the area. Syria was granted official

independence in 1941, but France maintained nominal control until the end of WWII in 1945, and when Britain reoccupied Syria in 1946 the last remaining French troops left Syria. Only Lebanon sought continued relations with France after the war. In the case of Britain, nominal independence of Transjordan was awarded in 1943 under British tutelage, but the British mandate was not terminated until 1946, and even then independence was nominal under the terms of the treaty arrangement.¹ Britain pulled out of Palestine in 1948, which led to the creation of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The 1940's signaled the beginning of Arab independence, but it was not until the 1950's that Arab nations began to assert self-definition and self-expression by first engaging in military coups.² After expelling remnants of regimes that had closely coordinated state policies with French and British interests, the newly independent nations each sought an ideological platform on which to base national policy, goals and strategies.

¹ British/Jordanian relations were revised several times under the terms of amended treaty arrangements. Jordan did not attain full independence and self-determination until 1958, when Jordan's treaty with Great Britain was terminated.

² The last French soldiers left Syria in 1946, although formal independence had been declared in 1941, and the first elected government took office in 1943. In 1949 Syria was subjected to three military coups, and a fourth in 1954, and was beset with continual political instability for over 20 years. King Farouk of Egypt was overthrown in 1952 by a revolutionary military coup, spearheaded by the Arab world's most charismatic and influential personality, Gamal Abdul-Nasser, who assumed leadership of the newly formed republic in 1954. The first military coup in Iraq occurred in 1936 after years of instability, especially since the death of Feisal, the son of Sharif Hussein, in 1933. A pro-British sponsored coup restored Hashemite rule to Iraq by appointing Feisal's four-year-old grandson King in 1939, and this rule lasted until 1958, since which time the country has been subject to additional coups. King Abdullah of Transjordan was assassinated in 1951, but was succeeded by his son Talal, then by King Hussein, Abdullah's grandson, two years later. Jordan has been subject to many coup attempts by the military and by political leaders but none has been successful.

The critical hiatus for political reorientation and ideological formulation was the British, French and Israeli military action against Egypt in 1956. The defeat of these combined forces by direct American intervention during the Suez invasion effectively ended the historic role of Britain and France in the Middle East. The power configuration in the international system changed from a loose multi-polar, flexible alliance system to a bi-polar system based on an East-West dichotomy that emphasized the superpower basis of two competing ideological systems: that of the United States, a Western capitalist system; and that of the Soviet Union, a communist system. In the revised international system that rose from the ruins of WWII, traditional British and French interests were replaced by the political machinations of these two new powers in the region.

In the 1950's the Arab states, under new anti-imperialist regimes, were faced with the legacy left by Britain and France. The Middle East was segmented into territorial units that had partitioned the economic and power base of the extinct Ottoman Empire into unjustifiable individual states, and the new republican Arab regimes tried to rectify these inadequacies by engaging in unification schemes. In February 1958, Egypt and Syria signed a union agreement and merged into a newly created United Arab Republic (UAR), then, in March of the same year, Jordan and Iraq agreed to a loose federal system to offset the new power configuration that the UAR posed to the region. Neither effort succeeded. In July 1958 a military coup ended the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq and brought the federal arrangement with Jordan to an end, while Syria withdrew from the UAR in September 1961. Beneath the natural propensity for Arab union and the popular domestic support it received, there existed an undercurrent of power politics and particularistic

interests based on self-preservation that worked against Arab unity. A second working principle was the natural requirement of a balance of power amongst the independent Arab entities, which necessitated non-rigid alliances based on mutual strategic goals and national interests.

Thus, competing interest groups and alliances, both domestically and regionally based, led to continual political instability in the newly created regimes, and to frequent military coups, as competing national groups established regional alliances in the hope of implementing preferred policy goals. The two main competing platforms and ideologies involved the quest for Arab unity on the one hand, and national independence and self-determination on the other, and the failure of Arab unification schemes redirected national priorities to paying lip service to the continued desire for Arab unity and to the idea that prospects for it were favourable, and concentration on domestic priorities for national development and modernization programs.

Within the context of state maturation, the Arab world of the 1960's was preoccupied with the formulation of an economic and modernization plan geared toward reorganizing national economies on the basis of immediate needs, such as agricultural development and self-sufficiency, manufacturing, technological advice and financial assistance, skilled labour, and educational priorities.¹

The Arab regimes needed foreign assistance and a theoretical framework by which to design specific policy initiatives and goals. Two conditions influenced the opportunities and directions open to the Arab regimes: 1) The structure of the

¹ Under British and French occupation, the national economies of subject populations were planned and structured according to the priorities and interests of the 'mother land', or else domestic development and infrastructure was neglected and discouraged.

international system was now bipolar, the attributes of power being restricted to two dichotomous political systems, those of the capitalist US and the communist Soviet Union, which meant that assistance on the level required by Arab regimes necessitated cooperation and policy alignment with one of the superpowers; 2) Introduction of foreign ideologies encompassing political, economic, social and structural aspects. Variants of foreign ideologies included communism, socialism, social democracy and democracy. Republican regimes, unwilling to be subject to a new form of Western imperialism by ridding themselves of Britain and France only to become subject to Western hegemony,¹ were suspicious of the US. On the other hand, monarchical regimes welcomed Western assistance and protection against the instability and revolutionary zeal that characterized republican regimes, and such regimes fostered.

Under the cast of ideology, inter-Arab relations became subject to a myriad of competing and contradictory factors that, on the surface, seemed to pit republican regime against monarchical regime, Western-leaning regimes against Soviet-leaning regimes, and foreign ideologies against Arab ideologies. In fact there was a fluidity and flexibility of action governing inter-Arab relations, as regimes attempted to further national interests by following a policy of balance between competing interests and issues to suit their own advantage. There were three levels to this balancing game: 1) The playing off of East against West to one's own advantage, choosing either neutrality or a rotating, alternative cooperation, depending on the issue and response. 2) Inter-Arab balance of power, involving change and

¹ Egypt's new revolutionary regime, under Nasser, made initial overtures to the US, implying that it was interested in aid and good relations, but mutual mistrust and the rescinding by the US of its decision to finance the Aswan Dam forced Egypt to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance.

flexibility in alliances of convenience¹ between monarchies and republican regimes, based on inter-Arab rivalries, national interests, pragmatic cooperation on the basis of particular issues and the consideration of external interference into inter-Arab affairs by the superpowers. 3) Management of domestic politics, i.e., the management and manipulation of domestic sentiment on the levels of domestic affairs and inter-Arab politics. Domestic populations were sympathetic towards Arab unity and had strong feelings on inter-Arab issues, such as the Palestine question and anti-imperialism. Governing regimes used these sentiments for political purposes, and faced constraints due to the popularity of these issues. Additionally, inter-Arab interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states made governments sensitive to management of internal affairs and potential domestic opposition.

It is the complexity of the balancing game between the involvement of foreign powers in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries, regional politics, and internal domestic propensity to respond to developments on local, inter-Arab and international issues that led to the failure of Western scholarship to understand the area. Arab regimes had to operate within a climate of complex relations and issues, and in this climate the particular tool of ideology was used in reaction to foreign influence, and also reflected the desire, following independence, to formulate a framework that might facilitate the entry of Arab countries into the modern age of industry, economic development and modernization.

¹ Depending on the issues, Arab alliances veered between conflicting monarchical and republican blocs and close monarchical and republican relations, as reflected in the alignment between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Jordan's shifting relations between all parties, particularly Syria and Iraq.

Unity, East and West Banks Of The Jordan River

For thirty-six years, from the 1915 Arab Revolt until his assassination in 1951, King Abdullah fought and strove for Arab unity. Three particular phases mark the essence of his efforts and plans to this end: 1) The unfulfilled creation of the United Arab Kingdom from liberated Arab territories at the end of WWI. 2) The Greater Syria unification plan and membership in the Arab League, proposed during and at the conclusion of WWII. 3) The unification, in 1950, between a part of Palestine (i.e., territory saved from Israeli control in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war) and Jordan, this being undertaken as a measure to prevent these territories from falling under Israeli domination.

The Great Arab Revolt in 1916 post-dated an agreement between Sharif Hussein and the British government, to the effect that all Arab territories liberated at the end of the war (except Aden and the Gulf) would receive independence in return for Arab military action against the Ottoman Turks. Britain's enforcement of the Sykes-Picot agreement at the end of the war, by which it retained military control of the region, and the implementation of the mandate system officially conferred by the League of Nations, denied the Arabs independence and a united Arab Kingdom. Subsequent Arab insurrections, revolts, and uprisings against the British and the French did not alter the regional balance of power. Arab actions for liberation from foreign control, whether by mandate or ostensible treaty terms, were not to be realized until the end of WWII.

The second phase of King Abdullah's unification efforts was the proposed Greater Syria plan in 1938, 1943 1945 and 1946.¹ Although King Abdullah had long fostered proposals for

¹ King Abdullah's 1946 Greater Syria Unification Plan became an official document known as the 'White Document'.

Syrian unification, the best opportunity for pursuing this initiative was Britain's change of attitude and policy in the region, namely its stated support for Arab unity, first enunciated in 1941. The Greater Syrian plan envisaged:

"the foundation of a Syrian Federation composed of the Governments of Transjordan, Northern Syria, the Lebanon and Palestine with its capital at Damascus. The Federal Government would be responsible for 'defense, communications, national economy, foreign affairs, general culture ... and the federal judiciary'. The four territorial Governments would retain their autonomy in other matters. The Federation should have a generally elected Legislature and a Council of Representatives of the territorial Governments of the Federation. The Federal Prime Minister and the members of the Federal Executive would be elected from the Legislative body. The Federation should be established as a result of negotiation and agreement between its member Governments the first step being negotiations between Transjordan and Northern Syria. The Federal Constitution should be drafted by a special committee and ratified by the representative council of the territorial Governments either in a general congress or by a general national assembly representing the different territories of the Federation and elected as a Constituent Assembly. 'His Highness the Amir Abdullah shall be nominated as Head of the Syrian Federation..., the administration of Transjordan to be entrusted to a deputy of His Highness.' Provisions are made for the eventual adhesion to the Federation of the Lebanon and Palestine. ... If, for special reasons, the Lebanon should decline to join the Syrian Federation then those Syrian territories which had been attached

to the Lebanon against the will of their inhabitants should be allowed 'to revert to Syria by free plebiscite'."¹

King Abdullah claimed the right to exert Hashemite leadership over a united Greater Syria for the following reasons:²

- (a) His legally established rights on the Transjordanian Emirate, which is an important section of the Greater Syria.
- (b) His effective assistance to the Allies, which included assistance on the Syrian front during WWII.
- (c) His being the first heir to the right of his late father King Husain to watch over Syrian interests, in particular and Arab rights in general.
- (d) A promise given to him in 1921 by Mr. Churchill, later Prime Minister of Great Britain, that he would be the Head of the Syrian State. With the collapse of France and the abolition of her mandate on behalf of the League of Nations...all obstacles to the fulfillment of that promise have been removed.
- (e) The desire of the Syrians for a constitutional monarchy in the event of Syrian unity or a federation of the Arab countries being realized.

King Abdullah decided to give effect to his aspirations for Arab unity and his Greater Syria unification plan by addressing the people of the Arab world in a speech delivered on April 8, 1943. "The British authorities in Palestine, the Free French authorities in Syria and Lebanon and the Egyptian Government

¹ King Abdullah, Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan, Edited by Philip Pl Graves, London: Alden press, 1951. pgs. 264-265.

² Ibid. pg. 263.

forbade the publication of this proclamation in the press or by their broadcasting services."¹ The banning of King Abdullah's proclamation for the unification of Syria based on the 1st Syrian National Congress Declaration of 1920, raised questions about Britain's stated policy of supporting Arab unity. Abdullah, in furtherance of his position, sent a memorandum to the British High Commissioner in Palestine, outlining specific proposals for implementing his Greater Syria plan:²

1. An official joint declaration shall be issued supporting either the independence of Syria within its present boundaries or a federation of the lawful national Governments of Syria `with the necessary reservations for the protection of such British and French interests as are not opposed to the country's independence, and to its union or federation.'
2. A real co-operation shall be established at once between the Governments of Northern and Southern Syria (i.e. Transjordan) guaranteeing the freedom of travel and communications and free interchange of ideas which means that these territories should not consider each other as alien in view of the existence between them of mutual vital interests and permanent geographical, national and historical ties.
3. We in Transjordan should immediately have either a delegate or a consular mission in Syria and the Lebanon and that we should consult with their responsible authorities on the important common measures in order to strengthen the co-operation and friendship which are necessary in the present delicate circumstances.

¹ Ibid. pg. 267.

² Ibid. pgs. 267-268.

4. Official delegations with full legal authority shall be empowered to ascertain within a fixed time the views of all concerned on the proposed treaty on the bases of the Franco-Syrian treaty of 1936 and the Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iraqi treaties.
5. The question of the establishment of a united Syrian State or Federation of Syrian Governments shall be considered as a purely Syrian matter to be settled by the existing Governments of the Syrian territories and by the free consent of the Syrians themselves.

On May 22, 1943, the High Commissioner of Palestine informed King Abdullah that the contents of the memorandum had been forwarded to the British Government. The documents remain classified, but, according to Jordanian officials, the British Government rejected King Abdullah's proposal. The reconstitution of Syria never occurred. The proposed Arab League, the symbol of Arab unity, had a general principle of recognition of the independence of each Arab state, acceptance of the existing state boundaries and non-interference in internal affairs. The status quo of Arab territorial boundaries and government structures was thus an integral feature of the League's operational modus vivendi. Moreover, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war altered the territorial, political, and economic base of Transjordan, and its relative importance in Arab affairs.

The third phase of Abdullah's Arab unification efforts culminated in the union between Palestinian territories and Jordan. Arab and Palestinian military efforts aimed at the liberation of Palestine in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war failed, but a part of Palestine was nevertheless saved from Israeli occupation due to the military efforts of Palestinian fighters and the

Jordanian armed forces. The incorporation of "this part of Palestine into (the) Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan," stated King Abdullah, was promulgated for the purpose that "in so doing we kept the remainder of Palestine from falling into the hands of the Jews."¹ Accordingly, on April 24, 1950, the Jordanian Parliament, representing the East and West Banks of the Jordan River, declared the following:²

Firstly: It confirms the complete unity of the eastern and the western banks of the Jordan and their merging into one state, the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, at the head of which is His Hashemite Majesty the exalted King 'Abdullah ibn al-Husayn, a state based on a parliamentary, constitutional regime and on equality of rights and duties among all its citizens.

Secondly: It confirms the reservation of all Arab rights in Palestine, the defense of such rights by all legitimate means and with full competence, without prejudice to the final settlement of their just case within the scope of the people's aspirations and of Arab co-operation and international justice.

Thirdly: This decree, issued by the two chambers of Parliament--the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies--representing both banks of the Jordan, shall be submitted to His Exalted Majesty and shall be considered effective upon receiving the high royal sanction.

Fourthly: This decree shall be published and executed by the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan as soon as it has received high royal sanction and shall be

¹ King Abdullah of Jordan, My Memoirs Completed (Al-Takmilah), London and New York: Longman Group Ltd, 1978. pg 13.

² Ibid. pg. 16.

communicated to our sister Arab states and to friendly foreign states by the usual diplomatic means.

In part, the official reply of the Senate, concerning unification, stated:¹

The Senate tenders His Hashemite Majesty its most sincere thanks, admiration, and respect for the excellent spirit revealed in His Majesty's (may God support him!) earnest desire that the decision for unification should not prejudice any final settlement of the Palestine problem which might redound to the benefit and honour of the Arabs, and for his desire to co-operate with the Arab states within the scope of the people's aspirations. The Senate recalls also with much pride and gratitude His Majesty's (may God preserve him!) promise to modify the constitution, with the confidence that the anticipated modifications will produce changes conforming to social needs and will lay out the right way for the attainment of the nation's goals. Our body accepts with wholehearted support the straightforward policy and judicious plans set forth in the high Speech from the Throne as both clearly discerning the situation and courageously facing realities.

In part, the official reply of the Chamber of Deputies, concerning unification, stated:²

It is a cause of satisfaction and confidence that this unification has been brought about without any prejudice to the general Arab rights in Palestine or to the final settlement of their case. This unification, in fact, strengthens the defense of the justice of their cause and is a stimulus for the redoubling of

¹ Ibid. pg. 17.

² Ibid. pg. 18.

efforts to arrive at a just solution which will preserve their rights and self-respect in co-operation with our sister Arab states.

Fifteen months after the formal declaration of the unification of both banks of the Jordan River, King Abdullah was assassinated at Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. He had spent a lifetime devoted to the furthering of Arab unity and the pursuit of policies that he felt were in the best interest of the Arab world. But the assassination of King Abdullah was a political statement of the competing interests between great powers on one hand, and Arab nationalism on the other.

The unification of liberated Palestinian territory with Jordan marked an alliance that lasted until the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. During this war Israel occupied the rest of Palestine, including those territories that had been united with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The loss of Palestine was a major catastrophe for Jordan, for the Palestinians and for the entire Arab world. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war brought change in inter-Arab politics with regard to the question of Palestine. Palestinians were to embark on a road of self-determination and championship of self-interest, involving the elaboration of a 'Palestinian versus Arab' response to Israel's occupation of Palestine.

CHAPTER 2: Role of Key Decision-Makers

THE HASHEMITE KINGS

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE:

ABDULLAH, TALAL, HUSSEIN

King Abdullah: Jordan's First King

The Great Arab Revolt of 1915, led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca, symbolized the Arab desire for national independence and self-determination under a unified state to be named the United Arab Kingdom.

The institution of the United Arab Kingdom, whose boundaries were to encompass all territories liberated from Turkish Ottoman rule at the conclusion of WWI, was never realized because of the betrayal by Great Britain, Sharif Hussein's wartime ally.

At the end of WWI, with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain was in military control of all liberated Arab territories, with 200,000 British, Australian and Indian troops. In liberated Damascus, Feisal established an interim government under the jurisdiction of the Arab Military Administration and Transjordan was attached to this administration "per the October 1918 OET (Occupied Enemy Territory) order issued by General Allenby."¹ On March 7,

¹ P.J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957, : Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1967. pg. 41. Regarding the makeup of the administration, "This Administration was headed by General Rida Pasha al-Rikabi as Military Governor-General. The Balqa' district (the area comprising al-Salt and Amman) was administered by the local military governor, Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, an Iraqi officer, in his capacity as Officer Commanding the Arab armies there. Amman,

1920 the National Syrian Congress proclaimed the full and undivided independence of Syria, including Palestine. The delegates simultaneously announced the election of Feisal as their constitutional king, while Feisal's elder brother, Abdullah was proclaimed king of an independent Iraq.¹

"When the independence of geographical Syria, comprising Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, was proclaimed by the Syrian Congress...it appeared...that Feisal would be able to reorganize his kingdom on a more permanent basis."² Arab independence and self-determination was, however, conclusively terminated by the concerted decisions and actions implemented by Great Britain and France in accordance with the San Remo agreement of April 19, 1920.³ On July 26, 1920, the French conquered Damascus and expelled King Feisal. French military occupation of Damascus was only made possible after the British had withdrawn their military forces from Syria.

At the close of August 1920, with the expulsion of King Feisal and the nationalist government from Syria, the circumstances of the Middle East became those of armed resistance, revolt and uprisings against Britain. The French secured Syria for themselves, with the introduction of superior military force in the area, but Britain's future holdings were less

moreover, was at that time the headquarters of 2 Division of the Arab army under the command of another Iraqi officer, Rashid al-Midafa'i."

¹ See pages 17 & 18 of Chapter 1.

² Vatikiotis, op, cit., p. 37.

³ The San Remo Agreement provided the terms for the severing of the Arab territories from the Ottoman Empire and the division of the Arab territories between Britain and France. The British were to maintain military control over Iraq and Palestine, while France was awarded to Syria. The instrument of legalizing and sanctioning this territorial aggrandizement, in the form of a mandate system, was conferred by the international institution of the League of Nations.

secure, as its military occupation forces had become overextended and insufficient to command the explosive situation of 1920. Imperial Britain faced challenges in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Transjordan.

In Mesopotamia (Iraq), Jamal al-Midafa'i spearheaded a liberation movement and the formation of a provisional Arab government.¹ Transjordan, at this time, had British officers engaged in negotiating new forms of administration, while there still existed, simultaneously, the administrative infrastructure set up under Feisal's Arab Military Administration in Damascus. Amman was still the "headquarters of 2 Division of the Arab army under the command of Rashid al-Midafa'i."² Concurrently, Abdullah entered Transjordan en route for Syria to reinstall his brother Feisal to the kingship there, raising additional troops for the enterprise in Maan.³

Palestine was ablaze with demonstrations and armed attacks against British occupation and the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Winston Churchill, Britain's War Minister, convened a Middle East conference in Cairo, in March 1921, in order to arrive at some solutions to Britain's substantive problems in the region. The Cairo Conference's most magnanimous recommendation, aimed at quelling the Arab

¹ The liberation movement and provisional government spearheaded by Jamal al-Midafa'i collapsed in 1921 when Imperial Britain reinforced its military position in Mesopotamia with 25,000 Indian, and 5,000 British troops. See the section on Arab Armed Struggle, and Kingship by Negotiation, Chapter 1.

² An Iraqi officer. See Vatikiotis, op, cit., p. 41.

³ Upon Abdullah's arrival in Maan, he issued a proclamation on December 5th, 1920, rallying the people of Syria to rise up against the French, to re-establish Feisal as king, and to unite and defend their country.. Abdullah "then sent messages to all the districts to announce that I was the Vice-king of Syria, and asked the members of the Syrian Congress and all officers and troops of the Syrian Army to come to Maan," see Memoirs, King Abdullah of Transjordan, p. 191.

revolt of 1920-21, was to offer Feisal the kingship of Iraq and Abdullah the kingship of Transjordan.

To secure the kingship, together with Transjordanian independence, Abdullah was required to accept Great Britain's uncompromising terms:

- 1) Renunciation of Abdullah's claim to Iraq.
- 2) Abstention from further action against the French in Syria.
- 3) Recognition of the British mandate in Palestine, including the territorial domain of Transjordan.
- 4) Establishment of an administrative infrastructure to maintain order and services in Transjordan under the authority of Britain's mandate.

On March 27, 1921, Abdullah accepted Britain's conditions in the greater hope of securing eventual Transjordanian independence.

The agreement between Britain and Abdullah in March 1921 ensured the separate identity of the land east of the Jordan River, which would not be included in the Jewish homeland provided for in the British directive known as the Balfour Declaration. This set the precedent for the structural integrity of an independent Jordan. It was not until 1946, twenty-five years later, that Great Britain terminated its mandate over Transjordan, replacing it with a favourable treaty arrangement. It was not until 1957, under the Kingship of Hussein, Abdullah's grandson, that Jordan obtained full independence with the abrogation of the treaty between Great Britain and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Jordan's territorial domain was the incidental result of international intrigue, foreign domination and the political astuteness of its founding father King Abdullah ibn Hussein. Created in 1921, Transjordan was a desert backland, an insufficient economic space carved out from Greater Syria and inhabited mostly by roving Bedouin tribes and people living in small villages. In Abdullah's eyes, Transjordan was a territorial base from which to wage a long-term initiative for Arab independence and the reunification of Syria, under the leadership of the Hashemite king. International and regional politics frustrated Abdullah's plan to formulate a United Arab Kingdom in Syria (including the Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and Palestine), or between Iraq and Transjordan.

The leadership of King Abdullah lasted between 1921 and 1951, and that of King Hussein from 1953 to 1999.¹ To know the ambitions, goals and attitudes of these men, is to understand the history of Jordan's development and its national policy objectives. As most eloquently and concisely stated by Abd al-Hamid Sharaf:²

"The Middle East is a part of the world where, in the absence of strong institutions, men put their personal imprint on events. The style of government is shaped, the tone of society set, even

¹ On July 20, 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated in Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. Upon his return from medical treatment in Europe, Talal ibn-Hussein, Hussein's father, assumed the duties of the Kingship of Jordan. On August 11, 1952, both houses of Parliament met, declared King Talal unfit to fulfill his duties on the grounds of ill health, and pronounced Hussein King at the age of 17, approving a regency council to legislate on his behalf until he reached 18 years of age. Hussein was inaugurated King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on May 2, 1953.

² Patrick Seale, Editor, The Shaping of an Arab Statesman: Abd al-Hamid Sharaf and the Modern Arab World, New York: Quartet Books, 1983, pg. 1.

to a large extent the quality of life determined by the man at the top...".

In 1921, the political and structural framework of the nation state of Transjordan had yet to be conceived and implemented, and the environmental reality that faced Abdullah on his arrival in Amman was one of chaos, instability and disorder. The military administrative organization in the region was undermined by the overthrow of Feisal's National Government in the Kingdom of Syria in Damascus, and the simultaneous efforts of British officers to set up competing centers of authority. Political cadres and refugees from French-occupied Syria arrived in Amman, which became a center for anti-imperialist activities. Abdullah was confronted with the challenge of instituting a central government, and law and order, in a revolutionary environment with few resources, an insufficient economic and territorial base, and with a largely tribal, agrarian and traditional society.

The uncertain and violent circumstances surrounding Abdullah's entry into Transjordan opened up the opportunity for this man to exert his personal influence in implementing his vision for Transjordan.¹ Although the environment offered opportunities to Abdullah it also imposed constraints.² The

¹ For the merits of utilizing 'personality' theory in analyzing nation-state politics, government and foreign policy, in the light of a single individual's role, please see: Fred Greenstein, "Personality and Politics," in Political Leadership: A Source Book, Barbara Kellerman, Editor, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986. In particular please see pg. 43: "The likelihood of personal impact varies with (1) the degree to which the actions take place in an environment which admits of restructuring; (2) the location of the actor in the environment, and (3) the actor's peculiar strengths or weaknesses," and pg. 44,; "2. Likelihood of personal impact varies with the actor's location in the environment. To shape events, an action must be performed not only in an unstable environment, but also by an actor who is strategically placed in that environment."

² Regarding constraints on political elites, see: Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976. Example, in Preface,

constraints consisted of the conditions placed on Abdullah by the British to secure the future independence of Transjordan. He had to operate within the parameters of Britain's mandate system for Palestine, to which Transjordan was attached,¹ he was obliged to administer Transjordan under the supervision of British controls, and he had to refrain from future action against the French in Syria and cease to assert his right to Iraqi kingship.

Abdullah's arrival in Amman in 1921, with an accompanying Arab liberation force, marked a victory for the cause of Arab unity and independence. Abdullah proved himself to be a formidable challenge to Great Britain. Transjordan's military presence was a threat to Britain's relations with the French, and also threatened a dangerous escalation of the already violent anti-British actions throughout Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine.

The driving force behind Abdullah's motivation was his vision of the fulfillment of Arab aspirations to national independence and self-determination under Hashemite leadership.² Abdullah's entry into Amman was a bold political and military initiative to force the implementation of the contractual British agreement to Arab independence.

Great Britain released Transjordan to Abdullah partly as an accommodation, and a means of subduing the potential threat

Pgs. 1X-X: "Decision-makers always operate within institutions--legislatures, armies, bureaucracies, parties, firms, and so on. Moreover, they must adjust their actions to the immediate political and socio-economic circumstances. ...explanation of a leader's behavior must take account of both his institutional context and his tactical calculus."

¹ Under the Palestine mandate system awarded to Great Britain, there was a separation between the East and West Banks of the Jordan River. Transjordan was not included in the Balfour Declaration.

² And the fulfillment of the dream of his father, the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, father of the Arab Revolt, of a United Arab Kingdom encompassing all liberated Arab territories.

that he signified to British interests.¹ The foundation of Transjordan was formulated as a result of Abdullah's military campaign. The Arab army was the primary force in establishing the national state of Jordan. But what made Abdullah dangerous was not his martial capabilities alone, but also the intellectual and personal attributes of the man.

Abdullah's personal attributes were the manifestation of cultural, political and educational experiences offered by life in the vibrant city of Constantinople, and the strict Bedouin customs and values characterizing life in Mecca and in the Hejaz. While tribal experiences sharpened Abdullah's martial capacities and inculcated the straightforward values of traditional codes of honour, generosity and valour, he was also counseled in the virtues of patience, in political astuteness and the realities of political life, and in educational knowledge. The value of King Abdullah lay in his ability to make pragmatic decisions based on realistic assessments of situations and events, and to engage in tactical maneuvers to overcome environmental circumstances.

A tribute to Abdullah's character and strength of personality is implied in the statement of General John Bagot Glubb, a respected British Officer and former Commander of the Arab Legion:

"When King Abdullah was alive, Syria and Saudi Arabia lived in fear of Jordan, and Egypt, with fourteen times her

¹ Regarding Abdullah's entry into Amman, and his strength of character, see: Major C. S. Jarvis, C.M.G., O.B.E., Arab Command: The Biography of Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Peake Pasha, London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1948, pg. 81. "It had not occurred to the British Government previously that one of the Hashemite family, a son of King Hussein, should act as a ruler in Trans-Jordan, but his presence in the country as prince of a ruling house was now a fait accompli, and it was advisable to make the best of a situation that might prove difficult".

population, viewed her with anxiety as a rival. So immense can be the power and influence of one man."¹

Abdullah persistently employed his power and influence to implement his desired policy goals for Transjordan, and his regional objective of a United Arab Kingdom. For Abdullah, winning independence for the Arabs in Transjordan was not an end in itself but a tactical concession from which to create a national base for Arab independence and reunification. In both domestic and regional efforts, Abdullah exerted a powerful presence and influence that exceeded his limited territorial enclave and resources.

On the domestic level, Abdullah cooperated with British administrative advisors, while maintaining complete control on political, economic and military matters of state. Throughout his reign of Transjordan, his primary domestic objective was to build the foundation and infrastructure of a cohesive nation state. In these early stages such efforts were directed at imposing law and order, establishing a central government, adherence to a central governmental authority and settling wandering Bedouin tribes. Abdullah ruled with an iron will, making use of the Arab Legion to quell rebellious behaviour. Under his leadership, Transjordan was converted into an area of stability with a climate conducive to the establishment of a network of loyal patrons and the development of national identity and a cohesive unitary state.

On the regional level, Abdullah continued to contest the imposition of arbitrary divisions, both political and territorial, on Arab states by Britain and France. He pursued a policy of quiet

¹ John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier With The Arabs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.. Pg. 438.

diplomacy, petitioning Britain for its assistance in the reunification of Syria, and made several proposals for the unification of Palestine and Transjordan as an initial step towards the unification of Greater Syria. When, in 1941, Britain publicly announced its change in attitude, favouring a "form of Arab unification" to counter Axis influence in the region and its effect on Britain's WWII war efforts, Abdullah took on a more public and aggressive stance in pursuit of his strategies for Arab unity, proposing alternative Arab unification plans in 1943 and 1945¹. In 1946, when Great Britain terminated its mandate for Transjordan and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was declared, Abdullah's position in the region was strengthened.

King Abdullah made his position absolutely clear in a speech he gave at the Islamic Cultural College in Amman, September 19, 1947:

"There can be no room for denial that Jordan is a part of the Syrian entity and that to abandon or renounce this entity is to renounce the national charter and to submit to the solution imposed by foreign imperialism and the consequent fragmentation of the same land. ...With all due respect to the present regimes in the regional Syrian states and to their independence, we do not see that this state of affairs necessarily precludes any free call for the restitution of our natural right to unite or federate." (Re: the Hashemite family) "This family is in duty bound to oppose Syrian fragmentation or the renunciation of its common charter. Syria, in its natural borders, and not just in one of its regions, belongs to all of itself and is the legacy handed down by its martyrs and heroes."²

¹ Please see Chapter 1, section on Greater Jordan, for a definition of the proposed plans.

² King Abdullah of Jordan, "Islam and Arabism and the Unity Plan of King 'Abdallah of Jordan," p. 220, Chapter X, in Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, edited by Kemal H. Karpat, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.

Abdullah's lifelong effort to champion Arab independence and unification was justified in accordance with the implementation of the only democratic representation of the interests and free will of the Arab people, as embodied in the Syrian National Charter of 1920 governing the creation of the Syrian National Government, in the form of a constitutional monarchy. However, an equally pressing reality was the economic fragmentation of the Arab world, which severely weakened and limited the potential power base, and the economic stimulation and self-sufficiency that unification would bring. Transjordan was a non-viable economic entity that depended on external assistance to survive. Abdullah's Greater Syria plan, or any alternative unification scheme, would strengthen the resource potential of any partner and would make Transjordan non-dependent on external assistance. Abdullah's continued efforts in 1938, 1943, 1945, 1949 and 1950, to seek a greater territorial base can be attributed both to his credentials as a nationalist leader of the Great Arab Revolt, grasping for the attainment of a lifelong dream for Arab unity, and also to reasons of national security.

The extent to which the strength and power of King Abdullah was felt in the region, and the influence he wielded in the politics of surrounding states, can be illustrated in developments occurring behind the scenes in the successive coups that plagued Syria in 1949. Regional politics at this time, as represented in events leading up to the subsequent organization of the Arab League and determining its structure, evidenced a power axis counter posing Egypt and Saudi Arabia against the interests of the Hashemites in Jordan and Iraq. The issue was a power struggle springing from regional rivalries

The 'legacy handed down by martyrs and heroes' refers to the Great Arab Revolt of 1915, with regard to its purpose and aspirations.

between the actors, competition for leadership in the Arab world, and interference in Arab affairs by external actors seeking to impose their preferences. According to Abdullah, the Fertile Crescent area was the heart of the Arab world, whereas Egypt wanted the mantle of Arab leadership for itself. Internal politics in Syria were torn between the two camps, the choice being between national independence and unification under the Hashemite umbrella. Then in a coup d'etat in 1949, Husni al-Zaim came to power in Syria. Zaim did not share Abdullah's enthusiasm for Arab unification and was sympathetic towards the regional stances of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In the following passages it is implied that Abdullah therefore arranged for Azim to be replaced by someone who had similar aspirations for the greater good of the Arab nation.

"Most sources agree that the Hashemites, displeased with Za'im's attitude towards them, and with his pro-Saudi-Egyptian policy, wished to see established in Damascus a government more friendly to them, were ready to pay to bring him down. Thus, on 14 August 1949, Colonel Sami Hinnawi overthrew Za'im's regime in the second coup of the year."¹

"With Hinnawi, the People's Party, which advocated Iraqi-Syrian unity, came to power. In its meeting on 12 December, the Syrian Parliament gave high priority to the question of union with Iraq, and declared it a basic constitutional goal. By uniting Jordan with the Syria-Iraq federation, the Fertile Crescent would emerge under the Hashemites."²

¹ Mohammad Ibrahim Faddah, The Middle East in Transition: A Study of Jordan's Foreign Policy, London: Asia Publishing House, 1974. p. 158.

² Ibid. p. 158. Also, see footnote 58: While on a state visit to London, only four days after the pro-Hashemite coup, Abdullah stated that Greater Syria "is a natural necessity...It will be governed by the Hashemites," (New York Times, August 1949).

On December 20, 1949, Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi was deposed in a third coup by a man called Shishakli. Between the years 1949 and 1953 Syria was to undergo "three coups d'etat, twenty-one Cabinet changes, and two military dictatorships."¹

Political instability, conflict and changes of regime in the newly independent Arab states were a direct result of domestic differences. These included ideological differences over the type of regime; republicanism vs. monarchy, Arab unification vs. parochial state nationalism, as well as conflict emanating from traditional strategic orientations and tribal rivalries, and of the internationalization of the conflict by parties with vested interests in any changes in the status quo (namely France, Great Britain, the US and the Soviet Union). The regional and international alliances and interests that were instrumental in the deposition of Colonel Hinnawi of Syria in 1949, together with the subsequent changes in power that occurred in Egypt, turned Lebanon into a battleground of unending civil war and shattered hopes for the fulfillment of Abdullah's dream of a United Fertile Crescent under the Hashemite mantle.²

The unfortunate political realities of the time did not prevent Abdullah from pursuing his stated goal. By an act of Parliament on April 24, 1950, the East and West banks of the Jordan River were united, securing Arab sovereignty over the West Bank of the Jordan. Subsequently, Abdullah again entered into negotiations for a unification agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Iraq. The assassination of King Abdullah in 1951 brought the era of his quest for Arab

¹ Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966. pg. 30.

² For a detailed analysis of inter-Arab relations, please see: Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, London: Oxford University Press, 1978, third edition. And, Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West, New York: Harper & Row, 1964.

unity to a dramatic close, as well as his commanding rule over Transjordan and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and his personal influence on the shape of events and developments in the Middle East.

King Abdullah was a man who wielded great personal power, who exerted influence beyond the resources and capacity of Jordan, and who upheld particular policies and ideals in the midst of regional and international opposition. The mantle of Hashemite leadership and the legacy of King Abdullah's rule, his dream and vision for the Arab world, was preserved, nurtured and ingrained upon the memories, experiences and historical values of the young Hussein, Abdullah's grandson, who was destined to inherit the leadership of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

On August 11, 1952 Hussein was proclaimed King;¹ and on May 2, 1953, he took the constitutional oath, after a one-year rule by an interim Regency Council appointed by Parliament, which managed state affairs until the King reached the age of 18. Hussein's rule of Jordan is a lesson in transition, continuity and change, from the authoritative rule and ideals of Abdullah to Hussein's own equally powerful imprint on the development of Jordan and its role in the Arab World.

Jordan under Talal 1951-1952

In 1951 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was a country just 30 years old, which had been ruled by one man, King Abdullah, from 1921 to 1951. Abdullah's legacy to his successor was twofold. During his 30-year reign Abdullah succeeded in forming a secure, national entity in Jordan by

¹ Talal, Hussein's father, succeeded Abdullah, and ruled Jordan for one year, 1951-1952. Talal served an important transitional role, but his greatest achievement was to secure the Hashemite line of hereditary monarchical rule for his son, who was underage.

setting up a central government, imposing law and order, settling roving Bedouin tribes and weaving a patronage network of loyalty. The new political, economic and structural changes brought about by the unification of the West Bank and Jordan did not alter the nature of Abdullah's kingship of Jordan, for he retained complete authoritative control of all aspects of state functions, including the military and police forces, quelling any opposition. Jordan's unilateral move, through an act of Parliament, in formally uniting the East and West Banks, in opposition to the Arab League member states, further alienated Jordan from its Arab neighbours. King Abdullah's assassination in 1951 left his successor the task of formulating policies to face the newly emerging complexities of a changed Jordan to deal with new realities and relations within the Arab world, and with the legacy of its ties with Great Britain.

Following Abdullah's assassination, it was Talal, Abdullah's son¹ and Hussein's father, who secured the family line of hereditary Hashemite rule for the Talal branch of the line. Although Talal was King of Jordan for only one year he performed an important task in the transition between Abdullah's and Hussein's rule, broadening the scope of alternative approaches and policies available to Hussein upon his inauguration as king.

Talal's personality and policy directions were different from those of his father, Abdullah. Talal was a sensitive and temperate man, which Abdullah perceived as weakness. The combination of Talal's personal character and a recurring mental affliction made for a permanent barrier of indifference that

¹ Abdullah had two sons, Talal and Naif. Naif was Talal's half-brother. Both were candidates to succeed Abdullah. See: Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography, London: Barrie & Jenkins Ltd, 1972, pgs. 37-38.

neither seemed able to surmount. The division between Abdullah and Talal, the two most important men in Hussein's life, was a cause of great sorrow. In his biography, Uneasy Lies the Head, Hussein addressed this circumstance:

Abdullah, "He was a wonderful old man, fierce and sometimes autocratic..."¹ "Many men were afraid of him, but not I. He loved me very much, that I know, and I, in my turn, loved him to a point when I no longer feared his rather austere outward appearance, and I think he knew and appreciated this. To me he was more than a grandfather, and to him I think I was a son."²

"My father, later King Talal, was utterly different. He was the kindest of men, gentle and possessed of great charm, at whose feet as children we would sit and listen as he wove one miraculous story after another for us...His honesty was a byword and I never met a man who did not like him....family differences exist among monarchs as much as among their subjects, and the truth is that my grandfather and my father never got on well together. The two men were separated by different lives and different ages...He had wanted a brave, intrepid, Bedouin son to carry on the great tradition of the Arab Revolt, and was incapable of accepting an invalid in place of his dream. It was the bitterest disappointment of his life."

Talal was considered an intelligent and wise man, a capable king. It was the increasing occurrence of mental attacks that limited his ability to continue his service to Jordan beyond 12 months, after which the Jordanian Parliament, in a special meeting, proclaimed Hussein as the new king.

¹ HM KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, UNEASY LIES THE HEAD: an autobiography, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1962. pg. 14.

² Ibid. pg. 14.

The two most important policy changes instituted by Talal shortly after assuming his duties as King of Jordan were, first, that he moved to "introduce a new Constitution, which made the cabinet responsible to parliament for the first time, and reduced the powers of the King,"¹ and, second, that he "joined the Arab League's Collective Security Pact, which together with Iraq it had refused to do in 1950."²

Talal was sensitive to the new realities and circumstances that presented themselves in 1951. A large section of Jordanian citizens were Palestinian who, under British occupation, had experienced a different political environment and development. The Palestinians, although given equal representation in Parliament, were integrated into a Jordanian political system that included a network of paternalistic relations nurtured over 30 years under Abdullah's rule. Not all Palestinians shared the unique relationship between Abdullah and his East Jordanian subjects. Talal's reform policies helped to bridge this gap by giving the Palestinians increased opportunities for self-expression and participation in Jordan's political system. Talal's reform initiative was Jordan's first step toward testing the capacity of the country to respond, responsibly, to democratic forms of government.

Talal was also responsible for shifting Jordan's regional policy toward reconciliation and improved relations with neighbouring Arab states. By joining the Arab League's Collective Security Pact, which Abdullah had refused to do in 1950, and terminating Jordan's unification talks with Iraq, initiated by Abdullah before his death, Talal signaled Jordan's

¹ Peter Snow, HUSSEIN: A Biography, London: Barrie & Jenkins Ltd., 1972. pg. 44.

² George L. Harris, Jordan: Its People Its Society Its Culture, New Haven: Hraf Press, 1958. pg. 110.

interest in ending the state of division and conflict that marked its relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and highlighted sincere efforts geared towards rapprochement and cooperation. Talal was clear that the main factors behind problems affecting the region sprung from British and French imperialist policies, both historical and current.¹ Perhaps Talal wisely concluded that only through Arab cooperation could Middle East states confront the many problems they faced. Under a new set of conditions, Talal pushed Jordan into a new alignment of moderation consistent with the emergence of a new reality: the end of the dream of Arab unification, and the entrenchment of independent Arab states, whose territorial base was carved out of the remnant of the Ottoman Empire.

These bold policy actions, of political reform and Arab rapprochement, gave Hussein a broadened political spectrum of opportunity and flexibility to national policy goals that were in the best interest of Jordan.

Hussein bin Talal: King of Jordan 1953-1999

Hussein was 18 when he was ceremoniously crowned king on May 2, 1953. In the forefront, preceding Hussein, were the legacy of Abdullah's 30-year rule and the important contribution of Talal towards Jordan's future. Both men were powerful sources of influence upon the young Hussein as heir apparent. But of Abdullah, Hussein said:²

"...he, of all men, had the most profound influence on my life. So, too, had the manner of his death."

¹ For a detailed review of colonial rule over the Arabs and its effect on Arab perceptions of the West, please see: Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

² HM King Hussein of Jordan, Uneasy Lies the Head: an Autobiography, p. 10.

King Abdullah took a profound interest in Hussein at an early age, particularly when he perceived in him the qualities of spirit and mind that he had desired for his own son. Abdullah took care personally to direct the cultivation of Hussein's educational and learning pursuits and, ensure the imparting of the art of statecraft by having Hussein accompany him amidst the daily duties of a king:¹

"he let me accompany him everywhere; it was he who taught me to understand the minds of my people and the intricacies of the Arab world in which we lived. He taught me the courtly functions, how to behave and - perhaps because he was a sadly disappointed man who had been deceived by the British and French - how to come to terms with adversity as well as with success. And he taught me above all else that a leader's greatest duty is to serve."

Nor did Abdullah neglect to impress thoroughly upon Hussein, in vivid detail, the guiding principles, virtues and military conduct of the Great Arab Revolt. From Abdullah, Hussein "learned the fundamental precepts of Arab independence ... he believed (and Hussein believed with him) that all Arab peoples must be masters of their own affairs."² It was in the spirit of these ideals that Abdullah confided to his grandson, shortly before his assassination in Jerusalem:³

"I hope you realize, my son, that one day you will have to assume responsibility. I look to you to do your very best to see that my work is not lost. I look to you to continue in the service of our people."

¹ Ibid. pg. 17. Here Hussein refers to time spent with his grandfather, King Abdullah.

² Ibid. pg. 108.

³ Ibid. pg. 4.

Assassination is, in itself, the ultimate act of political desperation and weakness, by which the assailant or conspirators, bereft of any alternative solution, merely force silence upon an opponent. Hussein's witnessing of this violent deed, and his memory of the scene at the Al-Aqsa mosque as Abdullah's entourage scattered 'like bent old terrified women' seeking refuge and safety in fear of the assassin's bullets', imprinted upon Hussein's mind 'the frailty of political devotion'.¹

In life and death Abdullah transmitted lessons and experiences to Hussein concerning the nature of politics and the nature of men. Such experiences contributed to the formulation of Hussein's own philosophy of life and death:

"I have a simple philosophy of life and death. How easily life comes and how easily it can end! What man can afford to waste time? At any moment death can claim the body, and, when it does, death itself is unimportant. The only thing that matters is the work that one has accomplished.

To this creed of life I would add one more tenet. I believe with all my heart that if one is to give of his best one must live the fundamental life of an ordinary man. One cannot hide behind a title or a throne. One can be proud of one's responsibilities, as I am, but one cannot use position as a shield. I will never work merely to make a reputation for myself, to be superficially popular. My task is to lead my country through service."

¹ Ibid. pg. 8. Both statements are quoted from Hussein's Uneasy Lies the Head.

Abdullah was not the only influence on the development and character of Hussein. The early memories of his family life at home also played a part in the making of Hussein the man.

On assuming the duties of kingship, Hussein was catapulted into a period of unparalleled dangers for the survival of the Hashemite regime, and of Jordan, in the years 1953-1958. The period was marked by volatile regional turmoil and a backlash against imperialist rule, and the Arab world laboured with questions of ideology, regional alignments, forms of political system and the question of identity. Jordan was part of this pattern, and, at the age of 18, Hussein entered the arena of power politics in which survival demanded strength of personality, qualities of leadership and skill in the art of statecraft. These challenges were the final stage of Hussein's political education, and the knowledge imparted by Abdullah and Talal formed the firm basis that enabled him to meet them.

Hussein was born in Transjordan and spent his youth in the familiar atmosphere of Amman, then a small city of 30,000 people, circled by hills that were sparsely inhabited. The 1948 war brought change to the quiet serenity of Amman, as Palestinian refugees streamed into the open spaces seeking shelter and security. In 1950, the unification of the East and West banks gave legal sanction and representation to the Palestinians of the West Bank, and Hussein, as King of Jordan, now ruled over a social mix of different nationalities, half of them Palestinian, with a diversified social structure and economic base. In sociological terms Hussein wanted to know the minds, attitudes and feelings of the urban dweller as well as those in rural areas of Jordan. In practical terms, Jordan's social structure had become richer in character, encompassing as it did the city dweller, townspeople, villagers, farmers, Bedouins,

refugees and those sectors supplying the majority of the recruits for the Arab Legion and Frontier Force.

Hussein toured the countryside, meeting personally with men of rank, position and stature among the Bedouin tribes and villages. He walked amongst the troops of his Arab army, giving great attention to the individual soldier. He sometimes ventured out in disguise, on one occasion as a taxi driver, to question his people and listen to their thoughts and their opinion of the king. He kept in touch with the mood of his countrymen, well aware that a balance would have to be maintained between the interests and demands of the various social and political sectors of society and his intention to serve the best interests of his country. The three main typologies of concern for the Jordanian government on the domestic front were:

- 1) the political system and infrastructure
- 2) the economy
- 3) the military.

However, political realities in the Middle East precluded any conception of non-interference in the internal concerns of Jordan. Indeed, the foreign policies and interests of external regional and international actors represented an ever-present ingredient for Hussein in determining foreign as well as domestic policy.

King Hussein on the Domestic Front

After touring the countryside and sensing the mood of the country, King Hussein set out to supplement Abdullah's enfranchisement of the Palestinians in 1950 and Talal's political reforms in 1951 by formulating additional policies aimed at

domestic integration and political representation. Influenced by Arab intellectuals imbued with the merits of Western political party systems, Hussein took incremental steps towards political reform.

This reform was twofold. First, Hussein agreed to the formation of political parties, and, second, he engaged in a policy of co-opting both potential opponents and modern-minded individuals into the work of the government. The diversity of political recruitment of East and West Bankers, conservatives and liberals, modernists, and traditionalists into government service¹ aided the process of domestic integration and nurtured personal identification with the regime and interest in its maintenance. By meeting some demands for change, the long-term effect of such a policy was to create a loyal opposition that worked within the system to effect policy changes. In the short term, however, liberalization of the political system, in an era marked by a highly politicized and active Arab population, conflicting popular ideologies and explosive, unresolved issues, such as the Palestine question and western imperialism, put the working relationship between newly formed political parties and the national government into question.²

In the spirit of new ideas and the desire to propel Jordan into the modern age of development and industrialization, Hussein was willing to test the idea of democracy in Jordan. However, the political strain of conflicting ideologies that

¹ i.e.: the balance in recruitment and placement between the executive, legislative, judiciary and bureaucratic sectors of government and the military.

² See: Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967, London: Cornell University Press Ltd., 1982.

infected the Arab world¹ was to become the source of domestic and regional conflict throughout the Middle East.

Hussein's policy goals were distinctly nationalistic and development-oriented, while the orientation of many of the newly-formed political parties in Jordan was anti-Western, favoured a socialist economy and called for Arab unification which undermined the independent status of Jordan.

Hussein's conception of the role of political parties included its *raison d'etre*, to represent the interests and policy preferences of various sub-sectors of the Jordanian population within the parameters of constructive efforts to improve and enhance the development of Jordan under Hashemite rule. However, parties whose platforms were adamantly anti-Western and anti-Israel felt that only through Arab unification could sufficient strength and power be gained to defeat Israel and Arab unification, in this sense, meant the dissolution of Jordan and its territorial annexation into a 'Greater Syria' or envelopment under a Syrian/Egyptian axis.² Hussein's conception of Arab unity was in the form of economic, social and cultural cooperation with political integration as the final stage.

The irreconcilable differences between the policy directives of Hussein and the radical platforms of many of the newly formed parties, such as The Jordan Communist Party, Al-Qawmiyun al-Arab (The Arab Nationalist Party), The Liberation

¹ These ideologies included: Pan-Arabism: (the quest for Arab unity under a single regime); Pan-Islam (the quest for Arab unity under a unitarian Islamic state); nationalism (support for national independence and national identity as distinct from integration unto a unified Arab state); and, regarding type of regime: republicanism versus monarchy and a choice between democracy, social democracy, socialism and communism.

² Creation of the United Arab Republic, involving union between Syria and Egypt in 1958, threatened to engulf Jordan within its sphere of influence.

Party, The Muslim Brothers, meant the eventual end of the democratic experience in Jordan. The climax was reached with a military coup attempt in 1957 and successive reforms, such as the dissolution of all political parties, declaration of martial law and abrogation of the constitutional reform under King Talal. The cabinet was henceforth to become responsible to Parliament and to the King.

Commenting in retrospect on Jordan's experience with political parties, Hussein noted:

"There are in the free world different interpretations of the term 'democracy'. In the Arab world we have learned that to copy one system of government completely and to attempt to apply it to a newer state with a different background and history, is unwise, even dangerous."¹

And in an interview many years later, when Hussein was questioned as to why he did not re-establish political parties, "King Husayn replied that the time has not yet come to allow political parties to be recognized...he said, political parties had been engaged in an intense struggle for power and tended to confuse and divide public opinion rather than to mobilize it to influence and guide the nation to do constructive work."²

For Hussein, the concept of a party system was unworkable and destabilizing. Domestic parties became the source of ideological propaganda, representing the broad spectrum of ideological alignments in the region, which were markedly anti-Hashemite and anti-monarchical. Several critical policy initiatives that Hussein instituted saved his regime,

¹ Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head.

² Majid Khadduri, Arab Personalities in Politics, Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1981. pg. 119.

including: 1) the dissolution of political parties 2) the control of political elites 3) policy concerning the military.

Although the experiment with political parties failed, Hussein continued his drive toward domestic integration and national identity, directed particularly at the newly enfranchised citizens of 1950. What made the political system in Jordan work was the broad elite recruitment policy of the king and his utilization of men with different political orientations and backgrounds, whose talents, connections and experience could be used to serve the requirements of the Kingdom. This approach moved towards integration and political accommodation within the system and allowed the participation of known opposition figures. Subversive activities were punished, but even some of Hussein's most formidable opponents were forgiven, and brought out of exile to serve, once again, the government of the Hashemite monarchy.¹ This policy also kept Hussein informed and in control of the political opposition. With the assistance of his intelligence network, the king was in a better position to identify those who posed a serious threat or sought to undermine Jordan's stability. His most important support was the military.

¹ Regarding the pardon of Ali Hiyari and Ali Abu Nuwar, for their role during the 1957 coup attempt, the Zerka incident: "...Hussein later forgave Ali Hiyari, just as he forgave Ali Abu Nuwar. In 1971, Hiyari was appointed Jordanian ambassador in Cairo." In the case of Ali Abu Nuwar, "Less than ten years later he was back in Amman--with a full pardon from Hussein, and for a time, he was the King's special representative. At the time of writing, he has returned to his old haunt, the Jordanian embassy in Paris, not as a military attaché, but as an ambassador. His cousin Ma'an was acquitted after a trial on conspiracy charges and later became a Major-General, and Chief Public Relations officer for Jordan's armed forces." See pages 113, and 111 respectively, as quoted from: Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography, London: Barrie & Jenkins Ltd., 1972.

The military in Jordan was a professional, non-political, and well-trained fighting force and completely loyal to the Hashemite monarchy. "Until 1956 the Jordan Army was a long-service volunteer force; there were no conscripts in it. Regiments were about 500-900 strong."¹ Hussein, as king, initiated several policy changes and acted in such a way as to confirm the complete identification of the military with the monarchy, represented by him.

Hussein's first action on assuming his duties as king was to develop a personal rapport with the soldiers under his command. He made himself available to his troops by visiting outposts and shaking the hand of every recruit, and he took a personal interest in scrutinizing the general operational directives for the Arab Legion and strategic military plans. Hussein's military education at Sandhurst gave him the basic skills to determine the military requirements of his forces, and to judge the appropriateness of offensive and defensive operational plans. His conception of the military needs of Jordan set him in direct confrontation with General John Bagot Glubb, the British officer who was Commander-in-Chief of the Arab Legion.

Hussein's first policy actions were to seek troop expansion in the Arab army, modernization and supply of forces, Arabization of the Officer Corps, and the development of a credible and efficient air force. The difficulty faced by Hussein at this time was Britain's de facto control of the security and military forces in Jordan by virtue of Jordan's treaty relations with Britain, and by the fact that the Officer Corps and Jordan's

¹ P.J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1967. p. 145. In Uneasy Lies the Head, pg. 111, King Hussein estimates that in 1948, "the Arab Legion consisted of less than 4,500 troops".

Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, General Glubb, were British Officers.¹

Hussein was interested in keeping good relations with Great Britain, upon which Jordan was dependent for financial assistance amounting to 12 million pounds a year, while, at the same time, exacting reforms in the military. Hussein wanted Arab officers prepared and trained to replace British officers, and Britain's response to this request was to "submit a plan of Arabization which 'in due course' would give more opportunities to Jordanian officers. (Hussein was shortly informed that the Royal Engineers of the Arab Legion would have an Arab Commander by 1985."² The British communicated their intention to comply with Hussein's request in thirty years time.

This response, in conjunction with other personal disagreements, precipitated Hussein's dismissal of General Glubb Pasha in 1956. The 21-year-old Hussein's firing of Glubb, which he considered an internal matter, was in actuality a direct confrontation with Great Britain over the independence and national integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The immediate effect of Hussein's action was Britain's hasty recall of British officers serving in the Arab Legion, whereupon Arab officers, not yet prepared to fulfill new responsibilities, were nevertheless rapidly promoted to fill the

¹ The security forces of Jordan, including the police, came under the control of the army. In effect, General Glubb, as Commander-in-Chief of the army, was in direct control of the internal security forces and the army in Jordan. See pg. 116, Uneasy Lies the Head. Also, in Hussein's words: "Under the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, Jordan received approximately L12 million a year of British financial aid and Britain supplied officers to 'train' the Arab Legion. In effect they virtually ran it," Ibid. pg. 108. For more information see Chapter 1X, 1956 The Dismissal of Glubb Pasha.

² Ibid. pg. 109

void of military leadership. Arab officers long disgruntled over their treatment by Britain thus found themselves in a position of power without appropriate training and experience to adequately fulfill the demands of their new responsibilities. This posed an interim inconvenience for Hussein, but not an insurmountable problem. In fact, the tandem effect of Hussein's popular policies and his personal rapport with the troops made the military an unquestionable bastion of loyalty and support for the regime. The rumblings of dissent in 1957 represented an isolated phenomenon within the officer corps (of which there are two versions)¹, and were never a serious threat to the monarchy. The

¹ For version number 1, the most widely accepted and that of King Hussein himself; see chapter X and XI in his autobiography Uneasy Lies the Head. Briefly, the Zerka uprising in 1957 was essentially a political conspiracy between Suleman Nabulsi, the Prime Minister and Secretary-General of the National Socialist party, General Abu Nuwar, Chief of Staff of the armed forces, and 'leftist forces' instigated by inter-Arab politics emanating from Syria and Egypt; the question of politics centering on: regional alignment, i.e., Arab unity and social versus capitalist democracy; the effect of the East-West cold war; and the political makeup of the cabinet, which instituted policy directives for the future of Jordan. The conspiracy and instigated political crisis sprang from Hussein's order to dissolve the Government, under Nabulsi, and the political maneuverings which prevented the formation of a new government, with Nabulsi purportedly blocking any cabinet which did not meet his terms. Under explosive domestic conditions, an ultimatum was given by Abu Nuwar: "unless a Cabinet satisfactory to the people and all parties is formed and announced on the radio by no later than nine o'clock tonight, then I and my colleagues will not be responsible for anything that happens," p. 139. The military plan, as stated by Abdul Rahman Sabila, to King Hussein, was: "to prepare to move at short notice on to Amman, to surround and capture the royal palace" and the King, p.141. The conspiracy ended in fighting which broke out between troops in Zerka-- confused about orders and rumours concerning the safety of the King, and uncertain of who the conspirators were--with indiscriminate and random gunfire. The King's hasty arrival on the scene, and the assurance of his safety, brought an end to the fighting and reintroduced order. According to Hussein, the "final objective, after murdering me, had been to establish some king of federal union with Egypt," p. 151.

The second version suggests that the Zerka incident was a masterful manipulation of events, by Hussein, to eliminate leftist, and communist and subversive elements among the army and political elite. One such book, by Mohammad Ibrahim Faddah, postulates

kind of military in Jordan was, in fact, the reverse of that found in other Arab countries. In Jordan, "Change has been effected by the regime, protected by the military".¹ Political parties and opposition political elites constituted the primary source of conflict and threat to the regime, but deprived of support from

that Hussein, after terminating the Anglo-British treaty in 1957, and therefore the British subsidy, did so on condition that Arab states meet the financial needs of Jordan. Unhappy with dependence on Arab aid, Hussein then sought an alternative: "To free himself from his critical situation, Husayn played the American game by declaring that the Nabulsi Cabinet and Parliament as well as the army had been infiltrated by Communists, and that Communism was the major cause for instability in Jordan. Under the protective eye of the U.S.A., Husayn executed his coup against the nationalists and the army, thus bringing Jordan within the American sphere of influence;" Mohammad Ibrahim Faddah, The Middle East in Transition: A Study of Jordan's Foreign Policy, London: Asia Publishing House, 1974. pg. 307. And, as quoted and footnoted in Vatikiotis' book on Politics and the Military in Jordan: "Despite a period of civil disturbances, widespread violence was successfully avoided," pg. 147, and footnoted, #6: "Here one should refer to Erskine B. Childers, The Road to Suez (London, 1962). Childers devotes an Appendix to his book (pp. 397-401) to debunk the commonly held theory of a coup led by Ali Abu Nuwar in April 1957. Childers puts forward the theory that the coup was engineered by King Husayn and the Americans. His version is based largely, if not exclusively, on his interviews with President Nasser in Egypt and General Abu Nuwar who, at that time, was in exile." And, as printed in: Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography, London: Barrie & Jenkins Ltd., 1972. pg. 113: "...Hiyyari telephoned Hussein to say he was resigning, and at a Press Conference in Damascus, Hiyyari accused Hussein of inventing the whole idea of a plot against him in order to eliminate nationalists like himself and Ali Abu Nuwar. He claimed that the King was being aided by certain foreign military attaches and clearly implied that the Americans were involved." And, pg. 116: "Both (Ali Abu Nuwar and Suleiman Naboulsi) of them strongly deny any intention to overthrow Hussein and create a Republic. Naboulsi told the author in December, 1971 that even Nasser himself was against a change in Jordan.* *Naboulsi claims that on his last visit to Cairo before his resignation as Prime Minister, he was urged by Nasser to do nothing to upset the monarchy in Jordan. Nasser's last words, as he escorted Naboulsi to his car at 4 a.m. were: 'I beg you to remain on good terms with King Hussein'. Naboulsi says that all the rumours of plots and coups against Hussein--at the time of his Premiership and later--were deliberately generated by the Palace and by the West in order to create an atmosphere of siege, which would allow the West a permanent entree to Jordan as 'protectors' of the threatened Hashemite regime."

¹ P. J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1967, pg. 153.

the military political dissent was easily and successfully contained by the King.

Although, after the 1957 Zerka incident, a National Congress representing leftist parties and including 200 party delegates and 23 parliamentarians, made a final demand upon the King "asking for federal union with Egypt and Syria, rejection of the Eisenhower doctrine, and the reinstatement of all dismissed officers,"¹ Hussein dealt his final blow to what he considered the excesses arising from his democratic experiment by declaring martial law, banning all political parties and rescinding the Constitutional reform order made under Talal by which the Cabinet was answerable to Parliament. At 21, Hussein became the explicit and indisputable leader of Jordan, with the support and backing of the military. It was not until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war that he was faced with a challenge that threatened the continuance of his regime.²

King Hussein and Regional Politics

Regional politics were intended to be regulated within the institutional structure of the Arab League.³ The League, rather than facilitating inter-Arab cooperation, more regularly highlighted the differences and conflicts between the Arab nations. It was not until Talal's ascent to power in 1951 that Jordan's position in the Arab world was reversed by Talal's policy initiative towards rapprochement and reconciliation with neighbouring states, concretely conveyed by Jordan's joining the Arab League Collective Security Pact.

¹ Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography. pg. 113.

² Please see the section on the Palestine Issue, which addresses the time span 1967-1970 and deals the challenges and Hussein's response to them.

³ See: Robert W. Macdonald, The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Under the leadership of King Hussein, Jordan's posture in the Arab World was to follow a path of flexibility, showing moderation and cooperative restraint, together with strength and fortitude in sustaining foreign policy initiatives that reflected the needs of Jordan's national security. An analysis of Hussein's regional politics during the 1950's and 60's confirms his sincere efforts to maintain good relations with his Arab neighbours and to avoid the irreconcilable differences and rigid alliances that had characterized the reign of Abdullah. In the words of Hussein:¹

"Jordan is a country that depends on good neighbours for its existence."

Given the violent, chaotic and unstable conditions that prevailed in the Middle East in the 1950's and 1960's, part of Hussein's success could be attributed to his ability to find a balance between the necessity for cooperative action amongst Arab League members and the actions requisite in Jordan's national security interests. The willingness to face risks, make hard choices and maintain a flexible response contributed to Hussein's success.

The first test of this policy came in 1954, when Iraq again broached the subject of unity. Unification talks between Iraq and Jordan had been under negotiation up to the point of Abdullah's sudden assassination in 1951, but had not been renewed by Talal. Hussein, in accordance with his desire for good relations with the Arab League, informed Iraq that such action would, in his view, lead to division rather than the cooperation that was essential in the Arab world.

¹ Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, pg. 85

The second test for Jordan came one year later, in 1955, in the form of the Baghdad Pact. Hussein was adamantly anti-communist, perceiving the Soviet Union as a potential threat to the region and, as such, he was favourably predisposed to the concept of a defensive alliance as a means of containment against possible Soviet military and subversive activity. However, Hussein was equally firm in his belief that membership of the pact should not be undertaken unilaterally, but should be presented, rather, in terms of an Arab initiative, or at the very least meet the approval of Arab League member states. The fact that Britain seduced Iraq into unilaterally signing the Baghdad Pact without the consultation of Egypt, the predominant power in the region, or informing Jordan of its decision, completely undermined the initiative. It is fair to judge that the Baghdad Pact was the root issue behind a set of events culminating in the bloody military coup of 1958, which ended the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq. In the case of Jordan, a 'misunderstanding' with Egypt on this issue brought significant problems for the regime.

The fact that Iraq, a lone Arab state, entered a strategic alliance devised by the Americans and guaranteed by Great Britain made the Baghdad Pact, a tool of Western imperialism and challenged what Egypt considered to be its leadership role in the region. At the time Egypt was giving signals to Washington that it hoped for good relations, but the handling of the Baghdad Pact alienated Egypt and posed the issue in terms of competitive leadership and influence in the region. Britain's unilateral move with Iraq indicated Britain's desire to maintain hegemonic and imperialist influence in the region, either on behalf of itself or in consortium with America, at Egypt's expense.

Britain's next target was Jordan, but following Iraq's unilateral move Hussein was unwilling to enter into the Baghdad Pact, which he now considered a dead issue. However, Britain influenced reconsideration by promising financial incentives that would strengthen Jordan's financial reserves, which were insufficient to meet the demands of its development and modernization goals, particularly with regard to the military. Hussein was in a difficult position. On the one hand, the economic viability of Jordan was dependent upon Britain's financial subsidy provided under the Anglo-Jordan treaty. On the other, the political and structural integrity of Jordan as an independent state was also subject to the power and policies of regional actors, particularly Egypt. The dilemma posed by these conflicting needs pushed Hussein to consult with Nasser of Egypt.

According to Hussein's version of the story, he met with Nasser and discussed his negotiations with the British and his interest in obtaining specific concessions and financial assistance in return for signing the Baghdad Pact. A series of exchanges between Hussein and Nasser followed, including the transmission of a copy of the terms negotiated for Hussein's entry into the pact. Hussein contends that Nasser approved:¹

"...he gave the project his blessing and echoed specifically the words of General Amir: 'Any strength for the Jordan is strength for the Arab world. Therefore, I can see no objection.'"

Further events rapidly unfolded that indicated either a misunderstanding between Hussein and Nasser regarding the

¹ Ibid. pg. 90.

Baghdad Pact, or political intrigue on the part of Egypt aimed at using the issue to topple the Hashemite regime.

Egypt publicly renounced the Baghdad Pact and accused Jordan of collusion, of intending to join a Western alliance with Iraq to establish a bridgehead of continued Western imperialism in the region.

Egypt's critical condemnation of Hussein reverberated within a highly politicized and activist domestic environment in Jordan. The emergence of parties under liberalization reforms had given political structure and power to domestic groups whose sympathies were pan-Arab and anti-West. The newly enfranchised citizens did not equate political loyalty with loyalty to a Hashemite monarchy, but rather to the wider ideals of Arab unity. Hussein was decidedly pro-western and anti-communist and he disapproved of Nasser's concepts of 'neutralism' and 'Arab unity'. He felt Arab unity should proceed on a platform of economic and social cooperation, with political integration deferred.¹ Joining of the Baghdad Pact, with Iraq alone, was seen as a divisive effort by Britain to isolate Egypt, the champion of Arab nationalism. Violent domestic unrest, incited by Egypt, caused a political crisis in Jordan, and Hussein was forced to dissolve the government and disclaim any intention of joining the Baghdad Pact.

In the events of 1955, and the tensions over the Baghdad Pact, there was a lesson to be learned. Although, as Hussein recounts, he had consulted with Nasser and obtained his blessing, the fact remains that there is only a fine line between a

¹ There is a distinction to be made between Nasser's conception of Arab nationalism and unity, and Hussein's. Nasser's foreign policy posture was anti-British and neutralist on the International front, and Arab unity was seen as territorial unification under the leadership of Egypt.

balancing of Jordan's domestic and regional interests and a costly course of going alone. Egypt's response to a foreign policy or domestic initiative it disliked was to foment domestic unrest in Jordan through propaganda and the infiltration of the open party system in Jordan. Hussein reduced the opportunities for domestic interference in 1957 by dissolving all political parties and instituting martial law. Nevertheless, the events of 1955 clearly manifested the inseparability of domestic from regional and international politics.

Regional politics in the late 1950's and 1960's were dominated by the charismatic and authoritative figure of Nasser of Egypt. Nasser was the embodiment of hope for the future of the Arab world. His vision of Arab unity and nationalism was a powerful influence in the region, and popular among the masses of individuals who shared a common language, culture, history and religion, but were separated by political territorial borders. Under Nasser's leadership, there re-emerged the concept of national integration, similar in ideal to the aspirations of the Syrian Congress of 1920, with the difference being that political leadership would be under the mantle of Nasser, an Egyptian, and not that of the Hashemites or the ruling elite that emerged in Syria after France's withdrawal following WWII.

The creation of the UAR in 1958, uniting Egypt and Syria, was a move to redress the divisions imposed by Britain after WWI and to fulfill Egypt's long-term interest in asserting itself as the centre of power in the region.¹ Inclusion of Jordan in

¹ See: Howard M. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East 1936-1954, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972; as illustrated on page 403, Egypt under King Farouk: "People then understood," wrote Muhammad Hussein Haikal, "that King Farouk's personal policy had for its aim the establishment of his personal leadership over the Arab states." "The most eminent of Farouk's advisers were Ali Mahir and Azzam Pasha, who shared the monarch's vision of Egypt as an authoritarian Moslem state embracing gradually all

the UAR would extend the borders of a unitary state across the western divide of North Africa to Turkey. The unity scheme would also resolve the historical competition with Iraq for regional power in Egypt's favour.

In the 1940's, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were in opposition to Abdullah's efforts toward unification of the Fertile Crescent, either Greater Syria, joining Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and Lebanon, or the union of Transjordan and Iraq. Egypt's scheme of 1958 was the reverse of this, postulating the incorporation of the territories of Syria and Jordan under Egyptian rule and the termination of Abdullah's Hashemite legacy and the independent integrity of Jordan.

In the matter of preserving of the Hashemite legacy, national security considerations took precedence over Hussein's express foreign policy goal of moderation and cooperative efforts for good neighbourly relations. Fourteen days after the UAR was created, Jordan and Iraq reacted by forming the Arab Union, an arrangement for union between the two countries. The Arab world was therefore now split between the UAR (the union of two republican regimes) and the Arab Union (the union of two Hashemite monarchies).

Hussein's decision to form the Arab Union with Iraq was a defensive move, intended to offset the change in balance of power resulting from the creation of the UAR. As evidenced by

the Arabs, and perhaps in the fullness of time, all Moslems." Egypt, under Nasser, had similar ambitions. Please see: R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir, New York: State University of New York Press Albany, 1971. Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Tareq Y. Ismael, The Arab Left, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1976. Regarding balance of power configurations and alliances, see: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. James N. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Hussein's refusal to unite with Iraq in 1954, the 1958 union was a tactical move to strengthen the power base of both countries. However, the power lay with the UAR and within five months the Iraqi Kingdom was eliminated in a bloody military coup that resulted in the murder of the ruling monarchy and members of the government, and the collapse of the Hashemite union. Hussein's intelligence network had uncovered information about the coup plots against Jordan and Iraq, but the precise details were not known. The instability that followed events in Iraq motivated King Hussein to ask for Western assistance and Britain responded by sending immediate assistance to Jordan, while the Americans landed marines on the beaches of Lebanon. Within four months Hussein had reestablished order and the British troops left the country.

Hussein did not implement his right to preside over the Arab Union following the death of King Feisal the Second of Iraq, and the Jordan armed forces sent to quell the coup in Iraq were recalled. Feisal and Iraqi government leaders were already dead, the power game had already been played out and Jordan had insufficient resources to act alone. The Hashemite monarchy survived in Jordan, but continued survival meant that Jordan had to seek a rapprochement with Egypt, and, in concert with this, maintain the support and assistance of the West.

The complex set of circumstances that marked domestic and regional relationships in the Middle East became exposed in the climactic crisis of 1967, the Arab-Israeli war and its aftermath.

The existence of Israel was an issue that caused political and domestic troubles for the sovereign Arab nation-states. Fearful of an attack by Israel, due to Palestinian armed attacks on Israel from the territories of the confrontational states, and

Egypt's closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, no Arab state wanted or was prepared to wage the war to which these events contributed.¹

The United Arab Command, formed in 1964, was inadequate to deal with evolving events and circumstances, and Egypt and Syria therefore signed a secret defense agreement that was soon followed by a precise bilateral agreement between Egypt and Jordan. Hussein was perfectly clear that if war came he would join the Arab forces against Israel.² War did come, and inadequacies in military preparedness, planning, coordination, supplies, air cover, troop reserves, and the ever-present suspicions and rivalries between Arab states foretold the inevitability of failure. Israel won the war and occupied the Gaza Strip, which had been under Egyptian administration, the Al-Himma region of the Golan Heights, which had been under Syrian administration, and the West Bank, which had been under Jordanian suzerainty.

The end of the war was a tragedy for the Arab world, but particularly for the Palestinians and Jordan. The whole of the West Bank was lost, and with it Jordan's agricultural sector and one half of its territorial base. The newly occupied territories of the West Bank produced floods of refugees seeking refuge in Amman. Within three days the geographic structure of four states had been changed. The borders of Egypt, Syria and Jordan had been transformed, and Israel occupied Arab land.

The failure of Arab states to reclaim Palestine for the Palestinians, compounded by the loss of additional Arab

¹ See: Donald Neff, Warriors For Jerusalem, New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1984.

² See: Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War, London: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

territory to Israel, clearly meant the end of Arab unity and the end of ideology. The 1967 war revealed an Arab world divided, and demonstrated the hollowness of the war of words, the propaganda that had convinced the people of the Arab world that their governments had the will and the strength to defeat Israel. The slogans of "Pan-Arabism", "Justice for the Palestinians" and "Death to Israel" were just words and nothing more. The ideals, hopes and aspirations championed in the slogans of political regimes lost the bite of credibility in six days. The aftermath of the 1967 war was to open a new age of realism in the Middle East, and bring about a transformation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that was created by Arab states in 1964 as a voice for the Palestinians. After 1967, the PLO was to emerge as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

The significant changes brought about by the 1967 war spread through all sectors of Arab domestic and regional politics, and plunged the Middle East into a period of self-examination and adjustment to new realities. For years the power of rhetoric and propaganda, masterfully turned upon the hopeful aspirations of the Arab people, had hidden the true forces of power in the Middle East. What King Abdullah, then King Talal, and King Hussein after him, had long since realized was that the West, first Britain and France and then America, were the power brokers preventing the formation of a united Arab regional bloc that could undermine Western geopolitical, strategic and economic interests. The political division of Arab territories into individual states that split up ethnically cohesive units was simply a means of perpetuating disunity and manipulating relationships and alliances in the region. The 1967 war clearly manifested the reality of Israel's permanent existence, the commitment of Western powers to its survival, and the inability of Arab regimes to unite in a meaningful and

effective effort. Consequently Arab regimes were left to manage the devastation that the war wrought and address themselves to these new realities. In the wake of the war new forces and new ways of thinking were preparing to emerge and redirect Arab political thought.

On the domestic front, Hussein was faced with new challenges following the loss of productive territory and the influx of more Palestinian refugees, which challenged Jordan's ability to provide an environment of stability and economic sufficiency to people within its borders.

King Hussein and International Relations

Jordan's history and foreign relations were, until 1957, inexorably intertwined with the policy preferences and interests of Great Britain, the recipient of the mandatory award of Palestine and Mesopotamia. Faced with the fait accompli of Abdullah's military presence in Amman in 1921, Britain sought accommodation by offering Abdullah administrative rule of Transjordan and eventual independence on condition that law and order were established in the territory.¹

Britain did not terminate its mandatory control of Transjordan until 1946, and did not officially recognize the independent status of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan until 1948.² The mandatory relationship, however, was continued within the framework of the Anglo-Jordan treaty, which gave protection to continued British interests in the country. Abdullah was favourable towards continued friendship with Britain, upon which Jordan was dependent for financial

¹ See Chapter 1, for details of Abdullah's relations with Great Britain, and the terms for the creation of Transjordan.

² The International Community did not recognize the independent status of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan until 1948.

subsidies, economic assistance and military supplies, equipment and training.

King Hussein, who assumed power in 1953, was Western-oriented and desired good relations with Great Britain. However, domestic and regional influences, as well as national interests, complicated the relationship between the two countries. The first concrete confrontation was Hussein's dismissal of General Glubb in 1956.¹

Underlying Hussein's disagreements with Glubb Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, was the more acute issue of Jordan asserting greater independence and responsibility for its own affairs and policy directions that Hussein felt were in the best interests of his country. Hussein's desire to modernize the military, expand its capability and replace the essentially all-British Officers Corps of the Arab Legion by Arab officers was a legitimate internal concern for the king. Under increasing pressures from nationalistic forces, Hussein was risking discontent within the most important sector of regime support, the military, and it was Britain's refusal to consider substantive changes in the military that precipitated Hussein's decision to dismiss General Glubb. This was only the first of a succession of incidents leading to the termination of the Anglo-Jordan treaty in 1957 and the military entente between Britain, France and Israel. Their attack on Egypt in 1956 conclusively necessitated the treaty's abrogation.

In 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company, heretofore considered the property of Great Britain as a leftover from its colonial heyday in Egypt, and unceremoniously closed the canal to Israeli shipping. Regarding such actions as an

For details, see Chapter 2, section: The Domestic Front.

affirmation of Egyptian independence and control over national industry and infrastructure, Egypt was unprepared for the joint military actions of Britain, France and Israel to reclaim canal ownership and access. Although America forced a cessation of all military engagements and the withdrawal of Israeli troops, the non-participant that suffered was Jordan. The Arab League resolved the problem for Jordan, with member states agreeing to replace the British subsidies in return for Jordan's abrogation of the bilateral treaty, which Hussein agreed to.

The termination of the Anglo-Jordan treaty was popular in Jordan and throughout the Arab world. Jordan was perceived as having finally won full independence, and Britain's 36 year control of the country summarily ended. For Hussein, however, the euphoria was short lived, as his new concern was Jordan's dependence on Arab commitments to replace Britain's subsidy of the Jordanian economy. Political instability and change in the region placed Jordan's long-term assurance of Arab financial assistance in doubt, and this lies behind the suggestion of many commentators that Hussein contrived or masterfully manipulated an incident, now called the Zerka uprising of 1957, to play the American card.¹

Whether the Zerka uprising was a conspiratorial military coup that failed through the combined factors of mismanagement and the actions of the king, or whether Hussein masterminded a plot to fabricate a communist coup attempt and so entice American involvement and financial commitment to replace Jordan's dependence on Arab subsidy commitments, it does not alter the fact that in 1958 the US did commit itself to

¹ See Chapter 2, Section: Domestic Front; addressing the Zerka uprising, and footnote #36. Specifically, authors Mohammad Ibrahim Faddah, The Middle East in Transition: A Study of Jordan's Foreign Policy; Erskine B. Childers, The Road to Suez; and Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography.

declaring American support for the independence and integrity of Jordan under the Eisenhower Doctrine, and made a commitment to provide Jordan with \$10 million USD. In the short term American aid alleviated Hussein's dependence on Arab financial support under uncertain regional political conditions. However, just as Britain's national interests in Jordan conflicted with Hussein's formulation of Jordan's national directives and policy goals, a review of American and Arab financial assistance to Jordan has often been tied to positions on specific issues, such as peace negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Jordan's and relationship with the PLO.

King Hussein, Palestine and the Palestinians

The conflict between Arab states and Britain over the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine culminated in the historic declaration of the Arab League in 1946, at Anshass, Egypt, that 'the Palestine question is the problem of all Arabs and not Palestinian Arabs alone. Between 1946 and 1974, Palestine was officially an Arab problem, to be resolved by the concerted efforts of Arab League member states. In reality, the question of Palestine was to become a hostage to conflicts and rivalries within the Arab League, variously caused by ideology, strategic and regional power configurations and alliances, and national interests. The question of who should represent the Palestinians was not resolved until 1974, when the PLO was recognized by the Arab League as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Until that time each regime sought to champion the Palestinian cause independently, and each aspired to dominate and control the final solution.

Jordan, by virtue of the fact that it had been in effective military control of the West Bank in 1948, was more affected by the Palestine problem than any other Arab League member state.

Moreover, the unification of the East and West Banks in 1950 meant that the political ramifications of any action concerning Palestine would have a direct impact upon the security and welfare of the Hashemite Kingdom. Although the 1950 unity declaration left the issue of Palestinian aspirations open, which would be revived by the return of the occupied territories or a political solution, the dominant political ideology of the time was Arab unity.

By 1959, the effects of the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict were the emergence of Palestinian political and paramilitary groups, Palestinian dissatisfaction with Arab inaction, and the call by Haj Amin Al-Husseini (the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, based in Beirut) for the creation of an independent Palestinian state. These factors created a need for Arab states to formulate some concrete action on the Palestine issue. The question that continued to reemerge was who represents the Palestinians? The solution was to be a negotiated compromise within the parameters of Arab League action.

In 1963, in a concerted effort, Iraq and Syria proposed the establishment of an independent Palestinian state according to a plan whose implementation would, in geopolitical terms, have given "the Ba'athist regime in Baghdad and Damascus the unquestioned allegiance of the refugees and remove both Jordanian and Egyptian control over those parts of Palestine they still occupied."¹ Not unnaturally, Egypt and Jordan objected to the plan. The compromise solution was the creation of the PLO in 1964, at the recommendation of Nasser of Egypt and under sponsorship of the Arab League.

¹ Pamela Ann Smith, Palestine and the Palestinians: 1976-1983, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. pg. 190.

The PLO, under the leadership of appointed president Ahmad Shuqairy, was assigned the complicated task of representing Palestinian interests, while balancing those interests within parameters acceptable to the major actors involved, namely Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. The statement in Article 24 of the PLO Charter that "the PLO exercises no 'regional' sovereignty over the West Bank of the Jordan, the Gaza Strip or the al-Himma area,"¹ and the definition of Palestine in Article 1 as "an Arab homeland bound by ties of nationalism to the other Arab countries which, together with Palestine, constitute the greater Arab Homeland", protect the interests of each Arab regime over the territory under its administrative control. The conservative nature of the 15 members of the PLO Executive Committee, mainly professionals, neo-bourgeois and representatives of traditional families selected by Shuqairy, made the PLO a malleable instrument of Arab regimes. Moreover, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), subsequently formed under the auspices of the Arab League, was composed of Palestinians already enlisted in Arab armies, and the respective Arab regimes were in complete control of the PLA factions. Clearly, the creation of the organization was a calculated move to give structure and organization to politicized Palestinians, and a means of orchestrating control over the manifest expression of emerging Palestinian nationalism.

Until 1967 neither the PLO nor Pan-Arab organizations had any specific platform or recommendations for the final status of Palestine, the issue being left ambiguous. The Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), a Beirut-based, Pan-Arab organization, confidently believed that Nasser and the Arab world would liberate Palestine. The sole digresser was Fatah, an

¹ Alain Gresh, The PLO: The Struggle Within, London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1983. pg. 22; regarding quotes from PLO Charter, Articles 24, and 1.

organization set up in 1959 in Kuwait, by Yasser Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir and Salah Khalaf that called for Palestinian self-assertion in liberating Palestine through armed struggle, and for Palestinians to affect their own destiny through self-determination with the cooperative assistance of Arab regimes. The secret platform of Fatah was to establish an independent, democratic Palestinian state over the whole of Palestine.

The position of Fatah on the Palestine issue was unique, outside of the mainstream, and it did not enjoy support until the Arab defeat in 1967, when the failure of the combined Arab regimes to liberate Palestine in the Arab-Israeli war effectively discredited the long-held ideologies of Arab unity and integration and underlined the rivalries and conflicts existing within the Arab world. The political program of Fatah's nationalist Palestinian goals became, in the wake of the 1967 war, a focus of support and catapulted the guerrilla organization into the forefront of the drive for Palestinian self-determination.

The resignation of Ahmad Shuqairy as chairman of the PLO, in December 1967, signaled the beginning of incremental events leading to the complete transformation of the organization, from an Arab-dominated organization into a revolutionary, Palestinian one. By June 1967, Fatah had succeeded in winning half the seats on the Palestine National Council (PNC) and in July of the same year the Executive Council "amended the National Charter to include Fatah's basic principle that 'armed struggle is the only way to obtain the liberation of Palestine'".¹ Attending the Fourth National Palestine Congress in July 1968, members of the PLO, together with the small organizations, Sa'iqa, Fatah and the PFLP, agreed

¹ Palestine and the Palestinians: 1976-1983, p. 194.

to the adoption of a new Basic National charter.¹ By February 1969, at the convening of the Fifth PNC, Fatah had taken control of the PNC and the Executive Committee, and Yasser Arafat was elected chairman. Fatah's control of the organs of power within the PLO enabled it to direct policy initiatives, and now, accordingly, "a statement of policy was adopted which said that the objective of the Palestinian people was `to set up a free and democratic society in Palestine, for all Palestinians, including Muslims, Christians and Jews, and to liberate Palestine and its people from the domination of international Zionism'".² Finally, on May 6, 1970, a Unity Agreement was reached between all Palestinian factions, which stipulated that "all groups recognized the PLO as the umbrella structure of national unity. ... The PNC in principle is the sole organ authorized to lay down the broad policy option of the PLO. But, each organization retains a broad measure of autonomy."³ Thus the basis was laid for a PLO that sought sole representative rights to speak on behalf of Palestinians.

The transformation of the PLO, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, into a revolutionary organization that claimed to represent all Palestinians and prescribed the creation of a

¹ Among the changes were: the abrogation of the original PLO Charter, which protected Arab states' interests over administered Palestinian territory (the West Bank, Gaza and al-Himma); reference to the territories of Palestine was qualified to reflect the interests of the Palestinian Arab People; the role of the PLO was changed, Article 26, now stating: "The Palestine Liberation Organization, which represents the forces of the Palestinian revolution, is responsible for the movement of the Palestinian Arab people in its struggle to restore its homeland, liberate it, return to it and exercise the right of self-determination in it. This responsibility extends to all military, political and financial matters, and to all else that the Palestine issue requires in the Arab and international spheres". See, *Ibid.* pg. 28, for further information.

² The PLO: The Struggle Within, pg. 18.

³ *Ibid.* pg. 11.

democratic Palestinian society, created differences between the new PLO and King Hussein of Jordan on three levels:

- 1) representation of the Palestinians
- 2) the issue of the return of Palestinian occupied territory
- 3) tactics and approach to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict

Hussein feared that coupling the return of the occupied territories with acceptance of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians would delay and complicate the resolution of what had previously been an Arab-Israeli problem to be resolved by recognized Arab states. The problem was one of priorities, concerning tactics on the one hand and legitimate representation on the other. Hussein believed that these should continue to be separate issues, to be resolved after the Arab states had negotiated a peace settlement based on the return of territory.

On the strategic level, Hussein believed that priority should be given to the return of territories occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The role of the PLO should, accordingly, be that of asserting Palestinian rights to the territories occupied in 1967 and supporting Arab efforts to negotiate a settlement by making the hardship occupation represented for the Palestinians clear in human terms. The Jordanian and Arab approach was encapsulated in a reaffirmation of the United Nations Charter Agreement that provided for the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war, and an endorsement of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which contained a formula of 'territorial return for peace for dispute settlement.'

The negotiations resulting in the formulation of Resolution 242 were conducted in New York in November

1967. As communicated by Goldberg, the head of the US delegation, to Hussein, the position of the US in these negotiations was "to help obtain an appropriate Jordanian role in Jerusalem and the Palestine territories; and that the US purpose was to create a context of peace in which Israeli withdrawal would take place and Jordanian territorial integrity and political independence would be protected."¹ In the context of the secret agreement between the parties, the 'territory for peace' proclamation would entail, at most, minor reciprocal territorial compromises. By way of illustration, and indicative of how minor US officials assumed the eventual changes would be, Goldberg said that if Jordan made an adjustment of the Latrun salient, the bulge between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, then "there ought to be some compensatory adjustment for it."²

At the time Hussein oriented his domestic and regional policy initiatives in the light of his optimistic view that, with the aid of the UN and the US, Resolution 242 and its secret understanding would be implemented. The Israeli bargaining position, and US disinclination to implement the terms of the secret understanding of 242, meant the prolongation of the state of war between Israel and the Arab world, and compelled the King, in 1981, to reveal the terms of the agreement:

"Since 1967, questions have been raised as to the true meaning of 242...I asked for clarification of the withdrawal provision at the time and was told the United States was prepared to make a commitment that would be understood to require Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territory of the West Bank, with 'minor

¹ Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed The Middle East, New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1984. pg. 340. This information is attributed to a State Department study.

² Ibid. pg. 340.

reciprocal border rectifications' conditional on mutual agreement...An essential part of the understanding as conveyed by the representatives of the United States was that Israel had acquiesced in the agreed interpretation of what Resolution 242 would require. The specific term used was that Israel was 'on board.' And furthermore, those six months would be the outside limit for its implementation."¹

Still firmly resolved to maintain a policy distinction between the return of occupied territory and Palestinian representation, Hussein's primary interest was in safeguarding the hard-won interpretation of UN Resolution 242, the concessions extracted from Israel to withdraw from the territory occupied in the 1967 war within six months in return for peace. Under the terms of UN Resolution 242, the Arab-Israeli dispute was clearly defined. If the question of Palestinian leadership were to become coupled with territorial return, Hussein feared a clear issue would become a confused, complex political whirlwind, subject to unending conflict over who represented the Palestinians.

This question of Palestinian representation was secondary to Hussein, who felt that the logical sequence would be first to secure return of the occupied territories, and second, to hold a referendum in which the Palestinians could decide for themselves which of three options they preferred:

- 1) unification of the East and West banks into an Arab Kingdom
- 2) formulation of a cooperative unity between Palestine and Jordan, a confederation or federation

¹ Quoted from Warriors For Jerusalem, pg. 348.

3) creation of an independent Palestinian state.

It must be remembered that the Union agreement of 1950, provided legislative guarantees that union would not prejudice the final settlement of the Palestinian problem. Palestinian aspirations, when a final settlement was achieved, were to be respected.

One problem that the question of Palestinian representation raised, both for the PLO and for Jordan, was that of the diverse circumstances, experiences and interests of Palestinians, given that some Palestinians were in Israel proper, as established by the 1948 war, some in the occupied territories of 1967, and some living as refugees in Arab countries, the majority of them in Jordan. For Hussein it was inconceivable that the PLO could represent Palestinians other than those in the occupied territories. On the grounds both of national security and of the integrity of Jordanian independence, the Palestinians in Jordan were its responsibility. The complicated relationship between the PLO and Jordan, with the discordances and opposed policy platforms it involved, created a crisis of relations that resulted in the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1971. The chain of events which finally led to the expulsion of the PLO in 1971 heralded a new phase for the country. Hussein emerged in complete control of the kingdom, enjoying a position of power that allowed a flexible response to events. The king now turned his efforts toward national reconciliation, embarking on a strategy of economic development, moderation in regional affairs and the establishment of a cooperative understanding with the PLO.

King Hussein's Leadership

King Hussein faced serious challenges, during the years to the stability and independence of Jordan on domestic, regional, and international levels. Flexibility, moderation and realism had been the hallmark of Hussein's policy formulations and actions on domestic, regional and international levels. A pragmatic overview of issues enabled him to test out new ideas, such as the democratic party system, and continue, terminate or adjust such policies, as has best suited the needs of the kingdom.

In considering the qualities and characteristics of a man such as King Hussein, it will be helpful to reveal the perceptions of two well-known political figures, Henry Kissinger and President Jimmy Carter. With regard to the challenges facing Hussein as the King of Jordan, and in particular the crisis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Kissinger noted:¹

"Hussein's mastery of this challenge stamped him as a formidable personality. His legendary courtesy, which the uninitiated took for pliability, was a marvelous way to keep all the contending forces at arm's length. He was imperiled by the intransigence of Israel, the embrace of the West, the hegemonic aspirations of Egypt, and the revolutionary fervor of Syria and Iraq. He emerged as his own man. Hussein did not take refuge in blaming America for the humiliation of 1967. He did not break relations with us, as did several other Arab states, but he maintained his insistence on a solution just to the Arab cause--even the cause of those who sought to bring him down."

¹ Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982. pg. 218.

According to President Carter:¹

"To protect their own interests, Jordanians will try to maintain a stabilizing role both in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in inter-Arab disputes. Hussein has been leading his country through this kind of political wilderness since he was eighteen years old, and he is a master at dealing with ever-changing questions and challenges. If there is any answer to Jordan's present quandary, he is the best man to find it."

By 1971, with the expulsion of the last PLO factions in Jordan, King Hussein had met the greatest challenge to his regime. By 1972, he had emerged in a position of power, and, confident of support in his domestic politics, began to enjoy flexibility and independent action in the regional and international spheres of foreign policy that would not have been possible fifteen years earlier. The 1970's opened up new possibilities for Hussein, in the context of economic development and prosperity, and of action toward resolving the Palestinian problem.

¹ Jimmy Carter, The Blood of Abraham, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985. pg. 150.

CHAPTER 3: Jordan' Interests: Domestic, Regional and International

History is a critical cultural, national and geopolitical factor in understanding Jordan and Jordan's role in the 'new' Middle East.

What emerged from the instability and violence of the 1950's and 1960's, and from specific interconnected issues that transcended the levels of domestic, regional and international politics and actions, was a set of standards and guidelines for the conduct of statecraft in the Middle East.¹ Jordan, a country with an insufficient territorial base and lacking the natural resources and industrial base for economic self-sufficiency, depended on foreign aid for survival and on good relations with neighbouring states and the international community. Hussein had seen and fully noted the cost of independent action, as reflected in the bloody downfall of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq over its relations with Britain and its unilateral entry into the Baghdad Pact. The survival of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was dependent upon the exercise of statecraft, which meant the balancing of national interests within the context of the regional environment and international affairs.

By 1970, the manifest realities of inter-Arab relations had become apparent, as had the interconnected nature of domestic, regional and international affairs that provided the context within which domestic and foreign policy were to be formulated. For Hussein, the decision-making process comprised of an exercise in assessing the total environment within which a decision would affect, and be affected by, a cost/benefit analysis.

¹ For illustration of this phenomenon, and of the lessons learned as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, see: Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem, New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1984.

It is true that, due to the complexity of statecraft in the Middle East, and the flexible nature of interactions in the region, policy intentions may be quite different from policy outcomes. Nevertheless, the only realistic strategy for Hussein, in the conduct of policy formulation, was to address specific issues on the merits of a three-pronged strategy: domestic, regional, and international. The issue of Palestine was approached, by Jordan, on the basis of this strategy.

During the period 1921-1973, the question of Palestine was marked by an evolution in definitions and associations. During the Great Arab Revolt of 1915, Arab independence was conceived in terms of a United Arab Kingdom encompassing all liberated Arab territory under Hashemite rule. In this scheme, therefore, Palestine was viewed as an integral part of the United Arab Kingdom. The failure of this goal, due to British military occupation of Arab territory and the imposition of the Sykes-Picot agreement under League of Nations auspices after WWI, did not prevent the continued efforts of the Hashemites to achieve some measure of authority and influence in the region. The level of domestic armed insurrections, civil disturbances, violence and instability that Great Britain faced after the French overthrow of the legitimate Feisal government in Damascus, and Abdullah's entry into Amman with the intention of pursuing military efforts aimed at the reinstatement of Feisal in Syria, forced the British to seek accommodation. Accordingly, Britain offered Feisal the Kingship of Iraq, and Abdullah the Kingship of Transjordan, accompanied by the promise of eventual independence if law and order were restored and a national government instituted. Abdullah accepted the kingship of Transjordan as a tactical maneuver to facilitate his ultimate goal of reunifying Syria in accord with the terms of the 1920 Syrian Congress, and the Hashemite vision of a United Arab Kingdom.

Within this context, Palestine was to become part of a reunified Greater Syria under Hashemite rule.

Both the dream of a Unified Arab Kingdom and the concept of a Greater Syria were brought to nothing by three things: the conditions for the creation of the Arab League, the League's declaration in 1946 that Palestine was an Arab issue, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

King Abdullah's vision for Arab unity was of a united Fertile Crescent, involving either union between Palestine, Transjordan and Syria, or union between Transjordan and Iraq, or a federal relationship forming a united bloc. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, however, were opposed to such a configuration, and the formation of a cooperative Arab organization with Saudi and Egyptian participation was dependent on agreement to a clause that would guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs of all Arab states in the region. The creation of the Arab League was, accordingly, conditional on this clause, and is part of the League's charter. This condition, in an environment of regional and international opposition to Abdullah's concept of Arab unity, forestalled any possibility of realizing the dream of a United Arab Kingdom, and Transjordan acquiesced by joining the Arab League.

The second factor was the Arab League's declaration that Palestine was an Arab issue. Although vague about the final status of Palestine, the Arab League was united in its attitude that Palestine, then under British occupation, should be returned to the Arabs. Palestine was an Arab issue on religious and territorial grounds, but also of concern in geopolitical terms, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia being opposed to Hashemite control over Palestine.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 complicated the question of Palestine, in political, territorial and legal terms, by fragmenting the country into sectors under the protective military and administrative control of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and by the creation of the state of Israel on almost half of the territory of Palestine.¹ Now the question of Palestine was no longer one of being associated with a United Arab Kingdom or a Greater Syria, it had become a firmly Arab issue by virtue of Arab governments' multi-faceted involvement in and control over Palestinian lands, and of their strategy for dealing with the newly created state of Israel.

For Jordan, the effects of the 1948 war were revolutionary. The country now controlled the West Bank and faced the challenge of administering a territory and population base equal to the size of the kingdom. In order to accommodate new realities and give political enfranchisement to the people of the West Bank, the Jordanian parliament, representing both the East and West Banks, legislated the unification of the two banks of the Jordan River in 1950, without prejudice to the final status of a final solution to the Palestine question. Although Palestine remained an Arab issue, the sheer magnitude of the Palestinian presence in Jordan, and the political, economic and geographical ties, both historical and current, between the West and East Banks, meant that the question of Palestine had crucial implications for the national interest and national security of Jordan. The question of Palestine became the most important factor affecting Jordan's policy-making process in all three realms of domestic, regional and international.

¹ Egypt was in administrative and military control of the Gaza Strip, Syria of Al-Himma, and Jordan of the West Bank.

The 1967 war and its aftermath made the status of Palestine an even more compelling question for Jordan and the Arab world, as Israel succeeded in occupying the West Bank and the additional Arab territories of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Syria's Golan Heights. The question of Palestine and the issue of the newly occupied Arab territory became defined in terms of UN Resolution 242, concerning the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by the use of force. A peace settlement in the region, and resolution of the Palestine question, took the shape of a 'land for peace' formula involving the return of territories occupied in the 1967 war. Arab countries, as legitimate and established states and members of the international community, became the direct actors in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The West Bank was now no longer the only issue, for Egypt and Syria had vested interests in securing the return of Sinai and the Golan Heights.

Jordan held a unique position after the 1967 war. Since the West Bank was legally a part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan was in a position to negotiate for its return on the grounds of the UN Charter, and had recourse to international mediation and support, due to the nature of the 1967 war and the content of Resolution 242. However, the war also created a new issue for Jordan and the Arab world, the growth of Palestinian nationalism.

Until 1967 the Palestinians had looked to Nasser of Egypt, and to the Arab world in general, to champion the Palestinian cause and confront the new state of Israel. The 1967 war made them realize two things: 1) that the state of Israel was a permanent reality 2) that the Arab world, beset as it was by internal weakness and conflict, was able neither to liberate Palestinian territory nor to confront Israel. The result was the

transformation of the PLO a passive voice of the Palestinians, created by the Arab League, into a revolutionary organization seeking sole representation and authority with regard to the Palestinian people and any peace settlement. The new platform of the PLO was to direct its efforts towards the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

This new revolutionary character of the PLO, and of its strategic tactics and long-term policy goals, created a conflict of interest between the organization and Jordan. Most critical, however, was the magnitude of recruitment of Palestinian refugees into PLO paramilitary factions in Jordan, which presented a source of national security concern for the kingdom. The PLO became a state within the state of Jordan, unilaterally engaging in military attacks against Israel that precipitated retaliatory Israeli military reprisals and pre-emptive strikes against Jordan.

The state of relations between the PLO and Jordan became untenable and resulted in the 1970 civil war, with armed clashes breaking out between PLO factions and the Jordanian army. At issue for Jordan was control and authority within the kingdom, while the Palestinians were interested in securing freedom of action against Israel and political and military autonomy for PLO activities in Jordan. Events culminated in the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan and the restoration of complete Hashemite control of the country by 1971.

The 1970's were to herald a new era in Jordan, in which King Hussein emerged as the undisputed leader of the country. He had weathered the challenges of the Arab ideological and revolutionary movements of the 1950's and 60's, survived the loss of the West Bank and Jerusalem in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, and, by 1971, succeeded in ending the threat of

independent PLO activities in Jordan. By 1971, King Hussein had achieved a level of security and stability sufficient for him to re-direct his attention towards domestic policy programs of economic recovery and development, the consolidation of political, economic and social integration, and the pursuit of foreign policy initiatives.

For Hussein, the question of Palestine remained an absorbing and far-reaching issue for several reasons. First, King Abdullah's legacy of the Arab Revolt and his philosophy of Arab unity had inspired in Hussein a deep psychological commitment to serve the interests of the Arab nation, a sense of obligation to devote his life to the service of the Arab people and to work for their best interests. The loss of Jerusalem, the third holiest shrine after Mecca and Medina, and the loss of the West Bank, was an affront to Hussein, to the honour of that which King Abdullah had fought for, and to the Arab nation.

Secondly, Jordan's geopolitical position as a confrontation state, with the longest shared border with Israel, meant the maintenance of a state of war and tension that was a threat to Jordan. Likewise, the emergence of a revolutionary nationalist organization, the PLO, that claimed to represent all Palestinians, even those within the kingdom, presaged an uncertain future, in which Jordan would have to consider the nature of its relationship with the PLO and Palestinian representation.

Post-1970 Domestic Factors in Jordan

Geography

The territorial boundaries of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan¹ have been subject to three main events:

¹ Palestine was also affected by these major events, the adjustment of its borders being one of the results.

- 1) the allocation of Transjordan as an entity under Britain's Palestine mandate, exclusive of the Balfour Declaration, and the granting of independence and territorial integrity along internationally agreed borders in 1946
- 2) the territorial adjustment of Jordan as a result of Britain's decision to terminate its mandate over Palestine, with Jordan successfully gaining control of the West Bank after the evacuation of British troops from the area in 1948
- 3) the territorial restructuring of Jordan after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, in which Israel occupied the West Bank of the Jordan

At its inception, Transjordan was a territorial domain formulated on a political basis, devoid of natural borders and historical associations. With the division of Syria into two separate mandates, one controlled by the French and the other by the British, and further subdivision into four separate entities--Lebanon and Syria, Palestine and Transjordan--the economic and power base of Greater Syria was reduced to dependency relationships, lacking the capacity to become self-sufficient in the basic requirements for an independent modern industrial state. Although Abdullah entered into the agreement with Britain as a tactical move in his quest to reunify the Fertile Crescent, succeeding developments prevented the realization of this goal. Jordan remained an independent state, serving an historical role as a barrier and gateway to the Arab East. Through Jordan access could be gained to Syria in the north, Iraq to the East, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt to the South. Jordan's geographical location made it a primary actor and participant in the question of Palestine, first under British mandatory rule, and then, in relations with Israel.

Within this territorial sub-sector, Transjordan had a population composed mostly of nomads, Bedouins and farmers. Amman, Jordan's capital, had a population base of about 30,000. The country was primarily desert with few natural resources and limited water supply. The benefit of the relationship with the British in the Palestine mandate was the provision of port facilities on the Mediterranean and a road network for the transportation of goods and supplies. Transjordan was dependent on British subsidies and financial assistance for the conduct of day-to-day national needs. The structural configuration of Jordan changed dramatically when the British quit Palestine in 1948.

The termination of the Palestine mandate in 1948 meant both opportunities and costs for Jordan. On the one hand, Jordan lost access to Mediterranean port facilities and a large variety of services and supplies due to the establishment of Israel on the coastal region of Palestine. On the other hand, Abdullah retained Arab control of the West Bank of the Jordan River, a primary, rich agricultural sector of Palestine. The union of the two banks in 1950 gave Jordan a territorial base of 37,737 square miles, provided Jordan with the whole agricultural region of the Jordan River Valley, and gave control of East Jerusalem, the Old City, and religious sites that secured additional income in the economic sector of tourism. By 1950 Jordan was endowed with the basic factors necessary to facilitate national development, modernization and economic self-sufficiency in basic food-stuffs.

During almost twenty years of integration between the East and West banks of the Jordan River, the Hashemite Kingdom carried out ambitious investment projects in the agricultural and tourism sectors, and in general development and

infrastructure in the West Bank. By 1967, the West Bank was contributing about 35 per cent of all agricultural production and 12 per cent of industrial production in Jordan. Tourism was focused on at religious sites in the Holy Land and Jerusalem. The loss of the West Bank to Israel, as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, was catastrophic for Jordan in territorial, economic and human terms.

Israeli occupation of the West Bank resulted in the structural transformation of the kingdom. The labour force, agriculture, and the industrial and economic base of the West Bank was lost, along with investment, structural infrastructure and development projects. An influx of 300,000 Palestinian refugees into Amman and the Zarqa region imposed additional strains and tensions upon the economy. The interim period, after the 1967 war, saw a structural change in Jordan designed to accommodate new realities. Jordan's economy had to adjust to the necessity of importing basic foodstuffs and the restructuring of industrial, agricultural and tourism-dependent sectors of the economy. Continued hostilities in the Jordan Valley, across the Jordan-Israeli border, resulted in the depopulation of the agricultural sector of the East Bank of the Jordan Valley. Development was restricted and concentrated to the highland plateau on the outskirts of the Amman capital. Not until 1972 was Jordan able to revive the economy to the levels which had existed prior to the 1967 war. The Jordanian economy became increasingly dependent on foreign assistance, and it became necessary to rely on the export commodity of Jordanian labour and the resulting financial remittances to relatives, which provided Jordan with a source of foreign exchange that could then be utilized within a national development-oriented economy.

Population and Structural Stratification

The population base and structural stratification of Jordan shifted over the years as a result of external events, regional conflicts and domestic requirements. Whereas the territorial domain of the newly created Transjordanian Emirate in the 1920's was sparsely populated and estimated to include a population base of 40 per cent Bedouin tribes and wandering nomads. The subsequent regional conflicts of 1948 and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war produced a population influx of Palestinian refugees into Jordan which, by 1985, had contributed to an expanded population base estimated at 2,800,000, not including the West Bank.¹

Changes in the demographic and territorial nature of Jordan simultaneously affected the structural stratification of the kingdom and brought about a shift from an essentially rural economy, dominated by agriculture and animal husbandry, to a highly urban one with burgeoning professional, entrepreneurial and service sectors. The structural and demographic changes in Jordan are evident from an examination of the transformations in four primary structural sectors of Jordanian society: 1) Bedouin 2) village and small town 3) city 4) refugee camps.

Jordan mixed population base that was predominantly Arab-Sunni Muslim. During the Ottoman Empire a small population of Circassians settled in Jordan to establish order in predominantly tribal land of Bedouin nomads in various stages of settlement. Southern Jordan was oriented toward the Hejaz and Northern Jordan toward Syria. With the staging of the Arab Revolt and the aftermath of WWI many Hejazis and Syrians

¹ Per 1983 figures, the population base of the Occupied Territories is estimated at 930,000 Palestinian Arabs and 42,000 Jewish settlers (source: World Bank Atlas, 1985).

came to settle in Transjordan, while the effects of war in Palestine and civil war in Lebanon created an influx of Palestinians and Lebanese refugees and immigrants to the kingdom. The social mixture within Jordan was not, in itself, a cause for conflict, nor did it hinder the process of national integration.¹ Jordan afforded an environment of tolerance, and Christian and ethnic minorities² in the kingdom enjoyed prestige and influence beyond their population, as the central government pursued a policy of providing employment opportunities in the civil service, the military and high-ranking government posts, and representation in parliament. Social class had not been the source of structural differentiation in Jordan; rather:³

"The distinction between people is not through classes but through "population groups or gatherings" depending on whether the society is Bedouin, Fallahin, or, nowadays, professional. These groups are based on life-style, either the nomadic Bedouin or the settled Fallahin or city dwellers, and on their occupation rather than on classes."

The Bedouin tribe is traditionally a highly structured, autonomous, communal unit, with rigid codes of conduct, laws, traditions, and culture. The word Bedouin means "inhabitants of the desert." Their livelihood has been dependent on animal husbandry, specifically the raising and care of camels, goats and

¹ Conflict in Jordan has been a phenomenon springing from the politicization of elements of the population as a result of the inter-relationship between domestic, regional and international events, and issues of ideology which transcended national borders. Such conflict transcended national, ethnic and religious groupings.

² Minority figures are estimated as follows: 125,000 Christians, inclusive of: Greek Orthodox, Greek Roman Catholic, Protestants, Armenians, Assyrians, and Syrian Orthodox; Muslim minorities include: Circassians, Muslim-Sunni, about 25,000; and 2,000 Shishanis, Muslim-Shia.

³ Jordan Times, Wednesday, October 3, 1984; article by Dr. Shabib Abu Jaber, entitled: "The general and particular in Arab social structure".

sheep. Bedouin movements are based on traditional grazing practices, with each tribe having specific territorial areas for winter and spring grazing. Prior to the Arab Revolt of 1915 most of what became Transjordan was inhabited by Bedouins, and rough estimates put the Bedouin population of the early 1900's at about 300,000-440,000.¹ By 1940 nearly half of this population had been settled as a result of King Abdullah's efforts to establish law and order, and to create a national government and state institutions and services. The efforts of the government to settle the Bedouin resulted in a reduction of the Bedouin to five to seven per cent of the total population of the kingdom by 1980.²

The structure and role of the Bedouin tribes in Jordanian society underwent significant changes with the establishment of the kingdom. Although the attributes and values of the Bedouin remained a venerable symbol of Hashemite tradition and rule, the lifestyle and structure of the tribes had been permanently transformed. The settlement of the Bedouin in rural communal areas altered the traditional reliance on animal husbandry for income.

Settlement of the Bedouin in brick or stone houses, or the occasional permanent tent, resulted in a change in the power configuration and communal structure of the tribe. In the case of pasture utilization, land had traditionally been the communal

¹ By 1940 half of the Bedouin population had been settled (see below); 1950 estimates for the Bedouin population ranged between 150,000 and 220,000.

² The 1961 Census of the Jordanian Government estimated that the Bedouin comprised about 61/2 percent of the total population. Of the approximately 95-100,000 Bedouin, half were living in desert areas, and half were accounted for in census districts of main towns. Figures provided from different sources offer varying estimates, including between 100-150,000 Bedouin. An accurate account is unavailable, estimates giving approximate figures based on what statistics are available.

property of the tribe and the introduction of private ownership of land in settled communities led to the problem of land distribution in uneconomically small plots. This resulted in overgrazing and a reduction in the size of animal herds. The market for traditional Bedouin handicraft was also reduced by the introduction of imported consumer goods. Income from animal husbandry and traditional crafts was, therefore, reduced, and Bedouin were forced to seek employment and income outside of the tribal community. The national government intervened and became the major source of income for the Bedouin by creating jobs within the community and hiring local officials and establishing services but primarily by providing employment in the Jordanian armed forces. Employment for the Bedouins was restricted to these two main areas, the army and government service, due to limited experience, education and training. A high percentage of Bedouin left their community for outside employment due to economic necessity.

External employment, together with the creation of new forms of communal organization linking community affairs and development with the institutions of the central government and policy directives, introduced new patterns of authority and patronage relations into the tribal community. The traditional tribal structure of authority was undermined, as the community became increasingly integrated into the national structure of the state. The role of tribal leaders was significantly reduced, as individuals sought direct assistance from external employers or central government offices that provided the requested services or aid.

In contrast to classical Bedouin reliance on animal husbandry as a means of occupation and income, the villager traditionally engaged in a combination of animal husbandry and

farming. In villages with populations fewer than 3,000 traditional forms of tribal life existed, with local families and leaders electing a Mukhtar, a village spokesman that served as the link between the government and the village and acted as a representative of village interests. Villages with over 3,000 inhabitants were structurally differentiated by the addition of an elected municipal council, which overtook the role previously fulfilled by the Mukhtar. In such cases the power and influence of the Mukhtar was significantly reduced by the municipal council and over time the structural changes permanently altered traditional forms of tribal communal organization. Population centers with over 10,000 inhabitants were characteristically differentiated from smaller villages in that they served as centers for commerce and trade, provided broader facilities and services and often had direct access to government branch offices. This type of structural entity was referred to as a town.

Villages and towns were dispersed throughout the Kingdom of Jordan, but the major concentration of population centers were found in the western sections of three governates, Al Asimah, Al-Balqa and Irbid.¹ The population density was further concentrated in Jordan's five primary cities, Az Zarqa, Irbid, As Salt, Ar Ramtha and Amman. In 1980, Jordan's capital, Amman, was estimated to be home to 30 per cent of the kingdom's total population.

The increase in the size of the kingdom's capital was due to the flood of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967, and to the natural rate of population growth, and the migration of Bedouin

¹ The five East Bank Governates of Jordan and the government's 1971 estimated population, based on 1961 figures, are: Al Asimah, 972,000; Al Balqa, 110,000; Irbid, 491,000; Al Karak, 90,000; Maan 60,000; with a total population estimated at 1,723,000; Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1971, XX11, Amman, 1972, p. 2; and Area Handbook for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, pg.59.

or farmers seeking employment opportunities. Jordanians located on the East Bank of the Jordan Valley were also forced to migrate to Amman as a result of border clashes between Israel and Jordan and the consequent destruction of farmland and villages. However, the unforeseen and unplanned cause of the significant population expansion was the primarily the influx of large numbers of Lebanese and Palestinian refugees.

The attitudes of these individuals towards the Jordanian government, and their adopted lifestyles in the kingdom, were reflective of the circumstances in which they became citizens or residents. For the Palestinians, their situation was determined by two typical sets of circumstances: 1) the effects of the 1948 war. Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war were classified as refugees and registered with UNWRA. These Palestinians resided in refugee camps. 2) The effects of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Between 1948 and 1967 the East and West Banks of Jordan were structurally integrated in all matters of national government service and development. Palestinians employed by the government were often relocated in different sectors of the kingdom for the performance of their duties and functions. These Palestinians therefore retained Jordanian citizenship. Palestinian refugees of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war were not classified as refugees by UNWRA, but as 'displaced persons', and were registered with the Jordanian Ministry of the Interior. Most of this group moved to the Jordanian capital, Amman, with a small percentage living in other established communities.¹

¹ As stated in the 1983 Briefing Book, put out by the American Embassy in Jordan: "Refugees, as defined by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA), are persons whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of the conflict, lost both their homes and their means of livelihood.

The influx of large numbers of Palestinians into Jordan provided both costs and benefits to the kingdom. After the 1967 war the largest percentage of Palestinians sought refuge in Amman, providing Jordan with a labour force of entrepreneurs who contributed to the transformation of Amman from a small city to an urban center with a highly commercialized service sector, banking system and light manufacturing sector. This process was also aided by external developments, such as Jordan's assuming the traditional Lebanese role as the Middle Eastern center for commercial services, banking and recreation, due to the instability and destruction caused by the Lebanese civil war. Also, the combined effects of the creation of the oil cartel, OPEC, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and sky-rocketing oil prices stimulated Jordan's oil-money-based service economy in terms of investment, employment opportunities and generous financial assistance. The majority of Palestinians and Jordanians who benefited from these developments established businesses and economic interests in the kingdom, and thus developed an interest in the continued stability of the country. Favourable economic conditions in Jordan in the 1970's, and infrastructural advances in educational facilities, health care, services, etc., contributed to the integration process of all sectors of the population in Jordan, particularly among Jordanians and

Displaced persons are those displaced as a result of the June 1967 hostilities. They are registered not with UNRWA but with the Ministry of Occupied Territories."

"Approximately one-third of Jordan's registered refugees are located in 10 refugee camps." There are no accurate figures covering Palestinian refugees in Jordan. The 1978 Briefing Book of the American Embassy in Jordan estimates that, out of a total population of 1,500,000 Palestinian refugees, inclusive of all three categories listed above, approximately 159,000 Palestinians reside in the 10 refugee camps; the remainder are located in existing communities. However, the 1983 Embassy report quotes a different figure for Palestinians in Jordan, stating that out of a population of about one million Palestinian refugees, "400,000 individuals of Palestinian descent...not registered as refugees also reside in Jordan."

Palestinians. The role of the economy in Jordan was a major factor in furthering national integration and stability in the kingdom.

Up until 1957, Jordan relied on foreign aid from Great Britain in its pursuit of economic development, and in providing for the basic needs of its citizens. This aid was subsequently replaced by Arab and American aid, and in the mid-1970's Jordan relied on Arab aid, particularly that of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Within this time frame Jordan attempted to introduce economic measures aimed at becoming self-sufficient in basic agricultural food production, established light industry and mining facilities, and worked to develop and expand specific areas of the service sector, such as tourism, trade and banking. However, external and internal events, outbreaks of civil unrest, and the effects of the 1967 war had direct effect Jordan's economic plans.¹

In 1961, 35 per cent of Jordan's labour force was engaged in agricultural production. By 1975, this figure had been reduced to 18 per cent, as a consequence of the loss of the West Bank in 1967,² and the destruction of farmland on the East Bank of the Jordan River.³ Consequently, the demise of Jordan's agricultural

¹ Suggested sources for statistical data on Jordan's economy and domestic factors include: Area Handbook for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, DA Pam 550-34, prepared by the Foreign Area Studies of The American University, Washington, D.C., 1974; Economic Development in Jordan, Ministry of Information, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1954-76; Five Year Plan For Economic and social Development 1981-1985, National Planning Council, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; The Middle East, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C.; Briefing Book, American Embassy, Amman, Jordan, 1976, 1982, 1983 and 1988.

² Other figures contend that agricultural production was reduced to 14% during this era.

³ The agricultural sector, besides being subject to reduction in the labour force and therefore in productive capacity, was also restrained by drought and natural disaster. Although a variety of products were grown--citrus fruits, bananas, melons, olives, grapes, wheat, barley, cucumbers, etc..., tomatoes were the largest export product.

base saw a structural change in the economy toward a dominant service sector, with employment rising from 44 per cent of the labour force in 1961 to 64 per cent in 1975. Adding to the expansion of the service sector were both East Bank entrants into the civil service and the military, and Palestinian refugees entering a variety of professions and fields of employment. Industry also reflected these changes, with growth in this field jumping from 16 per cent between 1959 and 1966 to 30 per cent between 1973 and 1975.¹

The post-1973 era in Jordan was marked by a high degree of prosperity and growth, as Jordan's economy was fueled by aid from Gulf oil countries that allowed the kingdom to engage in expensive structural projects and investment in industry and mining ventures, as well as exploration for oil.² High wages and job opportunities in Gulf States drew nearly half of the Jordanian work force to seek lucrative employment there, primarily in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.³ In the short term this created a

The agricultural sector of Jordan's economy averaged between 16-20% of total gross domestic product, depending on harvest production and growing conditions, in the 1970's. In 1989, Jordan's agricultural exports were 5.9% of total exports compared with 7.6% in 1987, 15.3% in 1986, 8.6% in 1985 and 9.8% in 1984. In part, reduction in exports is due to increased agricultural production in Gulf Countries, together with packaging problems in Jordan. (Sources: Jordan Times, April 11, 1989; Jordanian Ministry of Information).

¹ During its infancy Jordan's industrial sector was protected by the application of quotas and tariffs, the manufacture of products such as fodder, paper, detergents, soaps, plastics and refined petroleum having been limited to the local market. Manufacturing capacities of economic efficiency sufficient for export are primarily phosphates, cigarettes and cement, although pharmaceutical drugs, textiles and dry batteries are also exported. The goods of light industries are marketable in the Middle Eastern region, phosphates being Jordan's primary export in the international market. (See, Jordanian Ministry of Information).

² No exploitable sources of oil have been found in Jordan.

³ According to 1983 figures, Jordan's total labor force was estimated at 580,000 individuals, of whom 430,000 were Jordanians, and there were 320,000 Jordanians working abroad, mostly in the Gulf states.(Jordanian Ministry of Information).

shortage of skilled labour in Jordan, but this problem was offset by income generated in the form of remittances from workers abroad, repatriating their earnings in the form of cash and investment. Investment was directed towards Jordan's real estate market, which saw dramatic price increases spurred by real estate speculation, and a consequent firing up of the economy, creation of jobs and large profits in the construction business. The transfer of wealth to Jordan in the form of wage remittances, in conjunction with profits from the building boom and new wealth earned by Jordanians through the sale of land, created a demand for consumer products and luxury items. By 1976, at least 50 per cent of total imports were consumer goods.¹

Prosperity in Jordan, fostered by the economic boom of the 1970's, did not pass its peak until 1981, when reduction in oil prices began to have its effect on the domestic and regional policies of Gulf States. These effects were, in turn, to have a direct impact on Jordan's economy in the post-1984 era, due to changes in Jordan's foreign assistance and remittances from workers abroad, and to price fluctuations affecting the country's exportable resources, particularly the phosphate industry.

Economic growth and prosperity in Jordan had been excessively dependent on three sources of foreign exchange and income for the kingdom:

- 1) Foreign aid
- 2) Remittances from workers abroad
- 3) Income from exports

¹ Between 1954 and 1973 total imports consisted of 36% of Jordan's Gross National Product; between 1974 and 1976, this figure had risen to 50%. Although there are variations from year to year, the Jordanian government estimates that of total imports 50% is consumer goods, 22% raw materials and 22% capital equipment.

For years Jordan had successfully managed to deal with a large budget deficit by balancing budget expenditure with expected foreign aid payments and income from export products and re-exports, as well as through taxes. However, a reduction in Arab aid from a commitment of \$1.2 billion a year promised during the 1978 Baghdad Summit to \$322 million in 1984,¹ undermined Jordan's economic planning, and its ability to meet financial obligations and domestic requirements.²

Economic growth in Jordan was demonstrably linked to stability within the country and political vicissitudes affecting contributors of foreign aid. Foreign aid grants involved an element of real politic, having been conditioned, often, by political considerations and policy actions concerning the issue of Palestine. On the level of international finance and business, Jordan encouraged external investment in the country, but investors were hesitant because of the country's limited natural resources and small domestic market, and because of recurrent regional instability. While economic growth and stimulation during the 1970's provided an environment of relative security and stability in the country, the Jordan of the 1980's faced new realities that necessitated fiscal restraint, efficient management of resources, and new measures to compensate for income suddenly unavailable to the kingdom. The economic situation in Jordan was the kingdom's greatest challenge.

Quite apart from Jordan's economic problems, there was the problem that the Palestinian refugee camps represented the

¹ Only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have fulfilled their obligation under the 1978 Baghdad agreement.

² Sources: Jordanian Ministry of Information; U.S. Briefing Book, American Embassy in Amman.

most embittered and resentful community residing in the kingdom.¹

The refugee camps were semi-autonomous, highly structured encampments, forming communal districts according to residential connections in the occupied territories. Individuals, families and relations resided in "sections of the camp known by the names of the cities"² with which they had an historical association. Over 50 per cent of the camp population was under 20 years of age. Those Palestinians who did leave the camp for work abroad lived within the social, communal structure of the camps, and Palestinian self-identity and nationalism permeated camp life.

Domestic Concerns & the Palestine Issue

An analysis of domestic factors in Jordan, including the geographical boundaries of the kingdom, population and structural stratification, and the economy, highlight the fundamental effects of the Palestine question upon all aspects of Jordanian society. Jordan's territorial restructuring after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, together with the influx of large numbers of Palestinian refugees, had a major effect upon the social and structural character of the kingdom.

From 1972, with the departure of the PLO from Jordan and the unexpectedly rapid economic growth and prosperity in

¹ Although Palestinians, largely integrated into the middle and upper levels of Jordanian society, generally favor the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, they have also developed a vested interest in Jordan through the pursuit of businesses and livelihoods. Should a peaceful settlement to the question of Palestine be reached, a close relationship or network of relations should come to exist between Jordan and the Palestinians.

² Peter Gubser, Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1983, pg. 65.

the country stimulated by the sudden wealth of Gulf oil states gained from the rise in oil prices, Jordan had known an era of stability and tranquility, and this had, in turn, aided the process of internal integration and developed interest in maintenance of the regime. The 1970's, therefore, represented a period in which King Hussein enjoyed popularity, power and stability. This environment enabled him to maximize flexibility in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions, both in domestic and foreign affairs.

Regarding the question of Palestine and a comprehensive peace settlement, King Hussein proposed his consistent three-pronged strategy: 1) domestic 2) regional 3) international. On the level of domestic affairs, Hussein's strategy consisted of the continuation of current policy, to strengthen the economic base of the Kingdom increase the efficiency, enhance the armed forces and pursue national integration through economic advancement, elite recruitment and the enhancement of services. Conduct of regional affairs involved, among gaining Arab support for Hussein's conviction that the return of the occupied territories, as a condition for peace in the region, should be the strategic goal of Arab states. On the level of international affairs, Hussein's strategy focused on the implementation of United Nations Resolution 242, the 'land for peace' formula, with the assistance of the UN, the U.S. and the international community.

The combined factors of Jordan's educational, employment and elite recruitment policies had the dramatic effect of catapulting the kingdom into a modern-oriented society within the urban centers, characterized by Western technologies and tastes in consumer products, while nevertheless retaining conservative social values and culture. This new phase in

Jordanian society underlined the recognition that the era of ideology had ended and a new phase of pragmatism and capitalist attitudes had emerged.

On the political level, the co-option of Palestinians into the political process gave Palestinians a voice in Jordanian society and reduced any emerging opposition on political dissatisfaction with the regime to manageable levels. Within this environment of national development, national integration, economic growth and stability, there was, nevertheless, an ever-present threat to Jordan's national interest of the final status of the occupied territories and the continued existence of Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan. These realities continued to pose the greatest threat to the stability of the kingdom, and possessed the capacity to undermine all of the national policies that Jordan was trying to implement. Viewed in this light, external threats posed the greatest danger to Jordan and had to be addressed in accordance with Jordan's national security interest.

Formulation of national policy in Jordan was a complicated process, which took into account both regional and international considerations.¹ As previously stated, Jordan was a country that depended on foreign aid, and good relations with regional actors and the international community for its survival. Such a policy necessitated considerable statecraft in balancing the national security interests of Jordan with the demands and interests of Arab League member states and of the post-WWII

¹ Please see Chapters 1 & 2; events during the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's demonstrated the inter-relationship between domestic, regional and international action. Relevant examples are: politics in the creation of the Arab League, the issue of the Baghdad Pact (causing civil unrest in Jordan and leading to the overthrow of the Hashemite Monarchy in Iraq), conduct of political parties and ideology, the Question of Palestine, Creation of the P.L.O., foreign aid assistance, etc... .

influential powers of the international system. The single most explosive issue drawing each of these actors into an arena of great conflict was the question of Palestine, together with the security of Israel. Jordan, by the very nature of its geographical position coupled with its former union of the East and West Banks and home of Palestinian refugees, was necessarily a direct actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the longest border with the state of Israel, Jordan needed to find a solution.

There were several reasons why resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was a vital concern for Jordan. First, the state of 'no war, no peace' increased tension and instability in the region, and was a potential cause for the outbreak of further conflict and war. Second, the continued environment of instability discouraged world lending institutions, entrepreneurs and multinational companies from undertaking large capital projects for the purposes of investment, development and modernization programs in Jordan. Peace and regional stability would bring greater economic benefits to Jordan.

Resolution of the question of Palestine was also a national security necessity, with implications for the national integration and independence of the kingdom. Such considerations were certainly a key factor in the King's proposal, in 1972, for the formation of the United Arab Kingdom. The proposal provided for:¹

"Reunification of the two banks of the Jordan and of all other liberated Palestinian territory whose population asks for it, under a central government based in Amman." Under the Hussein Plan, there would have been two parts of such a

¹ Excerpt from King Hussein's Address to the 17th P.N.C. (Palestine National Congress) Session, 1984.

Kingdom, Palestine & Jordan, both with independent legislative and executive power. The central Hashemite government in Amman would "retain responsibility for defense and foreign affairs."

For Jordan, the formation of a unitary kingdom was the preferred solution to the Palestine question, because it provided strength in unity, as opposed to weakness and dependency if the solution took the form of two independent states.¹

The proposed United Arab Kingdom was to be an internal affair, an arrangement between the Palestinians and the Hashemite government. The King's strategy was to win approval of the plan from the PLO and the Palestinian people, to seek Arab support in implementation of this plan, and, with unanimous support from the Arab world and the Palestinians, to enter into peace negotiations with Israel on the basis of United Nations Resolution 242, which would be the return of Arab Occupied Territory from the 1967 war in return for peace, with the assistance from the US and the international community.

Establishment of the proposed United Arab Kingdom faced a critical obstacle, however, when the PLO waged a campaign against it. Old issues of regional power politics and the question of Palestinian representation were revived, with the re-emergence of the latter and the final status of a peace settlement becoming the subject of great politicking and discussion within the Arab League. On the one hand, concerns of regional power structures and competition for influence in

¹ In 1972, King Hussein offered to let the Palestinians choose to accept either an independent Palestinian state, federation with Jordan, or the relationship which existed prior to the 1967 war; these options were offered in addition to the King's personal proposal for the creation of the United Arab Kingdom. The P.L.O. turned down all of these options.

regional affairs re-introduced the traditional opposition of Saudi Arabia and Egypt to a Hashemite United Arab Kingdom. King Abdullah had, throughout his career, worked for Arab Unity in the Fertile Crescent and these moves had been undermined by regional and international actors. In 1972, the new PLO worked, within the Arab League, to undermine the current proposal for Arab Unification, the United Arab Kingdom. After the 1967 war, Palestinian factions, that gained control of the PLO in 1969, were determined to wage their own campaign for national self-determination and independence. Jordan disapproved of the tactics of the PLO in combining the issues of territorial return and Palestinian political representation. Hussein felt that the first priority should be the return of Arab land, to be followed, with settlement by referendum, of Palestinian representation and the definition of self-determination. In 1974 the Arab League decided to accept the position of the PLO by recognizing the organization as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, a decision that effectively undermined Jordan's ability to negotiate a peace settlement on the basis of UN Resolution 242, or to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people without the approval of the PLO. The decision terminated the option of creating the United Arab Kingdom, as proposed by King Hussein.

For Jordan, resolution of the Palestine question, and the establishment of comprehensive peace through a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, was the key factor in the kingdom's national security concerns and its pursuit of long-term domestic and economic development goals. The 1974 Arab League decision undermined King Hussein's strategy to bring peace and stability to the region. The PLO was given legal sanction and status, as a non-territorial actor, to represent the Palestinian people on the level of the international system. In effect the

League conceded to the Palestinians the right to negotiate a peace settlement on their own terms, with Arab support, thus transferring the responsibility for Palestine from Arab regimes to the PLO. The question of Palestine could now no longer be defined in terms of an Arab issue. Resolution of the conflict was not to be a negotiated settlement solely between Arab states and Israel, and Jordan was no longer free to make unilateral decisions concerning the West Bank and the status of the Palestinians. The question of Palestine became an issue of Palestinian political representation.

Jordan had to come to terms with the PLO, to establish a basis for a cooperative relationship. Both Jordan and the PLO recognized the unacceptability of the state of 'no war no peace' and the need for a comprehensive peace settlement, and both made repeated attempts to come to a satisfactory agreement that would define the appropriate relationship in a way suitable to each. This process culminated in the February 11th Agreement of 1985.

CHAPTER 4: Jordan/PLO Relations 1970-1985

Between 1970 and 1985, Jordan and the PLO sought to formulate a framework to define and regulate relations in a mutually beneficial way. Both actors strove to achieve a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Palestine. However, each had a different perception of the Palestine issue, different strategies for its resolution and different interests in any negotiated outcome. Both Jordan and the PLO were obliged to re-evaluate their positions and come to a compromise on the future vision of a settlement to the Palestine question. These negotiations culminated in 1985, in what is called the February 11th Agreement. This signed accord approved a framework for Jordanian-PLO cooperation and a joint strategy in the pursuit of a final peace settlement in the Middle East.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war brought dramatic change in the power configuration of the Middle East, and acted as a catalyst in redefining the policy positions and actions of Middle East nations in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel's occupation of Arab land, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, signified the inability of Arab regimes to settle regional differences through the use of force.¹ A comprehensive peace settlement in the region necessitated a forum for formal negotiations with all parties involved. On the Arab side, there were conflicting viewpoints as to the appropriate strategy, tactics and concrete action necessary, preliminary to convening such a forum. The revolutionary transformation of the PLO into a Palestinian nationalist organization,² claiming sole

¹ See: Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

² By February 1969, Fatah had won control of the PNC, the Parliamentary body of the PLO and the Executive Committee, thus enabling it to dictate the policy positions of

representation of the Palestinian people, created disagreement over strategy and tactics between the PLO and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The first attempts to resolve these differences occurred in 1970,¹ when the Arab League sent a delegation to mediate an end to armed clashes between PLO factions and the Jordanian army. Although the Arab League mediation team was able to devise an interim agreement, the differences between the two policy positions were too great.² In 1971, further mediation attempts were orchestrated by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Failure to mediate PLO-Jordanian differences resulted in the PLO exodus from Jordan.

The strategic and substantive differences in policy position between Jordan and the PLO were considerable.

On the systemic level, King Hussein, together with other Arab states, accepted the principle of UN Resolution 242 as a basis on which to formulate a strategic plan for the establishment of peace in the region. As such, the question of Palestine was defined within the context that Israeli occupation of Arab territory by use of military force was illegal, UN Resolution 242 provided a framework for the return of Arab occupied lands in exchange for peace, and the question of Palestine was an Arab issue to be resolved by Arab states. Accordingly, Jordan identified a peace strategy of 'land for peace'. Once the occupied

the organization and enact new legislation; Yasser Arafat was elected Chairman. See Chapter 2, Subsection: Palestine and the Palestinians.

¹ Arrangements for an Arab League mediation team were initiated at the Arab Summit of October 1970, held in Cairo.

² The Arab League mediation team negotiated a settlement known as The Amman Agreement. However, the agreement failed due to a clause stipulating that the PLO was the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Jordanian government reiterated its right of leadership over Jordanian citizens, rejecting PLO assertion of representation over all Palestinians, including those on the East Bank of the Jordan.

territories were returned,¹ Jordan was prepared to ascertain the will of the Palestinians through a referendum offering three options: 1) the creation of an independent Palestinian state 2) the creation of a confederate relationship between Palestinian territory and Jordan 3) the re-establishment of the Palestinian-Jordanian relationship that existed prior to the 1967 war. The PLO rejected all of these options, as well as Jordan's strategic and substantive conceptualization of the question of Palestine. The nature and platform of the PLO, as established in 1964, had, since the 1967 war, undergone a complete revolutionary transformation in alignment with the political conceptualization of Fatah.

The conceptualization and formulation of the al-Fatah movement began in the 1950's through the activities and experiences of men such as Yasser Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir, and Salah Khalaf.² al-Fatah was the reversed initials of Harakat Al-Tahrir al-Watani Al-Filastini--the movement for the national liberation of Palestine.³ The organization was officially launched in 1959 with its first publication, "Our Palestine." The platform of al-Fatah was unique in the Arab world in that it called for the

¹ Prior to the 1967 war, Egypt was in administrative control of the Gaza Strip, Syria of the Al-Himma region and Jordan of the West Bank. The West and East Banks were united in 1950, and the Jordanian Constitution was revised to give legal representation to Palestinians on the West Bank, without prejudice to the final status of Palestine. The West Bank incorporates the largest territory and population base of the Palestinians. With a final peace settlement, Jordan envisaged unification of Palestinian territory under a single administration, and a referendum for Palestinians to determine their aspirations.

² Yasser Arafat (Abu'Umar), Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), and Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) are three of the four originators of Al-Fatah. These three "...helped to organize the General Union of Palestinian Students in Cairo and Gaza" in the 1950's; see: Pamela Ann Smith, Palestine and the Palestinians 1876-1983, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984, pg. 192.

³ See: Alan Hart, Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984, pg. 127.

liberation of Palestine through armed struggle and held that the role of Palestinians was to assert their own national independence with the assistance of Arab regimes. Inspired by the Algerian revolution, Fatah was unwilling to place the mantle for the liberation of Palestine solely on Arab regimes. The Palestinian people, it believed, needed to take responsibility, to become politically and militarily active in the liberation of their own land. The goals of Fatah became clear in 1965 when it publicly disclosed the movement's essential direction towards the establishment of a democratic ruling authority in Palestine.¹

The revolutionary thinking of Fatah did not become dominant in Arab or Palestinian political thought until after the 1967 war, when the failure of the Arab regimes to liberate Palestine and the failure of the ideology of Arab unity caused the abandonment of long-held Pan-Arab beliefs. Al-Fatah was flooded with new recruits willing to view the question of Palestine in a fresh light. In July 1968, Fatah was instrumental in the decision of the PLO to adopt a National Charter, abrogating the original PLO charter that protected Arab states' interests over administered Palestinian territory, namely the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Al-Himma. Reference to the territories of

¹ See: Alain Gresh, The PLO: The Struggle Within, Towards an Independent Palestinian State, London: Zed Books Ltd., 1983, pg. 24, regarding proclamation of Fatah goals: "in a memorandum to the Second PNC (Palestine National Council in May-June 1965, Fatah) (37) stated that the Palestinian people was responsible for the liberation of its homeland, adding that the role of the Arab armies was to defend the borders against Israeli reprisals... Above all it proclaimed that there existed parts of Palestine under Arab control and that there had to be movement in these parts towards the proclamation of a governing revolutionary Palestinian national authority acting for Palestine in cooperation with Arab regimes," (38) referenced footnotes, Part 1, #37 & 38, quoted information taken from: Hourani, Al-fikr al-siyasi, pp. 120-1; and, the November 1961 issue of Filastinuna, quoted by Sakhnini, 'Al-kayan al-filastini', respectively. For a perspective of the Palestinian vision of a Palestinian state, please see: Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable," Foreign Affairs, 1977.

Palestine was qualified to reflect the interests of the Palestinian Arab people, and the role of the PLO was changed. Article 26 of the new charter stated that "The Palestine Liberation Organization, which represents the forces of the Palestinian revolution, is responsible for the movement of the Palestinian Arab people in its struggle to restore its homeland, liberate it, return to it and exercise the right of self-determination in it. This responsibility extends to all military, political and financial matters, and to all else that the Palestine issue requires in the Arab and international spheres". By February 1969, Fatah had taken control of the PNC and the Executive Committee, and Yasser Arafat was elected chairman. On May 6, 1970, a Unity Agreement was reached within the PLO, representing all Palestinian factions, which stipulated that "all groups recognized the PLO as the umbrella structure of national unity. ... The PNC in principle is the sole organ authorized to lay down the broad policy option of the PLO. But, each organization retains a broad measure of autonomy".¹ Thus, the PLO took on a new identity, a role much different from the one envisaged in the form of its original 1964 charter. The Unity Agreement gave authority and legitimacy to the PLO, as the only umbrella organization capable of representing the interests and national aspirations of the Palestinian people. The new PLO, under Yasser Arafat, was the organization with which Jordan's King Hussein had to deal.

The organization of the PLO, the PNC, the Executive Committee and associated institutions provided the basis of a national government in exile, and the nucleus for the eventual establishment of a governing entity in an independent democratic Palestinian state. The PLO became a national political movement that coupled recognition of the Palestinian

¹ The PLO: The Struggle Within, pg. 18.

right to self-determination with return of Palestinian occupied territory. Accordingly, the PLO strategy became:

- 1) to achieve Arab and international recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people;
- 2) to secure the participation of the PLO, as the representative of Palestinian interests, in a comprehensive peace conference held under international auspices, to bring about the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the return of Palestinian occupied territories.

This twofold goal of the PLO necessitated rejection of UN Resolution 242 and Arab representation of Palestinians in an international conference. Herein lay the basis for disagreement between the PLO and Jordan.

The PLO rejected UN Resolution 242 as a framework for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict because it failed to recognize the Palestinians as a national entity¹ and their right to self-determination. The PLO perceived the resolution, therefore, as an Arab-Israeli arrangement to effect disengagement of forces at the conclusion of the 1967 war, and as a means for Arab states to negotiate the return of Arab territory. The PLO regarded the question of Palestine as a Palestinian issue,² and as a matter necessarily required negotiations regarding Palestine be conducted with the PLO. Jordan disagreed with this assessment and strategy. King Hussein believed that UN Resolution 242 provided an internationally accepted framework for peace that

¹ Under UN Resolution 242, only item #2 (b) refers to the Palestinians in stated terms: "2. Affirms further the necessity (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem

² The PLO Charter, it must be remembered, was abrogated in 1968, terminating Arab interests over previously administered Palestinian territory. This right was reserved for the PLO.

clearly stated that acquisition of territory by force of arms was illegal. The issues were clear and the Arab states had legal authority over Palestinian administered territories. King Hussein believed that the first priority should be the return of the occupied territories, under international law, this taking precedence over determination of the final status of Palestine, which should be an Arab matter. King Hussein feared that the intervention of the PLO on the international front, and the coupling of Palestinian self-determination with the return of Palestinian lands, would postpone the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and complicate negotiations toward a final peace settlement. He also feared that a change in the status of Palestinian representation and authority with respect to the status of occupied territories would play into the hands of the Israelis. In 1972, to confront the perceived dangers of such a policy, King Hussein invited the PLO to join his government and outlined the proposal for the United Arab Kingdom. The text of King Hussein's 1972 proposal for a United Arab Kingdom was as follows:

- 1) The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall become a United Arab Kingdom, and shall be thus named.
- 2) The United Arab Kingdom shall consist of two regions:
 - A. The region of Palestine, and shall consist of the West Bank and any further Palestinian territories to be liberated and whose inhabitants opt to join.
 - B. The region of Jordan, and shall consist of the East Bank.
- 3) Amman shall be the central capital of the Kingdom and at the same time shall be the capital of the region of Jordan.

4) Jerusalem shall become the capital of the Region of Palestine.

5) The King shall be the Head of the State and shall assume the central executive power, assisted by a Central Council of ministers. The central legislative power shall be vested in the King and in the National Assembly, whose members shall be elected by direct and secret ballot, having an equal number of members from each of the two regions.

6) The Central Judicial Authority shall be vested in a 'Supreme Central Court'.

7) The Kingdom shall have a single 'Armed Forces' and its 'supreme Commander' shall be the King.

8) The responsibilities of the Central Executive power shall be confined to matters relating to the Kingdom as a sovereign international entity ensuring the safety of the union, its stability and development.

9) The Executive Power in each region shall be vested in a Governor-General from the Region, and in a Regional Council of Ministers also formed from citizens of the Region.

10) The Legislative Power in each Region shall be vested in a 'People's Council' which shall be elected by direct secret ballot. This Council shall elect the Governor-General.

11) The Judicial Power in each Region shall be vested in the courts of the Region and nobody shall have any authority over it.

12) The Executive Power in each Region shall be responsible for all matters pertinent to it with the exception of such matters as the constitution defines to be the responsibility of the Central Executive Power.

The PLO declined the King's offer.

Jordan's national policy for addressing the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict was undermined in 1974, when the Arab League Conference in Rabat adopted a resolution naming the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Political maneuvering was evident throughout the conference, with the PLO presenting its case for the adoption of the resolution and King Hussein of Jordan strongly recommending its rejection. The Arab League decision effectively provided the PLO with legitimacy and standing, and enabled the organization to enter the international arena as the only actor capable of negotiating a final solution to the question of Palestine. Israel's immediate response to the Arab League Resolution was to negate the legitimacy of the PLO, and to declare Jordan the only credible actor able to speak on behalf of the Palestinians.

In fact, the requisites of Middle Eastern regional politics forced King Hussein to concur in the resolution adopted by the Rabat Arab League Conference, and Jordan therefore became one of many actors, alongside Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the PLO, within the Arab League, with vested interests in the final resolution of the Arab-Israeli and Palestine conflict. It was in Jordan's interest to work within the Arab League to advance policy positions reflecting a moderate and realistic approach.

A second result of the 1974 Arab League conference was the designation of Egypt and Syria as part of a mediation team to reconcile differences between the PLO and Jordan. The first meeting was held in Cairo, but the second set of talks scheduled to be held in Syria were not convened. Failure to reconcile PLO-Jordanian differences brought a series of mediation efforts to a close. Up until 1974, King Hussein had a predominant position of power and influence over the Palestine question, with Jordan

the recognized primary actor in negotiating an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict with respect to the return of the occupied West Bank. The PLO's expulsion from Jordan in 1970-71 placed the organization in a position of weakness and disadvantage, with its political and military base in Jordan lost. The king's 1972 proposal to the PLO was an invitation proffered from a position of strength, and an effort to find a compromise solution securing the interests of both Palestinians and Jordanians. The decision of Arab League member states in 1974 reversed Jordan's power position on the question of Palestine in favor of the PLO. A new climate conducive to the furthering of PLO-Jordanian reconciliation was not to emerge again until the late 1970's.

Several important developments converged in 1977, inspiring a new environment within which activity recommenced on the question of Palestine. On the international front, the new Carter administration in the US signaled its intent to advance the peace process by sending Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on a Middle East tour to explore the possibility of convening the Geneva Peace Conference. Secretary Vance demonstrated a change in the US attitude toward the Palestine question by acknowledging "legitimate Palestinian interests."¹ In concert with the mood in Washington, the Soviet Union publicly stated that it recognized legitimate Palestinian rights. On the Middle East front, improved Arab relations recognized the necessity of resolving the instability and tension in the area created by the existence of a state of 'no peace no war' with Israel, and movement toward agreement on the convening of the

¹ The change in U.S. attitudes towards the PLO may have begun shortly after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and OPEC oil embargo. For a representation of President Nixon's position toward the PLO in 1973-1974, prior to leaving office, and the authorization of General Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director of the C.I.A., acting as special representative to the President, to meet with two PLO leaders, Khaled Al-Hassan and Majed Abu Sharar, see: Alan Hart, Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?, pgs. 397-405.

Geneva Conference provided an impetus for joint Arab action and cooperation.

The policy positions of the major Arab states in 1977 were far different from those represented at the Rabat Arab conference in 1974. Relations between Jordan and Syria had improved,¹ as was evidenced by a high degree of cooperative effort in political, economic and social spheres. Egypt desired peace, so as to reduce military expenditure and focus attention on improvement of the economy. Intense negotiations, both regional and international, concerning the terms for convening the Geneva Conference produced a consensus that Jordan should hold a predominant position in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.² In talks with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance "both the Egyptian and Syrian presidents stressed their conviction that Jordan would exercise the dominant role in any future link with the Palestinians. Assad...began to speak of an autonomous...Palestinian state, and Sadat went so far as to call for a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation even before Geneva..."³ A combination of Arab pressure on the PLO and Palestinian self-interest resulted in the PLO's decision to accept a Palestinian 'mini-state' on the West Bank and Gaza Strip: "The Palestinians have agreed to accept a Palestinian mini-state on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip and have

¹ Relations between Syria and Jordan had deteriorated due to Syria's anger over: Jordan's military actions against the PLO in 1970-1971; Jordan's 1972 proposal for a United Arab Kingdom, a federation plan between Jordan and Palestine; and non-participation in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

² The Geneva Conference was a forum designed to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict through negotiations. Each Arab state would send its own delegation; and, regarding Palestine, a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would be sent to negotiate the resolution of the Palestine Question. The other Arab states would be expected to negotiate the return of their land occupied by Israel in the 1967 war.

³ Clinton Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenge 1948-1983, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1984, pg. 85.

allowed the Arab powers to enlarge and stack the PLO National Council--its parliament-in-exile--with moderates. Next month the Council is expected to revise the Palestine National Covenant so that it no longer calls for an end to the state of Israel."¹The unprecedented compromises exacted from the PLO, and circumstances conducive to the possibility of negotiating a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, were undermined on November 19, 1977, when President Sadat arrived in Jerusalem as a prelude to a separate peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, which was concluded less than one year later.² Egypt's separate peace with Israel cost Sadat his life,³ brought about the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and

¹ The Washington Post, February 19, 1977, article by Stuart Auerbach, entitled, "PLO: Happy About Hussein's Troubles". In fact, the concept of a mini-state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip was recommended in 1967, in a political report submitted by F. Kaddoumi to the Fatah Central Committee; as quoted from Abu Iyad, My Home, My Land, p. 138, "In July 1967 F. Kaddoumi submitted a political report to the Fatah central committee in which he put forward proposals for the strategy and tactics of our movement. It was in this document that he was already suggesting that we should come out in favour of a mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza, in the event that these two areas were returned by Israel, which had just conquered them. Such a short-and medium-term goal was, he maintained, not only in conformity with the ownership rights of the Palestinian people over every inch of its homeland, but was also in line with an objective analysis of the situation. For it was obvious that, however extensive and vigorous guerilla activities against the Jewish state might (sic) be, Israel would remain invincible for the foreseeable future."

² Egypt faced overwhelming economic problems; Sadat felt that peace with Israel would give Egypt financial assistance from the U.S., including technical assistance and military credits, and that it would increase investment and business opportunities in Egypt. Peace would reduce the burden of investment in military supplies and equipment, and the saving from this could be directed toward the economy and address a large budget deficit. Sadat may have been persuaded by the Israeli negotiating position that direct talks would bring immediate results, whereas the Geneva Conference could take years to reach a final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Camp David Accords, a framework for a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel (with the invitation to any other Arab state to join), was signed September 17, 1978.

³ Sadat was assassinated October 6, 1981.

weakened the negotiating position of the Arab states vis-a-vis Israel. The question of Palestine, and that of other Arab lands occupied in the 1967 war, remained unresolved. The Soviet Union remained an actor in Middle East politics, albeit outside the parameters of the tri-axis of the US, Egyptian and Israeli peace process.

In the aftermath of Egypt's independent foreign policy initiative with Israel, Jordan and Syria continued to enjoy a honeymoon of good relations and Syria renewed its efforts to effect Jordanian-PLO reconciliation. An initial PNC delegation headed by Mr. Khaled Al-Fahoum went to Amman to discuss prospects for better relations. The meeting was successful and was followed up by a second delegation, which, after three days of negotiations, concluded a framework to guide future discussions. The 1978 session of the PNC, held in Damascus, approved "the continuation of a controlled dialogue and follow-up meetings between Jordan and PLO representatives".¹ A meeting between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat took place in Northern Jordan, near the Syrian border. However, the amicable environment conducive to peace negotiations in 1977, and the promising dialogue between Jordan and the PLO in 1978, was overrun by a series of events that were to yet again alter relations between the superpowers and Arab states.

The precursor year for dramatic development and change in the Middle East was 1978. The Camp David Accords, an agreed framework for negotiating Middle East peace, were signed by President Anwar Al-Sadat of Egypt, Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel and President Jimmy Carter at the

¹ Khaled Al-Hassan, Al-Itifaq al-Urduny Al-Falastiny (The Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement), Amman, Jordan: Dar al-Jalil, 1985; translated from the Arabic.

White House on September 17th, 1978.¹ The same year Israeli military forces entered Lebanon in a campaign to eradicate PLO operational bases.² The Iranian Revolution of 1979 brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power, and led to the complete restructuring of Iran as a theocratic Islamic Republic. Also in 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Then, in 1980, the Iran-Iraq war completed the cycle of violence, war, chaos and instability encircling the region. The US now faced a credibility crisis. With the loss of a major ally in Iran by the US failure to support the Shah, and with the Iran-Iraq war threatening to destabilize pro-Western Gulf states, increasing perception in the region that the US was losing the capacity to serve as an impartial arbiter in the Arab-Israeli conflict.³ Meanwhile the era

¹ A formal peace treaty ending the state of war between Egypt and Israel was concluded on March 26, 1979, in a ceremony at the White House.

² "...on March 15, 1978, an Israeli force estimated at the time at 20,000 soldiers struck across the Lebanese border, attacking on land and from the sea and air, bombing and strafing Palestinian camps and enclaves as far north as Beirut, and seizing what Israeli officials called a "security belt" up to six miles deep along the entire 63-mile border. Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman said that the operation was not for reprisal...but "to destroy and uproot, as far as possible, terrorist concentrations in southern Lebanon." Israeli forces remained in Lebanon until June 1978, having advanced beyond the original six-mile strip to occupy all of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. When they finally withdrew in June, they turned only a portion of the territory they had occupied over to the United Nations peacekeeping force that had been assigned to Lebanon by the Security Council in late March. Along the six-mile wide "security belt" adjacent to their border, ... the departing Israelis installed Lebanese Christian militia..."; Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, pg. 180.

³ This fear was underlined in September 1981, when the Reagan administration "announced plans for a new "strategic relationship" (between the U.S. and Israel) to encompass such collaborative measures as a joint air defense system, joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean, and the storage of medical supplies in Israel for possible use by American forces assigned to the Middle East in an emergency," *ibid.*, pg. 267. The "strategic relationship" appeared to complement the new effort of the Reagan administration to implement its conception of a "strategic consensus" whereby the Soviet Union was the real threat in the region, and priority was therefore to be given to an alliance between the U.S., Israel and moderate Arab states against

of cooperative relations between Jordan and Syria came to an end as Jordan drew closer to Iraq, offering assistance in its war effort against Iran, while Syria, historically opposed to the threat of a competitive power base in Iraq, sided with Iran. Israel's military activities against the PLO in Southern Lebanon, known as Operation Litani, took the form of direct military action and alliance with Lebanese Christian militias, and kept the PLO occupied. This brought about the military re-deployment of Syrian forces in Lebanon, with the aim of protecting not only Syria's south-western borders, but also its historical role and influence in Lebanon itself.¹ The rift between Jordan and Syria, together with Israel's activities in Lebanon, unfavourably impacted the PLO, and its relation with Syria. Syria's strategic priorities in Lebanon, its regional alliance with Iran and its increasing animosity towards Jordan resulted in pressure for a new understanding between Jordan and the PLO.

Soviet incursion, with the Question of Palestine reduced to a peripheral issue. The Arab states did not accept this reasoning, and viewed the "strategic relationship" between the U.S. and Israel as a destabilizing factor and an unwelcome development.

¹ Prior to World War 1, Syria comprised the territories of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. Under the League of Nations mandate system, France was awarded the mandate over Syria, whereupon it separated Lebanon from Syria and enforced a confessional system based on religious association. As a result of the Lebanese civil war, the Arab League agreed, in 1976, to the positioning of a Syrian peace-keeping force in Lebanon. In 1981 further conflict erupted in Lebanon "involving Israel, the various Christian militias within Lebanon, the Syrian peacekeeping force present under the auspices of the Arab League, Lebanese Muslim forces, and the Palestinian guerrillas. In late April Israeli planes shot down two Syrian helicopters fighting against Christian Phalanges' militia, which had been trying to strengthen their position in the Bakaa valley of east central Lebanon. The Syrians thereupon moved Soviet-supplied SAM-6 surface-to-air missiles into Lebanon, challenging Israel's hitherto unchallenged air supremacy over Lebanon...With Syria refusing to pull back the missiles, Israel repeatedly threatening to bomb them, and both the United States and the Soviet Union bolstering their naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean..." Ibid., pg. 38.

Israel's military action against the PLO in Lebanon in 1978 established a six-mile security belt along the southern Lebanese border, together with an alliance with Christian militias, which crippled the military capacity of the PLO, but failed to alter the organization's political status as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Israeli action made clear the inability of the PLO to settle its conflict with Israel through military means. However, Arafat achieved a major victory at the 1979 PNC Conference in Damascus when he was given "an official PNC mandate to negotiate on the basis of the mini-state compromise, which was endorsed in principle in 1977."¹ Arafat then embarked on a successful diplomatic offensive to sell his compromise in the international arena. "In July 1979 Arafat met Chancellor Kreisky and the chairman of the Socialist International Willy Brandt, in Vienna; he was later received in Lisbon, Ankara and Madrid. In the same year, the EEC for the first time recognized that the PLO was one of the 'parties concerned' by the settlement of the Middle East conflict; in June 1980 the Venice Declaration confirmed the EEC's stand...(in 1982) PLO offices were opened in Finland and Ireland; Vienna raised the PLO's representation to ambassadorial level; Papandreou's Greece followed its example and Arafat was received in Athens...Arafat was welcomed in New Delhi and Tokyo; in 1979, the PLO participated for the first time in the work of the UN Security Council;² in 1981 the socialist states granted the PLO's representation diplomatic status;"³ In the

¹ Alan Hart, *Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?*, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984, pg. 379. The PNC mandate for Arafat to negotiate on the basis of a mini-state was the culmination of five years of effort to persuade the PLO to accept compromise; see pgs. 379-382.

² This was at the United Nations General Assembly.

³ Alain Gresh, *The PLO: The Struggle Within*, London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1985, pgs. 219-220.

midst of this heightened diplomatic activity, negotiation and political maneuvering, Saudi Arabia presented, in August 1981, an Arab peace plan, called the Fahd Peace Plan,¹ as a framework for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Concurrently, with the authorization of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the State Department began secret negotiations with the PLO,² presumably with regard to the Fahd plan and the PLO negotiating position in the light of the Camp David Accord's failure to enroll the participation of any Arab state other than Egypt.

Israel's second invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, ended the US-PLO dialogue. This invasion exceeded Israel's 1978 initiative, with Israeli troops marching beyond the Litani River ending with the encirclement of Beirut. International mediation arranged for the evacuation of the PLO leadership and military forces from Beirut on August 30th and September 1st. As the last of the PLO forces left Beirut, President Reagan announced the Reagan Peace Plan on September 1, 1982.³ At the Arab Summit held in Morocco on September 9th an eight point-Arab peace proposal was announced, known as the Fez peace plan.⁴ On September 22nd, Jordan invited the PLO to discussing the possibility of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian

¹ See the Appendix for the text of the Fahd Peace Plan, 1981.

² See: New York Times, February 23, 1984. The news article states that negotiations between the US and the PLO began in August 1981 and lasted through to May 1982: "The discussions broke off after Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982. Mr. Arafat had told Mr. Mroz in mid-May that his group would have a formal response to the American conditions by the middle of June, and Mr. Mroz believed that the answer would probably be yes...". "...the Reagan Administration authorized John Edwin Mroz, a New York foundation president, to conduct (negotiations) with Yasir Arafat, the PLO leader...".

³ See the Appendix for the text of the Reagan Peace Plan, announced September 1, 1982.

⁴ See the Appendix for the text of the Fez Arab Peace Plan, September 9, 1982.

federation in response to the Reagan Peace Plan. The evolution of events was drawing Jordan and the PLO into a position of mutual compromise and accommodation on the question of Palestine.

Presented before King Hussein and Yasser Arafat at their meeting in Amman on October 9th and 10th, 1982, were two peace proposals, the Fez Peace Plan and the Reagan Peace Plan. Both plans had merits, however, although recognition of the state of Israel was implied in the Fez plan, the Reagan plan failed to acknowledge the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians and their right to self-determination. Nevertheless, Arafat kept the door open on both initiatives, waiting for clarification and future developments. A joint Jordanian-Palestinian Higher Committee was established to further negotiations. In the light of these events, an announcement was made on December 14th, 1982, that the PLO and Jordan shared a special and distinctive relationship, a statement clearly reflecting progress in accepting the idea of a yet unspecified relationship between Jordan and the PLO. Jordan preferred a federate relationship, while the PLO was willing to consider a confederate relationship that provided national integrity of Palestine and its independent status in the international arena.

Disagreement within the PLO did not prevent the 16th session of the PNC in Algiers on February 21, 1983, from endorsing the Arab Fez plan, declaring its support for resolutions included in the Six-Point Brezhnev Peace Plan¹ and endorsing of the idea that future relations with Jordan must be established on a confederate basis between two independent states. The rapprochement between the PLO and Jordan, and steps towards

¹ The Brezhnev Plan called for the recognition of the state of Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

a negotiated confederate relationship, were regretted and condemned by Syria and Libya. Yasser Arafat and King Hussein achieved an apparent breakthrough when they signed a 'notification of agreement' on terms for a joint peace initiative, but the effort was frozen when conditions disallowed any hope of progress. These conditions included failure of the Reagan administration to acknowledge the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people or to procure Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. Also the unlikelihood that the administration could enforce a freeze on further Israeli settlements on the West Bank, as well as Israel's rejection of the Reagan Peace Plan, and changes in the text of the Hussein-Arafat agreement, from the words, "dealing with all the political initiatives including the Reagan initiative" to the words "dealing with all political initiatives that would include the rights of the Palestinian people."¹ Although King Hussein terminated negotiations with the PLO and informed President Reagan that current conditions were unfavourable to embark on a new peace initiative, the PLO managed to smooth relations with Jordan, and the Jordan-Palestine Higher Committee continued contact.

A meeting between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat to discuss a joint strategic response to internationally sponsored peace plans occurred against a background of intense opposition from Syria, Libya, the Soviet Union and elements within the PLO. Libya opposed any form of conciliation and compromise with Israel and the US, and the Soviet Union opposed any action in the Middle East in which it was denied a role. Meanwhile Syria perceived the Hussein-Arafat dialogue as a threat to its national security interests in the region. At stake was the particular format for an Arab-Israeli peace conference, bearing

¹ Khaled Al-Hassan, Al-Itifaq Al-Urduny Al-Falastiny (The Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement), Amman, Jordan: Dar al-Jalil, 1985.

in mind the issue of the return of Syrian territory, the Golan Heights, occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the nature of the settlement prescribed for the Palestine question, given that an independent Palestinian state or confederate relationship between Palestine and Jordan would have implications for Syrian interests in the area. Whereas the Soviet Union warned Jordan against unilateral adoption of the Reagan Peace Plan, Syria dealt with the matter by inspiring radical elements within the PLO to engage in a revolt against Fatah. This, known as the 'colonels' revolt', took the form of military action against Fatah loyalists in Syria and Lebanon. President Assad's intention was to destroy Yasser Arafat and Fatah, and to support the takeover of the PLO by factions under its control. The revolt backfired.¹

Action against Arafat's peace initiative and efforts at negotiation with King Hussein and the Reagan administration included the assassination of Arafat special representatives, for which those behind Abu Nidal and his revolutionary organization were largely responsible.² The 'colonels' revolt', with Syria's support, contributed to this onslaught as rebel leaders moved against PLO offices in Damascus and military bases in Syria and Lebanon.³ By the end of June 1983, eight

¹ Those involved in the 'colonel's revolt' were discredited because of Syria's influence and control over their actions and policies; the divisiveness of the leaders in the face of the Israeli challenge to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and in Lebanon; and a sense that the spilling of Palestinian blood was unforgivable.

² Sabri Khalil Banna, code name Abu Nidal, was a Fatah loyalist until 1973; in disagreement with Fatah's decision to seek a compromise settlement with Israel--the mini-state option--he decided to set up his own rival organization in Iraq. Regarding the infiltration of Israel's Mossad into the Abu Nidal organization for the purpose of selecting targets for assassination by the Abu Nidal group, see: Alan Hart, Arafat: Terrorist or Peace Maker?, pgs. 395-397.

³ Concerning Syrian-sponsored activities against the Jordan-P.L.O. rapprochement and negotiations on the Reagan Peace Proposal see: Bruce R. Kuniholm and Michael Rubner, The Palestinian Problem and United States Policy: A Guide to Issues &

positions held by Fatah loyalists had been eliminated. The final showdown came with President Assad's expulsion of Arafat from Damascus on June 24, 1983 and the rebel military assault on Arafat's last stronghold in Lebanon, Tripoli, the location of PLO headquarters.

Arafat, chairman of the PLO and a symbol of Palestinian resistance and hope for Palestinian statehood, being besieged in Tripoli caused an immediate flood of demonstrations and statements of support for Arafat and the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.¹ The mutinous Palestinian rebels were discredited, Syria was forced to accept a UN sponsored plan to evacuate Arafat and the last of the Fatah loyalists from Tripoli, and the 'colonels' revolt' was thus turned into another political victory for Arafat and the PLO. On December 20, 1983 Arafat and Fatah loyalists were evacuated from Tripoli under UN supervision, and on December 22nd, Arafat re-appeared in Cairo and embraced President Mubarak of Egypt, an historic event that signaled the rapprochement of the PLO and Egypt following the break in relations caused by the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978.

The Mubarak-Arafat meeting was indicative of an opportunity to open a new direction for peace. Encouraging the PLO to establish a government in exile, President Mubarak appeared to desire a new role for Egypt, as mediator in a comprehensive peace plan. A meeting between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat on February 26, 1984, to discuss prospects for

References, Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1986; specifically pg. 68, in which the assassinations of Fahd Kawasmeh, a P.L.O. moderate on the Executive Committee, and Jordanian diplomats and other targets, are treated as warnings by Syria's President Hafez Al-Assad against excluding Syria from pursuing its traditional role and interests in the region, and from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

¹ Jordan also sent a delegation in support of Arafat.

renewed peace overtures, and the announcement on September 25th that Jordan intended to reestablish relations with Egypt, signaled a concerted effort between King Hussein, President Mubarak and Chairman Arafat to renew peace talks. With the isolation of PLO radicals and Syria, Arafat was free to embark on negotiations with King Hussein, aimed at reaching a joint Jordanian-Palestinian understanding.¹ Acceptance of King Hussein's invitation to convene the 17th session of the PNC in Amman permitted the king to extend a public invitation to the PLO to join Jordan in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian formula for peace.

King Hussein's opening address to the 17th session of the PNC on November 22, 1984, outlined a proposal for such a joint formula. The following are excerpts from the speech:²

The international position at large is one that perceives the possibility of restoring the occupied territories through a Jordanian-Palestinian formula, which requires commitments from both our parties considered by the world as necessary for the achievement of a just, balanced and peaceful settlement.

The existing facts in the Palestinian, Arab and international arenas require us to adhere to Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis for a just, peaceful settlement. The principle of "territory for peace" is the landmark which should

¹ In August 1984, Arafat convened the P.L.O. Central Council in Tunis; responding to the Syrian-supported mutiny of the 'colonel rebels', the Council confirmed its commitment to the resolutions adopted at the 16th P.N.C. Conference in Algiers, and the position of Arafat as Chairman of the P.L.O. Efforts by Arafat, in 1984, to reinstitute consensus and unity within P.L.O. ranks resulted in the 'Democratic Alliance Agreement'; with unity thus restored, Arafat was able to continue plans to convene the 17th Session of the P.N.C.

² Excerpts from the Address of His Majesty King Hussein to the 17th Session of the Palestine National Council, November 22, 1984.

guide us in any initiative we present to the world. This principle is not a precondition but a framework within which negotiations will be carried out. As such, it is non-negotiable. Negotiations we deem necessary within the framework of an international peace conference should revolve around the means, methods and commitments which would guarantee the achievement of the principle of "territory for peace."

The international conference would be held under the auspices of the United Nations and would be attended by the permanent members of the Security Council and by all the parties to the conflict. The Palestine Liberation Organization would attend on an equal footing with the other parties, since it is the party empowered to address the most important and momentous aspect of the Middle East crisis, namely the Palestinian dimension.

Organizing the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship is a basic responsibility of the Jordanian and Palestinian people.

The significance of this meeting in Amman lies in the probability of drawing up a Jordanian-Palestinian position, a proper position leading to correct action in the right direction.

For the PLO, the 17th session of the PNC was important in that it reconfirmed Yasser Arafat as chairman, reconfirmed PLO commitment to the Algiers resolutions,¹ constituted a

¹ According to Khaled Al-Hassan, "...four important issues were achieved at the 17th P.N.C. meeting: 1) The independence of the National Palestinian decision-making process and its execution; 2) The confirmation of the P.L.O. as the legitimate and only representative of the Palestinian people; 3) The election of a new Executive Committee, with four seats kept open for the Executive Committee and the leaders of the Council to choose individuals to fill those positions in order to achieve national unity, and to allow the Democratic Alliance and some of the independents to join; 4) The resumption of their work, by the institutions of the P.L.O., through the legal framework, regardless of any technical flaws".

moderate majority and consensus giving Arafat and the Executive Committee broad power and flexibility in policy issues, and succeeded in convening in the face of intense Syrian opposition. The Executive Committee immediately approved action to conduct negotiations and formulate a response to King Hussein's proposal for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian peace effort.

On December 10, 1984, Khaled Al-Hassan met with King Hussein in London, and expressed PLO interest in the King's proposal for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian formula for peace. He presented the king with an outline of 'points of understanding' that the PLO felt must be agreed to prior to further negotiations. These principles included:¹

-- UN Resolution 181: The PLO is committed to the rejection of the Palestinian settlement policy; however, it supports implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 191, providing for the return of Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who choose not to return.

-- Definition of UN Resolution 242: as an effort by Jordan, Egypt, and Syria to regain territories occupied in the 1967 war.

-- UN Resolution 242 (and UN Resolution 338 which confirms 242) fails to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, the rights of the Palestinian people, and their choice in establishing an independent Palestinian state. The Question of Palestine is a Palestinian issue. Resolution 242, or a new UN resolution, should be formulated making these points compatible.

¹ Khaled Al-Hassan, Al-Itifaq Al-Urduny Al-Falastiny (The Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement), Amman, Jordan: Dar Al-Jalil, 1985, translated from the Arabic; items paraphrased.

-- The "Arab-Israeli" struggle neglected the basic element of the conflict--the Question of Palestine. The national Palestine cause necessitates the existence of an independent national Palestinian political character on the international and Arab front.

-- The necessity of achieving the goal of national identity makes the relationship with Jordan one of 'confederate union' that would maintain the independent Palestinian political character on the international scene.

King Hussein's approval of the 'points of understanding' set in motion the formulation of a Palestinian negotiating committee and progress in a Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue. The effort resulted in the formal delineation of the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship represented in the February 11th Agreement signed on February 11, 1985. The following are the positions presented by Jordan, together with text clarification requested by the PLO, that formed the February 11th Agreement.

During follow-up talks in Amman, King Hussein stated his position on the substantive issues to Khaled Al-Hassan, in the form of an historical review, which, as represented by Hassan himself, being not a literal representation included:¹

1) The independent Palestinian state is not in principle simply a matter of Palestinian choice but a matter of Jordanian choice also. I (King Hussein) do not know what assurances you (the PLO) would wish to have of this official Jordanian stand, which stems from complete conviction, but if a secret memorandum signed by myself is sufficient, then I am ready to provide it.

¹ King Hussein's position as stated by Khaled Al-Hassan, in: Al-Itifaq Al-Urduny al-Falastiny (The Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement), Amman, Jordan: Dar Al-Jalil, 1985.

2) We in Jordan have arrived at the conviction that the Palestinian people cannot be led by any outside leadership, but rather that the leadership should be from within.

3) In the light of these two convictions we agree to a confederate union subject to a referendum for the Palestinian people and the Jordanian people, the result of which should determine whether the union will take place or not.

4) We accept unconditionally that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, with the right to determine the future of this people and the independence of the Palestinian national decision, and we totally reject the idea of any separate peace or separate negotiations. This also binds the PLO should it decide to undertake a separate peace initiative rather than a joint initiative.

5) The confederate union means that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestinian State will each give up some of its authority, and we in Jordan are ready to do so if this will ensure the return of the territories occupied in 1967, including the city of Jerusalem.

6) Jordan without the PLO does not have the capacity to operate on the international level with Arab support, and similarly the PLO without Jordan is not accepted in the Western camp and in particular in Washington. Union is therefore the foundation for joint action.

7) It is not the objective of the Jordanian-Palestinian initiative to achieve negotiation to bring about a political solution with Washington, but rather to put forward in our joint initiative all the political requirements involved. Action to this end should be based on the following aims:

- a. To induce Washington to accept the idea of an international conference and agree to the PLO participating in this conference on an equal footing with all the other participants in the conflict, and not simply to assess United States reaction
- b. To use the visits of Arab kings and presidents to Washington to achieve this goal
- c. To inform the Arabs immediately of all that happens, including the final outcome when King Hussein visits Washington following the visits of King Fahd, President Mubarak and President Shazilly (of Algeria)
- d. Through all of this to arrive at an Arab decision that would be the basis for international action and only after this to pursue a political initiative, bearing in mind that we are committed to the Fez resolutions and that you (the PLO) are also committed to these resolutions. We cannot agree to or move towards any political initiative that does not have the support and approval of the Arab world.

8) The Palestinian Proposal for the agreement, as it relates to our joint action, is a complete proposal and there is no objection on our part to any wording or any matter in it. However, we are convinced that it is not the desired agreement for joint action, but is rather applicable to PLO action considered separately. We have no objections or reservations concerning it and we are ready to stand with you in accordance with the convictions we have mentioned and in accordance with the resolutions of the Rabat summit, insofar as we have committed ourselves to help you in anything you wish to do and bearing in mind that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

9) Your own role, as we view it from our side, is to coordinate with regard to the requirements and conditions of the Palestinians who are under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza on the one hand and with regard to the wishes and interests of the Palestinians of 1948 on the other. This we believe to be the appropriate interim action, given that the achievement of a total solution is not possible at the present time while a partial solution is not easy.

10) If the insistence on the wording "joint Arab delegation" rather than "Jordanian-Palestinian delegation" or "joint delegation" stems from the desire not to alienate Syria, then we have no objection to this, but if Syria refuses to participate in the international conference, then logic dictates that we keep the door open for everyone and do not close it on ourselves due to the probability of an Arab party rejection, as happened previously at the Geneva conference when the Syrians agreed to participation at a later stage so as to effect a disengagement on the Syrian front.

11) We understand the importance of Syria, would like to have Syria with us, and understand your concern over Syria. However, although an agreement with Syria is easier for us at this particular point than it is for you, we do not wish this to be achieved at your expense.

12) If you decide that you wish to insist on this text in its full form, then that will mean that we cannot achieve the objectives of this joint action. In that case it would be for you to work independently. We would support you, but would also be obliged to consider our own security.

13) If our future goal is to achieve a confederate union, then our actions in the future will be conditioned by this goal, this applying also to the joint delegation to an international conference, and by the need for cooperation henceforth between Jordanian and Palestinian institutions. Jordan is prepared to agree to such cooperation if the PLO also agrees to it.

14) We would be prepared to transmit a further memorandum should certain words need to be added or removed or should certain wording need to be changed in order to clarify our goal and confirm PLO commitment to it in principle.

Follow-up negotiations reached an impasse on two issues, the make-up of a delegation; Jordan preferring joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the PLO a joint Arab delegation, and the time-frame for implementing Palestinian self-determination. The deadlock was broken during frank discussions between Yasser Arafat and King Hussein during a meeting in Amman. King Hussein offered a new text in English, the revised form stating as follows:¹

¹ Ibid as represented in Khaled Al-Hassan's article. Describing further clarification of the issues, Hassan states: "Then Abu Ammar inquired as to the meaning of the statement: "the Palestinian people will exercise their inalienable rights in deciding their future when the Jordanians and the Palestinians will be able to achieve that"; the meaning of "whenever the Jordanians-Palestinians will be able to achieve that". King Hussein replied "whenever the Jordanians and Palestinians can bring about the Israeli withdrawal". Abu Ammar agreed to this interpretation. Abu Ammar asked what was meant by the joint delegation. King Hussein answered that a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was meant, and Abu Ammar said that he understood it to mean an Arab delegation, which would include whoever would like to participate in the international conference. ...It was decided that Abu Ammar should send a letter to King Hussein clarifying the King's explanation concerning the first sentence of the second point; and also the Palestinians' understanding concerning a joint delegation. Abu Ammar sent a signed letter to King Hussein."

(Item #2) Right of self-determination for the Palestinian people. Palestinians would exercise their inalienable right of self-determination when Jordanians and Palestinians will be able to do so, within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated states of Jordan and Palestine. (Regarding item #5) referring to a joint delegation to an international conference, a new sentence was included that spoke of a joint delegation rather than a joint Jordanian-Palestinian or joint Arab delegation.

Yasser Arafat agreed to the revision. Hussein and Arafat were in agreement on the text and associated understandings, and the framework for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian relationship was signed on February 11, 1985, and known as the February 11th Agreement.

CHAPTER 5: The February 11th Agreement - A Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Accord

Significance Of Accord: Jordan/Palestinian Relationship - Continuity And Change, 1921-1985

The February 11th Agreement was the fruit of fifteen years of negotiations (1970-1985), during which the PLO and Jordan aspired to formulate a joint understanding on the question of Palestine. The significance of the agreement lies in its symbolic reflection of the continuities and changes that have characterized Middle East events since the imposition of the League of Nations mandate system at the end of WWI. In the early 1920's, the question of Palestine was subsumed within the question of the Arab world, as the leaders of the Arab Revolt struggled to attain independence through the creation of a United Arab Kingdom in Arab territories liberated at the end of WWI. History blocked the creation of a unified Arab Kingdom, as the mandate system divided the Arab world into the separate states of Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine under British and French military and administrative control.¹ The Arab liberation movement became redirected from a united front, as seen in the Great Arab Revolt, to nationalist liberation activities directed against British and French control.

In 1920 the conditions existed for a United Arab Kingdom, including popular endorsement, an administrative network and organization, economic viability, geographical continuity and a united leadership under a single Hashemite familial regime. The 1940's presented a *fait accompli*, in which the establishment of independent states and administrative and

¹ Israel was created in 1948, in a part of Palestine, when the British left the Middle East.

government institutions gave rise to new national leadership with vested interests in maintaining the status quo and personal positions of power and wealth. With independence, Arab states in the 1950's were concerned with national self-definition and were dealing with the legacy of colonial rule. The 1960's were characterized by a combination of issues, such as economic development and modernization, ideology, power politics and Arab Unity with a view to self-sufficiency. The 1970's began a new phase of reconciliation, flexible alliances and courses of moderation within the Arab world. The 1980's could be classified as the age of realism, flexibility and pragmatism in Arab relations in the international arena. The exception to this evolutionary transformation is the unique case of Palestine, and the special relationship that has existed between Palestine and Jordan since 1921.

This special relationship can best be described by reference to the concepts of continuity and change as illustrated over a 64 year period between 1921, the year Transjordan was formed, and 1985, which saw the signing of the historic agreement between Jordan and the PLO. Continuity is reflected in Jordan's constant policy of: 1) the continuation of the values inherent in the Hashemite tradition of the Great Arab Revolt, those of service in the interests of the Arab people; 2) the furtherance of Arab unity and independence; 3) the protection of Palestine and Palestinians; 4) the resolution of the question of Palestine 5) the safeguarding of Jordan's national security, a policy pursued under King Abdullah, King Talal and King Hussein. With the unification of the East and West Banks of the Jordan River in 1950, King Hussein pursued a policy of furthering national integration, political representation and expression, and domestic development, beyond that which was instituted by King Abdullah shortly before his death. The 17-

year experience of Jordanian-Palestinian territorial unity ended in 1967, with Israel's occupation of the West Bank, however, up until 1985, King Hussein sought to re-establish the joint Jordanian-Palestinian relationship. Illustrative of his attempts were:

-- Efforts to develop a framework of cooperation and understanding regarding the future of Jordanians and Palestinians.

-- King Hussein's 1972 proposal for a United Arab Kingdom:¹ Theoretically, the 1972 plan encompassed a series of strategic goals, and a framework for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian relationship for resolving the question of Palestine. First, creation of the United Arab Kingdom would reconstitute the special relationship between Jordan and Palestine (the West Bank) which had existed prior to 1967. Second, PLO acceptance of the plan would give unquestionable authority to King Hussein to negotiate the return of the Occupied Territories on the basis of UN Resolution 242 and its secret understanding. Third, the instituted organization and division of powers laid down in the Charter of the proposal would provide the scenario for the status of Palestinian territory returned to Jordan; a matter of concern for international powers and Israel. Fourth, the framework established an understanding concerning relations between Palestinians and Jordanians in the United Arab Kingdom, and a joint position against Israeli claims to keep the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fifth, the proposed relationship would provide for Palestinian autonomy and self-determination within the overall structure of the United Arab Kingdom; and it ruled out both Palestinian autonomy or annexation under Israeli control and an independent Palestinian state which would be

¹ For the text of the 1972 United Arab Kingdom proposal, see the appendix.

subject to foreign control, interference and dependency relationship. Sixth, creation of the United Arab Kingdom held out the promise of a cooperative relationship between Jordanians and Palestinians, in which a national economy could be geared toward self-sufficiency, economic modernization, development and prosperity. Seventh, the United Arab Kingdom provided continuity in a special Jordanian-Palestinian relationship which predated 1948, and was consolidated by King Abdullah in 1950. The Jordan proposal for the creation of the United Arab Kingdom was not implemented because of opposition by the PLO and Arab League member states, particularly Egypt and Syria. However, basic elements within the 1972 proposal would re-emerge in future negotiations between the PLO and Jordan, in their efforts to define a mutually acceptable relationship;

-- In 1977, substantive negotiations on a Jordanian-Palestinian relationship re-emerged, presumably on the lines of the 1972 proposal, in anticipation of convening the Geneva Peace Conference; environmental conditions favored compromise and the possibility of a comprehensive settlement was evident, as Egypt called for a confederate relationship between Palestine and Jordan, with Syria envisaging a form of autonomy. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and Camp David Accords terminated the Geneva initiative;

-- In 1982, in response to the Reagan Peace Plan, Jordan invited the PLO to formulate a joint Jordanian-Palestinian federation, presumably in terms similar to those of the King's 1972 political initiative. The Reagan Peace Plan,¹ in a contextual sense, reconfirmed basic U.S. and international principles to be the substance of a regional peace settlement, as well as a peace proposal which seemingly supported the peace agreement

¹ See the appendix for the text of the Reagan Peace Proposal.

envisaged by King Hussein, and included: 1) exchange of territory for peace; 2) implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in accordance with its "secret understandings" as negotiated in 1967; and 3) self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in association with Jordan.

A variety of factors encouraged the king to change this position and enter into an agreement with the PLO in 1985 that conceded both a confederate relationship, involving the "confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine",¹ and the participation of the PLO in an international peace conference within a joint delegation.²

The series of factors imposing a change in policy approach on the question of Palestine can be divided into three sub-categories: 1) environmental factors 2) domestic factors 3) the PLO as a factor. The first sub-category encompasses the foreign policy stance of Jordan, in its relationship with and perceptions of the Arab League and regional politics, the US relationship with Israel, Israel's foreign policy posture and its activities in the West Bank, and international politics as they relate to the question of Palestine.

In the Middle East, as in the community of nation states within the international system, power politics is the primary factor governing inter-state relationships. Middle East Arab power politics came to be embodied within a structural

¹ In part, item #2, Jordanian-Palestinian Accord, known as the February 11th Agreement.

² For political reasons, namely the fear of Syrian opposition, the PLO refused the wording "joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation". As a compromise the text of the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord states "joint delegation". The PLO interprets this to mean a joint Arab delegation; Jordan interprets it to mean a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

organization, the Arab League, which was originally envisaged as an organization to regulate Arab affairs and support Arab cooperation, but which, in fact, came to reveal Arab differences, rivalries and power struggles over leadership and power predominance in the Arab world. These same differences, based on considerations of power politics and influence in the Arab world, re-emerged on the question of Palestine.

The Arab League exercised a very important role in sponsoring and formulating an Arab position on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine issue. The PLO was dependent upon Arab League member states for financial aid, provision of offices and a territorial base for activities and political support, quite apart from the institution's role in furthering PLO legitimacy and recognition on the level of the international system. Arab League actions and resolutions on the Palestine issue constrained Jordan's strategic formulation and implementation of foreign policy initiatives on the issue.

The nature of Arab regional politics, as reflected in the political maneuverings of the Arab League, and the nature of Jordan's power and territorial base, together with its geographic location, necessitated acceptance of the Arab League decisions, while seeking as much political maneuvering room as possible consistent with its essential national policy requirement of maintaining "good neighbourly relations". Although regional Arab relations in 1977 favoured reconciliation and a potential Arab consensus on a more predominant Jordanian role in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian solution, rather than the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the 1982 Arab Peace Plan, adopted at the Arab League Summit at Fez, confirmed sustained

Arab League support for an independent Palestinian state under the political authority of the PLO.¹

The firm position of the Arab League between 1980 and 1983, in favour of an independent Palestinian state under the political authority of the PLO, in conjunction with the conduct and outcome of secret negotiations surrounding the 1982 Reagan Peace Plan, was a strong external factor in making a Jordanian-Palestinian federation impossible.

The 1982 Reagan Peace Plan envisaged Palestinian self-government of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in association with Jordan, and it was on this basis that King Hussein invited the PLO to engage in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian federation. In the course of negotiations that King Hussein perceived as being between himself, Yasser Arafat and President Reagan, on terms for accepting the Reagan peace proposal, direct Saudi-Reagan contacts also took place without the king's knowledge. The Saudi intention was to extract concessions from Reagan on behalf of the PLO, specifically with regard to the PLO preference for a confederation as opposed to federation with Jordan.² Within the secret negotiations a network of contacts

¹ See the appendix for the text of the Fez Arab Peace Plan.

² "The King learns that Mr. Arafat, while discussing a negotiating team with him, has secretly arranged for Saudi Arabia to try to wrest a better deal from President Reagan than the King had won. On March 3, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, a nephew of Saudi King Fahd and his special emissary, flew to Amman to tell of his own talks with Mr. Reagan....the Saudis have asked Mr. Reagan if his envisioned "association" between the West Bank and Jordan means a "confederation"; a confederation would imply a link between two countries and thus might be a back-door U.S. endorsement of a Palestinian state. As the King listens to Prince Bandar, he realizes that Mr. Reagan's answers to the Saudis don't square with those he had himself received. For Mr. Reagan has told the Saudis in writing that "confederation is one of the possible outcomes." ...The president had told King Hussein no such thing. The effect of the discrepancy is to undermine the King's credibility with Mr. Arafat and to lead the PLO to believe that more generous concessions can be wrung from the U.S. than those the

amongst parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict engaged in political maneuvering and bargaining, defining positions, extracting compromises and planting confusion in the process. To complicate matters further, one of these personalities was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, his official role undeclared. Dr. Kissinger was quoted as having told King Hassan of Morocco that "a dialogue among Israel, the PLO, the US and Jordan is possible".¹ United States consideration of and expression of interest in a possible confederate relationship between Jordan and Palestine, and PLO participation in talks on a framework for peace, contradicted prior information Reagan had given King Hussein about the initiative and ended any chance for further consideration of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian federation.

As a result of the network of contacts and political maneuvers since the announcement of the Reagan Peace Proposal in September 1982, the conception of a confederate relationship between Palestine and Jordan now took precedence. On February 21, 1983, the PNC endorsed the principle that 'future relations with Jordan must be established on a confederate basis between two independent states.' Further negotiations between Jordan and the PLO, continuing through 1984 and culminated in the February 11th Agreement of 1985, centered on the basic element of defining the "confederate relationship", and on provisions for sufficient Palestinian political independence, particularly in foreign relations. In its final draft, the February 11th Agreement confirmed agreement between the PLO and Jordan on a joint relationship, which

King had obtained," quoted from: The Wall Street Journal, April 14, 1983, by Karen Elliott House, in a piece entitled, "The peace effort, in King Hussein's mind, was at an end".

¹ Ibid. While in Morocco, Dr. Kissinger met with Ahmed DeJani, an aide to Yasser Arafat.

provided that when Palestinian territories are returned by Israel in a 'territory for peace' settlement, that Palestinian self-determination will be implemented "within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine".¹ The agreement also provided for PLO participation as an equal partner in a joint delegation, either Arab or Jordanian-Palestinian, in an international peace conference to be attended by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The US relationship with Israel and Israel's foreign policy posture on the occupied Arab territories were additional concerns for Jordan. Since 1963, each US administration had made a public commitment to the protection of the security of Israel. Jordan perceived the US as the only actor capable of exerting influence on Israel to implement UN Resolution 242, and convene an international conference. Jordan also believed that delay in the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would only serve to increase tension in the region, causing potential for war, violence and instability. If the US continued to consolidate relations with Israel, in the form of a strategic alliance,² at the expense of a relationship with Arab states, then Jordan feared the US would lack the will to pursue a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In consideration of the close military, economic and political ties existing between the US and Israel, in the 1980's Jordan found it

¹ Quoted from the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord, in part, item #2, and reference to item #5 on an international conference.

² Although close and cooperative relations have been conducted for years between the U.S. and Israel, not until 1981 was there a public announcement of a 'strategic alliance' between the two countries, which included the establishment of a joint air defense system, joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean and forward deployment of U.S. supplies (medical) to be stored in Israel, in case of an 'emergency'. This arrangement was formalized in 1983.

necessary to formulate a foreign policy stance bridging relations within the Arab world and extending relations with the Soviet Union and other international actors. Threats to Jordanian national security on the question of Palestine included not only the US-Israeli relationship itself, but in the light of this, Israel's threat to Jordan.

There are three facets to Israel's threat to Jordan. The first is the balance of power configuration, the second is Israel's foreign policy stance, and the third is its activities in the occupied territories.

The balance of power configuration in the Middle East eliminated the military option as a means of imposing a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict through the use of force. Superpower involvement, through client states in the region had ruled out an all-out war which would involve direct US/Soviet confrontation. The Soviet Union was not prepared to give Arab states the same level of support as Israel received from the US, and was unwilling to engage in direct conflict with Washington in the region. Within the realm of limited engagements, however, Israel remained a potential threat to Jordan, bearing in mind its military superiority in the region, in terms of sophisticated military hardware, mobilization and preparedness of forces, and its shared border with the kingdom. Israel's military actions against the PLO in Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 were a source of concern to Jordan, lest violence and turmoil in the West Bank or Lebanon spill across to the East Bank of the Jordan River.

Israel's foreign policy stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict was also a matter of concern for Jordan. Israel refused to negotiate with the PLO and remained adamantly opposed to participation in an international peace conference attended by

the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Jordan's primary national security concern had been resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the Arab League resolutions naming the PLO sole representative of the Palestinian people make it impossible for Jordan to enter into peace negotiations without the PLO. The Soviet Union's insistence on being included in an overall peace agreement necessitated an international conference to secure the participation of all involved parties and further the prospects of a comprehensive peace settlement. Diplomacy seemed to be the only means of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and for diplomacy to be successful compromise had to be elicited from all involved actors.

Of major importance to Jordan was the hard-line posture Israel had taken on the status of the occupied territories. The Arab territories of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights were annexed by Israel in 1980 and 1981 respectively.¹ With regard to the West Bank, Israel followed a two-pronged policy: 1) increasing Israeli settlements and population base on the West Bank in order to prevent the return of the West Bank to Arab control; 2) proclaiming that Jordan was Palestine, thus precluding the need to return the occupied territories, or for a separate Palestinian state other than Jordan. Both strategies were geared towards Israeli retention of the West Bank and its eventual annexation, whether official or in practice. The question for the Likud government had been what to do with the 1.5 million Palestinians in the occupied territories, for the nature of Israel as a Jewish state precluded the possibility of Israel's accepting Palestinians as citizens of the country.

¹ In July 1980, the Israeli Knesset passed the 'Jerusalem Law' declaring Jerusalem the state capital of Israel. The Golan Heights were annexed by Israel on December 14, 1981.

Jordan had long worked toward enhancement of the special Jordanian-Palestinian relationship that existed prior to the 1967 war, seeking to improve conditions in the West Bank by providing financial, educational and social services, as far as this could be arranged without the interference of Israel's military authority on the West Bank. However, the politicization of Palestinians in the West Bank made it more difficult for the king to gain support among these Palestinians for a federal system, should the occupied territories be returned to Arab control. Radicalization of the youth and loyalty to the PLO gave rise to a growing belief that only an independent Palestinian state could protect the national interests and national aspirations of the Palestinian people. The greater the incidence of violence and the worsening of economic conditions for Palestinians in the occupied territories, the more support grew for the PLO and the idea of an independent Palestinian state. Jordan was anxious that failure to convene an international peace conference and negotiate a final solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on UN Resolution 242, would create an explosive situation in the region, with a consequent upsurge of uncontrollable violence that could spill over into Jordan.

With the failure of the 1982 negotiations on the Reagan Peace Plan, King Hussein felt that cooperation with the PLO was the only realistic alternative to the continuation of the 'no war no peace' situation. This would counter Israeli domestic and foreign policy positions on the occupied territories, and form a political bridge between Palestine and Jordan, making the PLO responsible for the Palestinians, while maintaining domestic and economic integration between the two confederate states.

By the 1970's and 1980's, Arab states had developed a system of flexible response between the superpowers to extract

maximal concessions either for domestic purposes, such as financial aid, military supplies, technical support and investment, or with relation to foreign policy positions. However, the superpowers continued to view the region as a theater of East-West competition, involving the preservation of national interests in the sphere of international and regional politics. This relationship was clearly evident in 1980 by the Reagan administration's intent to implement a new foreign policy strategy in the region. This foreign policy plan was called the "strategic consensus".

The "strategic consensus" signified the Reagan administration's reformulation of perceived threats, priorities and US posture in the Middle East, with the Soviet Union identified as the greatest threat to the region. It envisaged an alliance between the US, Israel and pro-western Arab states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Jordan) as a form of containment against Soviet influence and involvement in the region. This "consensus" was reminiscent of the failed Baghdad Pact of 1955, a similar containment plan directed against the Soviet Union that only gained one Arab state supporter, Iraq (with Great Britain, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran also participating) and led to the overthrow of the Hashemite regime in Iraq in 1957. Under the strategic consensus scheme, the unresolved question of Palestine and Israeli occupation of Arab territories was to be downgraded in importance and made a secondary concern in overall US strategy in the area. The US administration engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy, trying to convince Arab states that the real threat to their national security arose from the Soviet Union. Middle East realities, however, demonstrated the implausibility of the "strategic consensus" scheme. Arab regimes, and Jordan in particular, refuted the administration's conceptualization of the major threat to regional

stability, and the Lebanon war in 1982 underscored the reality that the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict was the major issue and major source of instability in the region.

The configuration of power politics and influence extending from the international realm into Middle Eastern regional politics was not only applicable to US activity, but to the Soviet Union as well. In 1982, the Soviet Union clearly demonstrated that it had interests in the region and that no Middle East peace conference or framework would be successful without Soviet participation. The Soviet Union had continued to play a role in Middle East politics since 1948, ⁽¹⁾ when it recognized the independent state of Israel, and also developed close relationships with the PLO, Syria and other Arab states. The particularly close Soviet relationship with Syria, a primary participant in the Arab-Israeli conflict as a confrontation state, and with the PLO, as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, guaranteed a role for the Soviet Union in the region and in any final settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1982, when Jordan's King Hussein engaged in negotiations on conditions for implementing the Reagan Peace Plan, the new Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, warned King Hussein:²

"I shall oppose the Reagan plan, and we will use all our resources to oppose it. With due respect, all the weight will be on your shoulders, and they aren't broad enough to bear it."

¹ The Soviet Union, as a Security Council member in the United Nations, was involved in the question of Palestine prior to 1948, participating in U.N. Resolutions and proposals for a solution to the problem.

² Quote from King Hussein, recalling his conversation with Yuri Andropov at a meeting in the Kremlin; cited from: The Wall Street Journal, April 14, 1983, from a piece by Karen Elliott House, entitled: "The peace effort, in King Hussein's mind, was at an end".

The Reagan peace initiative was a plan designed to deny the Soviet Union a role in the peace process. The Soviet Union rejected the Reagan Plan because it did not allow for Soviet participation, while Syria rejected it because there was no provision either for Syrian participation or for the return to Syria of the Golan Heights, which Israel had annexed in 1981. The two superpowers had parallel strategic policies in the region, to project influence and power in the region as a consequence of their strategic position in the international system as superpowers, and of attributive foreign policy interests, and to advance the interests and positions of client states and actors in the region.

The formulation of Jordanian foreign policy had to take the effects of this reality into consideration on any decision or action that Jordan takes. In light of developments between 1980 and 1983, it became quite apparent that no promising framework for Middle East peace could be successful without superpower participation and agreement. Thus, King Hussein had become a staunch advocate for an international conference, or for a peace framework that met the approval of both superpowers.

Beside environmental factors that pressed King Hussein to engage in a written agreement with the PLO on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian understanding, there were also domestic realities and concerns. These concerns involved the nature of Jordan's economy, particularly its dependence on foreign assistance, and political representation and the effects of the 1974 Rabat Conference that named the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

Domestic Factors

In 1921, King Abdullah safeguarded Transjordan from inclusion in the Balfour Declaration by engaging in an agreement with Great Britain to form a national government and institute law and order in the territories east of the Jordan River, in return for eventual independence. King Abdullah's strategy was to use Transjordan as a base to reunify the Fertile Crescent. He never intended that Jordan should remain a country dependent on foreign assistance, with a territorial and population base inadequate to meet the requirements of self-sufficiency. Jordan had limited natural resources and limited water reserves, and political compromise was what the circumstances of the time required. External events prevented King Abdullah from attaining his goal, and Jordan, as an independent state, had to accommodate foreign and domestic policy goals in accordance with its geographical position and national security requirements

The 1982 peace initiative was King Hussein's final attempt to reach a federal arrangement with the PLO. Not only did external actors, particularly the PLO, the US, Israel, undermine the King's initiative, but also change in the domestic fortunes of Jordan in the 1980's put pressure on the King to direct his attention to internal matters and economic developments in the East Bank. Indicators of a change in the fortune of Jordan's economy began to appear as early as 1981, and had a direct impact on the Kingdom's 1981-85 economic plan, budgetary provisions, foreign currency reserves, level of exports, investment and prosperity. The precursor indicator was the reduction in oil revenues in the Gulf states, with the implications this had for Jordan.

In contrast to the prosperity generated in the 1970's by real estate speculation, the construction industry and the service

sectors of the Jordanian economy, the 1980's indicate that Jordan had to redirect the economy toward investment in internal sources of production, such as manufacturing and light industry, so as to compensate for the decline in external sources of revenues for the Kingdom. The depth of Jordan's economic problems, and the urgent need for restructuring, can be seen from the following examples:

1) Jordan's economic growth rate between 1975 and 1981 averaged 11%, a very high percentage relative to that of developing countries, and of some industrial states; Jordan's wealth and prosperity was in fact tied to the economic health of Gulf states, and to generous Arab aid which allowed Jordan to invest in development projects. As this aid was reduced, so was the overall growth rate in Jordan (not exclusive of other inter-related factors): in 1981 the growth rate was reduced to 7.5%; in 1982 to 5.5%; in 1983 to 5.4%; in 1984 to an estimated 3.8%.¹

2) Agriculture is Jordan's second most important export area.² However, since 1967 the productive capacity of the agricultural sector, including individuals employed in agriculture, has declined. In 1982, agricultural exports amounted to 114 million dollars; in 1983 this figure was reduced to 99 million dollars; and in 1984 to 91 million dollars. Jordan is not self-sufficient in local food production and imports more food supplies than it exports.

¹ Data source, The American Briefing Book, American Embassy in Amman.

² Jordan's major exports are phosphates and fertilizers; lesser income-generating exports include cement, pharmaceuticals, etc... . Although Jordan has increased production in phosphates, it has received less in revenues because of depressed world prices.

3) The industrial sector in the 1980's: although production levels of existing enterprises rose, overall investment--the creation of new companies and capital expenditure--decreased.

4) Construction: the construction industry, fueled by investment in real estate as a result of income generated by Jordanian workers in the Gulf and elsewhere abroad, did not show adjustment to changed economic circumstances until 1983-84. Confidence in the Jordanian economy, in conjunction with "a time requirement" for the effects of reduced external income to be felt in the domestic market, explains the slower change in Jordanian patterns of domestic consumption and investment in luxury goods and real estate, and in adjustments within the service sector of the economy.

5) Investment: foreign and private investors had been more hesitant to engage in long-term investment projects in Jordan, due to: the changed economic environment in Jordan; reduction in foreign currency reserves and budgetary restraint; depressed world prices for Jordan's exportable products; Jordan's small population base; and the uncertain political environment as a result of the non-resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The changed domestic environment in Jordan in the 1980's provided a challenge for King Hussein. Not only was the king faced with the necessity of reshaping the structure of the economy to shift investment and limited foreign exchange into ventures that would create internal sources of income to offset the reduced external sources of income, but he also had to find a way of providing an avenue for political expression and the representation of individuals and interest groups during an era of change.

In the 1970's, economic growth and prosperity, in conjunction with traditional forms of political representation and expression, were sufficient to meet the requirements of domestic support for the king. But in the 1980's, with the need for fiscal restraint and re-structuring of the economy, he needed to marshal public support and participation in the implementation of new policy initiatives to meet Jordan's needs over the decade. The second problem for the king was political. In 1974, Parliament, representing both the East and West Banks of the Jordan River, was dissolved in compliance with the Rabat Conference decision naming the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Although the National Consultative Council was formed to replace Parliament in 1978¹, it was inadequate to meet the political requirements of the 1980's. Had negotiations on the Reagan Peace Plan in 1982-83 been successful, and a federal relationship between Palestine and Jordan been realized, several of Jordan's problems would have been alleviated:

1) Political resolution of the Palestine question, in terms of a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, would have brought peace to the region; and peace, with the consequent elimination of war, uncertainty and instability related to the conflict, would have created an environment conducive to external confidence in investment in Jordan, and eliminated the reservations of international lending institutions over providing

¹ The National Consultative Council, formed in 1978, is an advisory body whose duties include: study and debate of bills referred to them by the prime minister, their opinions being communicated to the Council of Ministers before action is taken; help in drafting bills, and recommending the repeal or amendment of any laws in force; and communication of opinions and advice on matters of general state policy and public services and utilities. Members of the N.C.C. are appointed by royal decree, on the recommendation of the prime minister, and the President of the Council is appointed by the King. The original members numbered 60.

loans to Jordan; thus, alleviating financial flow problems and current economic difficulties.

2) A Jordanian-Palestinian federation would have encompassed expressed principles for a structural and political relationship (between Jordan and Palestine), perhaps similar to that projected in King Hussein's 1972 United Arab Kingdom plan, and would have resolved King Hussein's political problem of how to re-introduce a parliamentary system and political representation, thus satisfying internal demands for participation.

3) A Jordan-Palestine federal system would have re-united the East and West Banks of the Jordan River, and Gaza, and provided a substantial territorial base and considerable resources that could have been directed toward developmental goals of self-sufficiency in agricultural food production, light manufactured goods and income from exportable products and tourism.

The 1982-83 negotiations between Jordan and the PLO over the Reagan Peace Plan failed. Although the necessity for a joint Jordanian-PLO understanding remained, and became manifest in the 1985 February 11th Accord, the king was unable to delay the domestic Jordanian requirement of political representation. On January 9, 1984, King Hussein re-convened Parliament, inclusive of East and West Bank representation. In November 1984, the PNC convened in Amman. The fact that the PNC was held in Amman signified that both sides were prepared to make concessions, that both Jordan and the PLO recognized the necessity of ending the state of 'no war no peace' in the region. This event was the prelude to final terms, as represented and agreed upon in the February 11th Accord, 1985.

The PLO Factor

The endeavours of the PLO found formal recognition and support in the Arab League action at the 1974 Rabat Conference, which named the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, thus establishing a formal change by transferring the responsibility for Palestine and Palestinian self-determination from the Arab states to the PLO. The 1982 Arab Peace Plan¹ confirmed Arab League support for an independent Palestinian state, with the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. By 1979, after years of political maneuvering, and the failure of the military option to liberate Palestine, Arafat won PNC endorsement for a mini-state formula, and was empowered to engage in peace negotiations on this basis. Arafat's political success in gaining international recognition, observer status in the UN General Assembly, the establishment of PLO offices world-wide, diplomatic recognition, and secret negotiations with Washington between August 1981 and May 1982, were offset by Israel's military attempt to eliminate the PLO leadership and organization in Lebanon, in two military attacks against the PLO in 1978 and 1982.

Arafat's military defeat at the hands of the Israelis, together with the political split within the PLO reflected in the Syrian-inspired 'colonels' revolt' by Fatah loyalists, represented a grave setback for the PLO. This was, however, turned into a political victory when Arafat successfully negotiated a 'Democratic Alliance Agreement' among PLO factions in 1984, reinstated a consensus in favour of the moderates, and convened the PNC in Amman in the same year. With the radical rejectionist factions expelled from the PLO, and those behind

¹ This was the Fez Peace Plan, adopted at the Fez Arab League Summit in 1982, and also known as the Arab Peace Plan.

the 'colonel's revolt' discredited, the new, moderate-dominated PLO was free to reconfirm Arafat as chairman of the PLO at the 1984 PNC meeting, and establish a platform to pursue peace talks on a mini-state formula, with the Executive Committee being given a broad range of powers to engage in peace negotiations.

This elemental change in the PLO set the stage for the compromises necessary for the PLO and Jordan's King Hussein to negotiate the February 11th Agreement. Although Arafat had long advocated the necessity of compromise and the acceptance of a mini-state formula, his first, urgent priority was maintenance of unity within the PLO. By 1984, Arafat had the authority and support for compromise.

The king's speech at the opening session of the 1984 PNC meeting in Amman urged the PLO to join Jordan in formulating a joint Jordanian-PLO framework for peace. On the Jordan side, the combined factors of the failed 1982 Reagan Peace Plan, the domestic economic realities of the 1980's, the explosive potential for instability and war with the continuation of the 'no war no peace' situation, and the inability of the king unilaterally to resolve the Palestine question, left no alternative but to find a joint solution with the PLO. On the Palestinian side, the failure of the military option, the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon, the last PLO stronghold in a state bordering Israel, deteriorating conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, the continuation of Israeli settlements, and US and Israeli refusal to consider an independent Palestinian state compelled the PLO to seek a compromise solution with Jordan.

Thus, after fifteen years of negotiations toward a Jordanian-Palestinian understanding, conditions in the 1980's pressured both Jordan and the PLO to seek accommodation and compromise, and this resulted in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian

accord--the February 11th Agreement. The text of the agreement is as follows:¹

Jordanian-Palestinian Accord

Emanating from the spirit of the Fez Summit resolutions, approved by Arab states, and from United Nations resolutions relating to the Palestine question,

In accordance with international legitimacy, and Deriving from a common understanding on the establishment of a special relationship between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples,

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization have agreed to move together towards the achievement of a peaceful and just settlement of the Middle East crisis and the termination of Israeli occupation of the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, on the basis of the following principles:

- 1) Total withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 for comprehensive peace as established in United Nations and Security Council Resolutions.
- 2) Right of self-determination for the Palestinian people: Palestinians will exercise their inalienable right of self-determination when Jordanians and Palestinians will be able to do so within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine.
- 3) Resolution of the problem of Palestinian refugees in accordance with United Nations resolutions.
- 4) Resolution of the Palestine question in all its aspects.
- 5) And on this basis, peace negotiations will be conducted under the auspices of an International Conference in which the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the

¹ The text of the agreement was released to the press in Amman on February 23 by Jordan's Acting Minister of Information Taher Hikmat; as printed in Al Urdun, A Jordan Newsletter, Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Vol. X No.2, February 1985.

parties to the conflict will participate, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people, within a joint delegation (joint Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation).

The significance of the accord was compromise and accommodation with the realities of the 1980's. Conditions prevented a 'go it alone' posture by either the PLO or Jordan, and imposed the necessity for compromise, such compromise being reflected in the following provisions of the February 11th Agreement: 1) an international conference, at which all five permanent members of the UN Security Council would attend, notably the US and the Soviet Union, and with PLO participation secured within a joint delegation. 2) the proposed formation of the confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine.

The intention of the accord was to formulate a relationship acceptable to Jordanians and Palestinians, and, also, to minimize external opposition and maximize fulfillment of the partial demands of external actors. An international conference would satisfy the Soviet Union's aspirations to participation in regional developments, and confederation would counter US and Israeli objection to an independent Palestinian state. The ingredients for compromise and the potential for a comprehensive peace settlement were integrated into the Jordanian-Palestinian framework for peace. The success of the initiative would be dependent not on the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship itself, but on regional and international reaction and support with regard to this proposed framework.

CHAPTER 6: Implementation of the February 11th Agreement - Gains and losses

The February 11th Agreement was not only significant in terms of its historical content, reflecting the evolutionary process of continuity and change embodied in the special Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, and of the factors that made the agreement both desirable and necessary, but also served as a document and instrument, whether specified or implied, for:

1) the provision of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian peace initiative, as a framework for joint action towards resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict 2) the manifestation of a definition and understanding of the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship 3) the definition of the Jordan-PLO understanding as a long-term relationship, irrespective of the success of the peace initiative.

The structure of peace negotiations, based on the February 11th Agreement encompassed bilateral relations, regional Middle Eastern politics, inter-Arab politics and the international system of inter-state relations.

During the month of February 1985, a flurry of contacts occurred following the announcement of the Jordanian-Palestinian accord. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was notified of the announcement while on his way to Washington on an official visit. President Hafez al-Assad of Syria was informed of the substance of the Washington talks by Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia. Algeria, recognized as an important actor in inter-Arab affairs,¹ was the center of events as King Hussein met with the

¹ Algeria has played a key mediator role in resolving inter-Arab disputes, and differences between hard line and moderate factions within the PLO. Algeria had an important

Algerian President, Chadly Benjedid, in Algiers on February 12th. Algeria also hosted both meetings of Fatah's revolutionary Council through February 14th, to be followed by the PLO Executive Committee meeting on February 17th, which was expected to endorse the February 11th Agreement. Between February 14th and 16th, Arafat flew on to Romania for talks with President Nicolai Ceausescu, prior to a scheduled visit there by Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres.¹ Also during February, Egypt sent a special envoy to explain the February 11th Agreement to Israeli officials. On the level of unilateral contacts, a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was formed to visit European capitals, as well as Peking and Moscow, to explain and gain support for the political peace initiative.² Although US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy arrived in Amman in April,³ on a regional tour to assess the prospects for a new peace initiative, it was not until King Hussein's visit to Washington in May that a strategic plan for implementation of the February 11th Agreement was revealed.

During substantive meetings with President Reagan in Washington in May 1985, King Hussein presented a four-stage plan as a vehicle for implementing the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord, which, in principle, was welcomed by the administration. The four stages comprised:⁴

role in ending PLO differences in 1984, with the creation of the Democratic Alliance Agreement which enabled the 17th session of the PNC to convene in Amman in 1984.

¹ Regarding Romania's role as a secret channel between Arab states and Israel, see: Arab News, February 14, 1985.

² Although the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was welcomed in some states, like France and Italy, other actors refused to meet the joint delegation, but would speak with Jordanian representatives, as was the case in the Soviet Union, Britain and the U.S.

³ During this time a joint delegation was preparing a trip to Moscow and Peking.

⁴ The four stages are quoted from: Al-Fajir, a Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly, July 19, 1985.

First stage: US officials will meet with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation;

Second stage: The US will announce its acceptance of the Palestinian right to self-determination.

Third stage: The PLO would then accept UN Resolution 242.

Fourth stage: Direct negotiations with Israel in the context of an international conference. (Inclusive in the international conference would be the joint delegation, other Arab countries, Israel and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council).

The meeting between the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and US officials was intended as an informal forum for both sides to discuss policy positions, in order to assess the potential for 'a meeting of minds'. Both Jordan and the PLO saw US participation and its intermediary role with Israel as critical to the success of the peace initiative, the US being perceived as the only actor capable of ensuring Israeli participation in an international peace conference. In terms of the US-Jordan-PLO theatre of the negotiating process, three issues remained obstacles to progress on the peace plan, namely the composition of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the conception of the international conference, and the conditions for PLO acceptance of UN Resolution 242.

Over nearly one year of negotiations on these three issues between the US and Jordan, with indirect Israeli and PLO involvement, compromise emerged, as well as non-negotiable positions. Progress on the composition of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation showed promise, but was hindered by a US law preventing direct talks with the PLO until it recognized

Israel's right to exist, denounced terrorism and accepted UN Resolution 242. Drawing up a list of Palestinians to participate in the joint delegation that was acceptable to all parties was, therefore, a difficult and long process. A compromise solution was worked out during Secretary of State George Shultz's visit to Jordan in May 1985, when a distinction was made between Palestinians affiliated with the PLO and members of the Palestinian Parliament, the PNC. This distinction enabled Shultz to agree to inclusion of West Bank Palestinians and PNC members in the proposed joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. In the final list submitted to Washington four Palestinians were to have been chosen. The US agreed to the participation of two Palestinian representatives but excluded PNC members, and the US added an additional condition, that the PLO must accept UN Resolution 242 before it could meet with US officials. Under pressure from Israel, the first stage of King Hussein's four-step plan, the meeting between the joint delegation and US officials on September 7, 1985, when Washington sent a message to King Hussein terminating the delegation initiative. However, the Reagan administration conveyed the possibility of continuing talks on the basis of an international conference.

The second obstacle was the international conference. The initial policy position of both the US and Israel was to reject an international conference, the US insisting on Soviet non-participation, while Israel feared the possibility that such a conference might be able to impose a peace settlement, and wanted direct negotiations between Israel, Jordan and Palestinian representatives from the West Bank under US auspices. Although the US had opposed the idea of an international peace conference during King Hussein's visit to Washington in May 1985, "White House spokesman Larry Speakes said the administration remained ready to consider an

international conference if it 'would lead to direct talks between Jordan, Palestinians and Israelis'."¹ The stumbling block was composition, the definition of powers and the role of the international conference. The initial US posture on the nature of the international conference was completely unacceptable to King Hussein.

Prior to King Hussein's May visit to Washington, Reagan's position on a new peace initiative was that the US would have no direct role "...in his quest for a Mideast settlement, Reagan has been trying to push the belligerents closer to each other in direct negotiations in which Washington would play no direct role".² After King Hussein's talks with President Reagan, the administration was willing to consider an international conference restricted to the participation of the US, Israel, Jordan, Palestinians, and possibly Egypt, but excluding other international actors, among them the Soviet Union. Without the participation of the PLO, Syria and the Soviet Union, King Hussein knew that no viable peace solution could be arranged, and that such a configuration would be a threat to the national security concerns of Jordan. After the failure of the joint delegate initiative, and a breakthrough in secret talks between the Soviet Union and Israel in the fall of 1985, follow-up negotiations with King Hussein on the issue of the international conference elicited a compromise on the part of the US. The US would agree to an international conference with the participation of the five members of the UN Security Council, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the PLO, if the PLO recognized UN Resolutions 242 and 338. The additional understanding was that the conference would not have the authority to impose or implement a final peace settlement, and

¹ The Washington Post, May 31, 1985.

² Re-quoted in Arab News, April 18, 1985, from Al-Majallah, a London-based Magazine.

that Arab states would engage in direct negotiations with Israel once the conference convened. Although the US compromise was a step in the right direction, King Hussein was not the only actor involved in the peace initiative, the PLO had to agree to the US conditions, and the package would also have to be acceptable to Syria and the Soviet Union, so as to guarantee their participation.

The third obstacle to the success of the Jordanian-Palestinian peace initiative, on the Jordan-PLO-US front, was US insistence that the PLO endorse UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, prior to direct talks with the US, and as a condition for convening the international peace conference. The US position on these two requirements was firm and non-negotiable. For its part, the PLO was prepared to endorse UN Resolutions 242 and 338 on condition that 1) the US publicly recognize Palestinian rights to self-determination or 2) the PLO should publicly recognize UN Resolutions 242 and 338 within the context of all UN General Assembly and UN Security Council Resolution or 3) UN Resolution 242 should be amended to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The problem with UN Resolution 242, as the single basis for a peace initiative, was that it referred only to 'refugees', and not to Palestinians as a national entity or their legitimate national rights to self-determination. The US, in turn, opposed the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that the concept 'self-determination' implied, and therefore considered each of the PLO compromises unsatisfactory.

Neither the PLO nor the US was able to bridge the differences on the terms for PLO endorsement of UN Resolution 242 so the US would not permit its participation in an international peace conference. Conciliatory or not, the US

administration interpreted the Jordanian-Palestinian accord as an internal matter, and should an international conference secure the return of the occupied Palestinian territories to Jordan, the details of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation and the distribution of authority were not seen as the concern of the US. The PLO remained insistent that its specific recognition of UN Resolution 242, which does not recognize Palestinian rights, would only be endorsed when such rights were acknowledged by the US, or under UN guarantees. This impasse prevented further progress on the basis of the Jordanian-Palestinian peace initiative, which was a product of the 1985 February 11th Agreement.

A network of factors outside the Jordan-PLO-US theatre also had an impact on the Jordanian-Palestinian peace initiative, the most notable of these being the attitude and policy stance of Syria and the Soviet Union toward the peace process. The Soviet Union's initial reaction to the peace plan was unfavorable, because it felt that "the proposal is part of an effort 'to impose on the Arabs unequal separate deals'."¹ The formulation of the international peace conference was also a matter of concern to the Soviets. The Soviet preference with regard to the international conference was for a forum co-sponsored by themselves and the US, outside of the purview of the UN Security Council. The Soviet Union opposed "participation of all UN Security Council members because it feels that Soviet influence would be diluted at such a meeting. The Soviets 'want to be just with the United States,' said Jordanian Foreign

¹ See: The Washington Post, March 21, 1985, reported by Dusko Doder; the statement was ascribed to an article in the Communist Party newspaper, and was implied in Pravda.

Minister Taher Al-Masri."¹ The Soviet Union later softened its position, and, in July 1985, joined France in a joint Soviet-French call for the convening of a Mideast peace conference. Syria's attitude to the peace initiative differed, however, from that of its ally, the Soviet Union.

Syria believed that a comprehensive peace settlement within the context of an international conference with the participation of all involved parties was the only realistic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, that diplomacy offers the only prospect for peace. President Hafez Al-Assad was a realist, a pragmatist, a political and military strategist and an important player in Middle Eastern politics. He wanted peace, but not at any price, and he believed that conditions in 1985 were not right for a new peace initiative. It was President Assad's conviction that only when the Arabs had attained military parity with Israel, only from a position of equal strength, could the Arabs achieve a balanced, comprehensive peace settlement, and not one that is imposed by the U.S. and Israel.² Consequently, President Assad opposed the February 11th Agreement, because of the disunity in the Arab world and the weak bargaining position of the Arab states in the light of Israel's dominant position in Lebanon and unquestionable support by the US. Syria's Assad was against any US-dominated peace initiative because of past grievances

¹ As quoted from: Arab News, London, June 7, Agencies. Taher Masri's comment was quoted as a result of his interview with Soviet officials in Moscow.

² In support of President Assad's balance of power theory was what is perceived as his victory over the abrogation of the May 17, 1983 treaty between Israel and Lebanon, mediated by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, and Israel's unilateral withdrawal of military forces, under pressure from a resurgent Shi'a population in southern Lebanon taking up arms against Israel's presence there; and, Syria's procurement of sophisticated Soviet military hardware after its defeat during the 1982-83 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Syria is perceived as having won a victory in Lebanon, in defense of its national interests and influence there. This is serving as a lesson to other Arab states in the arena of power politics.

against the US, and a perception that the US cannot bring about Israel's return of the occupied territories, and cannot deliver its promises.¹

The Jordanian-Palestinian peace initiative was a calculated gamble, a risk in the face of Syrian opposition, which King Hussein took in a final bid to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.² The February 11th Agreement was a political victory for the king, entailing great compromises on the part of the PLO, and offering the most realistic course for a peace settlement. However, the peace initiative was not successful in the international arena due to developments beyond the king's ability to control. On the western front, the king's negotiating position was undercut by a number of policy actions on the part of the US administration:

- 1) low priority given to the peace accord
- 2) delegation of contacts to lower US officials who lacked the authority and position to bring progress to the peace initiative
- 3) allowing Israel to pressure the Reagan administration into changing its position on the terms of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and finally terminating the first stage of King Hussein's four-stage plan based on the accord

¹ Representative of President Assad's attitude is his statement in the following extract, "Celebrating the fighting in southern Lebanon, Assad asked, "Why should Israel give them (Palestinians) the land of Palestine when they would neither be a major obstacle if it decided to fight nor achieve peace if it decided to make Peace?"; quoted from: The Washington Post, March 24, 1985.

² See: Arab News, May 6, 1985, in a piece entitled "Hussein Issues Warning": "The circumstances which have created this opportunity for negotiations will not last indefinitely. For the PLO to have taken this step was an act of great courage. If the PLO continues to be denied its part in the peace process and the creeping annexation of the West Bank continues, how long will it be before the Palestinians and Arabs conclude that peace in our time is unattainable and struggle the only alternative?"

4) Senate adoption of a resolution, in June 1985, against sales of advanced arms to Jordan, and the subsequent Reagan administration's subsequent withdrawal of the \$1.9 billion USD arms package to Jordan. This was a critical issue, in that Congress adopted a similar position with respect to Jordan's 1984 arms request, with the administration again withdrawing the Jordan arms package;

5) the Reagan administration's decision to reduce a financial aid package to Jordan.

These activities on the part of the US administration, in the midst of King Hussein's efforts to implement a framework for peace and bring about the final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, undermined the king's negotiation position and necessitated Jordan's rapprochement with Syria, the dominant Fertile Crescent Arab power, which began in September-October 1985. Without effective US support, and denied the compromises needed for US involvement and Israel's attendance at a comprehensive international peace conference, Jordan had to readjust its policy posture to accommodate regional Arab politics and power configurations. Although King Hussein continued to negotiate with the US throughout February 1986 on terms for an international conference, the cost of Jordan's rapprochement with Syria was the unilateral abrogation of the February 11th Agreement, on February 19, 1986. The PLO refrained from taking action on the accord until April 1987, when it was officially abrogated at the 18th session of the PNC, as a condition for rapprochement between the PLO and Syrian-based Palestinian hardliners. However, although the international peace initiative based on the February 11th Agreement had come to an end, this did not change the special Jordanian-Palestinian relationship and understanding that had

made the accord a reality. This was evidenced in a public statement made by the Hashemite Government of Jordan, "The Government of Jordan, in response to the recent decision made by the PLO Executive Committee to abrogate the February 11 Accord between Jordan and the PLO, said that it will not allow the Committee decision to retard efforts towards achieving regional peace through the convening of an international conference. In a statement, which was issued April 21, the government affirmed that Jordan still views the Accord as reflective of the distinctive relations that exist between the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples and restated Jordan's belief that, in every situation, the Palestinian people must have the final say about their future."¹

Failure on the international level to take positive action on the peace formula envisaged in the February 11th Accord, on the side of moderation and compromise, not only strengthened the position of Palestinian hardliners, but also vindicated Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad's foreign policy stance that the U.S. could not deliver Israel, and that practical political considerations required Arab states to negotiate from a position of strategic parity. As predicted by King Hussein, the years 1987-1989, in the absence of a peace, saw a cycle of violence emerge capable of threatening stability and causing war in the region. As early as 1987, it was clear that a change in the organization and occurrence of activities against Israeli occupation were already beginning to occur in the occupied territories,² as Palestinians, frustrated by continued failures to

¹ Al Urdun (Jordan Newsletter), Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in the United States, Vol. XII No. 3; April-May 1987.

² In the Christian Science Monitor, April 14, 1987, reference was made to a change in the West Bank, stating that perhaps 80% of the disturbances there stemmed from internal organizing in the field by local Palestinians, rather than from planned actions by external PLO factions. This point was made by Major General Ehud Barak, in an

resolve the Palestine question, became increasingly militant and non-compromising.¹ As a result of the failure of the February 11th Accord and disenchantment with the US, due to its strategic alliance with Israel at the expense of its relationship with Arab states, its sustained refusal to approve arms packages to Jordan,² its secret arms sales to Iran, who was at war with Jordan's ally Iraq and was a threat to Gulf Arab states, Jordan had opted to re-focus its foreign policy posture toward Europe and the Soviet Union, adopting a balanced foreign policy position. Also, Jordan took up a new policy approach to the question of Palestine.

Confronted with the failure of the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord on the international level, with a continuation of the condition of 'no war no peace', no prospective resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in sight, and with US and Israeli unwillingness to acknowledge the necessity of PLO participation in the peace process, and the uncontrollable cycle of violence in the occupied territories in support of the PLO leadership, King

interview with Israel Army Radio: "One other change Barak noted was the fact that more of the attacks by Palestinians against Jews on the West Bank appeared to be planned locally rather than directed from abroad by Palestinian groups such as the PLO", *Ibid*.

¹ As early as March 1986, after King Hussein had abrogated the February 11th Accord, frustration levels were high: "In Amman, on the West Bank, and in Israel, the frustration is palpable. Realization has set in, observers on all sides say, that the options have been used up and that a deep and dangerous stalemate remains," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 11, 1986, by Mary Curtieus.

² Regarding the Reagan Administration's indefinite postponement of US weapons to Jordan, "Hussein described the decision as bringing to an end "30 years of very close association" in which the US has been a major supplier of arms to Jordan," *The Washington Post*, June 11, 1986. Jordan is reorienting its arms requirements to European manufactured jet fighters and military supplies from the Soviet Union. Also, the US administration decided to ask Congress for a reduced financial aid package for Jordan in the 1988 administration budget.

Hussein announced his decision, on July 31, 1988, to sever legal and administrative ties with the Israeli-occupied West Bank

The King's directive encompassed a series of measures and stages of implementation:¹

--- On July 30, 1988, the Jordanian government announced cancellation of the \$1.3 billion Five Year Development Plan for the occupied territories.²

--- On July 31, 1988, King Hussein dissolved the lower House of Parliament by Royal Decree: "We, King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, under powers vested on us in Paragraph Three of Article 34 of the Jordanian Constitution, decree that the lower House of Parliament be dissolved as of July 30, 1988".³

--- On July 31, 1988, in an evening television and radio broadcast, King Hussein delivered a speech announcing his decision to sever legal and administrative ties with the Israeli-occupied West Bank. King Hussein said:

"We respect the wish of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to secede from us in an independent Palestinian state," (this decision is aimed at) "enhancing the Palestinian national orientation and highlighting the Palestinian identity".

¹ Information on all initiatives taken is as reported in the Jordan Times, on the dates given; here, direct quotes are cited, and the general events paraphrased.

² Of the proposed \$1.3 billion development plan for the Occupied Territories, Jordan was to supply \$7 million financed through a US aid program; the US, the only contributor, reduced its support of the project to \$25.5 million, citing US budgetary constraints.

³ Of the 60 Parliamentary seats in the lower House, half belonged to representatives from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

"In addition to the PLO's ambition to embody the Palestinian identity on Palestinian national soil, (there should be) a separation of the West Bank from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. There the Palestinian identity will be embodied, and there the Palestine struggle shall come to fruition as confirmed by the glorious uprising of the Palestinian people under occupation."

"National unity is precious in any country; but in Jordan it is more than that. It is the basis of our stability, and the springboard of our development and prosperity. It is the foundation of our national security and the source of our faith in the future. It is the living embodiment of the principles of the great Arab Revolt, which we inherited, and whose banner we proudly bear. It is a living example of constructive plurality, and a sound nucleus for wider Arab unity."

--- August 10, 1988. In conformity with Jordan's disengagement decision, Interior Minister Rajai Dajani "was quoted Tuesday as saying parliamentary elections would not be held unless the 1986 Election Law has been amended"¹. A special committee was expected to study such an amendment.

--- August 21, 1988. A piece printed in the Jordan Times, entitled, "New Civil Status Rules Announced". The official statement "defined "Palestinians" as all those permanent residents of the West Bank as of July 31, 1988. All such residents are "Palestinian, not Jordanian," it said. Announcements were also made concerning passports and travel documents for Palestinian residents of the occupied territories."²

¹ Jordan Times, August 10, 1988.

² Two-year passports, for travel purposes, are to be issued to West Bank residents instead of full passports.

--- September 21, 1988. Interior Minister Rajai Dajani commented on changes in the status of Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan: "Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan are now integrated into the residential areas of Jordanian cities and the government will provide them with all basic services. (The minister underlined) "the importance of preserving national unity, which ensures security and stability in the Kingdom".

King Hussein's disengagement decision, in conjunction with measures implemented since the July 31st announcement, was indicative of Jordan's clear reorientation toward internal affairs and addressing a troubled economy, dealing with demands for internal political representation/political expression, furthering domestic integration/unification, and assuming an inactive role on the question of Palestine. King Hussein would not alter this position unless circumstances changed. As circumstances were in 1989, there was no indication of a breakthrough in PLO-US relations and with respect to Israel's foreign policy stance.

PART II

CHAPTER 7: Jordanian Diplomacy between February 11 Agreement and Madrid Peace Conference

Jordanian Diplomatic Efforts Supporting Moderation in the Region

Jordanian diplomatic efforts continued after halting political coordination with the PLO and the failure of February 11th Agreement. Jordan remained a strong believer in the peace process in spite of these obstacles.

Jordan launched a new round of diplomacy with the aim of holding an international peace conference rather than pressuring the PLO to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242 as the basis for political settlement. This led Jordan into a new round of talks with the US and Israel.¹

By the end of 1985, the Prime Minister of the Israeli coalition government, Shimon Peres, suggested an international forum to sponsor direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis.² At the UN General Assembly, Peres announced his support for a peace conference.³ In conjunction with this shift in Israeli position, the US Secretary of State George Shultz implied that the opposition of the US Administration had changed. The peace conference seemed to be agreed on.⁴

¹ Adnan Abu Odeh, *The Problematics of Peace in the Middle East: An Inside View* (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Studies and Publishing, 1999).

² William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Translation and Publishing, 1994).

³ Hamad Al-Maw'ed, *Israel and International Changes* (Damascus: Kan'an Studies and Publishing House, 1991) 77.

⁴ Quandt 340.

Jordan was active in creating a consensus on the form of the international conference with the objectives of ending the war between Israel and Arab states, resolving the Palestinian issue and establishing comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Jordan cited UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and “land for peace” as the basis for this conference and stressed that the outcomes should be binding with authority granted to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as sponsors. Jordan also stressed that the conference must be held under the patronage of the UN and that all conflicting parties must be invited, including the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.¹

Jordanian diplomacy gained momentum after relations between Jordan and Syria had improved as a result of Jordan's redefinition of political priorities on regional and international levels. King Hussein met with Hafez al-Assad of Syria² and the latter expressed interest in a peace conference according to the following terms:

1. The international peace conference must be sponsored by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
2. The conference will set the framework for negotiations.
3. The PLO will be invited to attend the conference.

¹ Ghazi Ismail Rabab'ah, *The International Peace Conference* (Amman: Amman Publishing and Distribution House, 1990) 26-27.

² Sayegh 75.

4. Participation of the PLO is contingent on the conditions of accepting UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the rejection of violence.¹

Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifai presented a worksheet entitled “A Proposal to Hold an International Peace Conference on the Middle East” during his visit to Washington in April 1987.² The Jordanian proposal received international support and raised hopes, until Yitzhak Shamir became the Prime Minister of the Israeli Labor- Likud power-sharing government in 1986. The international peace conference seemed to be distant reality as Shamir fiercely rejected withdrawal from the West Bank³ and proposed Jordan as an alternative homeland for Palestinians.⁴

Israelis were divided into two camps, that of Shamir and that of moderate Peres, and the “land for peace” formula became controversial within the country. While the US administration remained neutral, moderate voices in Israel that gave legitimacy to Arab public opinion were weakened. The international peace conference was abandoned.⁵

The Arab Summit of 1987

After failing to secure commitment to an international peace conference, Jordanian diplomacy found a political breakthrough in coordinating Arab efforts over core issues facing the region, mainly the Arab- Israeli conflict. Spurred on by his pan-Arab national sense of responsibility, King Hussein

¹ Rabab'ah 29.

² Rabab'ah 29.

³ Quandt 342.

⁴ Al-Maw'ed 79.

⁵ Abu Odeh 173.

called for an urgent Arab summit and he considered it a strategic victory when all Arab states agreed to attend a summit in Amman between November 8th and 11th, 1987.

The summit had significant outcomes. Arab states reiterated their commitment to reach a political settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict by supporting moderation in the region.¹ They also unanimously agreed that holding an international peace conference under the patronage of the UN, with active participation of permanent UN Security Council members and all parties to the conflict, including the PLO, was the only way to reach a just and comprehensive political solution to the Palestinian issue that would guarantee the return of Arab lands occupied since 1967.²

Perhaps one of the most prominent political accomplishments of King Hussein at the Amman Summit was sponsoring a reconciliation meeting between the Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad and the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.³ Such an achievement was remarkable following historical hostility between the two presidents, as each belonged to a different ideology of Ba'ath Party. Syria agreed to condemn the Iranian occupation of Iraqi lands after previously supporting Iran in its war against Iraq.⁴

Jordan's efforts led to the emergence of a new axis that included Cairo, Riyadh, Amman and Baghdad, planting the

¹ Abu Odeh 174.

² Mohammed Salem Al-Majali, *Peace in Al-Hussein's Thought* (Amman: Al-Majali for Publishing, 1995) 76.

³ Moshe Zak, *Hussein and Peace: The Jordanian Israeli Relation* (Amman: Trans. Al-Jalil Publishing) 502.

⁴ Al-Saleem 151.

seed of Arab solidarity.¹ Amman earned the title of “The Capital of the Arab World.” The Amman Summit also reopened channels of communication between Jordan and the PLO.

Efforts of Jordan To Bring The PLO Closer to the Moderate Camp

King Hussein’s annulment of the year-old February 11th Agreement in 1986, highlighted the sense that the PLO had become ineffective and incapable of internal organization. The PLO was not seen as capable of making further political compromises to achieve a practical and acceptable solution for the Palestinian matter.²

Jordan changed its policy regarding the PLO. Arab sources confirm that Jordan asked Iraq and Saudi to cut funds to the PLO to weaken its regional and Palestinian status, and to pressure them to cooperate with Jordan.³ The Jordanian government also shut down Fatah’s headquarters in Amman in July 1986 and controlled the travel of PLO members to and from Jordan. The official Palestinian presence in Jordan was minimized. Jordan justified these measures by citing illegal political activity by Fatah, hinting that the PLO played a role in bloody clashes that involved communist and radical Muslim students at the University of Yarmouk in the Jordanian northern city of Irbid.⁴

In mid 1986, Jordan decided to abandon the PLO as a middleman and initiated direct connection with Palestinians in

¹ Al-Saleem 151.

² Sayegh 75.

³ Ahmad Al-Khalayleh, *Jordanian Strategy and Ties with the Palestinian Cause*

⁴ Sayegh 75.

the West Bank.¹ A five-year (1986-1990) \$1.3 billion unilateral economic development program for the West Bank was announced that included support for health, economic and industrial sectors. A meeting was held in Amman to launch the economic program and was attended by public and private sector representatives from the West Bank, US officials and representatives of the IMF, which provided the financial support for the program. The objectives of the economic development program were to preserve Arab identity in the West Bank and improve the livelihood of Palestinians, enabling them to face the economic pressures imposed by the Israeli occupation. Most importantly, the program would limit the compulsory migration of Palestinians to Jordan at a time when Jordan was trying to avoid being an alternative homeland for Palestinians, an option that was being strongly proposed. However, Jordan's long-term objective was for a new Palestinian power to emerge within the occupied lands to be a substitute for the PLO in the peace negotiations. The new power would be used to pressure the PLO to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242 as basis for the negotiations.²

A major turning point occurred in 1987 when the first Palestinian uprising, or Intifada, broke out. Jordan quickly realized the futility of its plans. As the Intifada gained momentum, spreading to many towns and cities and as its leaders became close to the PLO, Jordan's plan to involve the Palestinians living in Palestinian territories in a peaceful settlement had to be aborted, and Jordan attempted to shirk commitments it had previously made.³

¹ Abu Odeh 75.

² Abu Odeh 187.

³ Abu Odeh 188.

The Palestinian Intifada and Jordan

Although 20 years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank were not without unrest, the Intifada forced Israel into a new kind of war and shook the Israeli security dogma. Israeli strategic analysts agreed that the Intifada caused more harm to Israel than the October 1973 war.¹

On December 9th, 1987, six months after the Amman meeting, the Intifada broke out in Gaza and spread to the cities and towns of the West Bank, fueled by despair and frustration over the 20-year-long political deadlock and the lack of progress towards peace or a just solution to the Palestinian question. Highly motivated Palestinian youth started throwing stones and Israeli occupation soldiers responded with gunfire and teargas canisters.

The Intifada made the Palestinian cause a priority for all sides of the conflict. The Jordanian reaction to the Intifada was articulated by King Hussein as the result of the feeling of isolation and disappointment that overtook Palestinians living inside the occupied territories. He also said that the systematic violation of basic human rights of Palestinians by the occupation had created an environment ripe for violence and extremism.²

When the Intifada began, Jordan took the initiative to form governmental and non-governmental action committees to gather donations and support Palestinians in the occupied territories. The government of Jordan continued to pay salaries

¹ Al-Maw'ed 227.

² Sobhi Al-Otaibi, *Moderation between Words and Deeds in Jordanian Model* (Amman: Committee on History of Jordan 1994) 43.

of Palestinian public servants in governmental bodies that were under its jurisdiction before the 1967 occupation, as well as death gratuity for families of martyrs, financial assistance for university students and continued agricultural and industrial imports from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The amount of financial aid gathered by Jordanians for Palestinians in the occupied territories between 1987 and 1995 reached \$8 million JD (more than \$11 million USD).¹

The Intifada provided significant political support for the PLO, strengthening its struggle for recognition of an independent Palestinian state both regionally and internationally.² The PLO was initially taken aback when the Intifada broke out and spread widely, but it quickly assumed guardianship over it. Palestinians in the West Bank soon formed pro-PLO networks³ and the PLO became the national leadership for the Intifada. It attempted to align resistance with its political activity, thus capitalizing politically on the Intifada and making itself a key player that could not be left out of any settlement for the Palestinian cause.

By November 1988 it became obvious to Israelis that they could not suppress the Intifada and it was necessary to seek a political solution.⁴ On January 23rd, 1989, Israeli Minister of Defense, Isaac Rabin, had to admit that the military choice had reached a dead end and that Israeli Forces were unable to defeat the Intifada.

¹ Al-Khalayleh 325.

² Al-Khalayleh 326.

³ Quandt 343.

⁴ Al-Maw'ed 230, from Maariv Israeli newspaper.

Shultz Initiative

The iron fist policy that Rabin used to end the Intifada caused an uproar in international public opinion. Images of Palestinian women and children beaten mercilessly raised voices of condemnation of Israel around the world. Graham Fuller, a US senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer and political scientist specializing in the Middle East, prepared a report for the US Department of Defense entitled “The West Bank of Israel: Point of No Return.” He came to the conclusion that “repressive Israeli measures can... succeed only in bottling up intense, hostile forces for an explosion sometime in the near future, when the issue of the Palestinians' aspirations will have to be faced anew and at still higher cost. In short, this is a deep-rooted, evolving national struggle; it will not go away.”¹

Fearing a level of deterioration in the Middle East that might give way to radicalism, the US Secretary of State George Shultz launched a new peace initiative. Shultz embarked on a regional tour to explore the positions of all sides, including Jordan, Syria, the Soviet Union and Israel.²

Shultz launched his initiative in March 1988. It was the most significant US contribution to peace between Palestinians and Israelis since President Reagan's initiative in 1982. The initiative stated that:

1. The objective was to achieve just and comprehensive peace that guaranteed security of all regional countries and legitimate rights of Palestinian people.

¹ Al-Maw'ed 231.

² Quandt 344.

2. Launch bilateral negotiations on basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
3. Start preparatory negotiations between a joint Palestinian-Jordanian team and an Israeli team within six months and move to discussion of final-status issues after seven months.
4. The conference that will be held shall not have the authority to enforce solutions or object to agreements made. It would only receive reports on progress of negotiations.¹

Reactions to the initiative varied. Egypt was the only country to support it, and Syria and the Soviet Union were not enthusiastic. The Soviet Union did not agree to limiting the role of the international peace conference.²

Palestinians welcomed a US response to the Intifada but fiercely rejected Shultz's initiative.³ Israel, on the other hand, saw the Shultz initiative as surrender to terrorism and violence. Shamir was against a peace conference in spite of Shultz's assurance that it was only a preparatory step for bilateral negotiations.⁴ While he did not mind open talks with a joint Palestinian- Jordanian team to agree on a preparatory transitional-status situation, Shamir hoped that such preparations would in fact be the final-status.⁵

King Hussein tried hard not to join the camp opposing the Shultz initiative. He asked many questions, requested clarifications about the details of the initiative, and reiterated the importance of allowing the PLO to play a key role in the

¹ Al-Maw'ed 222.

² Quandt 345.

³ Quandt 345.

⁴ Al-As 147.

⁵ Madfai 288.

negotiations and grant the conference authority. He also underlined that the agenda of the conference should include a declaration of principles, transitional agreements and final-status talks on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. King Hussein tried to remain optimistically open to all options.¹

The king requested clarifications as to the guarantee for commitment to the negotiations, who the referee on resolving conflicts and implementing agreements would be since the international peace conference had no authority, when core-issues talks would start, whether legitimate rights meant civil or political rights or both, and who would control the West Bank and Gaza during the transitional stage.²

The US administration refused to provide any answers, claiming that it aimed to avoid the scenario of the Camp David Accord. **(PLEASE EXPLAIN)**.

In April 1989, Jordanian Prime Minister Zaid Al-Rifai announced that Jordan had informed Shultz of the principles that Jordan was committed to in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian cause. The principles were:

1. Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories as a precondition for resolving the conflict.
2. Resolving all aspects of the Palestinian issue, including granting Palestinians the right to self-determination as a precondition for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.
3. Resolving the Palestinian issue through an international conference.
4. The international conference should exceed protocols and reflect the ethical authorities of the five permanent members of UN Security Council.

¹ Quandt 345.

² Madfai 288.

5. UN Security Council Resolution 242 stated withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and is the basis for negotiations.

6. Jordan was willing to attend the international peace conference, but would not represent the Palestinian people and would not negotiate for settlement of the Palestinian cause on behalf of the PLO. Jordan was ready to participate in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian team if concerned parties agree.¹

The Jordanian stand towards the Shultz initiative became clear in the urgent summit held in Algiers between June 7th and 9th, 1988. Participating states praised the Palestinian Intifada, pledging to provide financial support to the PLO to guarantee continuation of the uprising. At the summit, King Hussein said that the Intifada was a revolution against the Israeli occupation and abuse of occupied lands through the building of settlements. He urged Arab states to support the Intifada. In addition to reiterating pre-conditions stated in the Fez Conference in 1982 and criticizing the Shultz initiative, Arab states condemned the anti-Palestinian US stand that they felt encouraged Israeli aggression and further hindered peace.²

King Hussein's speech in Algiers underlined long-term support for Palestinian resistance, until the end of occupation and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. King Hussein also addressed the PLO's skepticism of Jordan's intentions and stressed that Jordan has no intentions beyond enabling Palestinian people to determine their own fate and gain their legitimate rights.³

¹ Al-As 147.

² Madfai 291.

³ Al-As 194.

Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank

In light of such accusations, Jordan had to act promptly to end doubts and create the necessary dynamics for continuation of cooperation. In his speech on July 31, 1988, King Hussein announced administrative and legal disengagement from the West Bank, ending six years of efforts to reach a joint action plan and severing 38-years of unity, during which Jordan had repeatedly underlined its commitment to the Palestinians' right to self-determination. In his speech King Hussein said:

“Lately, it has transpired that there is a general Palestinian and Arab orientation which believes in the need to highlight the Palestinian identity in full in all efforts and activities that are related to the Palestine question and its developments. It has also become clear that there is a general conviction that maintaining the legal and administrative links with the West Bank, and the ensuing Jordanian interaction with our Palestinian brothers under occupation through Jordanian institutions in the occupied territories, contradicts this orientation. It is also viewed that these links hamper the Palestinian struggle to gain international support for the Palestinian cause of a people struggling against foreign occupation.”¹

King Hussein stressed that measures regarding the West Bank concern only the occupied Palestinian land and its people and do not relate in any way to Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan who have the full rights of citizenship and all its obligations. The speech also reiterated Jordan's commitment to take part in the peace process.²

¹ Khaled Al-Armouti, *Al-Hussein's Thought Weighed* (Amman: Al-Na'eem Publishing 1992) 142.

² Suleiman Al-Mousa, *History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century (1958- 1995)* (Amman: Al-Muhtaseb Publishing) II: 502.

Jordan started implementing measures of the disengagement from the West Bank through forcing public servants in the West Bank into retirement or suspension, and excluding workers of the Public Islamic Endowments Department and Supreme Judge Department from administering the holy sites. The Jordanian government cancelled the Ministry of the Occupied Land Affairs and scrapped the Occupied Land Act.¹

Although this decision would have negative impact on the economy of Jordan once Arab states cut financial assistance that had been given to Jordan for being on the front-line against Israel and for providing the budget to West Bank governmental bodies and ministries, King Hussein stressed that Jordan would proceed with the disengagement plan as it was for the best interest of Palestinians and their cause.²

Reactions to the disengagement varied. Some Palestinians rejected the measure. Among them was Jerusalem's former governor Anwar Al-Khatib who said "the parties that pressured Jordan to sever legal and administrative ties with the West Bank have harmed Palestine," adding that the Palestinian cause had lost a lot with the disengagement.³ The PLO welcomed the decision that fulfilled the organization's aspirations to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian leadership was divided into two sides on this matter; the radical leadership welcomed the Jordanian move and called on the PLO to take over the political and administrative role of Jordan, and Fatah who had reservations that Jordan had not consulted with the PLO to give it time to restructure the organization to suit its new responsibilities.⁴

¹ Al-Mousa 502.

² Al-Armouti 143.

³ Al-Khalayleh 327.

⁴ Al-As 151.

A PLO delegation headed by Mahmoud Abbas arrived into Jordan in August 1988 to explore Jordan's position and the parameters of the future relationship. The Palestinian delegation met with a number of officials, led by the Jordanian Premier Zaid Rifai. After the meeting, the Palestinian side said that the disengagement decision was in the best interest of the Palestinian cause and supportive of the PLO in establishing an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian soil.

The two sides agreed to pursue consultations on peace. The PLO stressed its commitment to a confederation between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and an independent Palestinian state.

The Palestinian Peace Initiative and the Role of Jordan

The disengagement put the peace process back on track. The PLO started taking practical steps towards peace and Yasser Arafat became politically active. Arafat delivered a speech to European Parliament in Strasbourg on September 31, 1988, denouncing terrorism and accepting UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as benchmarks for an international peace conference. He expressed a desire to reach permanent and comprehensive peace and a peaceful coexistence with Israel through negotiations.¹

The strategic ties between the PLO and Jordan became stronger as both chose a peaceful approach to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.² This stand was enhanced with the visit of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Yasser Arafat to Jordan on October 22, 1988. The summit discussed Jordanian-Palestinian ties and coordination over an international peace conference to be attended by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all concerned parties.

¹ Al-Madfai 292.

² Al-Khalayleh 339.

During the summit, King Hussein stressed the strength of Jordanian-Palestinian ties. He said that UN Security Council Resolution 242 was the only ground on which to present the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of Palestinians in the peace conference. The three leaders agreed to call on key international players to revive previous peace initiatives.¹

On November 12, 1988, the PNC held an urgent session in Algiers. The PNC issued a Declaration of the Independent State of Palestine and designated Jerusalem as its capital. The Declaration of Independence stated that:

“By virtue of natural, historical and legal rights, and the sacrifices of successive generations who gave of themselves in defense of the freedom and independence of their homeland; In pursuance of Resolutions adopted by Arab Summit Conferences and relying on the authority bestowed by international legitimacy as embodied in the Resolutions of the United Nations Organization since 1947; The Palestine National Council, in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people, hereby proclaims the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital Jerusalem (Al-Quds Ash-Sharif).”²

The PNC called for an international peace conference organized by the UN and with the participation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all conflicting parties, including the PLO, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 recognized by the PNC³ without prejudice to the national legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, namely the right to self-determination.

¹ Al-As 152.

² Al-Khalayleh 338.

³ Al-Madfai 292.

The declaration implicitly acknowledged UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947, or the UN Partition Plan for Palestine, as a source of international legitimacy. The meeting denounced all kinds of terrorism, including state terrorism, and underlined the deep ties between Jordanian and Palestinian people.¹ The PNC announced that the future relationship between Jordan and the Palestinian state would be based on confederation and free choice to enhance historical ties and joint-interests.

Thirty-nine of a total 160 UN member states recognized the State of Palestine upon declaration. Jordan announced the PLO Bureau in Amman an Embassy of Palestine.²

Syriaian and Palestinian factions based in Damascus rejected the declaration by the PNC and considered it a crime against the Palestinian people.³

The US had previously had three conditions to open dialogue with the PLO: acknowledgment of UN Security Council Resolution 242, ending armed operations against Israel and denouncing terrorism. To please the US, Arafat met with a group of Jewish American members of the Israeli-Palestinian Tel Aviv Peace Center in a meeting organized by the Foreign Minister of Sweden. The meeting announced the PLO's readiness to negotiate with Israel to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, in addition to its condemnation of all forms of terrorism. The statement also said that the Palestinian state pledged to peacefully coexist with Israel. The PLO announced that violence would end once negotiations started.⁴

¹ Al-As 152

² Madfai 292.

³ Al-Mousa 508.

⁴ Quandt 351.

On December 13, 1988, Arafat delivered a speech to the UN General Assembly in Geneva. Arafat's speech met the conditions of the US diplomacy, acknowledging Israel's right to exist, agreeing to UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and denouncing terrorism.¹

Arafat presented the following peace initiative:

1. To convene the preparatory committee of the international conference for peace in the Middle East.
2. Placing Palestinian land under temporary UN supervision and deploying international forces to supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli forces.
3. The US would seek a comprehensive settlement among the parties concerned in the conflict within the framework of the international conference for peace.²

King Hussein voiced support for the PLO's move. On December 14, Shultz announced that Washington was ready to open a dialogue with PLO representatives and the US Ambassador to Tunisia, Robert Bleider, was asked to take on the task. Shultz pointed out, however, that agreeing to the dialogue did not mean that the US had accepted the independent Palestinian state, and stressed that the status of the West Bank and Gaza were to be determined during the negotiation process. Shultz reiterated the US commitment to Israel's security.³ Thus, the US finally lifted the ban on dealing with the PLO.⁴

The first official contact between the US and the PLO was on December 15, 1988. Contacts continued infrequently until 1990, when they were halted altogether.

¹ Henry Laurens, *The Grand Curse: Arab Orient and International Rivalries* (Limassol: Cordoba Publishing House 1992) 252.

² Al-Khalayleh 339.

³ Madfai 294.

⁴ Quandt 353.

The Shamir Plan

Isaac Shamir, the Israeli Prime Minister of the Likud Party, was not ready to make any compromises. The policy he had agreed on with the Labour Party, a partner in the government, was to crack down on the Intifada. The Israeli government said no to a Palestinian state, no to talks with the PLO and no to withdrawal from the occupied lands.¹

The Intifada had revealed an ugly face of Israel to the world. In addition, the growing Islamic jihadist leftist stream became a major concern for the US and Israel. When George H.W. Bush became the president of the US and implemented “building confidence” to establish peace in the Middle East, Shamir was pressured to present a peace plan during his visit to the Washington in 1989. The plan was known as the Shamir Four Point Plan², which was announced as a response to the Palestinian peace proposal. The most significant point of the Shamir plan was the election of Palestinian representatives that Israel would negotiate with, ruling out dialogue with the PLO.³

Shamir referred to an interim stage that was to last for five years, after which final-settlement negotiations would open with participation by Israel, Palestinian local representatives and Jordan, provided that the US would exert

¹ Al-Maw'ed 81.

² The plan states that Israeli-Egyptian treaty based on Camp David Accords was the cornerstone to the building of peace in the region; Israel demanded peaceful relations with Arab countries that were still hostile towards it; Israel called for an international effort to solve the problem of the Arab refugees in the West Bank and Gaza and to allocate resources to improve their living conditions; Israel proposed that free elections be held among the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The aim of the elections was to bring about the establishment of a delegation that would participate in negotiations on an interim stage of self- governance. It would be followed by negotiations on the final settlement that would establish peace between Israel and Jordan.

³ Quandt 366.

efforts to ensure a solution to the humanitarian situation of refugees in the West Bank and Gaza and urge Arab countries to end hostilities against Israel.¹

It was implied in this plan that Israel did not want an international peace conference, but rather direct negotiations. It was also clear that Israel would not open talks with the PLO and rejected an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.²

Shamir admitted that the main objective of his peace plan was to end the Intifada. In May 1989, he said “when you offer a peace initiative with one hand, your other hand will be free to hit rioters and outlaws.”³

The Israeli Minister of Defense, Isaac Rabin, was blunt in stating the objectives of the plan. The Jerusalem Post quoted him as saying “the Israeli government aims at severing the ties between Palestinians abroad and Palestinian inside. Severing the ties means paving the way for negotiations between Israel and Palestinians inside.”⁴

Washington responded to the Shamir plan in May 1989 in a speech at the annual convention of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The US Secretary of State James Baker said he welcomed the Shamir plan and considered it a positive step towards peace. Baker also said that it was time for Israel to lay aside its unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel.⁵

President Bush sent a message to King Hussein urging Arab leaders convening in Casablanca to accept the Shamir plan. “We think that the Israeli breakthrough would initiate

¹ Al-Khalayleh 616.

² Al-Ma'aytah 158.

³ Al-Maw'ed 234.

⁴ Al-Maw'ed 234.

⁵ Laurens 262.

dialogue between the Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied lands,” Bush said in his message.¹

Shamir reassured the Likud, concerned over what seemed to be compromises, and pledged not to give the Arabs any piece of land, even if negotiations would have to go on for 10 years.² The Israeli government considered the plan the only solution to the Palestinian problem. The Israeli opposition parties also did not see an alternative to the framework of the Shamir plan. The Israeli government endorsed the peace proposal on May 14, 1989.³

The PLO opposed the Shamir plan and demanded the elections to be held within a comprehensive plan recommended by an international peace conference where Palestinians would represent their own cause.⁴ The Executive Committee of the PLO issued a statement on May 15, 1989 stating that the Shamir plan did not concern the Palestinian people because it did not acknowledge its national existence or international resolutions, including UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The committee added that Israel’s plan would not be able to deceive international public opinion or political key powers.⁵

Although the plan failed to gain Arab support, the US insisted on remaining neutral. In August 1989, a US State Department official said that the PLO should stop its attempts to convey to the US what is required from Israel, since the US was not negotiating on behalf of Israel, nor was it in negotiations with the PLO. He said that the US was in a dialogue in an attempt to move towards peace by proposing the

¹ Al-Ma’aytah 165.

² Laurens 267.

³ Al-Ma’aytah 156.

⁴ Madfai 295.

⁵ Al-Ma’aytah 164.

Israeli scheme to the PLO, whose best interests would be accepting it to some point.¹

Arab states asked many questions and requested many clarifications on the plan. Eventually, Egypt proposed a 10-point peace plan to Israel in September 1989.

Mubarak's Initiative

President Mubarak's initiative was an attempt to bridge the gap among conflicting parties and find a political breakthrough. The 10-point plan included holding free elections to choose Palestinian representatives that would legislate negotiations on an interim settlement with Israeli, guarantee free speech for candidates and participation of the Arabs of East Jerusalem in the elections., elections would be held under international supervision, Israeli forces would withdraw from electoral districts, guarantee the safety of candidates and stop all settlements before elections start. The resolution of Palestinian issue would be achieved in two phases, the interim settlement that would grant the Palestinians full self-governance, followed by the final solution. The initiative was based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The initiative sought clarifications on the position of the Shamir plan regarding the right to self-determination and the technical aspect of the election process in occupied territories. Mubarak's initiative stressed the "land for peace" formula that he felt was overlooked in Shamir's plan. Egypt suggested holding an Egyptian-Israeli meeting with UN envoys as a first step in preparing for Palestinian-Israeli meetings in Cairo.²

The PLO agreed to hold Palestinian-Israeli talks on the prospects of elections provided that they were held under

¹ Laurens 268.

² Al-Madfai 296.

international supervision. The PLO also demanded that at least one member be appointed to the Palestinian negotiation team and that there be no pre-conditions.¹

A US State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler said that the US encouraged all parties to find a way to launch Palestinian-Israeli talks on Shamir's plan. The US welcomed all efforts to push towards peace, she added.²

The statement meant that the US was not going to support Mubarak's initiative without Israel's approval, which the US would not press for. However, the US had no objection to the participation of a PLO representative from outside East Jerusalem, while Israel rejected the idea.³

A conflict occurred between the Likud and the Labour parties over the "land for peace" formula. While the Labour party had no objection to the principle, the Likud refused to consider it. Eventually, Shamir rejected Mubarak's initiative and said that open talks were equivalent to surrender. He opposed the Mubarak plan because it did not mention an interim settlement and he saw it as a victory for Palestinians throwing Molotov cocktails in the streets, stressing that the Israeli plan should be accepted as approved by the government on May 14, 1989. He did not see any other solution.⁴

The Baker Plan

In light of conflicts between the Israeli and Palestinian sides, and the divisions between the Labour and the Likud parties, a conflict that threatened to dissolve the Israeli coalition government, the US was forced to draft a plan, something it had rejected before. The US suggested holding a

¹ Al-Ma'aytah 196.

² Al-Ma'aytah 196.

³ Al-Madfai 296.

⁴ Al-Ma'aytah 196.

Palestinian-Israeli dialogue in Cairo in which the Palestinians could present their vision of the peace process, giving Israel the right to reject any member of the Palestinian team.¹

Secretary of State James Baker's plan aimed at initiating Palestinian-Israeli negotiations that implemented Shamir's plan and met Israeli conditions. The Baker plan consisted of: 1) opening talks between Palestinian and Israeli teams in Cairo 2) Palestinians would consult with Egypt and Israel with the US in all stages of talks 3) a group of Palestinians would be pre-approved by Israel to represent Palestinians in the talks 4) the Israeli side would attend on basis of the Shamir plan announced of 14 May 1989 5) negotiations and elections would be held according to the Israeli plan. The US suggested a preparatory meeting of the foreign minister of the US, Israel and Egypt in Washington.

Israel agreed to Baker's plan on the condition that the PLO did not appoint any of the Palestinian team's members or interfere in the talks. Israel also demanded that the Palestinian team would not discuss the electoral process. Shamir said that the US should realize that Israel would never agree to include PLO representatives in the peace process.²

In spite of the PLO's previous demand to be included in the Palestinian negotiation team, it did not decisively reject Baker's plan.

With the issue of forming the Palestinian team turned into an obstacle in the way of peace, the US administration took the initiative of convincing the PLO to let independent Palestinians participate in the talks. The PLO agreed, provided

¹ Al-Madfai 297.

² Al-Ma'aytah 222.

that it chose the members of the team, one of which should be not a resident of the West Bank or Gaza.¹

With Israel opposing any role by the PLO, dialogue between the US and Palestinians stopped. President Mubarak mediated an agreement and at the end of 1989 Egypt announced that Arafat had agreed to the Baker five-point-plan. However, Israelis continued to obstruct peace. At the beginning of 1990, when the Baker plan had Palestinian and Egyptian agreement, Baker suggested a meeting with the foreign ministers of Israel and Egypt in Cairo. Shamir, pressured by the right-win on an interim settlement, changed position and rejected the plan, while the Labour party threatened to withdraw from the coalition government if Shamir did not accept the proposal.²

Large numbers of Soviet immigrants were flowing into the occupied lands. Baker stressed to Congress that the US should not provide Israel with additional financial assistance to accommodate the immigrants before Israel gave guarantees to stop the settlements.³

President George H.W. Bush publicly criticized the settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The issue became a new obstacle for peace talks. With Shamir's rejection, the first round of the efforts of President Bush's administration to formulate a peace plan stalled.

Conflicts between Labour's Peres and Likud's Shamir led to the collapse of the Israeli coalition government and the withdrawal of the Labour party. Shamir formed a pure right-wing government.

¹ Quandt 347.

² Quandt 347.

³ Laurens 267.

After 18 months of dialogue between the US and Palestinians, on May 30, 1990, the Palestinian Liberation Front, led by Abu Al-Abbas, attempted a seaborne raid on Tel Aviv's coastline. Although Israel did not suffer any casualties or damages, the US urged the PLO to condemn the military operation and take action against those accountable. As the PLO did not clearly and directly condemn the operation President Bush announced suspending talks with the PLO.¹

The peace process entered a deadlock until the beginning of the Arabian Gulf crisis.

¹ Hosni Amr, *The US, Palestinian Dialogue* (Hebron: Association of Academics 1990) 113.

CHAPTER 8: Regional and International Shifts in the 1990s and their Impact on the Peace Process

The Palestinian issue was a major issue of the twentieth century. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict attracted active international interest, and international events had significant effects in escalating the conflict or pressing toward political solutions. The 1990s witnessed regional and international events and changes that reflected on the conflict and reinvigorated the need for a permanent comprehensive solution.

The most prominent events that shaped the 1990s were:

- 1) The Gulf War, triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- 2) The fall of the Soviet Union that ended the polarization that had characterized international relations for more than four decades.
- 3) Israel was pressured to accept the invitation of President Bush and the Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev to participate in an international peace conference.

The Gulf War

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces launched an invasion against neighbouring Kuwait after tension mounted over borders and oil.¹

¹ Hafez Barjas, *The Arabian Gulf Oil and International Conflict* (Beirut: The Academic Institute for Studies and Publishing 1998) 36.

The country was captured within hours, which led Saudi Arabia to seek US military assistance. The US took advantage of the situation, covered by UN legitimacy, to establish an international coalition against Iraq. The coalition included many Arab states. Jordan was among the few Arab states that insisted that the crisis should be solved within the framework of Arab diplomacy and without foreign intervention.

Thus, over seven weeks, some 750,000 allied troops from 28 countries pounded Iraq with air strikes and ground offensives. Iraq's civil and military infrastructure was destroyed.¹

The US policy on the Middle East was formed by two factors: the protection of US national interests in the region (mainly oil), and protection of the existence of Israel and its military superiority.

In a statement published in Newsweek on August 19, 1990, President George H.W. Bush said the US would not give in to Saddam Hussein's economic pressures, stressing that energy security was a crucial part of national security and that the US should be ready to act accordingly.² On the other hand, Israel was worried about Iraqi military infrastructure. Iraq had surprised Israel when it launched a 650 km range missile in 1989, proving that Iraqi missiles were capable of targeting Israeli cities and towns.

¹ Marwan Akender, *Clouds over Kuwait* (Beirut: All Prints Distributors and Publishers 1991) 178.

² Mohammed Abdul Alim, "Invasion of Kuwait and Gulf War: A Model of Post Cold War Crises" *Middle East Affairs* 11 (1992) 21.

Israel had considered launching strategic air warfare against Iraqi infrastructure in response to the missile attack, but this information was leaked to the Iraqi side and led to Saddam Hussein's infamous threat in March 1990 "to burn half of Israel" with chemical weapons if the latter hit Iraq.¹

While Israel feared a harsh Iraqi response, the US and the international coalition fulfilled the task. Former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin admitted that "what is happening in the Gulf is a miracle, for other people are doing our work for us."

The Stance of Jordan on the Gulf War

Jordan's stand on the war in the region was formed by its strong belief against occupation. Naturally, Jordan urged Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. King Hussein underlined that Jordan did not acknowledge the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq and still recognized the Emir regime and the legitimate Kuwaiti government that preceded the Iraqi invasion.² In a speech, King Hussein said that Jordan's principles had always opposed the occupation of land in all cases, including the Arab-Israeli conflict.³

Another factor was Jordan's commitment to resolve the conflict within an Arab framework. King Hussein said that any foreign intervention would only further complicate things.⁴

¹ Abdul Elah Balqzeiz, *The Post- Cold War Arabian Gulf Crisis* (Rabat: Dar Al-Kalam 1992) 26.

² Bashar Fakhruddin, "The Role of the Arab League during the Gulf Crisis" (Masters dissertation, University of Jordan, 1995) 53.

³ Khaled Al-Mahameed, *The Economic Factor in Jordan Foreign Policy from 1952- 1999*, 2nd ed. (House of Culture, 2002) 251.

⁴ Al-Armouti 132.

Jordan was in a critical situation after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Siding with Iraq risked the financial assistance given by the Gulf countries, in addition to jeopardizing the jobs of 300,000 Jordanians who worked in the Gulf. But siding with Kuwait would harm the Jordanian economy because of its ties with Iraq. In addition, Jordan's geographical position between Iraq and Israel, and its awareness of the shift in the international balance of power, pushed it to advocate for containing the issue internally and protecting Iraq as a strategic Arab state.¹

The Jordanian leadership realized the costs of foreign intervention that would cause mass destruction to the Arab country and lead to losing control over one of the Arab's most important natural resources. Jordan also knew that the foreign intervention would drive a wedge in inter-Arab ties and facilitate future foreign interventions in Arab internal affairs.²

King Hussein not only raised the alarm, but stepped up efforts to contain the crisis. Three days before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, King Hussein visited both Iraq and Kuwait and urged the leaders of both countries to solve the crisis peacefully. Immediately after the invasion, King Hussein left for Cairo to meet with President Mubarak in an attempt to discuss a mediation initiative. King Hussein called on President Bush to give a peaceful solution a chance. King Hussein then left for Baghdad to press Saddam Hussein for guarantees for withdrawal from Kuwait. The mission could have been successful, had it not been for Arab foreign ministers condemnation of the invasion. King Hussein toured with representatives from 25 Arab and Western countries,

¹ Al-Saleem 161.

² Al-Mousa 189.

including Libya, Sudan, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen, Tunisia, US, Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Spain,¹ to rally support for Jordan's proposal of a peaceful solution.²

Jordan faced pressures and criticism for its position. Accusations went as far as considering Jordan a partner in crime. The US attempt to create an Arab umbrella to build the coalition against Iraq brought a lot of pressure on Jordan from many Gulf and Western countries, especially the US. The pressure mounted due to of Jordan's strong ties with Iraq and its strategic geographical position.³

Opinion in the Arab world was sympathetic to Iraq. In Jordan, public sympathy was evident due to the bonds developed between the people of the two countries during the Iraq-Iran war. Public opinion was spontaneous and clear in parliament, in the press, in pro-Iraq rallies and in aid campaigns for Iraq.⁴

Jordanian political leadership reflected the pan-Arab sentiments among Jordanians and internally Jordan was united and harmonious. Jordanians confidence in their leadership increased and they were proud of their country's position on the war, despite the high cost they would pay later.⁵

The military aggression against Iraq stopped once a ceasefire agreement was signed on February 28, 1991. Jordan immediately began a new round of diplomacy to cope with the

¹ Al- Mousa 177.

² Ghazi Nahar, *Jordanian Foreign Policy towards the Gulf Crisis* (Amman: Majdalawi for Publishing and Distribution 1993) 91.

³ Sharaf 101.

⁴ Sharaf 102.

⁵ Sharaf 102.

aftermath and initiate a new era of cooperation and mutual trust between Arab countries, re-building trust with countries that opposed Jordan's stand during the crisis, and capitalize on the international enthusiasm created by the Gulf crisis to solve other regional conflicts, mainly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.¹

The impact of Gulf War on Jordan

Jordan was the third most negatively affected country by the war, after Iraq and Kuwait, as Jordan's rejection of foreign coalition intervention was interpreted as alignment with Iraq.² The US and the Gulf countries punished Jordan by freezing \$500 million USD in financial assistance to the country.³ Saudi Arabia imposed sanctions on Jordan, banning all Jordanian products from entering Saudi or other Gulf countries and banned Jordanian trucks from picking up Jordanian imports from Jeddah Seaport and Jordanian planes from flying over Saudi airspace.⁴ Most sectors of the Jordanian economy, including industry, transport and tourism, were affected by the Saudi sanctions.⁵

The coalition forces imposed a form of blockade on Jordan, with their sea vessels blocking ships bound for Jordan's port as of August 1990. Within one year, approximately 400 ships were prevented from traveling to the territorial waters of Jordan. The blockade became tighter when international aviation corporations suspended flights to Jordan.

¹ Al- Otaibi 46- 47.

² Al- Mahameed 254.

³ Al- Saleem 161.

⁴ Al- Mousa 185.

⁵ Al- Mahameed 254.

Most of Jordan's imports were forced to enter the country through neighbouring Syria.¹

The crisis climaxed when the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. This affected Jordan because it had previously imported 80 to 90 per cent of its oil from the now-sanctioned country. Saudi, which used to provide for the remaining need, cut off supplies entirely, further tightening its grip on Jordan. This led Jordan to plead to the UN Security Council, which allowed Jordan to import Iraqi oil via tank trucks in May 1991, but the plan was aborted when US warplanes targeted the trucks. In light of the hiking oil prices that reached \$41 USD/barrel after the invasion, Jordan took measures to regulate fuel use. In addition Jordan started importing limited amounts of oil from Syria and Yemen.²

The Jordanian economy suffered a great recession. Unemployment reached 33 per cent and inflation grew to more than 35 per cent. The Jordanian government had to take several measures. Jordanian currency was devalued by 40 per cent, prices of basic commodities hiked more than 30 per cent, and the government sought debt rescheduling. The Jordanian economy received a blow when its economic loss reached \$4 billion USD in the first six months of 1991.³ The situation deteriorated, with large numbers of people affected by the Gulf War flowing into Jordan, costing the Jordanian state an additional \$40 million USD in two months.⁴ Three-hundred thousand Jordanian and Palestinian expatriates who had

¹ Al-Mousa 185.

² Al-Mousa 187-188.

³ Al-As 181.

⁴ Al-Mousa 186.

formerly worked in Gulf countries were forced back to Jordan, burdening the country's health and education systems.¹

Jordan's economic losses were estimated at \$11,089 million JD (approximately \$15,666 million USD) in 1990 and \$2,264 million JD (approximately \$3,198 million USD) in 1991.²

Jordan's stand during the Gulf War cost it assistance from Gulf countries and from its major Western donor, the US. This halted the economic correction program that Jordan had implemented in cooperation with donor countries, the IMF and the World Bank to alleviate the economic crunch that began in 1989.

Jordan saw no other option but to agree to peace negotiations with Israel under US supervision to appease the US with the hope of renewing their previous relationship, particularly regarding financial assistance. The economic factor was one of the main reasons that Jordan agreed to engage in peace talks.³ Negotiations were launched at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991.

The Impact of Gulf War on Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Gulf War was considered the biggest Arab defeat in modern history, causing further setbacks in the cause of pan-Arabism, a deviation in the balance of forces towards Israel, loss of control over the majority of Arab oil reserves, and adverse effects on Arab economies. IMF statistics show that Arab countries lost \$676 billion USD in 1990-1991.⁴ The Gulf

¹ Jawad Al-Hamad, *Peace Process of the Middle East: Factors and Impacts* 25.

² Al-Mahameed 254.

³ Al-Mahameed 254.

⁴ Al-Mousa 183.

War divided Arab governments, weakening the Arab world after the foreign management of their crisis.

The Gulf countries cut aid to Jordan and the PLO after accusations that they had supported Iraq.¹ The Gulf countries also cut aid to the Palestinians, which negatively affected the Intifada. The deterioration of the Palestinian economic situation encouraged public opinion for more talks with Israel, contrary to the previous rejection of any kind of settlement that would not guarantee all of the Palestinian legitimate rights and liberation of the occupied lands.²

As the destruction of Iraq and loss of control over Arab oil reserves shifted the balance of power in the region, the US found a great opportunity to protect its interests and establish stability based on the status quo. However, stability would never occur without a permanent solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the US became an advocate for ending the conflict.³

The Gulf War put commitment to UN resolutions and application of international laws to the test. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait brought up the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and drew a comparison between Iraq and Israel in compliance with international legitimacy.

American author William Quandt raised the question of how President Bush could participate in the Gulf War in defense of international legitimacy that condemns occupation

¹ Al-Hamad 18.

² Al-Hamad 51.

³ "Challenges in the Arab World under New World Order," *Proceeding of the first international meeting of the Euro- Arab Center for Studies*, 487. 1993.

of foreign lands and did not do the same for the Palestinian issue. He questioned how the world could not draw the comparison.¹

Iraq's proposal to the UN to link the occupation of Kuwait with the Israeli occupation was rejected by the coalition states, the US and the permanent members of the Security Council. However, a number of Arab countries, led by Jordan, accused the US of applying double-standards in the Middle East. Commenting on this issue, King Hussein said that the US needed to live up to the ethical responsibility to apply fair standards and principles through equal treatment, adding that the responsibility of the US also included being a role model of leadership and applying equal standards in dealing with all issues of the world.²

King Hussein acknowledged that linking the Gulf crisis to other problems in the region would complicate the situation. However, he said, the Gulf crisis had indeed contributed to the public frustration of the deadlock facing the Arab-Israeli conflict and raised questions about the real motives of the US in pressing to implement UN Security Council Resolution 660, which condemned the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, while not showing the same enthusiasm for UN Security Council Resolution 242 that is based on the same principle of condemning occupation and demanding withdrawal of occupier.³

In response, President George H.W. Bush said in a speech on March 6, 1991, following the expulsion of Iraqi

¹ Madfai 299.

² Al-Armouti 132.

³ Al-Armouti 132.

forces from Kuwait, “Our commitment to peace in the Middle East does not end with the liberation of Kuwait... The time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.”¹

Baker visited eight Arab countries between March and October 1991 to show that the US was going to seize the opportunity to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.²

The Impact of the Fall of the Soviet Union on the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The fall of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 was an inevitable result of the economic and ideological crises that communism suffered in the post-Cold War era. Gorbachev had come to office in the mid-1980s and introduced a political movement called Perestroika, restructuring of the Soviet political and economic system based on openness in foreign policy known as glasnost. Perestroika exacerbated existing political, social and economic problems caused by the economic system adopted by the Soviet Union for the previous 70 years. Perestroika helped to further nationalism in the constituent republics and eventually led to an attempted coup d'état to oust Gorbachev. Gorbachev resigned from office and the Soviet Union was formally dissolved and replaced with a voluntary form of union known as the Commonwealth of Independent States.³

The fall of the Soviet Union left a gap in the international political scene and the Arab world was highly

¹ Madfai 300.

² Quandt 373.

³ Shafeeq Al-Masri, *New World Order: Features and Risks* (Beirut: Dar El Ilm Group 1997) 38.

affected. For decades the Arab-Israeli conflict had been linked to US-Soviet relations. as each country supported one side of the conflict financially and morally. A cut back in the support for one side would now benefit the other.

The impact of the collapse can be summarized in the following points:

- 1) Arabs lost their international superpower ally
- 2) Immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel
- 3) The unilateral US management of the Arab-Israeli conflict

Arabs did not only lose the military and financial support of the Soviet Union, but also international political advocacy for the causes of the Arab world by its strategic ally. Since the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union had supported the Arab side in the conflict with Israel. The Soviet Union was the main source for Arab military equipments.¹ Between 1965 and 1975, the Arab world received approximately 70 per cent of the total of Soviet weapons and military equipment sent to developing countries.²

The strong ties between the Arab world and the Soviet Union had been capable of restraining the Zionist violence against Arab states.³ The Soviet Union agreed that Israeli withdrawal of the Arab land occupied in 1967 should be the

¹ Abdul Qader Mohammed Fahmi, *The Russian federation and the Arab World* (Wisdom House, 1997) 38.

² Qasem Jaafar, *Syria and the Russian federation: A Study of the Arab- Soviet Relations* (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books) 22.

³ Balqzeez 150.

basis for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict.¹ The Soviet Union repeatedly called for an international conference for peace as envisioned in UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and that included all conflicting parties under the auspices of the UN.

The radical Arab camp counted on the power of the Soviets to create a strategic balance with Israel. Syria was among these countries, especially with the increased military assistance it received from the Soviet Union after Egypt had settled its conflict with Israel.²

However, with the fall of the Soviet Union, Syria lost hope in becoming a power strong enough to face Israel as the balance of power shifted further. Fearing a military confrontation with Israel that would have catastrophic outcomes, Syria was now ready to accept a settlement for the conflict.

The US-Soviet reconciliation was announced the end of the Cold War after the Helsinki Summit in September 1990. The Soviet Union agreed to the US policy regarding the Gulf crisis and did not object to the US standing army in the Gulf region, a matter that was previously rejected due to its conflict with Soviet national interests.³

Immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel

While the Soviet Union was calling for an international peace conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel and the US had two conditions before allowing Moscow to play a

¹ Al-As 24.

² Al-As 169.

³ Al-As 169.

role. They insisted that the Soviets resume diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, which had been severed following the 1967 war, and grant the approval for Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel. The Soviet Union discarded the conditions and refused to resume diplomatic relations before Israeli withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967. Conversely, with the new Soviet policy and economic crisis, Gorbachev agreed to the conditions of the US and Israel in return for economic assistance to Moscow.¹

The deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union announced the resumption of relations with the US in September 1989. At the end of the same year, the Soviet Union lifted restrictions on Soviet Jews², causing the second largest extensive immigration wave to Israel.³

Shamir said that the immigration of the Soviet Jews would solve the problems of Israel by eliminating the Palestinian demographic threat and creating a new reality in which immigrants settled in Jerusalem and the occupied lands held the Zionist belief in return to the Promised Land. Israel wanted the immigration wave to be a pretext for occupation. One of the most significant statements of Shamir was that “For a large immigration, we need the land of Israel. A large and strong Israel. We will need a lot of place to absorb everybody.”⁴ In addition, the immigration would increase financial aid provided by the American Jews supporting the Israeli economy.

¹ Balqzeez 152.

² Al- Hamad 13.

³ Abdul Latif Al-Mayyah, Hanan Al-Tai, *The Israeli Strategy on the Arabian Gulf* (Amman: Majdalawi for Publishing and Distribution 2002) 148.

⁴ Abu Odeh 258-259.

The immigration ruled out the possibility of Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in 1967. It further posed a threat to the neighbouring Arab countries, namely Jordan, when the slogan “Jordan is Palestine” started circulating after the number of Soviet Jews arriving in Israel multiplied.¹ These alternative homeland proposals mounted pressure on Jordan after the Gulf War. In November 1989, Shamir articulated the idea clearly, stating that the Palestinian State is in Jordan and that Greatest Israel is needed to settle the Soviet Jews.²

The US Unilateral Management of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict had been involved in the power struggle between the Soviet Union and the US. The US repeatedly rejected the peace plans of the Soviet Union simply for being proposed by a rival superpower. When the Cold War ended between the Soviet Union and the US, the chance to discuss a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict was present. The Soviet role in the peace conference was minor. The Middle East peace settlement process took off with great momentum.³

Change in Israeli Stance Towards Peace

The US pressure for reaching peace in the region, and the change in the Arab position toward peace with Israel, would not have launched the settlement process without the

¹ Saleh Zahriddin, *Greater Israel and the Matters of Demography, Oil and Water* (Beirut: Arab Center for Research and Marketing) 34.

² Shafeeq Al-Ghabra, *Israel and Arabs: from the Conflict of Causes to the Peace of Interests* (Beirut: The Arab Institute for Studies and Publishing, 1997) 127.

³ Al- Saleem 154- 155.

agreement of the other side, the side that had always rejected the peace conference proposal.

The factors that contributed to the shift in the Israeli stand towards peace and an international peace conference included:

1) U.S. pressure

The Gulf War created a regional situation that served the US interests. The US aimed at integrating Israel in a comprehensive regional security system that guaranteed stability for oil resources and prices that suited the US.¹

The US realized that the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict would continue to deepen tensions in the Middle East, something that contradicted the US national interest. The US started pressing for a solution to settle the Palestinian issue and establish the existence of Israel as a regional country, therefore there was a need to restructure Israel's regional role in accordance with US interests.² The US administration was concerned over relations with Israel. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, US-Israeli ties suffered a setback at a time when Israel's need for financial aid increased with the large numbers of Soviet immigrants creating a financial burden on Israel's economy.³

It was logical for the US to think that Iraq's defeat would rule out military options for even the extreme Arab states. The position of Jordanians and Palestinians had weakened so significantly following the Gulf War that they were expected

¹ Khulood Al- Asmar, *The Impact of Regional and International Developments on Arab- Israeli Relations* (Amman: Middle East Studies Center 2005) 115.

² Al-As 177.

³ Al-Masri 24.

to respond positively to any serious diplomatic initiative.¹ The US realized it was time to pressure Israel to accept a peace conference. President Bush linked \$10 billion USD in aid to help Israel settle Soviet Jews to Israel's participation in Madrid Peace Conference in 1991.² Although Shamir rejected the idea at first, US pressure forced him to change his mind.

2) The Intifada

The Intifada highlighted the pressing need of Palestinians for an independent entity and rendered Palestinian-Israeli coexistence in an Israeli federal state impossible.³ UN Secretary General Javier de Cuéllar admitted that the Intifada pressed for acceptable negotiations that would lead to a just and comprehensive settlement.⁴

Israel's greatest fear was that the Intifada had produced radical Islamic movements that rejected Israel's existence. Movements like the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas and Islamic Jihad Movement became popular among Palestinians and Arabs, forcing Israel to accept talks with the PLO, who demanded withdrawal to 1967 boundaries. Israel feared that the growing popularity of the Islamic movements would threaten to end the legitimacy of the PLO.

3) The Israeli economic crisis

Israel suffered an economic crunch at the beginning of the 1990s, with the Intifada increasing the security management expenses in occupied lands and prevented Arab labourers from

¹ Quandt 373.

² Al-Hamad 22.

³ Al- Sayyed Hussein 76.

⁴ Al- Sayyed Hussein 76.

entering into Israel. In 1988, the Israeli Minister of Finance said that the Intifada had cost Israel \$900 million USD, equal to 2 per cent of Israeli gross national product.¹

The crisis escalated as soon as the Soviet immigrant influx into Israel began. The unemployment rate reached 6.12 per cent by the end of 1989.² Aid from the US was necessary for Israel.

4) The collapse of Israel invincibility theory

Peace was linked directly to Israel security. The conventional theory of Israel invincibility collapsed³ when Iraq, a country that did not border Israel, attacked it with missiles even before acquiring nuclear arms and without using its chemical weapons. Israel feared the potential outcomes of a full scale Arab-Israeli war. This brief encounter with Iraq marked the end of a conventional war era for Israeli decision makers and the military force. New security threats caused by ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction emerged.⁴ Israeli security strategy had to include a peace agreement with Arab countries.

5) The advantages of peace

The US concluded that achieving peace in the Middle East required the promotion of regional ties between Israel and its neighbours.

¹ Al-Hamad 20.

² Al-Hamad 20.

³ Nabeel Al-Samman, *The Israeli Road to Peace* (Damascus: Al-Samman Publishing 1996) 7.

⁴ Al-Hamad 21.

This idea of normalizing relations was already part of the Zionist ideology, whose objective was to establish the territory of Greatest Israel by peace or war. The biography of the father of Zionism, Theodor Herzl, revealed his vision of a Middle Eastern commonwealth headed by the Jewish state that would be the center of technological advancement. The Zionist leader Nahum Goldmann saw that controlling the economy of the region would spare Israel a costly war. Moshe Dayan's perception of peace for Israel was different. He saw borders and joint projects unnecessary.¹

Decision makers in Israel believed that engaging in a peace process with Arabs could secure more economic and political gains than military force. Shlomo Gazit, head of the Intelligence Service of the Israeli army, said that peace was vital necessity for Israel.²

Shimon Peres, who had the vision of a "New Middle East," adopted this approach. Peres proposed the Marshall Plan, or the economic-cooperation Middle East plan, in 1986. In a Herald Tribune article published in 1992, Peres admitted wars were the worst form of dominance and that Israel had the upper hand through technological, economic and academic advancement. He also underlined the need to remove psychological barriers by linking all parties to a joint economic system.³

¹ Al-Mayyah and Al-Tai 182.

² Al-Hamad 183.

³ Al-Maw'ed 225.

6) The demographic issue

Population projections at the end of the 1980s showed that the Palestinian population would make 49 per cent of the total population in historical Palestine in the year 2000 and 53 per cent in 2015.¹

In spite of the large numbers of Soviet Jews immigrating into Israel since the mid-1980s, the demographic problem of Israel was larger than being solved by some thousand immigrants. This is what the Haaretz editor Zaeef Schef concluded in a study he prepared for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He pointed out that the impact of immigration was political and social only, and that Palestinians were more confident because of the demographic statistics. Zaeef said that the Soviet immigration would not solve the demographic problem Israel was facing.²

¹ Al-Sayyed Saleem 159.

² Al- Maw'ed 217.

CHAPTER 9: Madrid Peace Conference

Preparations for the Madrid Conference started in the fall of 1991, a few months after the end of the Gulf War and two months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although the US and the Soviet Union both called for and prepared the conference, the US was more active as a superpower due to international and regional factors.¹

The US President said in a Congress speech on March 6, 1991, after liberating Kuwait, that it was time to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, applying the “land for peace” formula. He stressed that the formula must guarantee recognition of Israel and protection of its security, as well as the guarantee of legitimate political rights for the Palestinian people. The US Secretary of State James Baker embarked on a regional Middle East tour, between October 30 and November 1, 1991, to arrange the Madrid Peace Conference.

Considering the circumstances under which the conference took place, the Arabs were in a very weak position.² The split in the Arab world following the Gulf War, along with the collapse of the long-time Soviet ally, undermined the conventional Arab strategic principles and ruled out any form of confrontation with Israel.

Baker started shuttle diplomacy to propose peace plans with a visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, followed by

¹ Hasan Abu-Shanab, *The Palestinian- Israeli Accord: Opposing Points of View* (Cairo: Madboli Bookshop 1995) 74.

² Salah Muntaser, *The Road to Peace: Madrid* (Egypt: Dar Al-Ma'aref 1992) 15-16.

Israel. He then met with Palestinian representatives and headed to Damascus.¹

Jordanian deputy chief negotiator Fayez Tarawneh wrote “when James Baker performed the Middle East tour between March and July 1991, contacts between the US and Jordan had stopped with relations reaching a critical point. This was obvious when Baker excluded Jordan from his regional tour and coordinated efforts for the conference with Israel, Egypt and Syria. Baker’s efforts reached a deadlock when Israel continued to reject talks with the PLO. The issue of Palestinian representation at the conference was the main obstacle. That was when joint Palestinian-Jordanian representation was suggested, since none of the other Arab countries, Syria, Egypt or Lebanon, could co-represent Palestinians.”²

Baker arrived on his first visit to Jordan in 1993. It was the first meeting to bring together US and Jordanian officials since the Gulf War. Baker said in a press conference following the debates that there was no one more courageous, flexible and supportive of peace than King Hussein. The US acknowledged the vital role Jordan could play in the peace process.

While Israel continued to fiercely reject talks with the PLO, President George H.W. Bush asked Congress in September 1991 to postpone deliberating financial aid to Israel. He also issued a statement condemning settlement

¹ Quandt 375.

² Tawfeeq Abu Baker, *The Political Settlement March 1977- 1994, A Testimony by Fayez Tarawneh* (Jenin Strategic Studies Center 1998) 19.

activity. With all the pressure, the Israeli cabinet was forced to vote for participating in the peace conference.

On October 18, 1991, the US and the Soviet Union issued invitations for Arab states and Israel to the conference. The text of the invitation read:

“After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians, the United States and the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace.

Toward that end, the president of the US and the president of the USSR invite you to a peace conference, which their countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct negotiations. The conference will be convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991.”¹

On October 12, 1991 and in his address to the Jordanian National Congress, King Hussein recalled the reasons for Jordan’s participation in the Madrid peace negotiations. King Hussein listed the facts for community leaders and officials saying:

“First, let me remind you of a fact I previously made reference to, namely that no observer closely scrutinizing the graph line

¹ Abu Baker 20.

of the Palestinian issue can fail to notice its steady decline. To be sure, what could have been achieved out of any peace opportunity has always proved to be less than that offered by the previous one. This, indeed, has been the trend since the thirties, despite the justice of the issue. If there is any significance to this it can only mean that our grasp, as Arabs and Palestinians, of the regional and international situation at every peace opportunity has always fallen short of what was required. Indeed, we have failed to deal with the events within the framework of what is possible and reasonable and have, consequently, lost one opportunity after another. This led to a situation whereby 65 per cent of the West Bank territories have been confiscated by Israel, and where the plight of the Palestinian people today is one best described as dispersion and uncertainty in the diaspora and increased suffering and hardship in the occupied territories.

“Second, the present Israeli leadership feels itself to be the only beneficiary from the continuation of the status quo, i.e. the state of no war/no peace—a situation Israel is exploiting to bring about changes on the ground through the flow of Soviet Jews into Israel by the tens of thousands and the establishment of new settlements.

“Third, the collapse of communism and its alliance, and the consequent breakdown of the international balance of power, has led to the end of the cold war and a world order based essentially on bipolarity.

“Fourth, the collapse of the Arab order, the disequilibrium in the Middle East balance of power, the new alliances, and the elusive drifting toward the concerns of individual nation-states

as a consequence of the Gulf crisis. This has left an immediate impact on the Arab outlook regarding the Palestinian issue.

“Fifth, Jordanians and Palestinians are besieged and they are the parties directly and adversely affected by the continuation of the status quo of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

“Sixth, the increased American interest in post-Gulf War stability in the Middle East—a stability based on the settlement of conflicts and the treatment of their root causes, and not one merely based on the containment and management of crises, as has been the case until quite recently.”¹

And thus, the Madrid Peace Conference opened on October 30, 1991. Jordan, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon participated as conflicting and negotiating parties. Egypt attended as a full partner, in addition to the Arab northwest African countries, except Libya. The Arabian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was also represented in the conference as parties interested in the Middle East Peace Process. The UN was represented by the Swiss diplomat Edward Bruno attending as an observer. Similarly, the Foreign Minister of Netherlands Hans van den Broek represented the European Community (EC) as an observer as well. The conference was held under US-Soviet supervision. Jordan was represented in a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation headed by Kamel Abu Jaber.

Framework of the Madrid Agreement

The track of negotiations launched in Madrid drew the structure of the peace process in three distinctive stages. The first stage was holding the Madrid Peace Conference that

¹ Al-Majali, *Peace in Al-Hussein's Thought* 1995.

represented the opening meeting for negotiations where the opening addresses of conflicting parties reflected their stands toward core issues referred to in the invitation letter. The second stage was direct negotiations opening in Washington immediately following the Madrid Conference and consisting of four separate sets of bilateral talks between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. The third stage was multilateral regional negotiations that opened in Moscow two weeks after the start of the bilateral talks and focused on key issues that concerned the entire Middle East regional security. That exceeded the land for peace formula as a blueprint for the relations between Israel and neighbouring Arab countries and considered a regional system for security and cooperation. The third stage was particularly distinctive as the basis of the peace process expanded to include not only the US and the Soviet Union, but other parties like the EC, Canada and Japan.¹

The UN did not chair the Madrid Peace Conference, but participated as an observer. The three permanent members of the UN Security Council (Britain, France and China) did not have any true participation in the conference, but rather participated as observers, which contradicted the previous proposed formula. Thus, the conference was not an international meeting as Arabs had called for. Instead, it was ground for direct bilateral talks having no power to impose solutions or veto agreements. It was co-sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union with no significant role for the EC or the UN.²

¹ Baker Abdul Mun'em, *The State of Palestine: The Peace Conference between Madrid and Oslo* (Amman: Dar Al-Shorok) 32.

² Taher Shalash, *The Final Settlement Negotiations and the Palestinian State: Hopes and Challenges* (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorok 1999) 44- 45.

Reassurances from the US stated that the comprehensive solution should integrate the UN Security Council Resolution 338 and 242 and the land for peace formula. Resolution 242 called for withdrawal from Arab occupied lands, parallel to establishing just and comprehensive peace and safe boundaries in the region. This meant a conditional withdrawal. However, Israel refused to link freeing lands with accomplished peace steps, which contradicts the core of Resolution 242.

In this regard, “the agreement reached in Madrid was that the basis for the peace process is [UN Security Council] Resolution 338 and 242, in addition to the invitation letter from the co-sponsors. Jordan stresses that the peace process basis in addition to that are the UN Charter and the international laws, especially the Geneva Fourth Convention that provides a clear definition for occupation, which all Arab countries and some other international players have agreed to.”¹

The land for peace formula was no longer consistent with the international law. The Israeli perception of the formula did not face any opposition from the US, when the US admitted to Israel that there were several correct interpretations for Resolution 242, which was open for debate and negotiations.

The US saw a two-stage solution for resolving the Palestinian issue. The first was an interim stage that granted Palestinians self-governance, enabling control over political and economic decisions, but without making any reference to the right to self-determination that leads to establishing an independent Palestinian state. The second was a final stage to

¹ Al- Masalhah 109- 110.

be reached through negotiations that covered all details between Israelis and Palestinians. The US administration reassured the Palestinians that they had the right to raise any issue, including the issue of East Jerusalem, during negotiations. However, the same administration hinted to Israel that the self-governance negotiations will open after the interim stage preparations.

The US stand led to major difference of opinion over self-governance between the Israeli and Palestinian sides. For Israel, self-governance was limited to the administrative domain, and did not have a determined identity but limited authority over residents only. The Palestinians wanted self-governance to grant legislative authority and guarantee sovereignty over residents, land and water.¹

The Israelis saw that Resolution 242 did not include the issue of self-governance, while the Palestinians insisted that it included self-governance in the final solution.

The US firmly opposed settlement activity and unilateral actions that negatively affected negotiations. The US rejected Israel's decision to impose its administration and jurisdiction in the captured Syrian Golan Heights and called for direct negotiations...²

The US stand on the Golan issue did not appeal to Shamir, who grudgingly accepted the peace initiative and regarded it as a means to buy time while building more settlements and dividing the Palestinian land into distinct and

¹ Bilal Al-Hassan, *The Void Peace from Madrid to Oslo* (Damascus: Al-Ahali Publishing and Distribution 1994) 22.

² Al-Sayyed Hussein 84.

isolated areas to rule out any future Palestinian entity. The settlement activity carried out by Shamir was an obstacle to negotiations for the US administration. This led President George H.W. Bush to tighten the guarantee conditions for the \$10 billion USD loan that Shamir had requested in an attempt to pressure Israel to change its settlement policy in the occupied territories. But Shamir's stubbornness caused him to lose elections. Labour Party's Rabin took over the Israeli government. This resulted in the US easing the loan guarantee conditions for Israel.¹

A new chapter of the peace process opened as Bill Clinton took office as the 42nd President of the US.

The bilateral talks took the form of separate sets of talks between Israel and Arabs. Israel aimed at excluding any form of cooperation and solidarity among Arabs.

The first round of bilateral talks between Israel and the four Arab nations, represented in three delegations, opened on November 13, 1991 and addressed the issues of conflict between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries, settlements, self-governance for Palestinians and Israel's withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights. In the second round of bilateral talks, that opened in Washington on December 10, 1991, the Palestinian delegation demanded separation of the Jordanian track from the Palestinian track in talks, which was approved and implemented at the beginning of the third round.

¹ Al-Hassan 24.

The Jordanian-Israeli talks concluded with signing the Peace Treaty on October 26, 1994. The Syrian-Israeli and the Lebanese-Israeli talks were halted.

The bilateral talks did not lead to significant results in the years 1992 and 1993 compared to what secret Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy had accomplished. Secret diplomacy bridged the gap between the parties and paved the way for the signing of the Oslo Accord.

The Madrid Conference referred the issue of settling the conflict to the direct bilateral talks, where Arabs were not represented by one delegation and the conference did not have any authority to make recommendations or amendments to agreements. Israel had always requested bilateral talks.

The multilateral talks were considered the cornerstone of building the new Middle East that would allow Israel to play a significant role in shaping the region. In order for Israel to achieve its goal it proposed the idea of a new Middle East to engage in alliances with regional countries and have the chance to affect the policies of these countries. Israel's plan was to eventually normalize relations with Arab nations and become the link between East and West.¹

Normalization of relations was at the core of multilateral talks that were held parallel to the bilateral negotiations. It was the goal of the ongoing debates on water, arms, refugees, development, and environment. For Israel, peace translated into normalizations of relations and without normalization Israel would not withdraw from a single inch of Arab lands, or grant Palestinians self-governance.

¹ Al-Masalah 28.

The Syrian and Lebanese delegations did not participate in the multilateral talks as Syria thought that discussing issues of regional cooperation, such as water and economic ties, while not discussing the core of the process, Israeli withdrawal from Arab occupied lands, was “fruitless” in the words of the Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Al- Shara’a.¹

In spite of the absence of Syria and Lebanon, the multilateral talks were intensified with the involvement of several Arab and European countries and the US and Japan, which put pressure on Arab countries to consider the future of the regional ties with Israel and with international superpowers.

The most prominent outcome of Madrid’s policy was the establishment of secret diplomacy to revive the peace negotiations tracks while simultaneously proposing the New Middle East plan. It was the secret negotiations, rather than the direct talks that led to the formation of the Oslo Accords that were officially signed on September 13, 1993 at a public ceremony in Washington.

The Oslo Accords

The Oslo Accords, also known as the Gaza-Jericho Agreement or the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, were signed in Washington on September 13, 1993.

At the time when all eyes were on the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral talks in Washington, and while the senior Palestinian negotiators Haidar Abdel Shafi, Hanan Ashrawi, Faisal Al-Husseini and Saeb Ereikat were announcing having reached a

¹ Al-Masalah 29.

deadlock, secret negotiations were taking place in Oslo, Norway, overseen by the Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst. In the secret talks, the Palestinian side was represented by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Ahmed Qurei (Abu Al-Ala'), Hassan Asfour and Maher Al-Kurdi, while Yossi Beilin, Ron Pundak and Yair Hirschfeld represented the Israeli side.

The secret communications started in February 1993 after the Washington bilateral talks had stalled. The events occurred when Likud's Shamir was in power and led Palestinians to support the Labour Party in the Knesset elections in June 1993, resulting in a win for Rabin who formed the Israeli government. The backstage of the elections was considered part and parcel of Oslo secret talks.

The Palestinians felt at ease when Rabin won the elections. His electoral plan was promising and their communications with the Labour Party had convinced Rabin that it was time for direct talks with the PLO.¹

The first secret meetings between the PLO and the Israelis in Oslo were a few Norwegian-sponsored events that gathered academics from both parties, until Rabin commissioned Peres to upgrade the authority granted to the Israeli negotiators in Norway. It is noteworthy that Peres had adopted the concept of peace with Arabs within the framework of the New Middle East project since the end of the 1980's and had become a patron of a pro-peace bloc in the Labour Party. Yossi Beilin was a member of this bloc. His views revolved around creating an Israeli-led economic system in the Middle East, similar to the European model.

¹ Henry Laurens, *Arab World in America's Hour* 38.

Rabin's aspirations were more pragmatic and realistic. In the 1980s he realized that the Greater Israel politics were failing. The population growth of the Palestinians was fast and would threaten the Jewish identity of the state if Israel integrated the occupied lands, while violence would become a permanent state if the military and police grip remained tight. Rabin concluded that the Palestinians and the Israelis should be separated.

On the Palestinian side, the lack of financial support from the Gulf countries had tightened the margin of resistance for the PLO inside the Palestinian territories, which gave way to the rise of Islamist movements, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

The secret negotiations with Israel, after the long and unsuccessful talks in Washington, were a form of a fight for existence on the political scene for the PLO. British writer David Hirst said that the shaken image of Arafat among Palestinians, and losing the bet on the US after offering many compromises without receiving any in return, were the main reasons for Arafat to propose the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. "The PLO was ready to pay dearly to secure a return to the political scene," according to the Palestinian analyst Azmi Bshara.¹

At a time when Israel believed that talking with the PLO was more acceptable than talking with the Islamist movements whose charters refused to recognize Israel's right to exist, it found a chance in the secret talks to achieve political goals, mainly to establish a form of Palestinian authority in the West Bank and Gaza that could be responsible for security while

¹ Abu Shanab 69.

Israel continued to control foreign affairs. Israel calculated that talks with the PLO would encourage Arab states to seek agreements with Israel under its conditions.¹

Thus, the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee Yasser Arafat personally oversaw the negotiations that he kept a secret, even from the members of the committee. Israeli Foreign Minister Peres delegated his Deputy Minister Yossi Beilin to the negotiations. Along with the PLO Executive Committee member Mahmoud Abbas, who was in charge of the coordination of talks, Beilin played a major role.

The Israeli delegation in Oslo requested to inform the Egyptian and the US governments of the Oslo negotiation channel. The PLO informed the Egyptian party of the developments in secret, while Peres briefed the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Subsequently, briefings and meetings continued on the regional and the international level. Secret talks continued amidst Arafat's pressure on Israel to withdraw from West Bank and Gaza. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement initially took the form of an unofficial Israeli proposal that called for unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza strip after the Intifada had stepped up actions in Gaza and Israel realized that keeping the strip was getting very costly.²

It was clear that the secret negotiations were shaped by waiving the basic Palestinian rights that were the backbone of the bilateral talks in Washington.³

¹ Al-Hamad 35.

² Al-Hassan 73.

³ Al-Hassan 66.

Since the Oslo talks opened, the Israeli side involved prominent legal experts to advise them in drafting the accords. Among them was Yoel Zinger who took part in resolving the conflict on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts after the war of October 1973. The Palestinian side did not engage any legal advisors in order to protect the secrecy of the talks. Responding to a question by Peres on Israel's chances of reaching a solution with the PLO, Zinger said that Israelis would be stupid not to reach an agreement with the PLO negotiators.

President Clinton, Bush and Kissinger gathered at the White House on September 13, 1993 with 3,000 US political figures for the Oslo Accords signing ceremony. The documents were signed by Mahmoud Abbas for the PLO, foreign Minister Shimon Peres for Israel, Secretary of State Warren Christopher for the US and foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev for Russia.¹

The signing of the Oslo Accords was a surprise for the world. Reactions were divided, especially of in the Middle East.

Principles of the Accord

In essence, the accords between Palestinians and Israelis called for gradual implementation of peace, the first stage being Gaza-Jericho. Major issues such as Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees were to be decided after Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Furthermore, the two sides agreed on a division of their respective jurisdictions in

¹ Hassan AL-Jalabi, Adnan Al-Sayyed Hussein, *The Peace of Oslo- The State and Cause in the Middle East* (Beirut: University Publishing Institute 1995) 121- 122.

the West Bank into areas A (under full Palestinian jurisdiction) and B (Palestinian jurisdiction and Israeli security control) and area C (Israeli full jurisdiction and security control).

It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five-year interim period, during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated, beginning no later than 1996. Permanent issues such as positions on Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security and borders were left to be decided at a later stage.

The first article of the Declaration of Principles stated that the aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations was to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The fifth article stated that the five-year transitional period would commence with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Permanent status negotiations between the Israeli government and representatives of the Palestinian people would begin as soon as possible.

Oslo I and Oslo II

The Cairo Agreement (Oslo I) signed on May 4, 1994 detailed the first phase of implementing the Declaration of Principles entitled the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. The Protocol on Economic Relations was an annex of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed in Paris on May 4, 1994. It governed economic relations between the two parties and outlined the first stage of handing authority to the Palestinian side, to be followed by granting

increased self-governance authority in other areas of the West Bank. Arafat and Rabin signed the protocol, in addition to the Egyptian President Mubarak, Christopher and Kozyrev.

The highlights of the Oslo Accords were mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, ending all forms of traditional confrontations in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in addition to granting the Palestinian side self-governance in Gaza and the West Bank as a first step towards handing jurisdiction over to the Palestinians. It was agreed to grant the Palestinian side more self-governance jurisdiction at a later point, accompanied by Palestinian-Israeli economic cooperation.

Two years after the mutual recognition, and 18 months after initiating Palestinians self-governance in Gaza and Jericho, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, called “Oslo II” or “Phase II”, was signed September 24, 1995 in Taba, Egypt. It was the final stage of expanding Palestinian self-governance.

The Oslo II Interim Agreement was made up of a preamble, 11 articles, five chapters that include 31 items and six annexes that cover issues of security, elections, legal authorities, economic relations and Palestinian-Israeli cooperation.

The agreement stated that Israel would hand over certain authorities and responsibilities from the Israeli military governance to the elected Palestinian Council. The transfer of authority from Israeli forces to authorized Palestinians concerned education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. Among its major provisions, it called for Israeli troop redeployments beyond the Gaza and West Bank

areas, holding public Palestinians elections and maintaining security and safety considerations.¹

The agreement divided the West Bank and Gaza into three areas, each with distinctive borders and rules for administration and security controls, with the Israeli forces redeploying every six months.

Area A included all areas from which Israeli military control had been transferred to the administration of the Palestinian Authority, including the areas of Gaza and Jericho, and the seven major Palestinian population centers in the West Bank- Nablus, Kalkilya, Tulkarem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin and most of Hebron. In these areas, which made up 3 per cent of the West Bank, the PA had full responsibility for internal security and public order.

Area B included 450 Palestinian towns and villages that made up 27 per cent of the West Bank and was occupied by 68 per cent of the total West Bank population. In these areas, as in Area A, the PA controlled all civil authority and public order. However, it differed from Area A in that Israel maintained overriding security authority.

Area C comprised of the remaining areas of the West Bank, making up 72 per cent of the total area, including Greater Jerusalem, according to Peres areas of strategic importance to Israel and the settlements, where Israel retained full responsibility for security.

¹ Ahmad Sidqi Al-Dajani, *The Issue of the Racist Solution for the Palestinian Cause and the Means to Liberation* (Cairo: Arab Future Publishing House 1999) 148.

The Oslo II agreement permitted a Palestinian police force of 12,000 personnel to provide security in areas administered by the PA. The elected Palestinian Council cooperated with Israel to combat terrorism through joint security patrols in Area A.

Oslo II granted Palestinian self-governance that was limited to civil and administrative authority, excluded actual sovereignty on most of the lands and population, and gave Israel control over more than 70 per cent of the area under security pretension.

The agreement's provisions were to be implemented over two years, during which the final-status negotiations were to start.

Rabin's plan was becoming clearer at this stage. His strategy was to separate the Palestinians and the Israelis while granting Israel control over most of the lands occupied in 1967. This separation served to protect Israel's security and give Palestinians the illusion of a free government that might be upgraded into a state.¹

The Oslo I agreement was merely a declaration of general principles to govern an interim Palestinian-Israeli settlement in preparation for later final-status negotiations. Thus, Oslo I was not a complete integral settlement agreement, but rather an outline. Each point required further explanation and negotiation. The Palestinian side agreement to this formula was a risk, open to unpleasant surprises.

¹ Al-Dajani 150.

This was later proved when Palestinians and Israelis engaged in complicated negotiations over its principles to reach consensus over security, political and economic aspects. A series of meetings and negotiation rounds were necessary. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement required new long negotiations mediated by the US and Egypt, an ordeal that could have been avoided had Oslo I included a clear formula that explained its principles. Instead, the two sides had to engage in seven months of negotiations, during which several unfortunate events took place, including the Ibrahimi Mosque Massacre **A FEW DETAILS** and the following regional and international consequences.

The Gaza-Jericho Agreement occurred amidst concerns and doubts. Disagreement over the area of Jericho showed how hard and crucial negotiations were. The Palestinian delegation demanded to have 300 sq km of Jericho under the self-governance authority, but Israel rejected that. The Palestinian delegation then withdrew that request and both parties agreed to defer deciding on that matter until later. It was clear that Palestinian negotiators could not put pressure on the other side, to the extent that Peres criticized the Palestinian weakness after signing the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. He said “Palestinians do not have much to offer us. We are negotiating with ourselves in a way.”¹

Analyzing Oslo provisions

The Oslo Agreement tackled certain main issues: recognition, self-governance, and economic relations.

¹ Al-Jalabi and Al-Sayyed 136.

Mutual recognition was established in three letters: the first, a letter from the Chairman of the PLO Yasser Arafat to the Israeli Premier Rabin; the second, a letter from Arafat to the Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst; the third, a letter from Rabin to Arafat. The Declaration of Principles document signed on September 13, 1993 also established the mutual recognition.

These documents clearly stated the Israeli demands, vaguely mentioning the right of the Palestinian people. The PLO clearly stated that it “recognizes the right of the state of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized borders.” This recognition bestowed legitimacy upon the State of Israel, a legitimacy that it could never have gotten otherwise. Israel issued laws to confiscate Palestinian lands and expel Palestinian residents. For the Palestinians, these violations had always been illegitimate actions of the occupier. The PLO recognition suggested that the Israeli actions were fully legitimate.¹

In his book entitled *Secret Negotiations between the Arabs and Israel*, Arab thinker Mohammad Hassanein Haikal said “happiness was genuine in the Jewish Zionist groups in the US, because signing the Declaration of Principles means that the Palestinian people have recognized the State of Israel for the first time. The moral significant was priceless. The occupation may grant the strong the power to impose terms on the weak, yet the legitimacy remains on the side of the weak as long as that party remains committed to its right. When the

¹ Burhan Al-Dajani, *The Peace Negotiations- Track, Options and Possibilities* (Beirut: The Palestinians Studies Institute 1994) 89- 90.

victim recognizes the occupier, it turns from a matter of imposing power to a matter of agreement.¹

This was expressed by the Israeli Minister of Environment when he said “Israel was reborn today. Since it was established it was not regarded as a legitimate state in the region. Although it was able to invade, suppress and win, it was not legitimate. Today [September 13, 1993] Israel’s legitimacy was recognized.”²

The PLO recognized Israel’s right to live in peace and security. The wording of the text implied that the peace and security of Israel were a top priority. It also meant that Israel had the right to correct any situation that it deemed a threat to its right to “exist in peace.”

The PLO saw that the signing the Declaration of Principles marked a new era of peaceful coexistent with Israel. The PLO renounced the use of all acts of violence and agreed to assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators. This was a clear sign that the new era would end the Intifada. Arafat confirmed in his letter to the Foreign Minister of Norway that, “the PLO encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism... and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation.”

¹ Mohammad Hassanein Haikal, *Secret Negotiations between the Arabs and Israel* (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorok 1996) 328.

² *Arabs and Facing Israel: Future Probabilities* (Beirut: Arab Unity Studies Center 2000) 187.

The PLO emphasized that “the articles and paragraphs of the Palestinian Charter which denied the Israeli right to exist and contradict with pledges stressed in (Arafat’s letter to Rabin), became of no use and no more valid.”¹

According to Agence France-Presse, the articles that Israel demanded to be nullified were:

1. Article 2: Stated that “Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British mandate is an integral regional unit.”
2. Article 9: Stated that “armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not a tactic” and defined the strategies of armed struggle.
3. Article 10: On “mobilization of all the Arab and Palestinian masses and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution.”
4. Article 19: Stated that “the partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel is null and void from the very beginning.”
5. Article 20: Stressed that “the Balfour Declaration, the mandate document and what has been based upon them are considered null and void.”
6. Article 21: “rejects every solution that is a substitute for a complete liberation of Palestine.”
7. Article 22: Slammed Zionism as “a political movement organically related to the world imperialism and is

¹ Saed Al-Hassan, *Gaza- Jericho Agreement: Documents and Studies*.

hostile to all movements of liberation and progress in the world. It is a racist and fanatic movement in its formation, aggressive, expansionist, and colonialist in its aims, fascist and Nazi in its means.”

8. Article 23: urged “all states that maintain friendly relations with people, and loyalty of citizens to their homeland, to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement and to prohibit its existence and activity.”¹

Therefore, Israel received a clear Palestinian recognition of its existent on 4/5 of Palestine geographical area, the PLO’s recognition of UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338 and the PLO’s vow to resolve all conflicts with Israel in a peaceful manner. The Israeli side understood that this meant the end of the Intifada. However, the most important accomplishment was agreeing to defer permanent issues such as positions on Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security and borders to the final-status negotiations. The PLO was very clear in recognizing Israel’s right to exist. On the other hand, what did Israel offer the Palestinians? Following is Rabin’s letter to Arafat:

“Yasser Arafat Chairman: The Palestine Liberation Organization.

Mr. Chairman, In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.”

¹ Al-Dajani 93.

One can articulate several remarks on the Israeli recognition:

1. It was clear that the Israeli recognition was conditioned on the vows in Arafat's letter. Thus, Israel had the right to nullify its recognition of the PLO if it had not committed to its vows. On the other hand, the PLO did not have the luxury, as its recognition for Israel was unconditional.¹
2. The PLO referred to Israel as "the State of Israel" and thus recognized a state that has a land, sovereignty and authority. Israel, however, recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people to "commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process."
3. In his letter, Rabin did not refer to any rights of the Palestinian people, but rather accepted Arafat's proposal "that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations." To that Rabin replied, confirming that Israel decided to "commence negotiations with the PLO," and that was everything the PLO had accomplished.
4. Arafat's letter referred twice to the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for peace. In his reply letter, Rabin did not refer to the resolutions, neither to Arafat's letter, but rather pointed out the PLO's vows mentioned in the letter.

This shows how weak Palestinian negotiators were in Oslo and how little confidence they had in their cause, their

¹ Abu Shanab 117.

accomplishments and themselves. Palestinian negotiators were blinded by the illusion that recognizing them as a partner in negotiations represented a real political win. However, Israel's recognition did not acknowledge any right of the Palestinian people.¹

Self-governance granted to Palestinians included many limitations. Self-governance was first suggested by Beijing-Sharon and recorded in the Camp David agreements. It was later revived by Shamir and Rabin in 1989, and was meant to accomplish several objectives. First, it was meant to divert the negotiations, as it turned into the main issue from the withdrawal and UN Security Council Resolution 242. Second, it was thought to guarantee Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in addition to the security and military control. Third, self-governance aimed at ruling out annexation of the West Bank and Gaza to Israel, something that would dramatically change the components of the Israeli state.

From the Israeli point of view, self-governance served to protect security, guarantee control, and rid Israel of responsibility toward Palestinian inhabitants.²

In reality self-governance was an administrative entity that did not possess political authority, sovereignty, or water resources. The issues of Jerusalem, occupation, or settlements were not to be mentioned during the whole interim stage.

Looking into the jurisdictions of the Palestinian self-governance authority, one can see that they were limited to

¹ Edward Said, *Oslo: Peace without Land* (Cairo: Arab Future Publishing House 1995) 28.

² Muneer Shafeeq, *Oslo Accords- Gaza- Jericho and Aftermath* (Casablanca: Al-Furqan Publishing 1995) 61.

few civil administrative powers, while the Israel-PLO Agreement on Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed on August 24, 1994 included education, culture, health, and direct taxation, in addition to stating transferring secondary legislative powers. The Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities of August 27, 1995 stated that all powers and responsibilities regarding law enforcement would continue to be under the responsibility of the Israeli military authorities in the West Bank. This meant the Israeli mandate over all Palestinian issues would continue.

The first Oslo Accord linked electing a self-governing council to the redeployment of Israeli military forces outside the residential areas of the West Bank by the eve of the elections. The mechanism of the elections was detailed by a Palestinian-Israeli agreement on the election candidates, candidate eligibility, and suffrage. This clearly exhibits the limited Palestinian sovereignty in Oslo Accords.¹

Israel would continue to control the movement of individuals and goods for security reasons, including controlling the West Bank-Gaza corridor, rendering the powers of the self-governing authority void. The Israeli Minister of Police, Moshe Shahal, described the accords as recognition by the PLO of the legitimacy of the military occupation with whom it agreed to share the administration of these areas.²

The Israeli Major General Danny Rothschild clearly underlined the limited powers of the Self-Governance Authority when he told Al-Hayat newspaper on August 25, 1995 that Israel still had the power in the occupied territories

¹ Laurence 146.

² Al-Hamad 69.

in spite of transferring the responsibilities. He added that the role of the PNA was limited to providing services for inhabitants and nothing more.¹

Refugees since 1948 were not mentioned in the Oslo Accords, except to defer solving their problem. Internally displaced Palestinians, however, were mentioned twice. The first statement was to prevent them from participating in the elections, and the second allowed a number of them to enter the self-governance territories through a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian-Egyptian committee.

Although the UN resolutions stressed the right of return for both refugees and internally displaced Palestinians, the agreement only recognized UN Resolution 242 that addressed the issue of the displaced only. Clauses of the agreement stated that only a number of internally displaced Palestinians by the war of 1967 may enter the self-governance territories on conditions aimed at protecting the security of Israel. The Palestinian police personnel and their families, PLO leaders and their families, and Palestinians that Israel displaced in 1967 were the only ones allowed to enter self-governance territories, which were originally home to more than a million Palestinians. Israel allowed for no more than 105,000 Palestinians in the self-governance territories, or less than 10 per cent of the total population.²

Self-governance meant denying more than 50 per cent of Palestinians who lived outside of the occupied lands, including 350,000 in Lebanon and 700,000 in Syria, their right to return

¹ Said 34.

² Abu Shanab 128.

that had long been asserted by the UN, but was scrapped by Oslo Accords.

The Oslo Accords did not include a comprehensive military withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. The annex entitled “Withdrawal of Israeli Forces” stated redeployment and not complete withdrawal from the Palestinian territories. The agreement talked about a redeployment of the Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip outside populated areas and also stated that Israeli forces and civilians could freely use the roads in Gaza and Jericho that were under self-governance, take responsibility of the security of settlers and Israeli civilians living in those areas, and take part in security activities in bordering areas. The agreement declared that “further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence after the inauguration of the Council and will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian Police.”

The Chief of the General Staff, Ehud Barak, clearly stated that Israel was getting ready to redeploy forces in Gaza and Jericho, while there would be no change in other areas and everything would go on as usual.¹

The agreement implied that the populated Palestinian areas would be under a long-term military siege, legalized by the occupation force. The Oslo agreement was so unfair to Palestinians that it surprised Israelis themselves. After the signing of Cairo Agreement, Sholamet Alon, the Israeli minister in Rabin’s cabinet, said that if the British had imposed similar conditions on Israelis before withdrawing from

¹ Said *Peace without Land* 35.

Palestine, the State of Israel would have never been established.¹

The Oslo Accords did not address the issue of Jerusalem and did not include any principles for handing East Jerusalem over to Palestinians. The Oslo Accords established the religious sovereignty over the holy sites as part of the authority.

As for settlements, Palestinians did not make any gains in that domain. The security maps annexed to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement allowed for expanding settlements in the Gaza Strip to occupy more 36 per cent of the total Gaza land, double what the settlements had previously occupied. Oslo merely deferred discussing settlements until the final status negotiations, leaving out a proposed solution to the permanent settlement situation.

The Oslo Accords dealt with all aspects of the security of Israel, its army, and its people inside or outside the limited self-governance territories, at a time when Peres reiterated that Israel would provide arms for the Self-Governance Authority to face any security threats from the Palestinian opposition.

In the Oslo Accords, security had two aspects: external security and internal security. The Oslo Accords stated that Israel would carry the responsibility for external security, including protecting borders, including the Egyptian and Jordanians borders and crossing points. The Cairo Agreement concerning security and crossing points signed on April 15, 1995 clearly reflected the accords.

¹ Said *Gaza- Jericho* 61.

On internal security, Israeli forces would assume the responsibility of protecting civil and military Israelis in the self-governance territories and outside, leaving the responsibility of protecting the security of Palestinian civilians to the Palestinian police. The accords stipulated that Israeli and Palestinian police would perform joint patrols in areas inhabited by Jews and Arabs as per the Taba Agreement.

The gradual implementation of self-governance depended on the successful fulfillment of the tasks of the Palestinian police and on preserving peace, according to the agreement.

The economic aspect of the Oslo Accord from the Israeli point of view cannot be completely comprehended without understanding Peres' view of what role Israel should play in the twenty first century. The Israeli Foreign Minister and the godfather of Oslo believed in a new strategic plan that he published in his book *The New Middle East* in 1993.

Peres saw that Oslo should adopt policies to serve a strategy aimed at transforming Israel into the developed-Japan of the region. This explained the economic cooperation annex of the Oslo Accord that was meant to involve Israel in the Marshall Plan.¹ The Oslo Accord defined the type and quantities of commodities that the PNA was allowed to import. Other commodities were subject to Israeli economic policies regarding taxation and standards, yet keeping the markets of Gaza and the West Bank open for Israeli products.

The PNA was granted a national monetary authority, but under the control of the Bank of Israel. The Palestinian side

¹ Shafeeq 68-69.

was committed to apply the Israeli value added tax, accommodate Israeli customs officers at Palestinian customs centers, and use the Israeli Shekel, among other measures that would guarantee the subordination of the weak Palestinian economy to the strong Israeli economy.¹

This agreement made it impossible for the PNA to ensure food security in the West Bank and Gaza, keeping the Self-Governance Authority under the mercy of the donor countries and Israel. A Meed Magazine issue published on August 18, 1995, 16 months after the implementation of the economic protocol, featured a report on the Palestinian economy that said that Palestinians were concerned over the constraints on the PNA and had found themselves in a critical situation where they could not build a vital independent economy in Gaza.²

On the regional scale, Israel planned to establish a Middle East Development Fund, build cooperation with Jordan in developing the Dead Sea area, desalinate sea water, encourage agricultural development, link power grids, oil and gas transfer, tourism development, transportation, and telecommunications. Israel was the core of all economic plans on the regional level, implying that economic relations were the foundation and the strategic depth of the Oslo Accord.

The protocol's paragraph on regional development made it clear that international aid to the self-governance authority was pegged to a regional Middle Eastern framework and conditional to Israeli approvals.

¹ Al-Jalabi and AL-Sayyed 142.

² Al-Dajani 155.

Impact of the Oslo Accords on the peace process

The Oslo Accords were considered a crucial turning point in the Palestinian-Arab relations that were based on the PLO's commitment to the Arab action framework drawn by the resolutions of the Arab Summits. The Oslo Accords negatively affected the position of other Arab sides in negotiations, lowered the Palestinian standards to the minimum and dispersed the stands of other Arab parties.

The PLO walked out on the Arab negotiators and left them to face Israel and the US alone at a time when all Arab parties could have made gains and benefited from their unity and coordination by negotiating as one entity.¹

The Oslo Accords were the cornerstone for a new Middle East, of which Israel would be a leading member. It aimed at reviving the Camp David Agreement's attempt to establish relations between the Arab economies and the economy of Israel. This would remove the obstacle that would hinder Israel from controlling the regional economy and attracting global investments.

The agreement limited the final solution for the Palestinian to develop self-governance. The PLO could have obtained more wins with the compromises it gave had it been committed to coordination and solidarity with other Arabs parties.

In spite of the fact that the Oslo Accords were unfair to the Palestinian side, Israel boldly violated many of its clauses and the carefully set timetable. Isaac Rabin's famous statement

¹ Al-Dajani 155.

that “deadlines are not holy” seemed to be the theme of the Palestinian-Israeli relations, leaving Palestinians doubtful of Israel’s intentions to commit to Oslo.

On the morning of February 25, 1994 an Israeli settler named Baruch Goldstein opened fire on unarmed Palestinian Muslims praying inside the Ibrahim Mosque killing dozens and injuring hundreds.

This grabbed the attention of Arab and international public opinion and caused the Secretary General of the UN to announce that the UN was ready to intervene to protect Palestinians in the occupied lands if concerned parties agreed. The Israeli government rejected the proposal and the US voted against providing international protection in the Security Council.

The massacre at the Ibrahim Mosque jeopardized the peace process as a whole. Rabin and President Clinton both directed condemnations against the criminal acts and the criminal as an individual but refused to point to what Palestinians saw as the root of the problem, Israeli settlements in the West Bank as an obstacle to peace.

The PLO should have reviewed the negotiation approach at that time, but instead it merely called for international guarantees to protect the Palestinian people and disarm settlers, in addition to prioritizing the issue of settlements in negotiations. But, the escalating confrontations between Arabs and Israelis following the massacre forced the PLO to freeze negotiations. The other Arab negotiating parties announced freezing talks as well in an attempt to put pressure

on Rabin, who firmly rejected relocating settlers and opposed any form of international presence in the occupied lands.¹

In the aftermath of the massacre, the UN Security Council Resolution 904 condemned it and paved the way for resuming negotiations. Resolution 904 approved a temporary international presence for three months in the occupied territories and requested the co-sponsors of the peace process to continue their efforts to invigorate the peace process.

The Ibrahimi Mosque massacre indirectly condemned the Oslo Accords and the negotiations approach after drawing attention to settlements issue. The reaction of the PLO to the massacre did not live up to expectations. Instead of reviewing and assessing the Oslo Accords and negotiations approach, it resumed negotiations from where they stopped, as if nothing had happened.

The Jordanian- Israeli Peace Treaty

Negotiations between Jordan and Israel took place in Washington DC from January 1992 until the end of 1993, and were interrupted by crucial political events more than once. Jordanian-Israeli negotiations opened with an exploration round, where each side attempted to explore the viewpoints and intentions of the other side.

The two sides were in conflict over the interpretation of Resolution 242 and the Fourth Geneva Convention on settlements, refugees, and deported Palestinians. Israel insisted on postponing these issues until a later stage, stating that they were inter-related to other issues included in the multilateral

¹ Laurens 48.

negotiations. The two sides eventually agreed on defining priorities and the elements of the bilateral Jordanian-Israeli talks were: Resolutions 242 and 338, water, borders, refugees and displaced persons, regional issues, and future bilateral cooperation in natural and human resources, infrastructure, and tourism within a regional framework.¹

The blueprint for Jordanian-Israeli negotiations addressed several core issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Jordan provided the Syrian, Lebanese and, Palestinian negotiating teams with a copy of the agenda. The three countries considered the agenda notable progress in that it included the needed reference points, facilitating negotiations. Accordingly, King Hussein issued directives to halt steps towards pursuing the agenda until progress was made on other issues, especially the stalled Palestinian issue.²

It was a surprise for everyone that on September 13, 1993 the Palestinian and the Israeli sides signed an agreement known as the Declaration of Principles. The initial reaction of Jordan toward the Israeli-Palestinian agreement was negative.

Although King Hussein had initially criticized the agreement, he spoke positively about it later when he said “it is not our right to criticize this agreement. We will deal with and support them with our utmost energies and capabilities. The PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” King Hussein called on “the Palestinian brothers not to be carried away with emotions, but to use their sound judgment and unite with each other to gain back their rights.”

¹ Saleh Al-Qur'an, *The Jordanian- Israeli Peace Treaty* (Amman: Yafa Academic Publishing House 2007) 65-66.

² Al-Masalha 169.

King Hussein added that Jordan “provided an umbrella for our Palestinian brothers to enable them to move and have their say about their future and fate. We suspended the signing of this agenda until we were surprised to see that the Palestinian brothers and the Israelis have reached the Oslo accord.”¹

After signing the Oslo Accord, Jordan realized that the situation before September 13, 1993 would not persist afterward, whether on the level of bilateral negotiations or Arab coordination over negotiations. Jordan signed the agenda of the Jordanian-Israeli negotiations on September 14, 1994. King Hussein noted that Jordan signed the agenda 24 hours after the Declaration of Principles because Jordan required proof of considerable improvement on Palestinian-Israeli issues before continuing with Jordanian-Israeli negotiations. He underlined that Jordan signed the agenda to highlight its support for the mutual Palestinian-Israeli recognition and to endorse the issues agreed upon in the Declaration of Principles and their plan towards peace.²

The objectives of the agenda of negotiations were defined as reaching just and comprehensive peace between Palestinians and the Arab countries on one side and with Israel on the other. The components of the Jordanian-Israeli peace negotiations included in the agenda were:

1. Searching for steps to arrive at a state of peace based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
2. Security:

¹ Abu Shanab 250- 251.

² Al-As 220.

- a. Refraining from actions or activities by either side that may adversely affect the security of the other or may prejudice the final outcome of negotiations.
 - b. Mutual commitment not to threaten each other by any use of force and not to use weapons by one side against the other, including conventional and non-conventional mass destruction weapons.
3. Mutual commitment, as a matter of priority and as soon as possible, to work towards a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, conventional and non-conventional weapons; this goal is to be achieved in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace characterized by the renunciation of the use of force.
4. Water: Securing the rightful water shares of the two sides and searching for ways to alleviate water shortage.
5. Refugees and Displaced Persons: Achieving an agreed solution to the bilateral aspects of the problem of refugees and displaced persons in accordance with international law.
6. Borders and Territorial Matters: Settlement of territorial matters and agreed definitive delimitation and demarcation of the international boundary between Israel and Jordan with reference to the boundary definition under the mandate, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli Military Government control in 1967. Both parties would respect and comply with the above international boundary.
7. Exploring the potentials of future bilateral cooperation,

within a regional context where appropriate, in the following: natural resources (water, energy and environment, Rift Valley development), human resources (demography, labour, health, education, drug control), infrastructure (transportation: land and air, communication), economic areas including tourism.

8. Phasing the discussion, agreement and implementation of the items above, including appropriate mechanisms for negotiations in specific fields.
9. Discussion on matters related to both sides to be decided upon in common by the two sides.
10. It was anticipated that the above endeavour would ultimately, following the attainment of mutually satisfactory solutions to the elements of this agenda, culminate in a peace treaty.

Great pressure was put on Jordan after signing the common agenda to sign a peace treaty with Israel. However Jordan was firm against signing a treaty before reaching a settlement on issues of conflict. In October 1994 the international donor community met in Washington. Prince Hassan represented King Hussein in the meeting and met with the President Clinton and the Israeli Foreign Minister Peres at the White House. The three countries agreed to form a US-Jordanian-Israeli trilateral committee to follow up on the Jordanian-Israeli peace talks after the bilateral talks were stalled. The committee held a series of discussions over the components of the agenda of negotiations and Jordan Valley development.¹

¹ Al- Qur'an 66.

In light of the common agenda, Jordan demanded Israel return 320 km² of Jordanian land in the Jordan Valley and Wadi Araba north and south of the Dead Sea. Jordan also demanded to regain a 103 km² piece of land in the Jordan Valley South of Lake Tiberias. However, a disagreement occurred between the Jordanian and the Israeli sides over the Jordanian demands, which stalled the talks in the winter of 1994. No progress was made until Jordan received signals from Israel that it was open to delimitation and demarcation of borders within the framework of the bilateral talks. The Jordanian government was worried that it would lose the chance amidst regional and international events, and agreed to resume talks.¹

King Hussein met with the Jordanian Cabinet and Lower House on July 9, 1994 to brief them on the developments. He cited the great pressure on Jordan and said that following his visit to Washington, he had realized Jordan could not secure economic and military assistance, or alleviate the burden of foreign debt, without making progress in the peace process with Israel. He said that since Egypt and the Palestinians had taken several steps towards peace, waiting was becoming futile and could lead to the loss of many gains.

On July 17, 1994, the cabinet decided to send a Jordanian negotiating team to Israel, headed by Dr. Fayez Al-Tarawneh. King Hussein favoured relocating the negotiations to an undisputed border area between Jordan and Israel, and negotiations opened at Wadi Araba on July 18, 1994. The US Secretary of State Warren Christopher attended the talks that constituted the first talks to take place within the region of conflict. The talks continued for two days, and discussed

¹ Al-Sayyed Hussein 121.

mechanisms to resume negotiations over borders delimitation and demarcation and sharing water from the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers. Three joint committees were formed: the border committee, the security committee, and the joint water committee. The joint committees opened discussions following the meeting.

Israeli Foreign Minister Peres arrived on his first official visit to Jordan on July 20, 1994 and met with the Jordanian Premier, Abdel Salam Al-Majali. The meeting, attended by Christopher, reviewed economic relations in the fields of commerce, aviation, finances, and industry. Eventually, the meetings led to the signing of the Washington Declaration on July 25, 1994 in a ceremony at the White House attended by King Hussein, Rabin, and Clinton. The declaration stated that Israel and Jordan had ended the official state of enmity and would start negotiations to achieve an "end to bloodshed and sorrow" and a just and lasting peace. The Washington Declaration granted Jordan delimitation and demarcation of borders with Israel, lifting the ban on buying arms, and the US pledged to forgive debts and provide military assistance.

The Washington Declaration reaffirmed the following five underlying principles:

- a. Jordan and Israel aimed at the achievement of just, lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbours and a treaty of peace between the two countries.
- b. The two countries would vigorously continue their negotiation to arrive at a state of peace, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects, and founded on freedom, equality and justice.

- c. Israel respected the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status would take place, Israel would give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines. In addition, the two sides agreed to act together to promote interfaith relations among the three monotheistic religions.
- d. The two countries recognized their right and obligation to live in peace with each other, as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries. The two states affirmed their respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area.
- e. The two countries desired to develop good neighbourly relations of cooperation between them to ensure lasting security and to avoid threats and the use of force.

The Washington Declaration also mandated a number of practical steps:

- a. Direct telephone links would be opened between Jordan and Israel.
- b. The electricity grids of Jordan and Israel would be linked as part of a regional concept.
- c. Two new border crossings would be opened between Jordan and Israel.
- d. Free access would be given to third country tourist traveling between Jordan and Israel.
- e. Negotiations would be accelerated on opening an international air corridor between the two countries.

It is noteworthy that the Washington Declaration did not refer to the Madrid Peace Conference, or to any other peace

negotiations. It served as a bilateral joint declaration based on Jordanian-Israeli interests and the specific characteristics of their relationship. However, the declaration caused a Palestinian and Arab uproar over the third principle that granted Jordan custody over the holy shrines in Jerusalem. This principle triggered a crisis in Jordanian-Palestinian relations. Jordan issued a statement on July 28, 1994 referring this particular article to the Arab League, and informing Arab and Muslim countries of it to clear any ambiguity.¹

The custody over holy shrines in Jerusalem had been postponed in the Palestinian-Israeli talks to the stage following the application of self-governance. King Hussein felt it was important to take control over the holy shrines in Jerusalem to foil any attempt by Israeli extremists to violate the holiness of the shrines or take advantage of the absence of sovereignty.

The Washington Declaration underlined the importance of resolving the issue of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons on the basis of UN Resolution 149 and Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, that stipulated that refugees wishing to return to their homes should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return.

The Israeli Knesset endorsed the Washington Declaration on August 3, 1994 when 91 members voted in favour of it, and only 3 voted against.²

¹ Al-Majali 110.

² Nitham Assaf, *The Israeli Foreign Policy and Neighboring Countries* (Amman: Al-Majed Publishing 2000).

Israel immediately started supplying water from Yarmouk River to the Jordan Valley channel. On August 7, Israel inaugurated telephone links with Jordan. On August 8, the new Aqaba-Eilat border crossing between Jordan and Israel was opened. Prince Hassan, Rabin, and Christopher sponsored the opening ceremony.¹

After opening the border crossing, Jordanian-Israeli negotiations opened on the Israeli side of the Dead Sea. Talks covered issues of security, borders, environment, and energy. The technical steps for drafting common maps that marked borders between Jordan and Israel were endorsed. The two sides also agreed on a mechanism for supplying Jordan with water from the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers. Talks continued on issues of the air corridor, linkage of power grids, and tourism.

Jordanian negotiators exerted vigorous efforts to guarantee the Jordanian right to sovereignty on its lands following the Washington Declaration, until the Israeli recognition of this right was secured.

King Hussein met with Prime Minister Rabin on October 13, 1994 accompanied by a high-ranking delegation. The two sides discussed the articles of the peace treaty. After resolving all matters of disagreement, Jordan and Israel initialed the draft of the peace treaty in Amman on October 17, 1994. On October 18, 1994, the Jordanian cabinet endorsed the treaty.²

On October 26, 1994 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty in a ceremony held on the Wadi Araba border crossing.

¹ Al-Qur'an 69.

² Al-Qur'an 69.

King Hussein and Prince Hassan attended the ceremony, along with Ezer Weizman, the President of Israel, US Secretary of State Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozeryev and a number of other officials. Prime Minister Abdelsalam Al-Majali and Prime Minister Rabin signed the treaty. President Clinton signed as a witness.

Jordan's negotiations with Israel were driven by its commitment to international legitimacy, resolving the problem of refugees and settlements, and returning East Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty in the framework of a final and sustainable solution. However, in the absence of Arab coordination and under intense foreign pressure Jordan was forced to sign a peace treaty that did not address a final solution to all of these issues.

Jordan was under pressure on two levels that pushed the country toward signing the peace treaty:

Economic pressure

It is not an exaggeration to say that the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty was possible due to the aftermath of the Gulf War. Jordan suffered serious economic hardships due to its pro-Iraq stand. Jordan's economic losses reached \$2264 million JD in 1991, due to the cut in the aid from Gulf countries and the embargo on Aqaba Seaport. In his meeting with community leaders and political parties' representatives at the end of 1993, King Hussein clearly stated that Jordan was

put in an extremely critical situation and that he was forced to make a peace deal with Israel.¹

Jordan's peace treaty objectives had been:

1. Ending the long tie between the Jordanian economy and the Arab-Israeli conflict, preventing any future negative effects.
2. Recovering from the economic results of the second Gulf War, especially economic correction upon recommendations from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. As soon as Jordan signed the treaty with Israel, a considerable amount of Jordan's debt to Western countries was erased, including \$750 million USD debt to the U.S., \$100 million USD debt to Britain, and \$30 million USD to Germany. Other foreign debts were rescheduled. Through the Economic Correction Program (1992-1998), Jordan was able to reschedule debts for member states of Paris and London Clubs. US assistance also increased considerably, from \$35 million USD in 1991 to \$137 million USD in 1996, reaching \$325 million USD in 1999.²
3. Resuming normal relations with the Gulf countries after the second Gulf War with the help of the US, who urged the Gulf countries to support Jordan. The Gulf countries provided economic support to Jordan by opening their markets for Jordanian products, hiring Jordanian manpower, and giving direct financial assistance.

¹ Othman Al- Othman, *Guidelines of Negotiations and Characteristics of Negotiation Approaches* (N.p.: n.p. n.d.) 80.

² Khaled Al-Mahameed, *Economy and Jordan's Foreign Policy 1952- 1999* (Amman: Ministry of Culture 2002) 256- 257.

4. Bolstering economic cooperation with Israel in trade, establishing joint ventures and enhancing investment in compliance with the articles of the peace treaty.¹

Political pressure

The political pressure resulted from the signing of the secret Oslo deal between the PLO and Israel, which marginalized Jordan and denied it any power that it had previously possessed, which was the power of Arab solidarity. This gave way to speculations that there might have been a secret political deal sacrificing national reconciliation. Jordan realized that it was racing against time and weighed the risks that it could face if it waited until Syria and Lebanon signed a peace deal with Israel. It could have been further marginalized. King Hussein openly and frankly expressed his fears when he talked about Jordan's peace treaty with Israel before other Arab countries reached similar agreements. He said, "Egypt has travelled the whole journey. The Palestinian side moved afterwards. We moved to save our land, our water and our rights. Our country cannot defer critical issues that affect its future generations until everyone else solves their problems. Let us be honest, we are not being supported by a world superpower or by a group of countries. Our relations with other Arab countries following the Gulf War are still deteriorated."²

Jordan also feared that the new Palestinian entity would build strong economic ties with Israel and sacrifice its economic relations with Jordan. The annual revenues of Jordan generated by exports to the West Bank were estimated at \$10

¹ Al-Mahameed 258.

² Assaf 284.

million USD.¹ Jordanian fears increased after the PNA signed an economic agreement with Israel on April 29, 1994. Jordan was also worried that the international financial aid and the money transferred by Palestinian expatriate workers would be transferred directly to the Self-Governance Territories instead of the Jordanian banks.

During negotiations, the Jordanian side showed reservations over the economic relations between Jordan, the PNA and Israel in light of the Israeli monopoly of the West Bank market with \$1.5 to 2 billion USD of exports.²

The Peace Treaty

The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty addressed the peace established, the main principles, international boundaries, security, diplomatic relations, water resources, economic cooperation, refugees and internally displaced Palestinians, holy places, culture and science and mutual understanding and tolerance.

The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty was comprehensive and did not only address issues of controversy between the two sides, but also tackled other Middle Eastern issues that paved the way for a new regional order, as the two sides committed to enhance economic cooperation between themselves and within the larger economic regional framework.

Any regional order required two key factors to be successful, security and economy, and the peace treaty guaranteed both.

¹ Taher Kana'an, *The Economic Impact of the Declaration of Principles of Self-Governance* (Beirut: Palestinian Studies Periodical n.d.) 77.

² Al-Masalah 213.

It is notable that the treaty ended the state of enmity between the two countries and established mutual recognition. This is clearly stated in the treaty's preamble, "The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the State of Israel... bearing in mind that in their Washington Declaration of July 25, 1994, they declared the termination of the state of belligerency between them..."

The term "end the official state of enmity" that occurred in the Washington Declaration and that was reiterated in the preamble of the peace treaty is more comprehensive than the term, "end the state of war." The former is not limited to the military and martial actions, but includes cultural and psychological aspects of the clash of civilizations, in addition to the military one.

The mutual recognition was stated in Article 2 Paragraph 1 and 2: "1. They [Jordan and Israel] recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence; 2. They [Jordan and Israel] recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries." This article served the interests of both parties. It was recognition of the sovereignty, security and regional role of the State of Israel by an Arab country, and it calmed Jordan's fears of turning into an alternative homeland for Palestinians as it recognized Jordan's sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and recognized boundaries.

Paragraph 7 of article 2 stated that "They [Jordan and Israel] further believe that within their control, involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the security of either Party should not be permitted." This

paragraph directly rules out transferring the Palestinian population in either direction and aborted the alternative homeland, long sought by the Labour Party.

Boundaries, Sovereignty and Land

The treaty clearly defined the international boundary between Jordan and Israel being “delimited with reference to the boundary definition under the Mandate as the permanent, secure and recognized international boundary.” Annex I stated that the Baqura/Naharayim area (an area in the northern basin where Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers meet) “is under Jordan's sovereignty with Israeli private land ownership rights and property interests.” In 1928, the Jordan government sold 6,000 dunams of Baqura area to Pinhas Rutenberg for the hydroelectric power station of the Palestine Electric Company. The contract prohibited selling the land to a third party, and the condition was to use the part of the land required for building the power station and return the rest to the Jordanian government.¹

Under Annex I (b), Jordan undertook:

- to grant without charge unimpeded freedom of entry to, exit from land;
- usage and movement within the area to the land-owners and to their invitees or employees and to allow the land owners freely to dispose of their land in accordance with applicable Jordanian law;

Jordan also undertook:

¹ Khaled Al- Habashneh, *Jordanian- Israeli Relations: Roots and Horizons* (Amman: n.p. 1999) 72.

- A. Not to apply its customs or immigration legislation to land-owners, their invitees or employees crossing from Israel directly to the area;
- B. Not to impose discriminatory taxes or charges with regard to the land or activities within the area;
- C. To take all necessary measures to protect and prevent harassment of or harm to any person entering the area;
- D. To permit with the minimum of formality, uniformed officers of the Israeli police force, access to the area.

Moreover, the Israeli law was to be applied to Israelis and their activities in the area. Article 6 of Annex I (b) stated that the “Annex will remain in force for 25 years, and shall be renewed automatically.”

Paragraph 9 of Article 3 referred to the Al-Ghamr/Zofar area in the southern basin¹ as an “area which is under Jordan's sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights” for 25 years that shall be renewed automatically. The same provisions concerning Baqura/Naharayim apply.

Thus, Jordan managed to regain sovereignty over the areas of the 380 dunams of Baqura and Al- Ghamr that were occupied by Israel in 1950. The peace treaty recognized Jordan’s existence and boundaries, cancelling Zionist claims that the area to the east of the Jordan River was part of the Jewish land promised in Balfour Declaration and the Likud Party’s demands to turn Jordan into an alternative homeland for Palestinians.

¹ Al- Hamad 72.

Security

The peace treaty underlined mutual understanding and cooperation in security-related matters on the basis of mutual trust and aimed towards a regional framework of partnership.

As security was a top priority for Israel, the treaty paid significant attention to it. Both parties pledged in Article 4 (A, B and C):

- A. “To refrain from the threat of use of force or weapons, conventional, non-conventional or of any other kind, against each other, or of other actions or activities that adversely affect the security of the other Party.”¹
- B. “To refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party.”
- C. “To take necessary and effective measures to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party do not originate from, and are not committed within, through or over their territory.”

Jordan was committed to protecting the security and boundaries of Israel, even though that contradicted the Arab League members’ Joint Defense Agreement and Economic Cooperation Treaty. The task of Jordan included taking measures against organizations or political parties in Jordan that adopt charters belligerent towards Israel. This enforced regulations on the political, security and defense movements in Jordan and would have diverse effects on the ties between

¹ Ahmad Naji, “The Jordan- Israel Peace Treaty: Various Visions and Issues,” *International Policy* 119: 160.

Jordan and Arab countries and organizations, in addition to tightening the margin of democracy that would widen the gap between the Jordanian leadership and the Jordanian people, Jordanian political parties and Jordanian and professional associations.¹

Water

Many researchers of Middle East affairs and the Arab-Israeli conflict have underlined that peace in the Middle East will not be reached before agreement can be reached on the issue of water. The water crisis in the Middle East had always been prominent and pertinent to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In a report prepared by the CIA in 1992, three levels of risk were set for regions likely to witness conflicts over water:

1. Regions that might witness a war over water in the near future: mainly the Middle East region, involving Israel and Jordan.
2. Regions that are in danger: includes Arab Gulf countries and Tigris and Euphrates basin (Syria, Iraq and Turkey).
3. Region of unrest over water that might enter the risk zone in the coming 10 to 20 years: includes Nile basin countries.

The water conflict between Jordan and Israel could be summarized by the following:

1. The increase of water allocations to Israel from the Jordan River reached 660 MCM annually, despite the fact that a previous agreement had allocated 375 MCM only.

¹ Al- Habashneh 75.

2. The increase of water allocations to Israel from the Yarmouk River.
3. Israel took over most of the groundwater in Wadi Araba.
4. Drilling of deep water wells in the west bank of the Jordan River by Israel, which reduced the yields and quality of the Jordanian wells.
5. Israel took over mineral water springs in the occupied Jordanian Hemmeh area that gave more than 20 MCM annually.¹

The allocations of the Yarmouk River given to Israel reach more than half its capacity, while according to the Jordanian senior member of the Joint Water Committee Dr. Munther Haddadin, Jordan's water rights were from the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias and Israel had been over draining these water resources before negotiations started. Israel pumped 60 - 70 MCM from the Yarmouk River, but only 25 MCM were allocated to it in Johnson's Plan.²

Jordan did not have clear allocations of water from the Yarmouk River. Fixed allocations could have caused a conflict with Syria, in which 80 percent of the Yarmouk basin existed, and Syria pumped around 1 MCM of Jordan's allocations annually.

As for the Jordan River, the second paragraph of Annex II of the treaty allocated 50 MCM of for Jordan from the Jordan River given as following:

¹ Al- Hamad 90.

² George Al- Masri, *Israeli Covetousness in Arab Water* (n.p.: Euro-Arab Center for Studies 1996) 18- 19.

- “In return for the additional water that Jordan concedes to Israel in winter, Israel concedes to transfer to Jordan in the summer period (20) MCM from the Jordan River... Jordan shall pay the operation and maintenance cost of such transfer through existing systems (not including capital cost) and shall bear the total cost of any new transmission system...”
- In the winter: “Jordan is entitled to store for its use a minimum average of (20) MCM of the floods in the Jordan River.” Jordan will have to build a diversion/storage dam.
- “Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity of (10) MCM of desalinated water from the desalination... of saline springs...,” provided that it financed the operation and maintenance cost of the supply.

Jordan water experts estimated that the treaty granted Jordan an additional 215 MCM/ year.¹ Under the treaty’s provision, Jordan started receiving water from Lake Tiberias on June 20, 1995.²

The Economy

Economic development was a main objective of the treaty and it was to be reached through economic cooperation between the two countries to form a regional economic pillar. To accomplish this goal, the parties agreed to the following:

- A. “To remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations, to terminate economic boycotts directed at the other Party, and to co-operate in terminating boycotts

¹ Al- Hamad 91.

² Al- Sayyed Hussein 126.

against either Party by third parties.” This put Jordan in confrontation against any Arab country that was boycotting Israel.

- B. “Recognizing that the principle of free and unimpeded flow of goods and services should guide their relations, the parties will enter into negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic co-operation, including trade and the establishment of a free trade area or areas, investment, banking, industrial co-operation and labour, for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations, based on principles to be agreed upon, as well as on human development considerations on a regional basis. These negotiations will be concluded no later than six months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty;”
- C. “To co-operate bilaterally, as well as in multilateral forums, toward the promotion of their respective economies and of their neighborly economic relations with other regional parties.”

There was a great difference between Jordanian and Israeli economic capacity. At the time, the Israeli GDP was fourteen times larger than the Jordanian GDP. The Israeli economy could have taken over Jordan’s weak economy,¹ and it was hard for Jordan to create economic balance with Israel.

Implementing Article 7 of the treaty, Jordan and Israel signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement on October 25, 1995. The Israel-Jordan Trade Agreement

¹ The Parliament of Jordan, *The Statement of the Foreign Affairs Panel of the Lower House on Ratifying the Jordan- Israel Peace Treaty* (2 November, 1994).

recognized that the neighbouring geographical locations and joint boundaries enhanced cooperation in the economy, infrastructure and industry. The two countries agreed to work towards removing trade barriers, economic discrimination and the boycott of goods. An additional protocol established the granting of preferential customs treatment to a list of products agreed upon by the parties.

Article 6 of the agreement encouraged the expansion of economic cooperation in trade and industry through enhanced joint industrial projects, facilitating transit and re-export of goods and cooperation in building channels of marketing including exhibitions, conferences and advertisements. Israel would not engage in significant joint industrial ventures with Jordan that granted the latter access to modern industries. The joint projects focused on light industries, such as packaging, assembling Israeli products.

The results that Jordan expected to come out of this treaty can be summarized as following:

- Benefit of a number of joint ventures in employing manpower.
- Flow of investment money into Jordan. The previous instability of the region drove away Arab and foreign investments.
- Introduce technology to industry, agriculture and services, which would positively affect the Jordanian products.
- Benefit of transiting goods through Jordan between Israel and other Arab countries.

- Development of the tourism sector.¹

Israel signed the Peace Treaty aimed at:

- Ending the economic boycott of Israel and allowing Israeli products into the markets of Arab countries.
- Establishing the best conditions and terms for marketing Israeli products by removing barriers, facilitating the transfer of the products, and granting preferential customs treatment. Israel would also benefit from the convenient geographical location of Jordan in lowering the expenses of the transport of goods.
- Attracting investments to Israel.
- Growth in the tourism sector in Israel after establishing regional stability.
- Growth in the industrial sector in Israel after opening the region's markets to Israeli products and hiring relatively cheap Arab labour, ultimately leading to a reduction in production expenses.
- Development of the sea ports of Israel (Ports of Haifa, Ashdod and Ashkelon) to facilitate the import of goods from the US, South America and Europe.²

Refugees and Internally Displaced Palestinians

Under the operational definition of UNRWA, Palestinian refugees were people whose normal place of

¹ Al- Habashneh 114.

² Saqr, et al. 86- 87.

residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.

Palestinian refugees accounted for approximately 60 per cent of the total Palestinian population of six million. There were 1.74 million Palestinian refugees residing in Jordan.¹

Article 11 of the UN General Assembly Resolution 194 on refugees stated that “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return.”

Displaced Palestinians were defined as Palestinians “who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1967 conflict.” The Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles signed on September 13, 1993 in Oslo underlined the difficulty in reaching an agreement over the issue of refugees, which was deliberately left to be decided at a later stage.

As for the displaced Palestinians, the Oslo Accords stated that both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides would invite the governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in a quadripartite committee to decide upon an agreement to allow Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank who were displaced in the 1967 war to return in accordance with regulations. The Oslo Accords also stated that the return of some displaced

¹ Ali Za'al, *Refugees and the Future of Joint Security in the Middle East* (Irbid: University of Yarmouk n.d.) 12, 64.

Palestinians to the self-governed territories was subject to negotiations.

Postponing the decision on refugees until the final status negotiations weakened the Jordanian position in negotiations and limited their approach to the problem in the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty.¹

Article 8 of the peace treaty stated the following:

- “Recognizing the massive human problems caused to both Parties by the conflict in the Middle East, as well as the contribution made by them toward the alleviation of human suffering, the parties will seek to further alleviate those problems arising on a bilateral level.
- “Recognizing that the above human problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East cannot be fully resolved on the bilateral level, the Parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate forums, in accordance with international law, including the following: A. In the case of displaced persons, in a quadripartite committee together with Egypt and the Palestinians; B. In the case of refugees, (i) In the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees; (ii) In negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or otherwise, in conjunction with and at the same time as the permanent status negotiations pertaining to the Territories [the West Bank and Gaza].
- Paragraph 1 (C) stated that the Parties would seek to resolve the human problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East “through the implementation of agreed United

¹ Al- Qur’an 103- 104.

Nations programs and other agreed international economic programs concerning refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their settlement.”

Thus, it is evident that Jordan tried to save the rights of refugees and displaced Palestinians after the ambiguity in the clauses on refugees and displaced persons in the Declaration of Principles of the Oslo Accords that deferred deciding the issues.

The treaty articles on refugees agreed with the Labour Party of Israel that supported a confederation between Jordan and the Palestinians Self-Governance Territories. A Jordanian-Palestinian confederation would serve the Labour Party’s aim to establish the alternative homeland on the East Bank of the Jordan River, hoping that the unclear future, the deteriorated economic situation and the political unrest in the West Bank and Gaza might lead to voluntary migration to Jordan.¹

Places of Historical and Religious Significance and Interfaith Relations

The Hashemites had taken over responsibility of holy sites and endowments in Jerusalem in 1924 at the request of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and Muslim Leader Hajj Amin Al-Husseini’s to place Jerusalem under the guardianship of Abdullah I bin Al-Hussein. The Hashemites had continued looking after the holy sites in Jerusalem since Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank in 1988. However, recognizing the role of Jordan in Jerusalem in the treaty raised the ire of Palestinians who viewed the recognition as an act to marginalize their rights in custody over Jerusalem and hinder

¹ Al- Hamad 89.

their efforts in making Jerusalem the capital of the future Palestinian state.

Jordan made it clear that documenting this paragraph in the treaty was a result of postponing a decision on this issue until final status negotiations. If Jordan gave up custody over Jerusalem, the holy shrines would be put under the Israeli Ministry of Religious Services. Jordan reiterated its commitment to handing custody over to Palestinians after the conclusion of the final status negotiations and Jerusalem would be under Palestinian sovereignty.

King Hussein underlined that Jordan was committed to protect the right to the holy sites on behalf of the Muslim nation, stressing that Jordan would not abandon this responsibility until Palestinians regained sovereignty over national soil, including Jerusalem.

Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Jordan- Israel Peace Treaty states that “each Party will provide freedom of access to places of religious and historical significance.” Paragraph 2 of the same article underlined Israel’s respect of “the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem,” adding that “when negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.”

Paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty stated that “The Parties will act together to promote interfaith relations among the three monotheistic religions, with the aim of working towards religious understanding, moral commitment, freedom of religious worship, and tolerance and peace.”

The gains of Jordan and Israel from the Peace Treaty

With the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, both sides made many gains, but not without giving many compromises.

Jordan succeeded in fortifying its existence and political entity. It succeeded in delimiting borders with Israel for the first time since Israel was established in 1948, ruling out the alternative homeland theory. The Prime Minister of Jordan Abdelsalam Al-Majali, made a strong statement at the time that the delimitation of borders had ruled out and buried the alternative homeland plan.¹

The peace treaty also achieved the elimination of any military danger from Israel, returned water rights to Jordan, and granted Jordan custody over the holy sites in Jerusalem. On the economic level, the regional stability created by the treaty helped Jordan attract foreign investments and work toward economic prosperity.

Israel was recognized by Jordan as a country that had sovereignty and borders. The treaty guaranteed Israel's right to exist in peace and boosted its regional role. The Israeli economy witnessed significant growth after the end of the boycott, attracting investments, inaugurating joint projects and developing tourism.²

The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty was met with opposition and rejection on both sides. In Jordan, public opposition was intensified on the political scene by the Islamic, pan- Arab and leftist parties.

¹ Al- Qur'an 166.

² Al- Hamad 92- 93.

In Israel, many people thought that the peace treaty was a compromise that their government had given to the Arabs. One of the arguments was that the treaty harmed the interests of Israeli farmers who possessed lands that Jordan claimed sovereignty over. Israeli MPs rejected the peace treaty as a “surrender treaty that offers many compromises, making it look as if Israel has lost the war.” **CITATION???**

Ariel Sharon refrained from supporting the treaty, although he supported reaching agreement with Arab states. The reasons behind his rejection were that the treaty did not refer to the Jewish historical entitlement to the east bank of the Jordan River, it obliged Israel to pump a certain amount of water to Jordan in spite of the water crisis it suffered, it did not oblige both parties to regard terrorist groups as outlaw groups, and, most importantly, the treaty granted Jordan custody and the right of supervision on the holy sites in Jerusalem, or what Israelis call the Temple Mount, which is the holiest site for Jewish people.¹

The treaty was also not well received by some Arab states. Iraq clearly stated its rejection, while Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Libya had reservations on a number of specific clauses in the treaty. The rest of Arab states agreed that ending 47 years of enmity between Jordan and Israel was a step toward accomplishing just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

The UN naturally supported the peace treaty and expressed hope that peace would make progress on other tracks in the region, and key European and Asian countries adopted the UN stand.

¹ Al- Qur'an 63-64.

Developments In The Peace Process Until King Hussein's Death

Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference (29- 31 October, 1995)

Jordan believed that joint and rapid growth of the regional economy was a major pillar of peace that could be achieved through a partnership that was based on mutual commitment and interest. To this end, Jordan hosted the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Economic Conference with 2000 public and private sectors participants from 63 countries. The conference was intended to follow up on plans that had been proposed at the Casablanca Arab Summit (October 30-31, 1994).

In his opening address, King Hussein said that “Our efforts were crowned with success when we signed the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, which we hope will be the launching pad for comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the whole region. But the peace which we seek must be accompanied by sincere and persistent efforts in social and economic development...” King Hussein stressed that “the countries of the region have already initiated their cooperation, which is based on clear foundations, in three areas: the environment, water, and the infrastructure.”

The MENA Economic Conference focused on regional issues, including cooperation, special economic zones, trade and investment, and infrastructure. There were almost 1000 regional and local enterprises present, with a budget of \$100 billion USD on the conference's agenda for discussion. One of the most prominent projects proposed was the Development of

the Jordan Rift Valley area, Wadi Araba and Dead Sea projects, and interconnection of the electric grids.

The conference led to the establishment of:

1. A Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development in the Middle East and North Africa to support private sector growth, regional infrastructure development, and regional economic cooperation.
2. The Middle East and Mediterranean Tourism and Travel Association, to facilitate tourism and attract tourists.
3. Executive Secretariat of the Conference in Rabat to bolster partnership between the public and private sectors and encourage communication.

In the closing statement, the MENA Economic Conference hailed the measures taken by countries of the region to strengthen their economies. The closing statement also set the timing of the ministerial meeting in Paris on economic assistance to the self-governance territories for the end of 1995.

It was King Hussein's intention that participants would leave with a positive image of investment and the democratic atmosphere in Jordan.

Jordanian support to the PNA

By 1995, Jordanian-Palestinian relations were characterized by cooperation and coordination. The PNA invested in the international and regional status of Jordan and King Hussein pushed hindered peace negotiations between Palestine and Israel, led by Likud, forward.

The Jordanian political support for the PNA was evident in many ways, such as the Jordanian stand on the development of Palestinian self-governance negotiations and the Israeli withdrawal from Hebron. King Hussein exerted strong efforts to mediate between the PNA and Israel to support negotiations on the issue. King Hussein concluded his efforts with a visit to Gaza, during which he met with the President of the PNA Yasser Arafat, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the US envoy to the Middle East, Dennis Ross. The meeting helped to bridge the gap between the two sides and led to a redeployment agreement from Hebron on January 19.

Jordanian-Israeli ties were affected by Israeli attempts to evade the commitments of the phase II redeployment from the West Bank agreement. Relations entered a crisis when Israel excavated a tunnel under Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, causing Jordan to summon the US ambassador to Amman and hand him a letter of protest. The Jordanian Foreign Minister reiterated Jordan's rejection of any measures that would change the cultural, religious and demographic identity of the City of Jerusalem.

King Hussein's visit to Jericho on October 15, 1996 was meant to strengthen the Palestinian stand and support the demand of establishing an independent Palestinian state.

The Jordanian Foreign Minister also criticized the US move to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem. Jordan had reservations on any decision that would tamper with Jerusalem's status and influence any decision on the final status situation that should be based on UN Security Council Resolution 242.

Jordan also supported the PNA and Palestinians economically and socially by facilitating the movement of Palestinians to and from the West Bank and granting West Bank residents Jordanian passports valid for five years. This step was met with much relief by West Bank residents.¹ A joint Jordanian-Palestinian ministerial committee was formed in 1996 to establish cooperation in agricultural and industrial exchange and Jordan helped also in delivering Palestinian products to other Arab countries. Jordan worked not only on political and economic levels, but also provided urgent food and medical aid to Palestinians to alleviate the impact of the enforced Israeli siege.

Developments in the Palestinian settlement

The Oslo Accords stated that the permanent-status negotiations should commence no later than May 4, 1996 and that the interim-stage agreement should end by that date, as Israeli elections approached. The Palestinian and Israeli delegations met only once at the end of Peres' rule and agreed to postpone the permanent-status negotiations until after the Israeli elections.

The Labour Party government was removed from power without fulfilling its obligations concerning a number of special arrangements related to the interim period. The stages of the redeployment of Israeli forces stated by the interim agreement were not implemented.²

¹ Al- Khalayleh 660.

² Shalash 73- 74.

Netanyahu assumed office in 1996 believing in three no's: no for the Palestinian state, no for compromises in Golan and no to dividing Jerusalem.

Israeli settlement activity resumed. In December, Israel excavated a tunnel under Al-Aqsa Mosque which led to fierce confrontations with Palestinians and ended with Israel occupying self-governance territories. The US attempted to intensify efforts for resumption of negotiations. It invited Arafat and Netanyahu to meet in Washington in the presence of King Hussein.

In 1998, Clinton opened a summit that included Arafat and Netanyahu. The meeting led to signing the Wye River Memorandum at the White House on October 23, 1998. King Hussein was present.¹

The agreement was to consist of the transfer of 13 per cent of Area C by Israel to the Palestinian side while the core of the agreement was on security.²

Netanyahu froze the Wye Plantation Agreement two months after it was signed and it remained frozen until Ehud Barak assumed office in July 1999. Barak procrastinated resumption of negotiations according to agreements signed under Netanyahu's government, claiming he wanted to integrate the Wye Plantation Agreement with final-status issues. He bought time to increase settlements until another memorandum was signed on September 5, 1999. It was named Wye II because its goal was the implementation of outstanding

¹ Abdul Rahman Al- Hawari, *Developments of Peace on the Palestinian Track between Madrid 1990 and Taba 2001 and Future Prospects* (Cairo: Defense Periodical 2001) 16.

² Laurence 109.

commitments of the Wye Plantation I Memorandum. However, Barak continued to place obstacles for its implementing.¹

The Camp David Summit, held between July 10 and 25, 2000, was the catalyst for Al-Aqsa uprising, known as the second Intifada, which started after the failure of negotiations. The Camp David Summit was held at the end of President Clinton's term following pressure by the US administration. The two-week summit focused on the final-status situation, including Jerusalem, borders, refugees, land, and security. When negotiation over land and borders opened, Israel proposed keeping 80 per cent of 200,000 Israeli settlers that had settled in the West Bank under Israeli sovereignty. Barak suggested including three settlement clusters that formed almost 10.5 per cent of the West Bank and to use a strip that made up 8.5 to 12 per cent of the Palestinian lands parallel to the Jordan River and Dead Sea for a year to host alarm stations. Barak then suggested decreasing the area for Israel to take over to 9 per cent on condition of retaining alarm monitoring centers and stations. The lands chosen by Israel were agricultural lands that contained water resources.

Israel fiercely rejected the Palestinian right to return and proposed allowing several thousands of refugees to return to Israel in order to reunite with families. The proposed number of refugees was to reach 100,000 in the 10 years to follow. Israel demanded sovereignty over Jewish neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem that formed one third of the Holy City's area. They also requested to be in control of Al-Aqsa mosque. These demands revealed that Israel was not serious in reaching a final

¹ Mohammed Ali Al- Farra, *False Peace between Madrid Conference and Al- Aqsa Uprising* (Amman: Majdalawi for Publishing and Distribution 2001) 244- 245).

solution because demanding sovereignty over East Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque were non-negotiable to the Palestinian, Arab and Muslim negotiators.

Israel remained intransigent and the Camp David meeting was aborted. Moreover, the visit of Ariel Sharon to Al-Aqsa Mosque in the year 2000 catalyzed another Palestinian Intifada.

CHAPTER 10: Reforms of King Abdullah II

King Abdullah II focused on fortifying and developing Jordan internally to enable the country to assume an advanced level in the region and in the world. King Abdullah II gave great attention to the following reforms:

Political Reforms

Following his accession to the throne, King Abdullah II underlined the importance of establishing democracy and encouraging political participation. King Abdullah II was keen to establish the rule of law and support the diversity of political parties, which he saw as an important indicator of political development. The King launched many initiatives¹ to bolster Jordanians' social awareness, particularly among youth.

The reform march in Jordan was prominent in the King's approach to governing, and the parliamentary system witnessed several developments after King Abdullah II assumed his constitutional powers in the 13th Parliament in 1997.

The elections of the 13th Parliament were characterized by the absence of many key political powers following the failure of talks with the government. The political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), was the distinctive political player that did not participate. The IAF issued a statement on July 13, 1997 announcing a boycott of elections,² justified by the fact that the government rejected

¹ The most prominent initiatives were: Jordan First and Kuluna al Urdun (We are All Jordan).

² The Muslim Brotherhood also urged the government for a number of reform steps.

amending the one-man one-vote system¹ and opposition to the normalization of relations between the government and Israel. The boycott decision was well received by the public, who seemed indifferent to the electoral process.

Political parties that participated in the elections included the National Constitutional Party, the Arab Land Party and the Peace Party. The downside of the boycott, that negatively affected Parliament, was the absence of organized ideological and political movements and of opposition representation.²

Freedoms and Political Parties

King Abdullah saw developments in freedoms and political parties as strong indicators of political reform. In many of his speeches, he highlighted the active role of political parties. “When talking about political reform, the most important thing is spreading awareness and democratic culture and developing the political parties encouraging Jordanians to participate and take part in the decision making.”³

Regression in political life in Jordan was evident in the tension and opposition that often occurred in the relationship between the government and other the political parties. In an effort to develop the political parties in Jordan, the Political

¹ The one-man one-vote system means that each voter can give one vote for one candidate, regardless of the number of candidates of the electoral district.

² Khaled Ibrahim Al- Hmeisat and Khaled Mousa Al- Zou’bi, *Parliamentary Life in Jordan (1989- 2001): Performance, Achievements and Assessment* (n.p.: n.p. 2004) 287-290, 210.

³ *The Speech from the Throne, Opening of the Ordinary Session of the 15th Parliament* (2007).

Parties Law number 19 of 2007 was endorsed. The main changes presented by this law were:

1. Lowering the age for founder members from 25 to 21.
2. Allocating financial support for the political parties in the State Budget.
3. Guaranteeing unprejudiced treatment of citizens regardless of their political affiliations.
4. Enabling the political parties to use the state-owned public facilities.¹

The Political Role of Women

The status of women and their role in politics were also considered significant indicators of the political reform movement in Jordan. His Majesty King Abdullah II repeatedly stressed the significance of activating the political role of women. He reiterated that women represented a wide group of Jordanian society and that democracy would not be achieved with a lack of female representation in parliament and participation in decision making.

The first woman to occupy a parliamentary seat was Toujan Faisal in the 12th Parliament. She won a seat allocated to Circassians and Chechens under the quota system from minorities. The elections of the 13th Parliament witnessed an active woman's movement vying for parliamentary seats. Success in joining parliament was essential to protect the gains of women and update laws that would contribute to the development of women in society. Seventeen women

¹ *Political Parties Law 35 of 2007.*

participated in the 1997 elections, but none were elected. They secured a total of 13086 votes. In by-elections held in March 2001, after an MP passed away, the Lower House elected Mrs. Nuha Ma'aytah to become a member. No public elections were held.¹

The 14th Parliament witnessed progress in the participation of women by allocating six parliamentary seats for women as per the 2003 amendments to the Election Law 34 of 2001. The Jordanian Woman Declaration included several principles covering laws and legislations, and requested amending several laws, including the Election Law and the Naturalizations Law. It also underlined the importance of guaranteeing free and independent media that would actively participate in conveying a positive image of women and encourage the participation of women's movements. Finally, the declaration voiced value for the role of the family in maintaining a healthy society, at the same time calling for a review of traditions and the elimination of negative values.²

The 15th Parliament saw the success of the first woman to win a parliamentary seat that was not part of the quota. Falak Al-Jam'ani received 3,301 votes and was elected to the 15th Parliament. The number of women candidates reached 199, the highest in Jordan's history. The Election Law of 2010 allocated 10 parliamentary seats for women under the quota system, while they reserved the right to compete for other seats as well.

¹ Emily Naffa', *The Jordanian Woman Journey to the Parliament* (n.p.: n.p., n.d.) n.p.

² *Jordanian Woman Declaration- A Program for the Next Stage (2003- 2007)*

Women's access to Parliament contributed to gradually changing the stereotypes of women and their role in public life in a conservative society.¹

Economic Reform

When King Abdullah II assumed his constitutional powers, he was keen to increase economic growth to pull Jordan out of economic crisis. King Abdullah II continually stressed the importance of increasing economic growth and curbing the economic challenges facing the country, particularly poverty, unemployment, external debt, the state budget deficit and reliance on foreign assistance. Jordan implemented major policies that were applied to achieve economic reform and development.²

Privatization aimed to activate the role of the private sector in the process of economic development. Revenues generated by privatization reached \$900 million USD, accounting for 12 per cent of the GDP.³ In an effort to bolster relations between the public and private sectors, King Abdullah II issued a Royal Decree on December 13, 1999 appointing 20 members, mostly from the private sector, to the Economic Investment Council to supervise the implementation of reforms to economic and social domains. The King also invited over 160 representatives of both sectors to conference at the Dead Sea to enhance cooperation between the public and the private sectors. The two-day meeting proposed several recommendations for the progress of the Jordanian economy,

¹ Ensaf Al- Khawaldeh, *The Woman Participation in Political Development* (n.p.: n.p., n.d.) n.p.

² Fahd Al- Fanek, "Prevailing Economic Challenges," *Al- Rai Newspaper*.

³ Al- Tarawneh 45.

among which were the application of a free economy and modern policies, and necessary legislative amendments that supported the economic reform.¹

Privatization increased the efficiency of production projects and their competitive ability, encouraging local, Arab and international investments, and creating an atmosphere for proper investment. Privatization also aimed to alleviate the treasury burden by stopping assistance and loans granted for unsuccessful projects. Moreover, privatization encouraged adoption of modern and new approaches for managing projects with modern technology.²

The World Bank commended the Jordanian model as one of the most successful privatization models in the Middle East.³

King Abdullah II viewed free economic zones as an efficient solution for improving the national economy and increasing the rates of economic growth. The objectives of the development zones were to attract investments and create job opportunities, and distribute the development gains and benefits to all of Jordan's governorates by establishing proper development projects in each one.

The development zones contributed to the improvement of social, economic, cultural and construction infrastructure for future investment and service projects. The Development Zones Law stated that the Development Zones Commission would be established, and that the tasks and powers of the

¹ Mustafa Al- Khawaldeh, Wissam Zahran and Shireen Al- Amayreh, *The Royal Initiatives of His Majesty King Abdullah II* (n.p.: n.p. n.d.) 323- 324.

² The Executive Privatization Commission (EPC).

³ Al- Tarawneh 46- 47.

commission included “drawing up the general policy of the Development Zones and ... regulating the investment environment in the Development Zones and regulating and monitoring the Economic Activities therein... [in addition to] regulating the municipal affairs.” The Master Developer of any Development Zone was required to “undertake managing the financing and development of the Development Zone and related issue, including the establishment, management, and development of amenities and services necessary for that purpose, including roads, electricity, water, telecommunications, sewage, safety and environmental requirements and any other amenities or services.” These authorities were granted to the Development Zones due to the challenges facing municipalities in implementing such projects, e.g. lack of resources, increased debt of municipalities due to increased population, the expansion of municipal administrative boundaries and the lack of organization. The Development Zones Law offered investors a lot of flexibility and exemptions to support and encourage them. The law gave the government the power to grant visas and residency permits to foreign investors and workers of projects in the development zones.¹

The most successful of the development zones was the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA). ASEZA was initially established as a free zone upon King Abdullah’s initiative. It was the starting point for Aqaba to become a vital economic center in the region, particularly with its convenient geographical locations² on the shores of the Red Sea. ASEZA contributed to placing Jordan on the map of world economies.

¹ Nabil Al- Ma’ani, *Views of the Development Zones Law* (n.p.: n.p. 2008) n.p.

² The strategic location of Aqaba is from the fact that it oversees four countries.

Aqaba had the capability to host several economic activities including tourism, professional services and transportation and its location enabled it to attract global investments.¹

ASEZA started operations at the beginning of 2001, and included the area of 375 sq km, offering many facilities and imposing no restrictions on the share of foreign investment in industry, trade and tourism. ASEZA also offered exemption from custom fees imposed on imports for the zone. ASEZA did not enforce restrictions on dealing with foreign currency or on transferring profits and capitals outside of Jordan. The strategic plan aimed at attracting up to \$6 billion USD investments and creating 700,000 job opportunities by 2030.

Thus, announcing Aqaba as a special economic zone supported economic growth and created a prosperity that had positive effects on the city and the livelihood of its citizens, mainly due to growth in the job market. The success of ASEZA encouraged the creation of development zones in other governorates and the launching of investment ventures tailored to each governorate.

Free zones provided facilities, services and necessary infrastructure, including electricity power, water, roads. They also hosted institutions, such as bank branches and insurance companies.

The Economic and Social Transformation Program was prepared in November, 2001 upon royal directives. This program aimed to achieve economic and social growth and the

¹ Al- Tarawneh 107.

development of human resources¹, in addition to providing efficient public services in health and education. Among the program's objectives were the development of rural areas and enhancement of the role of the private sector by encouraging investments in development enterprises, adoption of new strategies with regard to accuracy, efficiency, and preserving monetary and financial stability.

The program was successful in achieving a number of laws and regulations to enhance the investment climate and align the legislative environment with the requirements of evolving global trends. The underlying goal was to enable the private sector to assume a leading role in the development process. In this regard, the Government of Jordan completed the action plan and timetable for the implementation of projects being undertaken by the private sector.

The Economic and Social Transformation Program concentrated on all aspects of development, from training and human resources to creating the proper environment for the implementation of the program through the amendment or passing of laws. The program also aimed to include the private sector as a partner in development.

The King Abdullah II Fund for Development (KAFD) was established in 2004. KAFD was designed to operate as a non-governmental organization to support development efforts in Jordan. The development enterprises implemented by KAFD, in cooperation with the private sector, improved the livelihood of Jordanians.

¹ Developing human resources refers to developing higher education, public education and vocational training sectors and paying a special attention to cultural issues. It also focuses on youth issues to increase the efficiency of human energy in Jordan.

There were two kinds of initiatives and activities undertaken by KAFD:

- Non-profit development projects to train members of the community to meet market demands. The projects targeted communities, particularly in remote areas.
- Investments that worked to achieve comprehensive development.

KAFD's objectives included encouraging individuals to launch business enterprises and to take part in comprehensive development. The organization was created to support and encourage scientific, cultural and educational activities by sponsoring excellent students in all educational stages and funding scientific initiatives.^{1 2} KAFD focused on preparing qualified leaders through developing education opportunities and supporting youth and its projects battled poverty and unemployment and boosted economic growth by cooperating with the private sector in launching investment projects.

The Economic and Social Development Plan (2004-2006) was a continuation of the Royal initiatives that had a great impact on the Jordanian economy. The plan aimed to face the challenges presented by regional and international developments to the economy of Jordan, such as the increasing rates of poverty and unemployment, the deficit in the state budget, the large volume of foreign debt and the continuous fluctuation in financial assistance. All of these challenges demanded that Jordan rely on itself. The Economic and Social

¹ Al- Tarawneh 93- 94.

² "King Abdullah II Fund for Development (KAFD)," *Al- Rai Newspaper* (7 June, 2009).

Development Plan was a step toward sustainable development to minimize Jordan's reliance on outside forces.¹

The plan focused on policies relevant to the general budget, balance of payments, monetary indicators² and the social sector.

The Economic and Social Development Plan positively affected the GDP, boosting it to 7.5 per cent in 2005 and exceeding estimated rates. However, there were no tangible results. Livelihood did not improve, poverty and unemployment rates did not change, and inflation rates exceeded estimations and reached 3.5 percent in 2005 and 4.4 percent during the first three months of 2006. Local government revenues exceeded numbers estimated by the plan due to the increase in tax revenues, and these increased tax revenues were absorbed.

Under the rule of King Abdullah II, many economic and legislative reforms were made to help Jordan meet global economic standards. In 2000, the Lower House of Parliament endorsed a bill to access the World Trade Organization (WTO) after the international body approved Jordan's request to join. Jordan was committed to providing services and access to foreign investors and signed a partnership agreement with the European Union (EU), which was activated in May 2002 and aimed to establish a joint Euro-Jordanian free trade zone by 2010.³

¹ The Economic and Social Development Plan (2004 -2006) A new Vision for Sustainable Development.

² The Balance of Payments is an accounting record of all monetary transactions between a country and the rest of the world.

³ Al- Tarawneh 38.

As a step towards bolstering partnership between Jordan and the EU, a financial assistance program allocated \$223 EUR million to Jordan between 2011 and 2013, 60 per cent of which would go toward supporting the state budget. The partnership between Jordan and the EU played a major role in giving momentum to the economic and social projects in Jordan. The partnership also encouraged and developed trade by waiving and lowering custom duties. The success of this partnership has been evident by the increase in the EU financial assistance to Jordan.¹

Jordan also became a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) along with 16 other Arab states. GAFTA is a program under which Arab products were to be treated like national products in all member states. Jordan signed bilateral agreements with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt in February 2003.

The agreements that Jordan signed contributed to the development and growth of the national economy by benefiting from other countries' experiences. In addition, such agreements facilitated the movement and transfer of capital, attracted new investments and increased Jordanian exports.

The impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on Jordan

When the US housing market bubble burst in 2008, global economic growth witnessed a slow down and the economic crisis experienced by large economy countries was

¹ Hala Hadidi, *Petra News Agency, Amman*. 31 May, 2010.

reflected on the economies of developing countries that were heavily dependent on financial assistance.¹

The impacts of the global financial crisis on Jordan were decided by the effects of the crisis on the economies of the Gulf countries, the effects of the crisis on economic sectors of the US, and the US measures taken to curb the crisis. The Jordanian economy was deeply affected by the exchange rate of the US dollar, as the Jordanian dinar is pegged to the USD, and the financial assistance that Jordan received from the US.

In the short term, the slow economic growth caused by the global financial crisis lowered the price of oil and other basic commodities, which positively affected the economy of Jordan by lowering the cost of imports and raising exports that resulted from low production costs caused by low oil price. The increase in exports also increased foreign currency reserves and the low prices of basic commodities and oil also lowered inflation rates. Thus, the economy of Jordan unmistakably improved at the beginning of the crisis.²

Although these short-term impacts were positive the long term impacts have been negative, as prevailing global economic stagnation harmed Jordan's small and open economy.

The main negative effects of the global financial crisis on Jordan included:

- The money transfer of Jordanian expatriates: With the

¹ Al- Tijani Al- Tayyeb Ibrahim, *The Storm in World Financial Markets and Effects on the Economy of Sudan*.

² A Lecture on the Impacts of the Global financial crisis on Jordan. University of Yarmouk.

continuation of economic stagnation and very slow economic growth, the investments, especially from the Arabian Gulf, in the US and Europe were harmed, lowering revenues for the Gulf States and affecting their economies. The income of Jordanian expatriates working in the Gulf was reduced, and was reflected in the decrease of money transfers sent home to family members.

- The economic growth in Jordan: Jordan is a small open economy and as the economic stagnation affected the export and import rates and lowered foreign investments, the economic growth in Jordan slowed dramatically.
- The public budget: The crunch in external financial assistance due to the crisis of the economy of donor countries who preferred to pump cash into their local markets to revive them.¹
- The exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar was affected by the weakened US dollar against foreign currencies as the dinar is pegged to the latter. The weakened currency increased the burden of Jordan's debt.²

Public Sector Reform

The significance of this aspect of reform lies in that it concentrates on the party that is responsible for implementing other aspects of reform. Based on this belief, King Abdullah II underlined the importance of transparency, accountability and the rule of law. The strategies and plans that could achieve reform in the public sector were:

¹ *Al- Rai Newspaper* (6 December, 2008).

² The debt burdens are the installments and interests.

- A. The Public Sector Development Program that was implemented between 2004 and 2009. It aimed to improve the performance of ministries and governmental bodies. It focused on several tasks:
- a. Improve quality of governmental services and facilitate procedures.
 - b. Establish an ombudsman bureau to reach the objectives of the program that focus on efficiency and rule out nepotism to guarantee the values of transparency and justice underlined by King Abdullah II.
 - c. Restructure governmental bodies, which was necessary to guarantee better services and sort out the overlapping in the tasks and jobs of the different ministries.
 - d. Manage human resources, which included recruitment, training and promotion, paying special attention to the rights and duties of the employee.
 - e. The Innovation and Excellence fund was a tool for developing the public sector. It aimed at enhancing the competitive environment among public institutions to secure technical support and implement initiatives that would guarantee improved services.

The Code of Conduct is a document that includes all legislations and principles that explain them. This Code of Conduct is an explanatory reference for public servants to be

introduced to the ethics of work. This document is also a Pact of Honor for public servants to serve the country.

The e-government is a national program launched by King Abdullah II at the end of 2006. The e-government aims to enhance the governmental performance, improving services and efficiency. The e-government program focuses on 4 areas: applications of electronic services, establishing and developing a proper electronic infrastructure, establishing a legislative and regulatory suitable environment, regulating procedures of the e- government efficiently.¹

King Abdullah II was keen on achieving judiciary reform to create a state of law and to achieve justice and integrity. These factors would boost the image of Jordan in the international community. A strategy for developing the judicial system was prepared between 2004 and 2006. The strategy highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial system. The objectives of the strategy focused on developing the judicial system and enhancing its independency, supporting the institutionalization of the Ministry of Justice, providing courts with necessary regulations and staff to increase efficiency, increasing the role of the judicial system in supporting the civil society and creating a judiciary system that embodied the principle that justice is the basis of ruling.²

The Social Reform

Social development is a key factor for several other reforms, including political reform. Although all necessary measures were taken to guarantee more political participation, such as passing election laws and bills to regulate political

¹ Al- Tarawneh 193, 194, 195.

² "Royal Initiatives," *Petra News Agency*.

parties, many policies were implemented in a manner that negatively affected citizens. The free market policy and opening the door for foreign investors or their agents harmed national production and marginalized the social and the economic role of the state. The social transformation triggered by such policies weakened the political reform process and made it hard to achieve. This social transformation wiped out the middle class creating two classes: the extremely wealthy and the extremely poor. With this new social classification system, different phenomenon occurred that obstructed the political reform process. Amidst poverty and deteriorated livelihoods, people were less keen on political participation and tended to sell their votes in elections.

Achieving political reform required social reform through curbing poverty and unemployment, applying relatively conservative economic policies, maintaining public services and activating the economic and social role of the state.

Since assuming constitutional powers King Abdullah II exerted enormous efforts to achieve social reform.

The housing initiative was one of the most prominent initiatives launched by King Abdullah II to improve the livelihood of his citizens. The initiative was launched in 2008 and was to be implemented over five years, after which 100,000 housing units would be complete. The initiative targeted low income families and was to be implemented over two stages: the first launched in 2008, and would include 20,500 housing units built on land owned by the Housing and Urban Development Corporation. The second stage would build 190,000 housing units.

The Jordan Education Initiative (JEI) was launched at the World Economic Forum held in 2003. The initiative focused on developing electronic learning and introducing information technology to the education system to enhance qualifications of the graduates and boost the knowledge capacity of people creating an educated society.

The program focused mainly on creating an environment that is attractive to investors to revive national economy and increase the GDP.

King Abdullah launched the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR) as one of the initiatives that played a significant role in government reform. It aimed at making progress in the field of human rights in accordance with international standards. The tasks of the NCHR were following up on human rights legislations, developing them in accordance with international standards and guaranteeing justice and freedom of speech to boost the democratic process. The NCHR organized many activities represented in forums and lectures to spread awareness on human rights, and created opportunities for teaching human rights principles in all educational stages.

We Are All Jordan

We Are all Jordan was an initiative launched by King Abdullah II in July 2006 to involve all components of society in the formation and implementation of public decisions. A preparatory meeting was held at the Dead Sea area with over 750 participants representing public and official bodies, and youth and civil society organizations. Participants voted on national priorities that included: citizenship, rule of state, protecting national interests and security, establishing good

governance, integrity of the judicial system, battling poverty, protecting human rights, fighting terrorism, developing education, regional stability, health care, financial stability, developing the political scene and attracting investments.¹

The forum highlighted the importance of bolstering ties with Arab and Muslim countries, in addition to making the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and applying principles of international legitimacy. It also emphasized establishing water security and coordinating with neighbouring countries to protect water basins, in addition to exploring new water resources. The forum discussed drafting plans to face the hikes in oil prices, and stressed support for the Iraqi people against occupation and in committing to participate in rebuilding Iraq.

The Palestinian cause was also mentioned and it was stressed resolution of the Palestinian issue in a way that guaranteed the legitimate rights of Palestinians, underlining that negotiations was the way to reach a just solution. Participants in We Are All Jordan said that resolving the Palestinian issue should not jeopardize Jordan's security, rejecting the alternative homeland solution. The pact condemned the separation wall and the illegal settlements on the lands occupied in 1967.

The forum pledged support to the PNA and its bodies, and to the Arab Peace Initiative, rejecting all unilateral actions.

It is noteworthy that the We Are All Jordan initiative followed the terrorist attacks on Amman in 2005. Thus, it was a message to all Jordanians to battle the challenges facing

¹ We are All Jordan Agenda, July, 2006.

Jordan by fulfilling their roles in serving the country and its national interest. This initiative was a response to the attack on Jordan. It was a national strategy intended to push the development process forward in Jordan.

CHAPTER 11 – The Peace Process under King Abdullah II

The Roadmap for Peace

As Ariel Sharon became Israel's prime minister and George W. Bush was elected president, Israeli and international pressures were exerted to replace the prime minister of the PA, as Yasser Arafat was not seen as a man of peace. As the engineer of the Oslo Accords and the only one capable of following up the negotiations, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazzen) was appointed Prime Minister of the PA in 2003.

The US administration used the opportunity of the change in leadership to propose a peace plan, known as the Roadmap for Peace.

The Roadmap proposed the following:

- 1) The PA shall issue an unequivocal, unambiguous statement in which it distinctly acknowledges Israel's right to peaceful and safe existence. The statement shall also call for an unconditional ceasefire, halting all armed operations and acts of violence, and incitements against Israel.
- 2) The Israeli government shall issue an unequivocal, unambiguous statement reiterating its commitment to the two-state solution, according to which a viable, independent and sovereign Palestinian state lives side by

side with Israel. The statement shall also call for a halt in acts of violence and incitements against the Palestinian people.

- 3) The PA must "undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere" and a "rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus" must "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of "terrorist" capabilities and infrastructure, including confiscating unlicensed weapons and enforcing the power of the security apparatuses.
- 4) The US shall show visible commitment to the rebuilding and rehabilitation of the Palestinian economy, restore bilateral security cooperation between Palestine and Israel in association with an external supervision committee (Jordan, Egypt and the US), and present international support for a sustainable, comprehensive ceasefire.¹
- 5) All Palestinian security organizations shall be merged in three security apparatuses and controlled by the Minister of Interior who is empowered with the necessary authorities.²
- 6) Under US patronage, the rebuilt Palestinian security apparatus shall resume security collaboration with their

¹ Saleh an-Nu'eimi: The Roadmap Plan, 8/8/2010, writer's own website.

² The US appointed General Keith Dayton to supervise the rebuilding of the Palestinian security apparatuses.

Israeli counterparts, including regular consultation meetings.

- 7) Arab countries shall halt all types of support to the groups that support and practice violence against Israelis. All financial support shall be transferred to the Palestinian Ministry of Finance treasury account.
- 8) Once tangible security progress is achieved, the Israeli army shall gradually withdraw from the Palestinian lands occupied since 28/9/2000, and be replaced by the Palestinian security forces.

The Roadmap also included procedures concerning the reformation of Palestinian institutions, formulating the Palestinian Constitution, establishing an authorized and empowered cabinet, and carrying out free and fair Palestinian elections.

The Roadmap focused on protecting Israel's security interests by rebuilding the Palestinian security apparatus, and tracking down all groups that engaged in operations against Israeli targets. In addition, what differentiated it from other peace plans was that the Roadmap did not have a clear deadline to stick to; it automatically expired once a Palestinian state was established.

The Palestinian stand towards the Roadmap varied between official and popular opinions. On the official level, the PA welcomed the US proposal and considered it an opportunity to resume negotiations and find peaceful solutions for the Palestinian cause. By accepting the Roadmap, the Palestinian side proved its willingness to realize peace in the region to the international community.

The Roadmap, with its conditions meant to restrain the Intifada and the Palestinian resistance, was rejected by resistance forces who said that it did not meet the expectations of the Palestinian people and was trying to change the PA into Israel's bodyguard by chasing down Palestinian resistance fighters.

Israelis, in turn, stipulated many changes to the plan in order to accept it, such as omitting the clause concerning Palestinian refugees' right to return.

Urging both Palestinians and Israelis to fulfill their commitment towards the Roadmap, Jordan welcomed the peace plan and urged all parties involved to support it.¹

In the same context, King Abdullah II hosted the Aqaba Summit in 2003. It was attended by President George W. Bush, Mahmood Abbas and Ariel Sharon. The summit was an attempt to find a middle ground between the different points of view in order to accomplish peace in the region. The summit was marked by the absence of the Palestinian president Yasser Arafat, in a gesture that foresaw that Abbas was to be the next Palestinian president.

The summit resulted in promises of commitments from all participants. The Palestinian party promised to stop the Intifada and attacks against Israel. Israel adopted the American vision of establishing a Palestinian state and agreed to dismantle its settlements. The US stressed Israel's security and the freedom of the Palestinian people. Jordan continued to

¹ The International Quartet is a committee whose function is to follow up the peace process. It was established in 2002, and includes USA, the EU, Russia and the United Nations.

push the peace process forward by holding meetings with both sides.

As a goodwill gesture, King Abdullah told Sharon that Jordan would send its ambassador, who was recalled to express Jordan's denunciation of the Israeli incursion into the Palestinian towns, back to Tel Aviv. The King also met Abbas and reiterated Jordan's support to its Palestinian brothers.¹

Arafat, who was under siege in his headquarters, did not approve the results of the Aqaba Summit and said it needed to be evaluated, along with the performance of the Palestinian delegation. The Palestinian resistance was not satisfied with the summit outcomes either.²

On November 11, 2004, after being confined to his Ramallah compound by the Israeli army for almost two years, Yasser Arafat fell ill, went into a coma and died. The cause of his illness and death continue to be disputed. His death gravely affected the Palestinian cause and cast a shadow on Palestine's relations with Arab countries. Although his successor (Abu Mazen) was already in place, Arafat's death created a huge vacuum. As a result, the Intifada continued, putting the new PA leadership under great pressure to contain and control Palestinian resistance brigades.

The PA encouraged all resistance organizations to participate in politics and decision making by running in elections. Surprisingly, in 2006, Hamas won the elections and formed the government. This put the PA in another dilemma, as international aid was cut off on the pretext that Hamas was a

¹ Al Mustaqbal Newspaper, Aqaba Summit, 5/6/2003.

² Al Mustaqbal Newspaper, Arafat Questions the Summit Outcomes, 6/6/2003.

terrorist organization and no one would sit with them at the negotiation table. Consequently, disorder spread through the Palestinian territories, which shifted attention to the internal Palestinian dispute at the expense of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian internal conflict caused a grave setback in the Palestinian cause and Palestine's relations with countries in the region.

Palestinian Elections 2006

The 2006 elections were specifically important as all political currents and forces, including Hamas, participated in them. Surprise reverberated around the world when Hamas won the elections.

There were many factors that helped Hamas to win the elections, most notably its role in the Palestinian resistance. Its attacks against the Israelis had increased its popularity and credibility among the Palestinian people. Palestine's religious culture also helped the religiously-oriented Hamas to win, as did the general mood in the region that rejected US and Israeli visions.¹

The new Hamas-led government took control of security apparatus and refused to negotiate with Israel. Tension between Fatah and Hamas intensified, accompanied by economic deterioration as the new government was unable to pay salaries to its citizens due to a campaign led by Israel, calling for the imposition of economic and political boycotts of the new government. Consequently, the PA's monthly allowances (\$55 million USD) were frozen. Israel arrested large numbers of Hamas leaders and many MPs and ministers. The US and EU imposed political isolation on the Hamas

¹ Addustour Newspaper, Jordan and Hamas: A Fresh Start... What's Next? , 10/8/2008.

government. The US congress issued a statement rejecting any kind of financial aid outside of legitimate channels.

Hamas forming the government was the key to Palestinian disunion, political pressures and an economic boycott on the Palestinian people. Since then, Arab countries have been working to bridge the gap between Fatah and Hamas in order to refocus on the basic issue, the Palestinian cause. Nevertheless, Hamas inevitably became a key player in Palestinian diplomacy.

In 1999 tension prevailed between Jordan and Hamas as the former told Hamas' political office to leave Jordan while Khaled Mash'al and other Hamas leaders were abroad. In the same year, Jordan arrested Khaled Mash'al and other leaders for two months. The crisis ended by deporting them to Doha, Qatar. Later on, Hamas opened its political office in Damascus, Syria.

In 2006, after Hamas won the elections and formed its government, communication channels between Jordan and Hamas were reopened, but soon cut off as Jordan refused to receive Hamas' Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad az-Zahhar. This was due to Jordan's accusations that Hamas has been using Jordanian lands to smuggle weapons.

Security officials from both sides held many meetings to try and settle this dispute. Saudi diplomacy also worked to end the tension between Jordan and Hamas. Both Jordan and Hamas needed to end this dispute as the latter needed to open communication channels with the world through Jordan to lift the blockade imposed on it. Jordan, in turn, needed to put an end to this tension to push the peace process forward and

bridge the gap between Palestinian forces to bring them back to the negotiation table.

Despite its connections with Hamas, Jordan did not cut its channels with PLO or the PA, hoping to use its good connections with both Fatah and Hamas to pave the way for national reconciliation.¹

In 2007 a peace convention was held at Annapolis Navy College in Maryland. The US administration was keen to realize peace between the Palestinians and Israelis, revive the Roadmap and establish an independent Palestinian state. However, the convention failed to set a timetable for establishing the Palestinian state. The Palestinian and Israeli delegations agreed to start the final-status negotiations after the convention.

Despite the significant Arab presence at the convention, which was understood as a step towards normalizing their relations with Israel, all Arab countries reiterated that they wouldn't establish normal relations before achieving peace in the region. Jordan stated that Israel's refusal to negotiate the unresolved final-status issues was a waste of a good chance for peace and a sign of the convention's failure, which would have a negative impact on the region.

Post 9/11 Jordan

There is no doubt that 9/11 gravely affected the world and the foreign policy of many countries, particularly the US.

¹ Fahd al-Kheetan, al-Haqeeqa International Network, 11/10/2007.

In the years that followed the attack, the US drastically changed its policy in the Middle East.

The 9/11 attacks took place on Tuesday September 11, 2001 when 19 members of Al-Qaeda group hijacked four passenger jets. The hijackers piloted two of those planes into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in Manhattan, intentionally crashed a third plane into the Pentagon in Virginia, and intended to pilot the fourth hijacked plane into the United States Capitol Building, Washington, D.C; however, the plane crashed into a field near Pennsylvania after its passengers attempted to take control of the jet from the hijackers. Nearly 3,000 people were killed, and thousands were injured.¹

The 9/11 attacks deeply affected the cultural perception of Muslims and Arab countries. There was a general sense of solidarity among Arab countries, and a willingness to confront American activity in the region. The negatives, on the other hand, were manifested in the arrest of members of Islamic groups under pretext of opposing the terrorist attacks. These tough security measures lowered individual freedoms in Arab countries.²

Following the 9/11 attacks, the US administration adopted a new anti-terrorism policy and invaded Iraq and Afghanistan.³. This policy brought instability into the Arab

¹ Wikipedia, electronic website.

² 9/11 Attacks and the Arab World: A State of Terrorism and Backwardness, Host Plus Institute for Web Service.

³ The war in Afghanistan was intended to chase down Al-Qaida organization, who claimed responsibility for 9/11 attacks.

region in the absence of security on the borders of these countries.

9/11 Attacks and their Impact on the Palestinian Cause

After the 9/11 attacks the US turned from a peace mediator to a key player in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Considering Israel its strongest ally in anti-terrorism combat, the US administration strengthened its relationship with Israel and worked hand in hand in combating Palestinian resistance groups, accusing them of backing terrorism.

The US administration also insisted on rebuilding the PA to settle the conflict and considered the PA as America's partner in its anti-terror war. Israel presented the Palestinian resistance and Intifada to the world as terrorist organizations, giving legitimacy to its acts against Palestinian resistance groups.

Another negative implication was the absence of European diplomacy in solving the Palestinian issue as US dominance continued to grow in the region. This isolated Arabs and Palestinians to face the US administration and Israeli government without an international partner.

The US invasion of Iraq changed the balance of power in the region. By occupying Iraq, the US sought to encircle Iran from the west after encircling it from the east in Pakistan and Afghanistan, in order to mount pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear program.¹

¹ Sa'ad Haqqi Tawfeeq, *The International Relations of the Arabs at the Beginning of 21st Century*, Wa'el Press, 2003, 380

For its part, Iran worked to increase its influence in Iraq by supporting the Shiites, in order to confront America. The Iranian support for the Iraqi Shiites created a sectarian conflict in Iraq and security deterioration in the region, pushing some major files, like the Palestinian cause, to the background.

Us Invasion Of Iraq 2003

The invasion of Iraq: Global Controversy

During the tumultuous negotiations to obtain international authority for the invasion of Iraq, both the US and the UK faced strong opposition from UN Security Council permanent members (Russia, China, France) along with Germany and some Arab countries. Therefore, the US and the UK decided to go to war unilaterally. Countries adjacent to Iraq had various stands on the issue. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stipulated UN authority to cooperate with US forces and as there was no international consensus in this regard, Riyadh stated it would not participate in any military action against Iraq. Syria opposed war against Iraq and banned coalition forces from using its land and air in the war. Jordan also opposed war against Iraq and exerted great diplomatic efforts to dissuade the US administration from implementing its plans, but to no avail. Jordan banned the coalition forces from using its land and air in any action against Iraq.

Despite being the biggest winner if Saddam's regime fell, especially after the eight-year war with Iraq, Iran opposed the war on Iraq because the US opposed Iran's nuclear program and put Iran on the terror-backing list. The Gulf States opposed the American rush to invade Iraq without international authority. Kuwait, in accordance with the Joint Defense Agreement, permitted the US to use its lands in the war on

Iraq. Having been invaded by Iraq in 1990, it was expected that Kuwait would support the US invasion to get rid of the Iraqi regime. Egypt opposed the war on Iraq and stressed Iraq's invincibility. It also adopted the Arab League resolution draft that clearly emphasized that no Arab country should participate in the war on Iraq.

Israel supported the US invasion of Iraq as it considered it a present danger to Israel, however, it did not send military forces.

The US justified its invasion by claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, which was later proved to be false. It also claimed that Saddam Hussein was in contact with Al-Qaeda and did not comply with the UN resolutions. Moreover, the US considered Saddam's regime dictatorial and it felt a duty to "free" the Iraqi people and spread democracy in Iraq.

On April 9, 2003 Baghdad fell. According to Resolution 1483 (2003), the UN Security Council considered Iraq an occupied country.

The US invasion of Iraq and its impact on the Palestinian Cause

The Palestinian cause was gravely affected by the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, losing a strong supporter for the Palestinian people.

Israel obtained many gains as a consequence of the US invasion of Iraq. The war protected Israel's interests in the region by eliminating Saddam's regime, which had been a serious threat to Israel's security. It reinforced Israel's military

and strategic superiority and changed the region geopolitically to serve American and Israeli interests.

The invasion paved the way for the Mossad and Western corporations to penetrate the Iraqi community and change its economic, ethnic and social system in order to lead the "new" Iraq to normal diplomatic relations with Israel. It also mounted pressure on Arab countries, particularly Syria, to make more political compromises, such as stopping their support for the Palestinian cause, which significantly changed the Arab-Israeli conflict into a Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The US invasion of Iraq had a negative impact on the Palestinian cause by blacklisting the Palestinian resistance. Moreover, the US invasion weakened Arab governments, as they were afraid to face a fate similar to Saddam's if they opposed US policy in the region.

The US invasion and its impact on Jordan

The 9/11 attacks had an economic impact on Arab countries. The retreat of foreign investments harmed the economies of Arab countries, especially Jordan, because of growing anti-Arab and anti-Muslim feelings. Also, foreign investors were afraid to be targeted in Arab countries.

The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were affected by the 9/11 attacks, which, eventually, affected Jordan's economy through the decrease of remittances of the Jordanians working in the Gulf. This was due to the slowdown

in the Gulf economy, and as the world prices of oil dropped, the trade deficit of these countries increased.¹

The cost of oil imports increased because of the US invasion of Iraq as Jordan used to import its oil needs from Iraq at preferential rates. The US invasion of Iraq increased Jordan's oil bill.

The negative implications on the Jordanian economy included increased rates of unemployment as a consequence of the region's economic slowdown. Thousands of people lost their jobs, and the possibility of the return of a large number of Jordanians working abroad threatened the country's economy in the future. Foreign trade was also affected because of customs complications and high insurance and freight costs.

The tourism sector was also damaged as foreign tourists refrained from visiting the region. This caused a massive decrease in the returns of a vital sector.

As Saddam Hussein's era ended and the Shiites started to rule the new Iraq, Jordanian-Iraqi relations were completely altered as the Shiites held a grudge for Jordan's role in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, and its strong bonds with the al-Ba'ath Party. Jordan decided to step back and became an observer rather than remaining an active player in Iraqi issues. The large Iraqi community in Jordan also played a large role in shaping Jordanian-Iraqi relations.

In order to restore the bilateral relations, especially the economic ones, diplomatic efforts started taking place. On

¹ Economic Report, the Gulf is the Biggest Loser after 9/11, studies and research, 27/11/2002.

November 3, 2004, the Jordanian-Iraqi Supreme Committee held its first meeting to set cooperation frameworks between the two countries. The following sub-committees were formed; Commerce Committee, Transport Committee, Oil and Power committee, Monetary and Banking Committee, Communication and Information Committee, Health Committee, Education and Scientific Research committee, Work and Training Committee, Security and Military Affairs Committee, Investment encouragement Committee. These committees included ministers in related fields and representatives of private and public sectors from each side.

All of the agreements, along with the diplomatic efforts, needed stability, especially on borders, to be effective.

An oil agreement was signed in August 2006 that determined that Iraq would provide Jordan with 30% of its oil needs (30,000 barrels a day to be increased to 60,000). The security deterioration, however, halted the Iraqi oil supplies.¹

As Saddam Hussein's regime was toppled and Iraq was consequently occupied by US forces, the Arab world had lost one of its pillars, which impacted the entire region. Iran expanded its Shiite influence in Iraq, intervening in the Iraqi decision-making process. The growing Iranian influence in Iraq created sectarian disputes inside and outside Iraq.

The Amman Message

The Amman Message was a detailed statement released in November 2004 by King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein. The

¹ *Al Ghad Newspaper*, 2 October, 2006.

Amman Message was launched at a time when Islam was being attacked by slander and misrepresentation and aimed to reiterate true Islamic values that seek the good for all humanity and that Islam is a religion of moderation.

The timing of the Amman Message was crucial. It came at a time when attacks were launched against Islam because of terrorist operations and the message came to speak on behalf of Muslims and to remind them of the roots of their religion, especially at a time when the global media was focusing on bomb attacks and killings.

The message addressed the challenges confronting Jordan and Islam, threatening identity, assailing tenets, and working to distort and harm what the country and religion considered sacred. It reminded Jordanians and the world that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was committed the inherited spiritual and historical responsibility carried by the Hashemite monarchy, honoured as direct descendants of the Prophet.

The Amman Message underlined that Islam was founded upon basic principles, the fundamentals attesting to the unity of God, continuous connection with the Creator, rulings that regulate human behavior in all its dimension, and noble principles and values that verify the good of humanity and that people are equal in rights and obligations. It focused on the King's commitment to achieving security, peace and equality for social solidarity, underlining the importance of protecting public and private properties, principles stressed by all Abrahamic religions.¹

¹ The Amman Message 2004.

It underlined that Islam is not a religion of violence and terrorism, or prejudice and isolation, and that it rejects any practice that poses a danger to human life, and calls for partnership with the modern human community to benefit from modern science and technology to achieve comprehensive development that would reflect positively on the Muslim nation. The Amman Message underlined the role of Muslim scholars in planting ethical and Islamic seeds in future generations and raising them to believe in moderation.¹

The Amman Message became a reference for many preaching and educational organizations; in addition many Arab and Islamic countries regarded the Amman Message as a national document.²

Amman Bombings 2005

On November 9, 2005 Amman was rocked by a series of coordinated terrorist bomb attacks on three hotels, the Grand Hyatt Hotel, the Radisson SAS Hotel, and the Day Inn Hotel. The bombs were simultaneously executed by suicide bombers, killing 70 people and injuring more than 300. The bombings were the most violent act of terror Jordan had ever witnessed.³

There was widespread condemnation of the attacks, both nationally and internationally. Locally, all measures were taken to capture those responsible for the bombings. King Abdullah II cut his visit to Kazakhstan short and returned to Jordan. He

¹ The Amman Message 2004.

² Al- Ghad Newspaper (27 June, 2008).

³ Al- Ra'i Newspaper , 10 November, 2005.

pledged that "justice will pursue the criminals", stressing that Islam had nothing to do with the terrorist attacks.¹

The King also chaired an urgent meeting at the National Security Council to take all measures needed to find those responsible. Mourning Jordanians showed profound solidarity as thousands of citizens participated in protests against the bombings. Al-Qaida Organization/Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Post- bombing Jordan

Many changes took place in Jordan after the terrorist bombings in Amman. One of the key changes was the end of Jordan's lenient policy towards foreigners. Before the bombings, visitors were able to stay wherever they wanted without going to security stations to give reasons for their visit. In post-bombing Jordan, it became a must for landlords and warehouse owners to provide security apparatuses with the name and nationality of people renting their properties. Moreover, the bombings increased public awareness of the dangers of terrorism, and it became every Jordanian's duty to keep their country safe and sound.²

Another implication of the bombings was the royal decree sent to the Prime Minister, Ma'arouf al-Bakheet, in which His Majesty gave his orders to set anti-terror law.³ In August 2006 the anti-terror bill was endorsed by the House of

¹ *Addustour Newspaper*, 11 November, 2005.

² Ya'qoob Jaber, *Addustour Newspaper*, 12/11/2005.

³ The Royal Decree, 24/11/2005

Representatives, however, there was criticism for reducing and violating personal freedoms and allowing suspicion-based trials. The supporters of the bill said that it was an essential step in preventing terrorist attacks on Jordan, and that it did not contradict the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

After the bombings and the security measures taken by the government, there was an expectation that Jordan's economy would be damaged by the withdrawal of foreign investments as Jordan's security and stability, for which it had always been known, were challenged by the bombings. However, none of these expectations came true. In fact, a meeting for Arab and Jordanian investors was held at the Radisson SAS Hotel, the very place where the explosions took place, in a message that Jordan would continue to be a reliable environment for investment.¹

Contrary to expectations, investment increased after the bombings. Investment volume reached \$1.6 billion JD in 2006, compared with \$757 million JD in 2005.

The Amman bombings shed light on a dangerously growing phenomenon in the Arab world, that of suicide bombings. There were many social and cultural factors that made this phenomenon grow, such as religious extremism. The political variables present in the Arab and Muslim world, including the occupation of Palestine and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, created an environment for terrorist organizations to carry out their operations under the pretext of liberating Arab and Muslim nations from Western imperialism.

¹ Salamah Dar'awi, Al Arab Al Yuom Newspaper, 12/11/2005.

Prelude to Israel-Lebanon War 2006

On June 26, 2006, a group of Palestinian resistance brigades attacked an Israeli camp at the far south of the Gaza Strip. Two Israeli soldiers were killed, four were injured and one soldier was captured.¹ Two Palestinian fighters were killed. Israel tried to free the captured soldier and reinforce its control over the crossings by launching a vast land and air supported military operation on the Gaza Strip and carrying out targeted killings.

Israel called the invasion Operation Summer Rains. The Israeli army used excessive force to return a captured soldier, and enhanced the siege through targeting the infrastructure of Gaza.²

During the operation Israeli tanks mounted numerous ground incursions into the south of the Gaza Strip under Israeli artillery fire and air raids. Israeli forces invaded and occupied homes in Gaza, turning them into military bases. Israeli warplanes bombed bridges that were destroyed and cut the Gaza Strip in half. The main water pipe that supplied the center of Gaza was also targeted, and Israel bombed the only electrical power plant in the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces also occupied the Gaza International Airport and airstrikes destroyed the airport's facilities.³

In 2006 the highest death rates among Palestinians were children. According to the data of Defense for Children International - Palestine Section, 127 Palestinian children were

¹ The military brigades that participated in this operation were : Izz ad-Din al- Qassam brigades(the military wing of Hamas) , Jaish as-Islam, and an-Naser Salah ad-Deen brigades. The operation ended with capturing the Israeli soldier Jilad Shaleet.

² *Al- Rai Newspaper* 13 July, 2006.

³ *Al- Rai Newspaper* 29 June, 2006.

killed, mainly due to the escalation of the Israeli offensive, which targeted Palestinian civilians with rockets and warplanes. Eighty-five percent of deaths of Palestinian children in 2006 occurred in the Gaza Strip.¹

In response to the Israeli aggression on Gaza, Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers in South Lebanon. Seven Israeli soldiers were also killed during confrontations between the two sides. Hezbollah stated that “Operation Truthful Promise” was to fulfill the promise to free all prisoners from Israeli prisons. Operation Truthful Promise took place on July 12, 2006.²

The capture and killing of their soldiers had a great effect on the Israeli army, demonstrating that their soldiers were in new danger. As a result, Israeli aggression on Lebanon began on July 13, 2006 and continued for 33 days until a truce was reached and the operation ended on August 15, 2006.

The main military operations in the Israel-Lebanon war:

- Since the beginning of the aggression, Israel bombed the Lebanese towns and villages of the south. Israel destroyed bridges that connected South Lebanon with Beirut and Baqa'a to divide the Lebanese areas and segregate them. Beirut International Airport and some religious sites, including the Roman Orthodox Church, were also targeted. Israeli warships also bombarded the Beirut Seaport.³

¹ Defence for Children International - Palestine Section.

² Abdul Aziz Abu Fadda, *The Sixth War on Hezbollah in Lebanon in July 2006* (n.p.: Al-Raya Publishers 2009) 39.

³ Abdul Aziz Abu Fadda 42, 45, 47.

- Qana Massacre: A massacre conducted by the Israeli forces on July 30, 2006, after an Israeli airstrike on a three-storey building in which Lebanese civilians were taking shelter. Sixty civilians were killed, 37 of which were children.¹

The second Qana Massacre brought to mind the first Qana Massacre, when Israeli forces killed more than 100 women and children on April 18, 1996 when they targeted a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) compound.

The Lebanese resistance had limited military qualifications and resources compared with Israel, however, the Lebanese resistance movement managed to hit northern Israel, including an Israeli military base and two airports. The Lebanese resistance shelled the towns of Nahariya and Tiberias and targeted Israeli settlements. Hezbollah rockets reached Haifa. The main operations conducted by the Lebanese resistance included drowning an Israeli warship that had shelled a southern suburb of Beirut.²

The Arab and international stands during the Israel-Lebanon war

Egypt indirectly held Hezbollah responsible for complications in the regional situation, and considered Hezbollah's actions an "uncalculated confrontation." In response to calls on Egypt to engage in a war with Israel to support Lebanon, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said that the army of Egypt was for defending Egypt and that the era where unnecessary risks were taken was over. Although

¹ *Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper* 31 July, 2006.

² Al-Manar TV channel of Hezbollah 14 July, 2006.

Egypt did hold Israel and the US responsible for the military escalation.

Syria was supportive of Lebanese resistance as the true path for liberating Arab land. The Syrian official statement underlined that resistance was not the opposite of peace, while stressing commitment to negotiations as a natural way to reach peace. The Syrian side also rejected that the resistance was responsible, citing Israeli escalation as the main reason for the war. Thus, Syria supported the Lebanese resistance as a force to be resorted to when negotiations fail. The Syrian president criticized other Arab nations who considered capturing the two Israeli soldiers an avoidable escapade. He also criticized those that said Hezbollah should have sought the permission of the Lebanese government for its operation. The Syrian President said the resistance should not seek the permission of governments, but governments should be a legitimate umbrella for resistance.¹

Saudi Arabia indirectly held Hezbollah responsible for the war. Saudi differentiated between legitimate resistance and uncalculated risks that endangered the region and underlined resorting to legitimate power, represented by the state, before taking any unilateral steps.² The Saudi King also criticized the US's lenient position of Israel's rejection of a cease-fire in Lebanon. Saudi offered all political and economic abilities to support the Lebanese people.

Jordan condemned Israeli aggression against the Lebanese people. Jordan's efforts to alleviate the impact of the aggression on Lebanon succeeded. A Jordanian Air Force

¹ *Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper* 14 August, 2006.

² *Asharq Al-Awsat* 15 July, 2006.

plane landed at Beirut International Airport with the first airlift of urgently needed aid into blockaded Lebanon. Inaugurating the airlift helped other countries to deliver aid to Lebanon through Jordan.

King Abdullah II connected achieving regional peace to the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, stressing that regional unrest would continue without a just solution for the Palestinian cause. Jordan urged the international community to fulfill its responsibility in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹ King Abdullah II contacted several world leaders, including the US president and the Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad, to raise support to end the aggression. King Abdullah II also met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.²

There was a lack of agreement among Arab countries, some who held Hezbollah responsible for the aggression. This illustrated the deep Arab disunity on Hezbollah. Jordan was the only country that focused on ending the aggression on Lebanon and stressed reaching a just solution for the Palestinian cause.

It is noteworthy that Hamas strongly condemned the Israeli aggression on Lebanon that destroyed its infrastructure. Hamas called on Arab countries to take more practical and feasible stances on the Israeli offensive on Lebanon, while it announced its full support for the Lebanese resistance and praised Operation Truthful Promise. Hamas saw the possibility of integrating the resistance in facing the Israeli occupation.³

¹ Abu Fadda 153, 154.

² *Asharq Al-Awsat* 15 July, 2006.

³ Hamas' statements on 8-8-2006, 16-7-2006 and 12-7-2006. Palestine Media Center.

It was clear that the US was supportive of Israel and was evident in the statements of President George W. Bush, who stressed that Israel had the right to defend itself while urging them to avoid civilian deaths.

The UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs refused to pressure Israel to end the aggression in the hope to end the existence of Hezbollah. He also rejected public calls, and even calls from his government, to join other European countries to urge ending the military operations in Lebanon.¹

The world turned immediately to Tehran once the offensive on Lebanon started, as Iran was viewed as the key ally for Hezbollah. Iran reiterated full support for the resistance in Lebanon and urged the UN to work to end the aggression.

The Main International Efforts to End the Aggression on Lebanon

In addition to the telephone calls and visits by many officials in an effort to end the aggression on Lebanon, several initiatives were launched:

Rome Conference: An international meeting called for by the Prime Minister of Italy, Romano Prodi. Fifteen countries, including four Arab countries, participated in the meeting, in addition to international and regional organization. Participants called for the end of military operations between the two sides. However, the conference only lasted for three

¹ *Al-Safeer Newspaper* 10 September, 2010.

hours without any agreement on practical means to end military operations.¹

The G8 Summit in St Petersburg urged a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. The G8 proposed four conditions for ending the military operations: freeing the captured Israeli soldiers in Lebanon and Gaza, a ceasefire from the Israeli side, ending the Israeli military operations and the urgent withdrawal from Gaza. No doubt, there was a close connection between what happened in Lebanon and what happened in Gaza, underlining that the most fruitful solution to establish regional stability was settling the Palestinian issue.²

The UN: The UN and its Security Council issued several calls to end the military operations in Lebanon. The UN issued Resolution 1701 urging a halting of military operations and withdrawal from Lebanon. The resolution also urged Lebanon to deploy the army in South Lebanon in cooperation with the UNIFIL, and the simultaneous Israeli withdrawal behind the Blue Line. The resolution also included establishing a buffer zone between the Blue Line and Litani River, free of all arms and military equipments, except those for the Lebanese Army.

The resolution stated that Israel should deliver maps of landmines it planted in South Lebanon to the UN. The Security Council increased the number of UNIFIL forces by 15,000 to observe the implementation of the ceasefire, guarantee delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians, and the return of displaced Lebanese. The resolution was unanimously passed.³

¹ Abu Fadda 213.

² *Al-Rai Newspaper* 17 July, 2006.

³ Aljazeera. net

The impact of the war on Israel

Not only did Israel fail to achieve its goals to free its soldiers and destroy Hezbollah, but the Israeli-Lebanese war was the first time that Israel engaged in war on its own land. As a result of the war Israel gave up its seclusion policy. The Israeli prime minister told his ministers that as a result of the harm that was done to the residents of the northern areas the seclusion policy was no longer a viable option. Rumours started after the war that the door for negotiations with Syria was reopened, when they had been ruled out before the war. After the war, voices in Israel started calling for Israel to act as a part of the region and not as an agent for the US. The Israeli economy suffered great losses due to the war. The losses of the industrial, agricultural, trade and tourism sectors in Northern Israel were estimated at 11.5 billion shekel, or 1.9 per cent of the GDP.¹

On the Lebanese side, the impact of the war was massive. The fierce pounding caused many economic losses, but what Hezbollah gained from the Israeli side had positive effects, mainly a prisoner swap, the landmines map, and the protection of Lebanese borders against Israeli attacks. The Lebanese side did not have to make any compromises in return for those gains.² These gains reflected on a political situation where a state of national unity was achieved where all parties were supportive of the resistance after a long era of political unrest in Lebanon.

¹ N.a., *The Israeli War on Lebanon: the Lebanese and Israeli Impacts and the Arab, Regional and International Effects* (n.p.: The Arab Unity Research Center n.d.) 39, 40.

² Abdel Amir Al- Rekabi, Nahed Hattar, *Lebanese Resistance Pound the Doors of History: War Diaries* (n.p.: Dar Ward 2006) 257.

Thus the resistance succeeded in creating a deterring force to face Israel. The victory of the resistance created a state of optimism and content among Arab people. The Lebanese victory also raised the spirits of the Palestinian and Iraqi resistance against Israeli and US occupation. Arab regimes were forced to reconsider their stances on resistance, especially those that held Hezbollah responsible for the war. The statement issued by the Arab Foreign Ministers Meeting on July 16, 2006 did not accuse the resistance of jeopardizing peace in the region.¹

The War on Gaza

After the Israeli-Lebanese war ended unrest continued in the Palestinian territories. Israel imposed a siege on the Gaza Strip to put an end to the launching of missiles and rockets from Gaza. Under pressure from the international community, Israel opened crossing points for delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza, but they were only opened for a short period of time before the beginning of a military operation in Gaza.²

Israel accused Hamas of being the obstacle hindering peace in the region. Before launching the military operation in Gaza, during a visit to Egypt, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, threatened to change the situation in Gaza if launching rockets against Israel did not stop. Israel did not only want to stop the rockets but also wanted to destroy Hamas. An Israeli military operation also aimed at locating and freeing the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.³

¹ The Israeli War on Lebanon 44.

² *Al-Rai Newspaper* 27 December, 2008.

³ *Al-Rai Newspaper*.

The operation started on December 27, 2008 was called Operation Cast Lead. The operation began with airstrikes that targeted the police and security centers of the Palestinian government in Gaza, killing 205 Palestinians. Israel said that the timing of the strikes aimed at taking Hamas by surprise to prevent it from organizing. The aggression also targeted Hamas' leaders, such as the Interior Minister of Hamas' government, Saeed Syam. Israel continued to say that the operation was not aimed at destroying Hamas' government in the Gaza Strip, but only at stopping rocket fire into Israel.

Operation Cast Lead lasted from December 27, 2008 until January 18, 2009 and killed 1400 Palestinians and injured 5000.¹

Arab opinion was unanimous that the military operation and the Israeli invasion should end. Qatar urged holding an urgent Arab summit on the Israeli aggression on Gaza, and that is when the Arab disagreements started. Some Arab countries thought that holding a summit to bring together Arab leaders would be time consuming, while the top priority was ending the offensive and reinforcing a cease-fire. They thought that holding a meeting for the Arab foreign ministers was enough to take necessary action. The Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was among leaders who pressed for a more urgent meeting of foreign ministers.²

The upcoming Arab Economic Summit to be held in Kuwait made the urgent Arab Summit unnecessary for some Arab countries. As a result of this split in Arab opinion, which

¹ Report of Amnesty International "Israel- Gaza Operation Cast lead: 22 Days of Death and Destruction."

² *Asharq Al-Awsat* 28 December, 2008.

was a reflection of the Palestinian internal split, the urgent Arab summit was not held, instead a meeting called the Gaza Summit was held in Doha. The meeting was attended by Iran and Turkey while several Arab countries did not attend, including representative of the PNA.

The Gaza Summit urged Israel to end the military operation in Gaza and held it legally responsible for the massacres. The participants pledged to take Israel to trial in international courts. It also stressed the importance of achieving Palestinian reconciliation. Countries that had diplomatic and economic relations with Israel were urged to sever the ties.¹

On January 18, 2009, Israel announced the end of military operations in Gaza.

At Kuwait's Summit Arab countries agreed to condemn the aggression and urged the Arab League to support and follow up on Palestinian reconciliation. The participants disagreed on several issues, including rebuilding Gaza and the Arab Peace Initiative. It was decided that rebuilding Gaza would be done according to international and Arab criteria and in coordination with the PNA.²

Jordan fiercely condemned the aggression on Gaza. King Abdullah II donated blood for Gazans, inaugurated a national campaign for supporting the residents of the Gaza Strip, and issued directives to send a field hospital to Gaza. Moreover, King Abdullah II drew the attention of the international community to the aggression on Gaza by

¹ Gaza Summit closing statement.

² *Al-Rai Newspaper* 21 January, 2009.

directing Jordanian ambassadors abroad to brief the host-governments on the events taking place to put pressure on Israel to end the aggression. Jordanian diplomacy succeeded in opening an airlift to deliver medical aid to Gazans, similar to the airlift Jordan opened to aid the Lebanese.¹

Arab countries had many disagreements during the war on Gaza, which negatively affected the Palestinian cause and allowed Israel to step up aggression. Jordan remained positive, focusing mainly on practical steps to help Palestinians, and pressing Israel to allow aid into Gaza. The Jordanian people participated actively in public campaigns to collect aid for the people of Gaza. Thus, Jordan focused its efforts on supporting the Palestinian people regardless of any other factors.²

The international stands were in vain. The UN Security Council failed to issue a resolution to end the aggression on Gaza due to US opposition. The US called for a truce in return for Hamas ending the launching of rockets into Israel permanently. The US administration accused Hamas of taking Gazans as hostages.³

After the aggression on Gaza ended on January 18, 2009, a summit was held in Sharm El- Sheikh in Egypt. The meeting was attended by regional and European leaders and aimed to support a ceasefire, prevent the entry of arms into Gaza, and discuss ways of lifting the siege, rebuilding the Gaza Strip, and pushing the peace process forward. Israel announced a ceasefire, claiming it was the result of an

¹ *Al-Rai Newspaper* 31 December, 2008.

² Other factors: the relation with Hamas and with Iran.

³ www.aljazeera.net

Egyptian request to end the military operation. International condemnation and criticism against Israel were running high by that time. In a meeting attended by the Israeli Foreign Minister at the White House, Israel was described as a terrorist state. Israel realized that continuing the aggression would bring further international resentment.¹

Iran Nuclear Program

Iranian nuclear activity began in 1960 when Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was the Shah of Iran. At the time Iran had strong ties with the US. In 1960, with the help of the US, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) was established. The US was keeping an eye on the developments in the nuclear program of Iran and would intervene if it found that the nuclear policy looked like it was planning to develop nuclear weapons. To impose further control on the nuclear program, the US signed an agreement with Iran that obliged the latter to scrap agreements with other countries in return for supplying it with eight nuclear reactors to generate electric power. The agreement was signed in 1978. However, it was never activated as it was interrupted by the Islamic Revolution in Iran that redefined the relationship between the two countries.

Iranian regional influence increased in the wake of the revolution. The Iraq-Iran war lasted for eight years and destroyed a significant amount of Iranian infrastructure, halting the nuclear program. At the beginning of the 1990s, the program was resumed with the support of Russia and China. Iran was in disagreement with the developed countries, especially the US, which feared growing Iranian influence in

¹ *Asharq Al-Awsat* 18,19 January, 2009.

the region and attempts to regain its status after the war with Iraq.¹

The nuclear program of Iran was also significant to the Middle Eastern and Arab countries because of the Iranian influence in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime and the expansion of that influence to other regional countries, in addition to the issue of the three Emirati islands² under the Iranian control. The dispute over the three islands could affect stability in the Arab Gulf and the whole region. Iran had also become a key player in the Palestinian issue and in Lebanon through its support to Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran, thus, had become an active component in the region, and urged the international community to deal with its nuclear program wisely without resorting to force.

Among the factors that contributed to complicating the relationship between Iran and the US was the support of the latter to Iraq in its eight-year war against Iran. This is the same issue that caused tension between Jordan and Iran. The 1990s witnessed closer relations between Iran and Jordan as Iran ruled out exporting the revolution after the death of the Iranian religious leader Musavi Khomeini, which had been a concern to many countries in the region. Jordan closed down the offices of the Iranian opposition People's Mujahedin of Iran "Khalq"³ in Jordan and expelled its leaders to improve the relations.

¹ Khaled bin Mohammed Al-Alwi, "The Technical and Political Aspects of the Iranian Nuclear Program," *The National Islamic Accordance Movement*, Political Studies Directorate 28 February, 2007.

² The three islands are: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and the Lesser Tunb.

³ The People's Mujahedin of Iran is a movement established in Iran in 1965 to topple the Shah regime. It later became an opposition movement to the Islamic Revolution regime.

When the Al-Aqsa Intifada broke out in 2000 it negatively affected Iran's ties in the region, especially with Jordan. Jordan announced foiling many Iranian attempts to smuggle arms to the Palestinian territories through Jordan. Jordan saw such attempts as part of Iran's efforts to play a leading regional role. The tension continued until 2003, when King Abdullah II visited Iran for the first time since the fall of the Shah.¹

Jordanian policy in dealing with Iran was not linked to US policy. The fluctuating relationship between Jordan and Iran was a reflection of regional issues, mainly the Palestinian cause. Jordan was keen on being a mediator and not part of the conflict.

In 2002, the nuclear program of Iran was put up for discussion by international forums. The US believed that Iran should remain under control to prevent the expansion of its influence. The plan for toppling the regime in Iraq was underway and there were fears that the sectarian loyalty of Shiites in Iraq would expand the influence of Iran.²

After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran took advantage of the political vacuum created by the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. The former Iraqi regime had been a wall between Iran and the Arab Middle East hindering its influence. Iran now managed to expand its influence in the region, improving ties with some regional countries like Syria, with whom Iran initiated a semi-strategic alliance. Any attack that might be directed against Syria would be considered an attack

¹ www.aljazeera.net

² Suhaila Abdul Anis, "Nuclear Program of Iran: A Study of the International Stands," Modern Discussion (17-2-2010).

on Iran. Ties between the two countries developed as pressure on Syria mounted amid accusations of plotting to assassinate the Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri.¹ Iran also worked to deepen ties with Hezbollah by providing support, which worried the US who saw Hezbollah a terrorist threat. Iran also deepened ties with Hamas, even before Hamas won the 2006 elections. The Director of Hamas' Political Bureau Khalid Masha'al had visited Iran in December 2005.²

Thus, Iran used the events in Iraq to expand its regional influence, and became an important player in the Arab-Israeli conflict through support of Hamas and Hezbollah. It could be said that the US wars on Afghanistan and Iraq brought benefits to Iran in helping it become a key player in the Middle East. The US regional plan failed to the extent that the wars it had waged reduced stability in the region and had benefited Iran.

Arab countries in the Middle East were divided when it came to Iran. Development of Iran's nuclear program did not only worry the US and the West, but also Arab countries that opposed Iran's growing influence. Jordan's worries were not about the nuclear program of Iran as much as protecting the region against sectarian division. Jordan underlined the importance of resolving the Palestinian issue and not taking sides with a certain Palestinian group.

Regional issues were further complicated when tensions hiked due to the Iranian-Israeli verbal war. Israel repeatedly threatened to strike the Iranian nuclear facilities and the Iranian president responded by stating that Israel should be wiped of

¹ Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri was assassinated on 14 February, 2005.

² Salim Khathem Ali, *The US Stance on Iran's Regional Aspirations: Competition or Conflict?* (n.p.: Al- Furat Center for Development and Strategic Studies, n.d.) n.p.

the map and that Iran will respond to any military strike. This would engage the whole region in a tense conflict with unpredictable results.¹

The US refused to allow Iran to develop its nuclear program and continued to demonstrate a desire to resolve things through diplomatic channels, but while reserving the right to use other means. The US believed that the best way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issues was by freezing it or dismantling it altogether. The US succeeded in rallying the support of France, Britain and other Iranian trade partners in Europe, including Germany. The alliance these countries formed against Iran had negative effects on the Iranian economy. To curb the impact, Iran transferred its reserves from Western banks to Asian banks. In addition to the blockade imposed by US diplomacy on Iran, the UN Security Council issued several resolutions² to mount the pressure on Iran.³

The nuclear issue of Iran witnessed an escalation when Western countries revealed in September 2009 that Iran had built a new nuclear reactor to enrich uranium in a mountainous stronghold in the city of Qom in 2006 without notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This offered justification for tightening the sanctions on Iran and raised doubts about the peaceful purpose of the nuclear program.⁴

As a result, the Security Council approved a fourth round of sanctions against Iran, which President Barack

¹ Deutsche Welle (www.dw-world.de) The Nuclear Program of Iran and its Impact on the Future of the Middle East.

² The US Security Council Resolutions are: (1737) of 2006, (1747) of 2007 and (1803) of 2008.

³ Abdul Anis n.p.

⁴ Abdul Anis n.p.

Obama considered the toughest ever faced by the Iranian government. While the US reiterated that the door to negotiations was still open, Iran rejected the sanctions and underlined its right to continue enriching uranium. Other countries thought that the sanctions wasted a chance to find a peaceful breakthrough for the nuclear issue of Iran.¹

With the prevailing tension between Iran and the international community over its nuclear program, both sides used the Middle East as a ground for expanding influence to press each other through alliances, which further jeopardized the Middle East security.

In theory, the nuclear program of Iran posed a threat to many Arab countries in the region, especially the Gulf countries, for its geographical proximity and for the conflict between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the three islands. The Arab stance was against any existence of nuclear arms in the region, whether owned by Iran or by Israel. In addition, Arab countries did not pressure Iran over its nuclear program and would not use force in its disagreement with Iran, but would use negotiations as a way for settling conflict.²

Jordan reiterated that the Middle East should be free of nuclear weapons, stressing that having access to nuclear energy should apply the criteria of the IAEA. Jordan supported resolving the Iranian nuclear issue peacefully. King Abdullah

¹ *Al- Mustaqbal Newspaper* 10 June, 2010.

² *Thawra Newspaper* 23 June, 2006.

II offered that Jordan would play the role of a mediator to settle the issue through diplomatic channels.¹

In an effort to bolster ties between Jordan and Iran, strengthening the economic and trade cooperation was discussed in a meeting between the Chairman of the Amman Chamber of Commerce and the Ambassador of Iran to Jordan on August 31, 2010. The meeting was also a means of encouraging investment between both countries.²

Jordanian policy showed flexibility in dealing with the Iranian nuclear dossier. In spite of the cold relations between Amman and Tehran, Jordan initiated communication to create a balance in its relations with all sides, especially conflicting ones. Jordan was keen on being a neutral power. Jordan was also pressured by the need to increase its rate of economic growth, making it essential to bolster ties with different countries, especially those like Iran that are rich in resources.

¹ *Al-Ghad Newspaper* 18 May, 2006.

² Amman Chamber of Commerce.

CHAPTER 12: THE PATH OF REFORM IN LIGHT OF THE ARAB SPRING

JORDAN'S INTERNAL AND REGIONAL SITUATION

The deteriorating economic and living conditions of Jordanians, on one hand, are pressing reasons for the need for comprehensive political reform. The poverty line has increased to approximately 800 dinars per month, compared to 630 dinars per month in the year 2008 according to official reports.

The economic indicators show an incessant rise in public debt. It actually rose by 9.1 billion dinars since the end of 2010 until the end of 2014 and by the end of 2016, the debt has surpassed 20.6 billion dinars. Indebtedness went on a rise, reaching to about 25 billion dinars by the end of February 2016. The financing needs of the Jordanian government, which constitute 17% of GDP, result from weak economic growth, affected by the worsening of regional calamity. The inability to find effective solutions to this crisis informs further upsurges.¹

On the other hand, since 2011 popular movements insisting upon the acceleration of political and economic reform, the development of laws and regulations that ensure pluralism and political participation, as well as the following-up on the different cases of corruption presented to the Anti-Corruption Commission. Recently, for example, combating corruption within municipalities where issues related to financial and administrative abuses are present². Other "economic concerns include privatization, the controversy about its feasibility³, as well as the weak performance of public institutions that led to debt increases. The electricity company

1- Al-Rai Newspaper, 7/5/2016

2- Al-Rai Newspaper, 10/3/2015

3- Al-Rai Newspaper, 3/4/2014

debt for example, is estimated at about ٦.6 billion dinars.¹ Besides, the migration of investments, the closing down of approximately 1,500 industrial facilities during the past two years, will reflect negatively on the competitiveness of the industrial sector².

Beyond the domestic situation, the volatile regional quandary in Syria and Iraq has massive impacts on Jordan intensifying the risk of extremism, not to mention the political, economic and social effects. For instance, land transport and the trade sector has suffered the closure of the Iraqi and Syrian markets to the Jordanian goods and services which traditionally have been the most important markets for Jordan in the Middle East.³

On the political front, the Syrian crisis and after more than five years of the outbreak of the war, has become complex internally and externally. Violence between the Syrian regime and its allies on the one hand, and between the Syrian opposition and the armed factions and organizations* continue on the other hand, in addition to the conflicts going on between armed factions among each other, resulting in regional and international interferences in an effort to preserve each player's strategic interests in a strategic country bordering the Mediterranean and linking Asia and Europe.

From a Western perspective, led by the United States, the toppling of Bashar al-Assad's regime is the goal. The survival of the regime and support for the elimination of extremist Islamic movements mean the continuation of the

1- Petra 29/12/2016

2- Al-Rai Newspaper, 16/4/2015

3- Alquds Alarabi Newspaper, 11/10/2015

danger and stretch of the Shiite influence, which may pose a serious threat to US interests in the region.¹ The aggravation of the Syrian conflict has had its outreach beyond the Syrian borders reaching to multiple capitals on the European continent witnessing different kinds of terrorist attacks such as the recent IS attacks in Paris and Berlin.

In Iraq, a similar image prevails. The sectarian conflicts and progress of the different extremist organizations are burgeoning as a response to the continuous governmental persecution and suppression of Sunnis in Iraq, as well as the failure of the Iraqi army to constrain the growth of extremist organizations.

As a result, Jordan's security becomes a serious apprehension, bordering both Syria and Iraq. Perhaps the most striking examples would be the various incidents such as smuggling of weapons and infiltrators, and the attack on commercial trucks in the joint Syrian-Jordanian Free Zone after the control of the factions of the Syrian opposition which estimated the loss of one hundred million dollars.² Moreover, what happened in Lebanon and Turkey in recent terrorist attacks underscores the degree of danger posed by instability in the region³.

Politically, Jordan has always been vigilant and maintained a non-biased position despite the continuous internal and external pressures be it regional or international in order to take a stand either with or against the Syrian crisis.

1- Alrai Newspaper, 1/6/2013

2- Addustour Newspaper, 3/4/2015

3- Ahmed Kandil, 2012 "Multiple levels: the potential effects of the Syrian Crisis." The International Policy magazine. Series: 190.

With the mounting complexities of this crisis, Jordan is moving more towards supporting the Syrian opposition civilians, with emphasis on the rejection of military intervention and preserving the unity of Syria and its people¹.

Those political and security pressures facing Jordan bring about various social and economic effects on the internal level. The number of Syrian refugees registered in Jordan according to the UN reached 612,000, while the number of non-registered refugees at approximately 700,000, bringing the total number to more than 1,100,000 distributed throughout the governorates of the Kingdom. The estimated cost of hosting refugees reaches 2.9 billion dinars. The public health sector, for example, has a cost burden reaching 253 million dinars per year, and estimated 864 million dinars since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011². The Syrian asylum and the continuous influx of refugees put tremendous pressure on infrastructure and municipalities in various provinces, especially in the northern parts of the country. Those provinces host the largest number of refugees hindering as a result the implementation of development plans. Development allocations are being used to secure the basic needs due to the shortage and delays in the international community's support³.

The Supporting Syria and the Region Conference, which took place in London on February 4th, 2016, discussed the challenges faced by countries hosting refugees, and in this regard, the conference outputs included carrying numerous international obligations to support and help Jordan cope with

-
- 1- Fahed Al-Khitan, 2012 "Has Jordan's position on the Syrian crisis changed?" Al-Ghad Arabic language daily newspaper, Amman.
 - 2- Alrai Newspaper 9/12/2014
 - 3- Alquds Alrabi Newspaper, 11/4/2014

the Syrian asylum crisis. One of the main goals of the conference is to grant Jordan \$700 million a year for three consecutive years totaling \$2.1 billion. The Conference also affirms the financing of the construction of schools at one billion dollars during the years 2016 to 2018 in order to absorb the Syrian refugees' problem, besides a donation of 300 million dollars in order to support the Jordanian general budget.¹ In brief, Jordan has been trying to avoid taking a stand, and therefore becoming part of the current crisis. The recent economic turbulences within the country caused both by the neighboring instabilities and internal factors are being handled in a way that does not affect the Kingdom's stability.

INDICATORS AND STAGES OF REFORM IN JORDAN

Reform is a continuous process that takes place at various levels in the state provided by certain indicators. This is reflected primarily in the Constitution and the development of laws and institutions. The King Abdullah II Discussion Papers and the positive relationship between the regime and the Islamic movement are other profound indicators reflecting the system as a whole and its mechanisms which are striving to achieve reform and support institutionalism.

LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT

First and foremost, the Jordanian Constitution provides respect for all religions within the state, particularly in matters relating to personal life. This is also reflected in the different religious institutions within the state respecting the freedom of these communities. Article VI in the Constitution confirms that all Jordanians are equal before the law regardless of race, language or religion. It affirms the principle of citizenship

1- Al Ghad Newspaper, 11/2/2016

regardless of religion. Thus, Jordan is a civil Islamic state adopting Citizenship as a source of sovereignty¹.

Since 2011, the country has witnessed massive constitutional amendments that demonstrate the prospect of change and progress toward reform. Many of those amendments confirm the inclination towards a democratic state; most prominent of which requires the resignation of the government during a maximum period of one week if parliament was dissolved, elections to take place within four months, otherwise calling the dissolved council to convene. Other constitutional amendments that have strengthened the independence of the legislative branch are the establishment of the Independent Commission for elections to the management and supervision of the parliamentary and municipal elections as well as the Constitutional Court. Additional amendments are the abolition of the Supreme Council for the interpretation of the Constitution as well as emphasizing the independence of the judiciary through an explicit constitutional announcement and the formation of the Judicial Council Act to take over all affairs related to the judiciary.

There are other amendments that took place during 2016 which allow the King to exercise his powers without the signature of the prime minister and the ministers. Specifically, the King can choose the crown prince, appoint the viceroy, and make the appointment of the Chairman and members of the senate board, the Judicial Council Chairman, the Chairman and members of the Constitutional Court, the army chief and the director intelligence as well as the director of the gendarmerie. In addition to the abovementioned appointments, the King has

1- Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, 2010

the power to accept the resignation of any of the above appointed officials.

Other amendments allow dual nationality for ministers and members of the National Assembly, and extend the period of the elected Speaker of the House to two consecutive years with the possibility of re-election¹. There have been diverse reactions on the social and partisan level towards the recent amendments. Some of which have seen it as an encroachment on the role of the House of Representatives. Others however have perceived higher independence levels of the judiciary.

In terms of the diversity of standpoints within the Jordanian society, the National Dialogue Committee under royal patronage was able to address the issue of preserving a collective national identity, and confirmed the firm Jordanian stand towards Palestine. Overall, the committee's conclusions are a solid base to utilize in the search of stability and reform since it creates a social contract that is able to safeguard national unity and enhance the concept of citizenship².

DISCUSSION PAPERS OF KING ABDULLAH II

An unprecedented step, King Abdullah's Discussion Papers manifest the main axes of reform within a democratic state. Those papers including their titles and main ideas come as follows:

1. First Discussion Paper: "OUR JOURNEY TO FORGE OUR PATH TOWARDS DEMOCRACY" focuses on dialogue and the acceptance of the opinions of others, without exclusion or

1- The Official Newspaper, 2016

2- National Dialogue Committee and its recommendations outputs, 2011

marginalization. It also stresses on the fact that accountability and citizenship go hand in hand¹.

2. "MAKING OUR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM WORK FOR ALL JORDANIANS" focused on the transition to parliamentary government, which requires according to His Majesty three steps: 1.The emergence of true national parties. The development of civil service to be able to support and advise governments. A change in the Parliamentary conventions and the way it works to support parliamentary government².
3. "EACH PLAYING OUR PART IN A NEW DEMOCRACY" highlighted the roles of political parties and the House of Representatives, the government as well as the role of the citizen³.
4. "TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC EMPOWERMENT AND 'ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP'" focuses on the promotion of popular participation and raises awareness among members of the community on the importance of participation. The main objective of reform based on the paper is to strengthen popular participation in decision-making.⁴
5. "GOALS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS: PILLARS FOR DEEPENING OUR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION": This paper reviewed the most important institutional

1- King Abdullah II, 2012, December 22nd

2- King Abdullah II, 2013, January 16th

3- King Abdullah II, 2013, March 2nd

4- King Abdullah II, 2013, June 2nd

achievements since the beginning of the Jordanian spring, including the Independent Electoral Commission, Constitutional Court and the Center for Studies and legislative research in the House, and of the Electoral Law and the parties for the year 2012, as well as the public meetings law and the amendment to the law of State Security Court to limit its jurisdiction within terrorism, treason, espionage and falsified currency issues¹.

6. "GOALS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS: PILLARS FOR DEEPENING OUR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION": Issued after the holding of parliamentary elections in September 2016, this paper focused on the importance of law enforcement considering that the rule of law is one of the most important criteria for successful countries in achieving development and prosperity, especially since one of the main reasons for deterioration in the region is due to the absence of the rule of law².

The concept of the civil state mentioned in the 6th paper caused controversy. The paper sought to clarify that the civil state is a state governed by the Constitution, and that the laws apply to everyone without bias; a state that relies on a system of separation of powers. A country based on peace, tolerance and co-existence and features to respect and guarantee pluralism and respect for the opinions of others. A civil state preserves and protects members of the community regardless of their religious or intellectual affiliations. It also guarantees religious freedom to its citizens and is devoted to freedom of

1- King Abdullah II, 2014, Oct 13th

2- King Abdullah II, 2016, Oct 16th

speech, love and respect for others, preserves women's rights and safeguards the rights of minorities.

Therefore, it is clear that the discussion papers constantly tried to recall and emphasize the weaknesses that stand in the way of democratization and of the lack of a complementary relationship, between the executive and the legislature. Regarding political parties, the papers explain that the weakness lies in their programs as well as in the decline of political and popular participation. Furthermore, the low levels of public awareness on the importance of political parties, and the weak performances by the government, the legislative and the regulators. There has been a continuous emphasis on activating the principle of accountability and transparency, as well as the role civil society's institutions play in a democratic state.

The continued emphasis on addressing these weaknesses and the repetitive use of the term "active citizenship" establish the foundations for Jordan's transformation towards a modern democracy. Addressing the weaknesses pointed out by discussion papers shall be the first step towards such a transformation.

POPULAR MOVEMENT:

The Arab spring has had its resonances in Jordan. On the largest part there have been positive effects on the escalation of reform process reflecting positively on the Jordanian case unlike other Arab states where this spring has been characterized with bloodshed and states on the verge of failure.

Reasons behind this positive mobility require a thorough look on the most prominent actors within the popular movement in Jordan.

1. Islamic movement and the National Front for Reform, which focused on demands for political reform and constitutional amendments.
2. Nationalists and Leftists.
3. Social and youth movements, emerging mainly in the provinces, and focusing on political reform, economic priorities, the achievement of social justice and the fight against corruption. An example is the Progressive movement of Tafeileh.
4. The Progressive Nationalists and military retirees focusing on strengthening the Jordanian national identity and the importance of making it a top priority. Their dominant discourse is the tendency of Jordan becoming an alternative homeland for Palestinians.
5. Other movements focus on the right of citizenship.

The diversity and the different priorities of those movements, including the ideological and intellectual differences between the Islamists and leftists nationalists, as well as the different visions on how the political reform should look like, weakened their influence and led to a decline in their capacity. Also, the repercussions of the Arab Spring and the chaos in the Arab Spring countries, especially Egypt, Syria and Yemen has led to a decline in social and popular support of the movements¹.

1- Al Jazeera, 29-1-2013

THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM:

The confusion and controversy in the understanding of the terms "religious state" and "civil state", the rise of Islamic movements in the Arab Spring countries and their impact on the internal stability in these countries makes it important to address the nature of the relationship between the Islamic movement and, in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood and the political system in Jordan, especially since this relationship has not seen any confrontations even though it underwent several tensions during the past periods, unlike what has happened and is happening in Egypt or other countries.

From the beginning, the Jordanian Constitution has been clear in giving the religious character way to being part of the system without diffusing the political system itself. Likewise, the political system did not affect the religious aspect of the Jordanian state, i.e., that the Constitution maintained the principle of equality in rights and duties and respect for different religions, both in terms of worship or transactions¹.

The shift in the relationship between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood began in the early 1990s. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the one hand, accused the government of minimizing its roles, especially in the election process. On the other hand, various regional issues play a role in this relationship. The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the Islamists' opposition to this Treaty led to the boycotting of the elections in 1997.

Overall, the movement has been critical of the 1993 elections law which is based on the singular vote system. They

1- Mohammed Abu Rumman, 2011 P18

were also critical of the weakness of political parties, the weakness of the institutional performance of many public institutions, the political will in relationship with governmental efficiency, as well as other social constraints and a weakened performance by the institutions of civil society.¹ Today, with the adoption of a new electoral law, the Islamic Action Front party announced its participation in these elections in a time when the relationship has been experiencing tension due to the closure of the headquarters of the Islamic Action Front in Karak, Mafraq, Sahab and Aqaba. Taking a decision to participate shows the desire to maintain a state of balance and openness with the government, thus the new stage of the relationship between and among Islamist authorities is likely to start with the formation of the eighteenth parliament.

MODERN ELECTORAL AND PARTY LAWS

The elections in 1989 and the modified electoral system formed the beginning of political reform and democratization. The introduction of the single-vote system in 1993 and 1997, minimized the extent of the influence of organized political forces. Parliamentary life ceased from 2001 until 2003, postponed for several reasons, including the regional developments in Palestine and Iraq. This is a crucial indicator on the impact of the regional situation on the electoral laws. The electoral law has witnessed many amendments until the elections of 2016. Outcomes and conclusions on the recent elections could be summarized with the following points:

1. Conservatives and tribes are still the most dominant category that tops the scene in the Chamber of Deputies (House of Representatives who relied on tribal and regional supporters/voters in their campaigns), after

1- Ayham Hiasat, 2013 P107-133

which come the business class and those who seek to preserve their interests through legislation.

- 2- There is a significant women's presence with 20 women accessing the House of Representatives, 5 of which won the elections based on competition and not quota.
3. The voting system and election calculus had their effects on the voting results.¹

Concerning the political parties' law, it is important to dig deep in the challenges faced by the party life in Jordan, and look into their most prominent features which include the following:

1. The absence of an environment that cradles political parties. Laws and regulations limit their roles, in addition to a social perspective which believe in the frailty of parties to provide powerful political programs.
2. Political parties programs appear similar in the way they deal with the economic and social realities. They do not seem to master effective solutions to pressing issues, and therefore, increase the social conviction of the incompetence of political parties.
3. Personification of political parties and their linkages to their Secretary General or the head of the party, which in return indicates the poor performance of the party on the ground and the lack of internal organization and democracy within the party structures.

1- Alwatan Newspaper, 25/9/2016

4. The absence of an effective role for parties to promote their programs and ideas in the provinces and among the citizens.
5. Security concerns among citizens caused by the accumulation of a social memory linking political parties with the martial law period.
6. Parties emerge from the system and not from outside powers. Jordanian personalities sought to form parties after coming into power. Despite the absence of any negativity to this approach, it still reflects the weakness and vulnerability of the partisan situation in Jordan.

DECENTRALIZATION

Equality is a key factor in democratization and reform. Either on the political economic or social level, equality of rights as well as duties is manifested in decentralization. As an approach, decentralization reflects equality and impartiality reducing the role of the central authority represented by the government. Each province in the country will be able to make decisions through its elected councils. This process increases citizens' participation and minimizes the role that the House of Representatives plays in finding solutions and services on the narrow province scale, and have it focus more on practicing their legislative and monitoring roles.

STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Democratization and reform are processes exhibiting equality as well as demonstrating high levels of freedom. The civil society is a vital criterion that reflects the levels of democratization and reform within the state. In definition, civil society is a group of the political, economic and social

institutions which are relatively independent of state power and corporate profits in the private sector. It involves institutions, NGOs, cooperative and mass organizations such as trade unions and women's organizations. The civil society's key role is enhancing the citizens' political participation as well as defending their interests by contributing to the formation of public policy through providing suggested amendments and proposals and creating studies that will help the decision-makers to be aware of the various issues affecting the interests of the members of the community¹. However, there are many obstacles that restrict the work of civil society organizations, most importantly the nature of the relationship between civil society organizations and the state, which has changed and evolved depending on the positions and issues, as well as other legislative and executive obstacles².

A series of measures must be taken to develop and support civil society organizations; the most prominent of these measures is to eliminate the erroneous image of civil society organizations which are based on the idea of treason. It is important to spread awareness of the legitimacy of those licensed organizations that work under the law. Deregulation of the activities of civil society organizations must discontinue and their involvement in social mobility in the political, economic, and social work promoted and supported financially as well³.

1- Nasser Al-Shaikh Ali, 2010 P53

2- Al Rai Center for Studies, 2005

3- Al Rai Center for Studies, 2005

A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO COMBAT EXTREMISM IN ALL ITS FORMS

The institutional success in nation-building appears in the success of the state in the recruitment of institutions to fight and control emergency challenges which appear and threaten the stability of the state and Jordan. Through these institutions, Jordan seeks to fight extremism. This is the most important challenge that stands in the face of the stability of countries, so much so that it becomes crucial to talk about developing a comprehensive strategy to fight extremism through the cooperation of different institutions from various disciplines.

Recently governmental statements talked about a comprehensive strategy to combat extremism in all its forms. This strategy has become necessary in light of the growing radical and extremist movements. Thus, a comprehensive strategy means a plan aimed at various sectors and themes to empower them in order to prevent the emergence of any form of extremism in any of the sectors.

Several reasons have led to the widespread of extremism which include the following:

1. Religious and ideological reasons that emerged as a result of the history of conflicts and wars targeting Arabs and Muslims, and the state of weakness that stimulated feelings of persecution, which form a platform for extremist thoughts and culture.¹ On the other hand, extremist groups are trying to reflect the image of a rapprochement with its members or through a rhetoric that reflects closeness and familiarity which attracts

1- Asharq Al-Awsat, 26/5/2003

those who have difficulties or problems in integrating into their own communities.¹

2. Economic and social reasons: Many of those who are turning to extremist groups and movements are driven by poverty and destitution. Unemployment, poverty, injustice, lack of equal opportunities, declining levels of education and the state of ignorance are factors which extremists exploit to promote their ideologies.
3. Political reasons include the absence of democracy, lack of public freedoms, restrictions on media, as well as a weak a political culture that results in ignorance with facts, data and changes experienced within the region. In addition, insufficient attention to human rights often causes pervasive injustice and oppression that leads to a negative reaction, and thus creating a fertile environment for extremism within communities in which they find themselves far from the participation in decision making. The democratic process, the devolution of power and the involvement of citizens in policy-making and decision-making would have people appreciate their roles as citizens².

COMPONENTS OF A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT EXTREMISM:

1. Political Reform

The consolidation of the foundations of the rule of law are mainly represented in election and parties laws to ensure the widest participation, in addition to the decentralization and municipalities laws, which form the opportunity and tool to

2- Addustour Newspaper, 19/11/2015

3- Asharq Al-Awsat, 26/5/2003

expand the rule of the people through the constitutional institutions, and work to develop legislation that would enhance the public freedoms.

Other requirements for political reform, besides political will and legislative reform, is activating the role of parties, trade unions and civil society institutions and the involvement of everyone in the reform, including youth and women.

2- Economic Reform

Economic reform requires the development of strategies that focus on the future, and raise efficiency, productivity and investment in productive projects that create jobs and accelerate the enactment of laws and legislation that would address economic issues such as those concerning energy, investment promotion, and working with the relevant authorities for the advancement of the economy, according to the principle of participatory. It also requires the continuous assessment of the progress of work, and the ability to face all the challenges that the establishment of the economic strategy may encounter. The most prominent of these challenges encompass high levels of unemployment, low participation of women in the labor market, absence of a unified entrustment concerned with the development of human resources, and the low confidence rates in the transparency and integrity of the fight against corruption.

When talking about economic strategy being part of a comprehensive strategy to combat extremism, Jordan's vision into 2025 represents an integrated framework for socio-economic policies over the upcoming years that include various plans to be implemented through the participation of all official institutions, businesses and civil society

organizations. The 2025 vision covers two parts. The first includes a summary of the economic and social realm, including health, education, employment and economic participation sectors, while the second part contains policies and initiatives that will be implemented by the various actors including the government, the private sector and business organizations, civil society organizations and citizens.

The document aims to improve public and basic citizen services, leading to a society in which opportunities for different sects are available. It also intends to bridge the gap between the provinces, carry out financial stability and self-reliance and enhance productivity and competitiveness of the Jordanian economy and targeting groups' owed direct support, which would strengthen Jordan's immunity and reduce the impact of external shocks.

3- Education and curriculum reform

Education reform embodies a sturdy revision for all curricula, the promotion of a culture of dialogue and acceptance of the other within these curricula in order to raise generations whose main characteristics are rational thinking, active listening and mastering the art of dialogue and open mindedness contributing to the fight against extremism and terrorism.

Curriculums must include scientific and educational positions epitomizing the rejection of extremism, and to focus on the presence of exercises and drills that allows developing their abilities and encourage them to think and be enlightened.

4- A media strategy building to combat extremism:

In light of the breadth and multiple sources of information and the evolution of the role of social media as an influential tool used in the dissemination of extremist and terrorist ideology, it is necessary to develop a national strategy to combat extremism through the expansion of the analysis of developments and events in the region. For media is no longer just a tool for the transfer of information, but also a tool to analyze. Therefore, it must be the role of the media to be realistic and objective in order to confront extremists' ideologies and become a platform for intercultural dialogue, according to the values of mutual respect to all faiths, religions and beliefs¹.

Media has an important role in opening all platforms and spaces available in order to clarify the true image of Islam. There also needs to be a formation of specialized groups from different countries comprising of experts in security, military and social areas as well as religious backgrounds to stand on the developments of the media's battle with extremism, and develop appropriate scenarios to win this battle and show the true image of extremism and extremists in front of public opinion².

5-Developing and supporting the role of imams in the fight against extremism:

Imams of mosques are considered a cornerstone in building a comprehensive strategy to fight extremism since they make the first line of defense for the Islamic religion and

¹ Addustour Newspaper, 16/4/2015

² Assabeel newspaper, 21/5/2015

moderate thought, as they are by virtue of their work closest to the communities and people. It is therefore their duty to the fight against extremist ideas and to clarify distorted images that extremists are trying to promote.

We must also work on activating the role of the mosque so that it becomes a place of enlightenment for the purposes of Islamic law and the true principles based on justice, tolerance and acceptance of others and coexistence between religions.

To be able to play their roles in the fight against extremism, Imams and preachers must work to improve their knowledge and education related to extremism and extremist thinking issues to be able to do their part. Refining regulations of preaching and guidance is also important in addition to improving the living and economic conditions of imams and preachers.

Eventually, the construction and implementation of a comprehensive strategy to fight extremism requires a consensus between the different spectra and actors of formal and informal bodies on all items relating to private strategic elements of political reform. It also requires a national effort from various quarters to work according to the mechanisms and steps specified in Jordan's vision for 2025 since it facilitates the evaluation process for the implementation of the strategy.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that Jordan possesses the opportunity to achieve a sophisticated model of democracy as a result of the presence of the bases, which serves as an opportunity that must be employed and built upon. However, it should be noted that the factors which influenced the positive efforts of establishing a civil democratic state would also serve in the embodiment of reform and democratization requirements on the ground. On the other hand, the developments in the region impose new input and circumstances making it necessary to bring about more compatible laws to prevent any repercussions that may affect the stability of the internal front.

National compatibility is perceived as one of the main pillars for the implementation of national strategies to combat extremism in all fields. Such a strategy leads naturally to a civil democratic state. The government's declaration to commence the implementation of a comprehensive strategy against extremism means decisiveness is necessary to move toward a democratic civil state and one of its main requirements for its continuation and endurance.

The experiences of other countries are a useful tool to reflect upon, and perhaps the Moroccan and Tunisian experiences are the closest to Jordan. In terms of the similarity of the regime in Morocco on one hand, while on the other hand, a comprehensive study looking into the different efforts and experiences of the Tunisian civil society will enable the development of civil society institutions in Jordan.

We must begin with a collective effort to establish a broad national consensus on the most important reform laws, particularly the electoral law, and should focus on improving

economic and social conditions of Jordanian citizens in all provinces and in a balanced manner that ensures bridging the gap between the three regions of Jordan, promoting public freedoms and reducing the impact of regional fallout and security on the state of freedoms in Jordan.

It is also necessary to begin a dialogue with all political parties and channels in order to ensure a national dialogue and participation by all, where outputs are embraced by everyone. Moreover, there is a crucial need to restore confidence in the institutions of the state through the promotion of the basic values of integrity and transparency, and to move forward in the fight against corruption.

At the same time, we must work simultaneously to implement a comprehensive strategy to combat extremism so that its positive impact touches everyone and from all sectors, benefiting from the experiences of the past, such as the experience of the National Charter, for example, to overcome the current stage, as well as continuing to urge the international community to find practical solutions for the crisis experienced by the region and to call on the powers of the world to take over their responsibilities with regard to the refugees crisis, providing Jordan the needed support to alleviate its repercussions.

Finally, and most importantly, it is necessary to be cognizant of the fact that equality and justice begin with a refined election law which will open the door to envision the principle of equal opportunities, women's empowerment and improving the economic and living conditions of citizens and achieve the principle of citizenship.

The book addresses the shifts in Jordanian policy on regional issues, especially the Palestinian cause.

This book sheds light on two different eras and two different approaches of dealing with main Middle Eastern issues, most importantly the Palestinian issue. It is notable that towards the end of the late King Hussein's reign, Jordan focused on the international diplomacy and foreign relations to rally support for the Palestinian cause and secure assistance for the development of Jordan. On the other hand, King Abdullah II focused on the development of Jordan to enable the country to advance its regional and international status, which would help in giving the necessary support for the Palestinian cause on regional and international levels.

There are many regional and international challenges facing Jordan, e.g. the instability of the region and the threat of terrorism. The book reviewed the different challenges in addition to the internal challenges, e.g. poor resources, in an attempt to highlight the Jordanian efforts to face both the internal and external challenges since the 1980s, and until the current time while stressing the Palestinian cause as the core of drawing Jordanian foreign policy.

APPENDIX
TEXTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
Security Council Resolution 242

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd UN meeting,
November 22, 1967.

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation
in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting
peace, in which every state in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their
acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken
a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East
which should include the application of both the following
principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every State in the area
and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Security Council Resolution 338

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting, October 21-22, 1973.

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiation start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

PEACE PROPOSALS:

The text of King Hussein's 1972 Proposal for a United Arab Kingdom:

1. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall become a United Arab Kingdom, and shall be thus named.
2. The United Arab Kingdom shall consist of two regions:
 - A. The Region of Palestine, and shall consist of the West Bank and any further Palestinian territories to be liberated and whose inhabitants opt to join.
 - B. The Region of Jordan, and shall consist of the East Bank.
3. Amman shall be the central capital of the Kingdom and at the same time shall be the capital of the Region of Jordan.
4. Jerusalem shall become the capital of the Region of Palestine.
5. The King shall be the Head of the State and shall assume the Central Executive Power, assisted by a Central Council of Ministers. The Central Legislative Power shall be vested in the King and in the National Assembly, whose members shall be elected by direct and secret ballot, having an equal number of members from each of the two regions.
6. The Central Judicial Authority shall be vested in a 'Supreme Central Court'.

7. The Kingdom shall have a single 'Armed Forces' and its 'supreme Commander' shall be the King.

8. The responsibilities of the Central Executive power shall be confined to matters relating to the Kingdom as a sovereign international entity ensuring the safety of the union, its stability and development.

9. The Executive Power in each region shall be vested in a Governor-General from the Region, and in a Regional Council of Ministers also formed from citizens of the Region.

10. The Legislative Power in each Region shall be vested in a 'People's Council' which shall be elected by direct secret ballot. This Council shall elect the Governor-General.

11. The Judicial Power in each Region shall be vested in the courts of the Region and nobody shall have any authority over it.

12. The Executive Power in each Region shall be responsible for all matters pertinent to it with the exception of such matters as the constitution defines to be the responsibility of the Central Executive Power.

The text of the Reagan Peace Plan, of September 1, 1982, is as follows:

First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there must be a period of time during which the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs. Due consideration must be given to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

The purpose of the 5-year period of transition, which would begin after free elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority, is to prove to the Palestinians that they can run their own affairs and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security.

The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transition period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.

I want to make the American position well understood: The purpose of this transition period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, such a transfer must not interfere with Israel's security requirements.

Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian state in those territories. Nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza.

So the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel.

There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give-and-take-of negotiations. But it is the firm view of the United States

that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.

We base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace. This exchange is enshrined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which is, in turn, incorporated in all its parts in the Camp David agreements. U.N. Resolution 242 remains wholly valid as the foundation stone of America's Middle East peace effort.

It is the United States position that--in return for peace--the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza.

When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel, our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization and the security arrangements offered in return.

Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations.

In the course of the negotiations to come, the United States will support positions that seem to us fair and reasonable compromises and likely to promote a sound agreement. We will also put forward our own detailed proposals when we believe they can be helpful. And, make no mistake; the United States will oppose any proposal--from any party and at any point in the negotiating process--that threatens the security of Israel. American's commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad. And, I might add, so is mine.

The text of the eight point Fahd Peace Plan, of August 1981, is as follows:

1. Israel to withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.
2. Israeli settlements built on Arab land after 1967 to be dismantled.
3. A guarantee of freedom of worship for all religions in holy places.
4. An affirmation of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homes, and compensation for those who do not wish to return.
 5. The West Bank and Gaza Strip to have a transitional period under the auspices of the United Nations for a period not exceeding several months.
6. An independent Palestinian state should be set up with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. All States in the region should be able to live in peace.
8. The U.N. or member-states of the U.N. to guarantee carrying-out of these principles.

The text of the Fez Arab Summit Peace Plan, of September 9, 1982, is as follows:

1. The withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 including Arab Al Qods (East Jerusalem).
2. The dismantling of settlements established by Israel on the Arab territories after 1967.

3. The guarantee of freedom of worship and practice of religious rites for all religions in the holy shrine.
4. The reaffirmation of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the exercise of its imprescriptible and inalienable national rights under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), its sole and legitimate representative, and the indemnification of all those who do not desire to return.
5. Placing the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the control of the United Nations for a transitory period not exceeding a few months.
6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Al Quds as its capital.
7. The Security Council guarantees peace among all states of the region including the independent Palestinian state.
8. The Security Council guarantees the respect of these principles.

BIBLIOGRAPHY/PERIODICALS

- (Jordan) Area handbook for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, prepared by Foreign Area Studies of the American University, available at U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Abdallah, King of Jordan, Al-Takmilah: My Memoirs Completed, Longon: Longman Group Ltd, 1978, (first published in Arabic in 1951).
- Abdel-Malek, Anouar, Contemporary Arab Political Thought, London: Zed Books Ltd., 1983.
- Abdullah, King of Jordan, Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan, Editor Philip R. Graves, London: Jonathan Cape, 1950.
- Abidi, Aqil Hyder H., Jordan Political Study: 1948-1957, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965.
- Abu Rumman, M. (2011). The Jordanian Approach to Managing the Relationship between the State and Religion (Vol. 6). Amman, Jordan: The Friedrich Erpt Foundation.
- Abu-Jaber K., "Development and Its Effects on Jordan's Society", Hamburg, 1978.
- Addustour Newspaper Arabic Language daily newspaper, Amman, Jordan.
- Ajami, Fuad, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967, London: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- Akhiemer, Yosef, "The Jordanization of Jordan," June 1971.
- Al Ghad Arabic Language daily newspaper, Amman, Jordan.

- Al Rai Arabic Language daily newspaper, Amman, Jordan.
- Al-Arab Al-Yawm Arabic Language daily newspaper, Amman, Jordan.
- Ali, N. A. (2010). The role of civil society organizations in promoting political participation in Palestine. Beit Sahour, Palestine: Palestinian Center for Research and Dialogue of Civilizations.
- Al-Khitan, F. (2012, January 21). "Has Jordan's position on the Syrian crisis changed? Al Ghad.
- Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971.
- Alquds Alarabi Newspaper, London, The United Kingdom.
- Al-Quds Center for Political Studies (2010). Workshop on Religion and the State: The Model of Jordan. P 16/24.
- Alwatan Arabic Language daily newspaper, Jerusalem, Palestine.
- Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, Capricorn Books, 1964.
- Antoun, Richard, An Arab Village: A Social Structural Study of a Transjordanian Peasant Community, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1972.
- Aresvik, O., The Agricultural development of Jordan, New York, Praeger Books Ltd., 1976.
- Aruri, Naseer Hassan, Jordan: A Study in Political Development 1921-1965, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.
- Asharq al-Awsat Arabic Language London-Based Newspaper.
- Assabeel Arabic Language daily newspaper, Amman, Jordan.

- Be'eri, Eliezer., Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1970.
- Beitz, Charles R., Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Bin Al Hussein, A. (n.d.). Discussion Papers. Retrieved February 7, 2017, from <http://kingabdullah.jo/ar/discussion-papers/>
- Carter, Jimmy, Keeping Faith, New York: Bantam Books, 1982.
- Carter, Jimmy, The Blood of Abraham, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985.
- Cohen, Amnon, Political Parties in the West Bank Under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967, London: Cornell University Press Ltd., 1982.
- Cordesman, Anthony H., Jordanian Arms and the Middle East Balance, Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1983.
- Dekmejian, Hrair R., Egypt Under Nasir, New York: State University of New York Press, 1971.
- Dowty, Alan., Middle East Crisis: U.S. Decision-Making in 1958, 1970, and 1973, Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Economic Development in Jordan, Ministry of Information, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1954-1985.
- El-Shazily, Saad., The Arab Military Option, American Mideast Research, 1986.
- Farah, Tawfic E., Political Behavior in the Arab States, Westview Press, 1983.
- Faris, Hani A., Arab Nationalism and the Future of the Arab World, Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1987.

- Farrag, A., "The WASTAH among Jordanian Villagers," in *Patrons and Clients*, ed. E. Gellner and J. Waterbury, Duckworth, London, 1977.
- Fisher, Sydney Nettleton, *Social Forces in the Middle East*, Cornell University Press, 1955.
- Fitzsimons, M.A., *Empire by Treaty*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1964.
- *Five Year Plan For Economic and Social Development 1981-1985*, National Planning Council, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
- Glubb, John Bagot., *A Soldier with the Arabs*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1958.
- Glubb, John Bagot., *The Empire of the Arabs*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963.
- Gresh, Alain, *The PLO: The Struggle Within*, London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1983.
- Gubser, P., *Politics and Change in Al-Karak, Jordan*, London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Gubser, Peter, *Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1983.
- Halcrow Fox and Associates and Jouzy and Partners, "Jordan Urban Project," Interim Reports, Amman, Jordan, May and July 1979.
- Halpern, Manfred., *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Rand corporation, Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Harris, George L., *Jordan: Its People Its Society Its Culture*, New Haven: Hraf Press, 1958.
- Hassan, Khaled Al-, *Al-Itifaq Al-Urduny al-Falastiny (The Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement)*, Amman, Jordan: Dar Aljalil, 1985.

- Hiasat, A. (2013). The role of the Islamic Action Front in Jordan's political reform in 1989-2012 (Unpublished master's thesis). Amman/ Middle East University.
- Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Ikle, Fred Charles, How Nations Negotiate, Harvard Universtiy, 1967.
- Jarvis, Major C. S., Arab Command: The Biography of Lieutenant Colonel E. G. Peake Pasha, London: The Mayflower Press, 1943.
- Kandil, A. (2012). "Multiple levels: the potential effects of the Syrian Crisis. The International Policy magazine, 190th ser.
- Kaplan, S., "United States Aid and Regime Maintenance in Jordan, 1957-1973," Public Society.
- Kellerman, Barbara., Political Leadership: A Source Book, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986.
- Kerr, Malcolm H.,The Arab Cold War: Gamal'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, London: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Khadduri, Majid., Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in Politics, Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- Khadduri, Majid., Arab Personalities in Politics, Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1981.
- Khadduri, Majid., Political Trends in the Arab World, Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1970.
- Khalide, Rashid., Under Seige: P.L.O. Decision-making During the 1982 War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986.

- Khalidi, Walid, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1979.
- Khuri, fuad., Leadership and Development in Arab society, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1981.
- Kissinger, Henry A., Years of Upheaval, Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1982.
- Korany, Bahgat, and Dessouki, Ali Hillal, The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Westview Press, Inc./American University in Cairo Press, 1984.
- Kuniholm, Bruce R., The Palestinian Problem and United States Policy, Regina Books, 1986.
- Laquer, Walter, The Middle East in Transition, Praeger Publications, 1958.
- Laquer, Walter, The Struggle for the Middle East, The Macmillan company, 1969.
- Lewis, Bernard, The Middle East and the West, New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
- Lias, Godfrey., Glubb's Legion, Forward by Sir John Glubb, London: Evans Brothers, 1956.
- MacDonald, Robert W., The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization, Princeton University Press, 1965.
- Merlin, Samuel., The Big Powers and the Present Crisis in the Middle East, Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1968.
- Mitchell, R., "Equitable Access to Basic Necessities in the Balqa-Amman Region," Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., 1979.
- Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978.

- Morris, James., The Hashemite Kingdom, New York: Pantheon, 1959.
- Mutawi, Samir A., Jordan in the 1967 War, Cambridge University Press, Inc., 1987.
- Nabulsi, H.U. and Batshuwn, Y., "Qata 'al-insha'atfi'al-Urdun," (The Construction Sector in Jordan), Jordan housing corporation, Amman, Jordan, 1978.
- National Dialogue Committee and its recommendations outputs . (n.d.). Retrieved February 7, 2017, from <http://menacircle.com/jPolitics/uploads/635256456049762782.pdf>
- Neale, Margaret A. and Baperman, Max H., "Perspectives for Understanding Negotiation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 29 No. 1, March, 1985.
- Neff, Donald., Warriors for Jerusalem, New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984.
- Odeh, Hanna S., "Economic Development of Jordan, 1954-1971," Ministry of Culture and Information, Jordan Press Foundation, Amman, Jordan, 1972.
- Othman, I., "'Al-Bina 'al-Usari 'al-Mutaghayr fi Hadar 'al-Urdun," (Changing Family Structure in Urban Jordan), Kuwait: Kuwait University, 1976.
- Patai, Raphael, The Kingdom of Jordan, New Jersey: Preinceton University Press, 1958.
- Peake, Frederick Gerard, A History of Jordan and Its Tribes, Coral Gables, Florida: The University of Miami Press, 1958.
- Perlmutter, Amos, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, Yale University Press, 1977.
- Pruitt, Dean G. and Snyder, Richard, Theory and Research on the Causes of War, New jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.

- Putnam, Robert D., The Comparative Study of Political Elites, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976.
- Pye, Lucian W., Politics, Personality, and Nation Building, Yale University Press, 1966.
- Quandt, William B., Decade of Decisions, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977.
- Quandt, William B.; Jabber, Fuad; Lesch, Ann Mossely; The Politics of Nationalism, Berkeley, California: University of California, 1973.
- Rosenau, James N., International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: The Free press, 1969.
- Sachar, Howard M., Europe Leaves the Middle East 1936-1954, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.
- Sachar, Howard M., The Emergence of the Middle East 1914-1924, New York: alfred A. Knopf, 1969.
- Sahliyeh, Emile F., The PLO After the Lebanon War, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1986.
- Said, Edward, The Question of Palestine, New York: Vintage Books, 1980.
- Sayigh, Rosemary, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, London: Zed Books Ltd., 1979.
- Seale, Patrick, The Shaping of an Arab Statesman, London/New York: Quartet Books, 1983.
- Seminar on Democratic Development in Jordan and the Mechanisms of Activation of Civil Society Institutions. (2005). In Al Rai Center for Studies. . Retrieved February 7, 2017, from http://alraicenter.com/User_Site/Site/View_Article.asp?type=2&ID=260
- Sharabi, Hisham B., Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World, New York: D. Van Nostrand company, 1966.

- Smith, Pamela Ann, Palestine and the Palestinians: 1976-1983, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
- Snow, Peter John, Hussein: A Biography, London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972.
- Snyder, Gleen H., and Diesing, Paul, Conflict Among Nations, Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Snyder, R. C. and Paige, G. D., "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytic Scheme," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1958.
- Sparrow, Gerald, Hussein of Jordan, London: George G. Harrop, 1960.
- Storrrs, Sir Ronald, The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1937.
- Talal, Hassan Bin, Crown Prince of Jordan, Palestinian Self-Determination, London/New York: Quartet Books, Inc., 1981.
- Talal, Hassan Bin, Crown Prince of Jordan, Search For Peace, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
- Taylor, Alan R., The Arab Balance of Power, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982.
- **The Official Newspaper** (2016). Issue: ٥٣٩٦.
- The Priorities of the Reformist Movement: between the Jordanian Ideology and Demography. (29-1-2013)
Retrieved from:
<http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/6c87b8ad-70ec-47d5-b7c4-3aa56fb899e2/aa0e2835-c857-4483-8074-248b6428f899>
- Tillman, Seth P. The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982.

- Vatikiotis, Panayotis J., Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921-1957, New York: Praeger Books Ltd., 1967.
- Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics, Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.